admin
February 27, 2026
Samar Srivastava, Forbes India
Feb 27, 2026
India’s young consumers are discovering the next big beauty serum, protein bar or sneaker brand not in a mall, but on Instagram reels, YouTube shorts and quick-commerce apps that promise 10-minute delivery. What began as a trickle of digital-first labels a decade ago has now become a full-blown wave. Direct-to-consumer (D2C) brands—built online, fuelled by social media and venture capital—have reshaped India’s consumer landscape and forced legacy companies to rethink everything from marketing to distribution.
India today has more than 800 active D2C brands across beauty, personal care, fashion, food, home and electronics, according to industry estimates and consulting reports. The Indian D2C market is estimated at $12–15 billion in 2025, up from under $5 billion in 2020, and growing at 25–30 percent annually. The pandemic accelerated online adoption, but the structural drivers—cheap data, digital payments and over 750 million internet users—were already in place.
Unlike traditional FMCG brands that relied on distributors and kirana stores, D2C brands such as Mamaearth, boAt, Licious and Sugar Cosmetics built their early traction online. Customer acquisition happened through performance marketing; feedback loops were immediate; product iterations were rapid.
Importantly, these brands are discovered online—but as they scale, consumers buy them both online and offline, increasingly through quick-commerce platforms such as Blinkit, Zepto and Swiggy Instamart, as well as modern trade and general trade stores. The omnichannel play is now central to their growth strategy.
According to Anil Kumar, founder and chief executive of Redseer Strategy Consultants, the ecosystem is maturing in measurable ways. Brands are taking lesser time to reach ₹100 crore or ₹500 crore revenue benchmarks and, once there, mortality rates are coming down. There is also an acceptance that if a brand is not profitable in a 3–5 year timeframe, that needs to be corrected. “There is a lot of emphasis on growing profitably and not just through GMV,” he says.
Big Cheques, Bigger Exits
The D2C boom would not have been possible without capital. Between 2014 and 2022, Indian D2C startups raised over $5 billion in venture and growth funding. Peak years like 2021 alone saw more than $1.2 billion invested in the segment. Beauty, personal care and fashion accounted for nearly 50 percent of total inflows, followed by food and beverages.
Some brands scaled independently; others found strategic buyers. Among the most prominent exits:
> Hindustan Unilever acquired a majority stake in Minimalist, reportedly valuing the actives-led skincare brand at over ₹3,000 crore. For Hindustan Unilever, the annual run rate from sales of its D2C portfolio is estimated at around ₹1,000 crore, underscoring how material digital-first brands have become to its growth strategy.
> ITC Limited bought Yoga Bar for about ₹175 crore in 2023 to strengthen its health foods portfolio.
> Emami acquired a majority stake in The Man Company, expanding its digital-first play.
> Tata Consumer Products acquired Soulfull as part of its health and wellness strategy.
> Marico invested in brands such as Beardo and True Elements.
Private equity has also entered aggressively at the growth stage. ChrysCapital invested in The Man Company; L Catterton backed Sugar Cosmetics; General Atlantic invested in boAt; and Sequoia Capital India (now Peak XV Partners) was an early backer of multiple consumer brands.
Valuations were often steep. boAt was valued at over $1.2 billion at its peak. Mamaearth’s parent, Honasa Consumer, listed in 2023 at a valuation of around ₹10,000 crore. Across categories, brands crossing ₹500 crore in annual revenue began attracting buyout interest, with deal sizes ranging from ₹150 crore to over ₹3,000 crore depending on scale and profitability.
Yet exits have not always been smooth. “While it takes 7-8 years to build a brand most funds that invest in them have a timeline of 3-5 years before they need an exit,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a retail consultancy. This timing mismatch can create pressure—pushing brands to scale aggressively, sometimes at the cost of margins.
Integration Pains and the Profitability Pivot
For large FMCG companies, buying D2C brands offers speed: Access to younger consumers, premium positioning and digital marketing expertise. But integration brings challenges.
Founder-led organisations operate with rapid decision cycles, test-and-learn marketing and flat hierarchies. Large corporations often work with layered approvals, structured brand calendars and rigid cost controls. Cultural friction can lead to talent exits if autonomy is curtailed too quickly.
