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February 27, 2026
Samar Srivastava, Forbes India
Feb 27, 2026
India’s young consumers are discovering the next big beauty serum, protein bar or sneaker brand not in a mall, but on Instagram reels, YouTube shorts and quick-commerce apps that promise 10-minute delivery. What began as a trickle of digital-first labels a decade ago has now become a full-blown wave. Direct-to-consumer (D2C) brands—built online, fuelled by social media and venture capital—have reshaped India’s consumer landscape and forced legacy companies to rethink everything from marketing to distribution.
India today has more than 800 active D2C brands across beauty, personal care, fashion, food, home and electronics, according to industry estimates and consulting reports. The Indian D2C market is estimated at $12–15 billion in 2025, up from under $5 billion in 2020, and growing at 25–30 percent annually. The pandemic accelerated online adoption, but the structural drivers—cheap data, digital payments and over 750 million internet users—were already in place.
Unlike traditional FMCG brands that