Margins are another sticking point. In the early growth phase, many D2C brands spent 30–40 percent of revenue on digital advertising. Rising customer acquisition costs post-2021, combined with higher logistics expenses, squeezed contribution margins. As brands entered offline retail, distributor and retailer margins of 20–35 percent further compressed profitability.
Large acquirers, used to EBITDA margins of 18–25 percent in mature FMCG portfolios, often discovered that digital-first brands operated at low single-digit margins—or were loss-making at scale. Rationalising ad spends, optimising supply chains and pruning SKUs became essential.
The funding slowdown between 2022 and 2024 triggered a reset. Marketing spends were cut by as much as 25–40 percent across several startups. Growth moderated from 80–100 percent annually during peak years to 25–40 percent for more mature brands—but unit economics improved.
Quick-commerce has emerged as a structural growth lever. For categories such as personal care, snacking and health foods, these platforms now account for 10–25 percent of urban revenues for scaled brands, improving inventory turns and reducing dependence on paid digital acquisition.
The next phase of India’s D2C journey will be less about blitz scaling and more about disciplined brand building—balancing growth, profitability and exit timelines. What began as a disruption is now part of the mainstream consumer playbook. And as capital becomes more selective, only brands that combine strong gross margins, repeat purchase rates above 35–40 percent and sustainable EBITDA pathways will endure.
(Published in Forbes India)
admin
February 11, 2026
Vaeshnavi Kasthuril, Mint
Bengaluru, 11 February 2026
Sales of winter wear were underwhelming for the second year in a row as an unusually delayed and milder winter disrupted demand for heavy winter wear, particularly in north and west India, executives at two of India’s top clothing retailers said. Initial optimism for a bumper season this year compounded the disappointment for retailers.
While early signs of a La Niña—a weather pattern typically known for bringing freezing temperatures to India—triggered some early buying in the previous quarter, the season remained unusually mild, leaving stores with a surplus of winter clothing. Excess rainfall and cyclonic activity during the festive period in parts of eastern and southern India further weighed on seasonal buying, compounding the pressure on winter sales which are typically front-loaded.
This slump is particularly painful because winter sales are the industry’s largest annual driver. These months coincide with India’s massive wedding season, when spending peaks. Together, they account for roughly 20% of total yearly revenue for apparel companies, according to industry estimates. India’s apparel market was estimated to be worth more than ₹1.9 trillion in FY25, of which 41% was organised, credit ratings firm CareEdge said in January 2026.
V-Mart: margin over volume
Lalit Agarwal, managing director of V-Mart Retail, said, “Northern India saw a delayed or milder winter initially, leading to dispersed demand for heavy winter wear. Winter demand was definitely delayed a little bit—it didn’t get lost, but it was erratic.” He added that while festive demand held up, “demand visibility was uncertain, particularly in winter-led categories, and we consciously chose to protect margins rather than chase volumes.”
V-Mart’s revenue grew a little over 10% year-on-year to ₹1,126.4 crore in Q3 from ₹1,023.7 crore a year earlier and ₹889.05 crore in the third quarter of FY24, but this growth was largely driven by wedding and festive-season clothing, executives at the company said.
Anand Agarwal, chief financial officer of V-Mart Retail, said despite forecasts of a strong, early winter, “peak winters were delayed across North and West India, leading to a lull post-Diwali.” He added, “While the festive period went off reasonably well, winter demand did not pan out as anticipated,” attributing the softer sales to fewer peak winter days and unusually warmer temperatures.
Despite the delayed demand, the company managed to avoid a build-up of unsold inventory during the quarter. “Inventory health remained strong despite the delayed winter, and in some categories we were even short of inventory,” said Anand Agarwal, indicating that the eventual dip in temperatures led to a sudden pick-up in demand in select winter categories rather than excess stock.
Winter-led assortments continue to account for a sizeable share of the company’s quarterly sales, underscoring its sensitivity to weather patterns. “Winter and pre-winter categories accounted for about 40-45% of the overall mix during the quarter, and this share rose to over 60% during peak winter weeks in December,” said Agarwal during the third-quarter earnings call. The higher share of winter wear sales during peak weeks helped cushion margins, even as volumes remained below expectations. Lalit Agarwal said the company refrained from aggressive discounting amid uncertain demand. “Higher full-price sell-through during the winter quarter supported margins, as we did not undertake aggressive discounting,” he said.
Vishal Mega Mart: the late recovery
Gunender Kapur, managing director and chief executive officer of rival Vishal Mega Mart, said delayed winters usually force retailers to push promotions to ensure that they don’t carry forward all that merchandise, because the next opportunity to sell it would be the following year.
Despite this, the company’s performance held up, he said, highlighting that winter sales achieved robust double-digit same-store growth for the entire season and the full quarter, effectively overcoming the sluggish demand during December. Kapur noted that demand for winter clothing increased significantly in January, adding, “Winter merchandise is still selling well, both in our stores and in other stores, we believe.”
Vishal Mega Mart reported revenue growth of about 17% to ₹3,670.3 crore in Q3 FY26 from ₹3,135.9 crore in Q3 FY25 and ₹2,623.5 crore in Q3 FY24, largely on the back of wedding and festive-season demand.
Kapur said the company was unsure whether there would be significant unsold winter merchandise at the end of the season, adding that maintaining pricing discipline helped protect profit margins. “Merchandise that sells in December typically fetches a higher price than January merchandise for winter because sales often begin by late December or early January,” he said. “In our case, there was no problem. We achieved same-store sales growth of over 10%, even with the winter merchandise we purchased for the autumn-winter season.”
V2 Retail: the outlier
In contrast, V2 Retail recorded strong performance in the third quarter, largely driven by winter wear. Revenue surged nearly 60% year-on-year to ₹929.2 crore in Q3 from ₹590.9 crore a year earlier. This is perhaps because V-Mart and Vishal Mega Mart are more concentrated in north and central India, where winter demand was more uneven this season, while V2 has a stronger presence in eastern and north-eastern markets, including Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha and Assam.
Managing director Akash Agarwal said the early onset of winter led to a “very good season” for the company. He noted that winter garments typically command a much higher average selling price (ASP) than summer products, which resulted in a visible bump in average bill value during the third quarter, led by higher sales of jackets and sweaters. Agarwal said this high-ASP, high-margin category accounted for the bulk of Q3 sales and was a key driver of the company’s same-store sales growth.
A worsening problem?
Two straight years of sluggish sales because of erratic winters highlight broader challenges around climate change for apparel retailers, which peg their inventory based on weather patterns and demand.
“Seasons have always been inherently unpredictable, and retailers have never been able to forecast with certainty how cold or warm a winter will be or how long it will last,” said Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a consulting firm. However, he said that the challenge has intensified over the past 15-20 years as apparel businesses have scaled up and expanded their store footprints nationwide, stretching product development and supply chains over several months.
“No matter how hard you work on the plan, your forecast will always be wrong. You will either overshoot or undershoot,” Dutta said, adding that this leaves retailers grappling with either shortages or excess stock. Winterwear, he said, is particularly vulnerable because it has a higher value per unit, a much shorter selling window, and a smaller market, factors which together create a “humongous problem” for retailers.
Data from a World Meteorological Organisation report published on 16 January showed that 2025 was among the three warmest years on record worldwide, continuing a decade-long streak of exceptional heat despite the cooling La Niña phase. This is a clear sign that background warming from greenhouse gases is overwhelming natural variability, the report said. It suggested that climate change will intensify seasonal shifts and extreme weather in the years and decades ahead, making industries tied to seasonal patterns, such as winter apparel, increasingly vulnerable to unpredictable weather swings and weaker cold spells.
(Published in Mint)
admin
January 28, 2026
What does it actually take to build a fashion brand in India?
This panel (“Beyond the Noise- How D2c Fashion Brands Are Reinventing Retail”) at the 25th Edition of India Fashion Forum focussed on some real answers, in a refreshing, down-to-earth conversation moderated by Devangshu Dutta (Founder, Third Eyesight), with the founders of DeMoza (Agnes Raja George), The Mom Store (Surbhi Bhatia), Miraggio (Mohit Jain), BeyondBound (Tejasvi Madan), and Bari (Sameer Khan Lodhi).
No fluff, no “disrupting the industry” talk. Just founders being honest about what’s worked, what hasn’t, and what they’d do differently. A few things that struck a chord:
• Every single brand started because the founder couldn’t find something they personally wanted: inclusive activewear, affordable handbags that didn’t look cheap, good maternity wear. Sometimes the simplest observation is the best business idea.
• Inventory management came up often. One founder took their inventory cycle from 6 months down to 4. Another re-shuffles stock every 15 days based on what’s selling where. Unglamorous? Yes, but this is what actually keeps a business alive.
• The marketing conversation highlighted a move away from traditional advertising toward things that actually make people feel something. One founder talked about turning a farmhouse into a full “apricot colour” experience for customers. Another shoots content with real customers, not influencers.
• And the most memorable line of the whole discussion came from the most experienced founder in the room sharing a learning: “I won’t open stores fast.” No explanation needed, really.
Building a brand is exciting. Keeping it alive is the harder, quieter work. This panel was a good reminder of that. Worth a watch if you’re building something in this space.
admin
August 18, 2025
Hiral Goyal, The Morning Context
18 August 2025
A trend that has been playing out through big and small changes over the last two decades is that in urban India the kirana store is easily replaceable.
When it comes to buying groceries, urban Indians have a number of options. They can visit a fancy supermarket run by a conglomerate or order online through a number of e-commerce and instant-delivery companies. And if the above doesn’t seem easy enough, they can hop over to a nearby mom-and-pop store.
It would appear it is now the turn of smaller towns in the country to witness the kirana disruption. Even though 99% of grocery shopping in these tier-3 cities is done through neighborhood general stores, there are startups that believe this is an outdated and inefficient form of retail and a change is in order.
One such company is SuperK. The startup’s mission is to build a grocery store model in small towns that has all of the advantages of modern retail packed in a compact 800-square-foot store. This is what Anil Thontepu and Neeraj Menta had set out to do when they founded the company in 2019. The idea was to bring a modern trade-like grocery shopping experience to small-town India a wide assortment of products at a better value.
“There is a cost-efficient world of general trade and a customer-loving world of modern retail,” says Thontepu. “We wanted to see if we can bridge this gap…and do something for the small-town people by bringing the best of both these worlds.”
Over the past five years, the Bengaluru-headquartered startup has opened over 130 stores across 80 towns in Andhra Pradesh. And it doesn’t want to stop there. The company wants to expand to another 300 towns in Andhra Pradesh and nearby states of Karnataka and Telangana over the next 24, months. That’s quite an ambitious target. But the founders believe the market size for Superk is so large that they should be able to build a Rs 2,000-3,000 стоore ($228-342 million) annual business from Andhra and Telangana alone.
To fuel this expansion, Superk raised Rs 100 crore ($11.7 million) in Series B funding last month. The round, led by Binny Bansal’s 3STATE Ventures and CaratLane founder Mithun Sacheti, valued Superk at 2-2.5x its previous valuation of Rs 160 crore (about $18.25 million) in 202/
Now, Superk is not entirely unique. It competes with startups like Frendy, Apna Mart and Wheelocity, which are also trying to organize the retail market in India’s smaller towns. What sets SuperK apart is its larger, bolder approach. Grocery chain Apna Mart, for instance, runs franchisee stores in tier-2 or tier-3 markets and also offers 15-minute home delivery, SuperK’s focus is only on supermarkets. Frendy operates mini-marts and micro-kiranas in villages and towns with fewer than 10,000 people, but SuperK targets small towns with populations between 20,000 and 500,000. And Wheelocity supplies only fresh produce to rural areas, while Superk sells dry groceries as well as packaged consumer goods.
This rather radical shift in focus-away from tier-1 and tier-2 cities-ties in with India’s changing consumption pattern. “Consumer mindsets are changing even in smaller cities,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder and chief executive of Third Eyesight, adding that these consumers are beginning to favour more modern retail environments. And NielsenIQ’s latest report says rural markets in India grew twice as fast as cities between April and June 2025.
In this landscape, SuperK fits like a glove, with its franchise-first approach. Thanks to an asset-light model, the company has the agility to go deeper into smaller towns.
But it won’t be all that easy either. As Dutta says, “Changing grocery habits is a long, capital-intensive game.” Moreover, big retail chains are also jumping on the bandwagon. Hypermarket chain Vishal Mega Mart, for instance, already operates 47% of its stores in tier-3 cities and plans to expand into cities with populations exceeding 50,000. Supermarket chain operator DMart is also focusing on tier-2 and tier-3 cities.
However, Superk founders believe they are prepared for the challenge. Menta says the startup has arrived at a business model that is scalable, sustainable and, more importantly, offers value to its customers.
It’s too early to say whether they will be successful in this endeavour. That said, SuperK appears to have built a smart retail business for small-town India.
Refining small-town retail
SuperK’s founders have drawn inspiration from domestic and international retail chains like DMart and Costco. But they haven’t duplicated their strategies and made their own tweaks instead. For instance, large retail chains usually run company-owned and company operated, or COCO, stores. Though this approach is more cost-intensive than the franchise model, it allows a company to ensure a uniform customer experience across all outlets:
Superk doesn’t do that. It runs only franchise-owned and franchise-operated (FOFO) stores, which are no bigger than 800 sq ft. The company is not the first to have experimented with this model, but Thontepu believes that everyone else before them “did not try with the right spirit”. A franchise-owned store, argues co-founder Menta, is run differently from a company-owned store one has to keep in mind the store owner’s incentives, needs and concerns.
Under the franchise model, entrepreneurs invest between Rs 12 lakh (about $13,690) and Rs 15 lakh (about $17,110) to set up a Superk store. Of this, Rs 4 lakh (nearly $4,560) is spent on the store fit-out and infrastructure, the rest goes towards buying inventory. These stores, according to Menta, typically achieve a breakeven point after six months. On average, a retail store takes longer than that-12-15 months to reach breakeven.
Superk fills the shelves by procuring its inventory directly from brands as well as distributors. “The inventory is recommended by us through a mobile application. Store owners have an option to make certain changes within the limits that we have set for them,” says Thontepu. Revenue is shared and the model is similar to the one followed by nearly all retailers in India. Franchisees earn varying levels of margins on different kinds of products, depending on how easy or tough it is to sell those items. For instance, staples like dal and rice have lower margins, while confectionary items and products that need greater effort to sell enjoy higher margins of up to 20%.
In addition to this, there’s a private label business, especially loose items like pulses. In fact, private labelling is part of the company’s efforts to bring some standardization in India’s unorganized retail market. “A customer coming to our store should be able to blindly expect consistent quality on the product they’re buying,” says Menta. “We have organized our sourcing, processing, cleaning, packaging, testing. Everything that a brand would do to provide a great-quality product to their customer.”
Unlike distributors or other retailers who operate franchise models though, Superk claims that it does not dump its inventory on store owners. Menta says the franchise structure is designed in a way that Superk does not benefit from selling unnecessary stock to store owners. “If I lose, he will lose. If he loses, I lose. That is the way (the structure) is created. We, in fact, recommend owners to remove some products if they are not selling.” says Menta.
On the customer side of things, Superk’s value proposition comes down to offering the best prices. More than a year ago, for instance, it introduced a membership programme that offers customers cashback that is redeemable on their future purchases. “If they pay Rs 300 [approximately $3.5) for a six-month membership, they get 10% cashback on all purchases that they are making up to Rs 300 every month,” explains Thontepu. He says 35-40% of Superk’s more than 500,000 customers are enrolled in this programme.
All of this sounds good even promising in theory. But will it be enough to build a sustainable and scalable retail business?
A long, hard look
Let’s first look at what really works in SuperK’s favour.
One, the focus on selling staples under a private label brand. This has been done successfully before. One example is Nilgiri’s, one of India’s oldest supermarket chains.
Founded in 1905, Niligiri’s operated under a franchise model and sold dairy, baked goods, chocolates and other items produced under its own brand. The supermarket chain was sold by debt-ridden Future Group for Rs 67 crore ($7.65 million) in 2023, less than one-third the price the latter paid to acquire the company from private equity firm Actis in 2014. However, its history is worth learning from.
Shomik Mukherjee, a Delhi-based consumer goods advisor who was a partner at Actis while the firm was in control of Nilgiri’s, recalls the value proposition created by Nilgiri’s private label products. “In the case of private labels, it is essential for a company to have a reason why people will walk into that store. For Nilgiri’s, it was bakery and dairy products,” says Mukherjee. Owning a private label that brought in customers also ensured that franchisee owners had incentives to continue working with Nilgiri’s. “It is about giving the franchisees a safe portfolio of private label goods that are desired by customer instead of something that is shoved down the franchisees’ throat to derive margin,” he says.
You see, the overall grocery business operates on a very low margin. But private labelling, says Satish Meena, founder of Datum Intelligence, offers the highest margins – 35-40% – in the grocery business, after fresh produce, making it a lucrative business to get into.
Superk, which sells essential items through its private label, has the opportunity to earn better margins in grocery retail. More importantly, private labelling holds the potential to become SuperK’s identity and boost customer retention and loyalty.
Two, SuperK’s franchise model allows it to expand to more locations rapidly as compared to a regular modern trade chain with company-owned stores, says Mukherjee. This model makes SuperK’s business asset-light and brings down the cost of running a network of stores. “Under this model, the franchisor does not incur the upfront cost of opening a store or having to deal with the trouble of hiring and replacing store managers,” he adds. Since most store owners in a franchise model are landowners, there is a greater stability in operations as well, he explains. Moreover, Superk stores are quite small (800 sq ft), allowing easier availability of property.
The franchise model, however, is not entirely foolproof. One of the inherent problems is the difficulty in implementing standard operating procedures (SOPs) across all stores. And the problem only worsens as the company expands operations to different cities. While Superk stores boast a no-frills fit-out that can be easily set up anywhere, how these stores are maintained through the wear and tear over the years is yet to be seen.
A bigger fear is that the store owner may start running their own store without the Superk branding. “If Superk loses the franchisee owner, it also loses the location in which the store was operating,” says Mukherjee.
Moreover, most franchisee owners in the retail business typically tend to be experienced general store owners who might not be willing to adopt new technology. “Since they have run a store before, they think they know how and what to order for inventory and may not follow SuperK’s tech-enabled recommendations,” says Mukherjee.
There’s another problem. While the founders claim to have seen considerable success (35-40% sign-ups) in the rollout of SuperK’s membership programme for customers, Third Eyesight’s Dutta raises concerns about its future growth. “Indian consumers’ price sensitivity limits membership fee potential,” he says. According to him, the programme’s value in the tier-3 market lies more in customer acquisition and retention than direct revenue generation. “Long-term success requires a cashback programme to drive purchase frequency and basket size increases to offset the costs,” says Dutta.
Menta, however, has a different view. He says SuperK’s subscription is designed in a way that benefits customers only when they make full basket purchases. Moreover, the company has different pricing slabs for membership depending on the various basket sizes, which makes the model more viable. Considering the programme is a little more than a year old, it is still too early to judge whether it will find a lot of takers in small towns.
For now, the founders are in no hurry to expand their business across India. “There is no reason to go into five states. Then, you are spread thin and your economics will not work out. It’s a business of managing operations at a very low cost,” says Menta. The plan is to stick to one region and continue to go deeper into it. “A lot of our competitors who started five years ago spread to so many places that it became very difficult for them to manage,” he adds.
This is also the crux of how Thontepu and Menta are building SuperK. By implementing what they have learnt not only from their own experiments, but also from the failures and successes of other businesses. While there’s no guarantee that Superk will become a roaring success, it does appear to have set an example by starting small and growing patiently. And if the latest funding is any proof, investors are interested.
(With inputs from Neethi Lisa Rojan)
(Published in The Morning Context)
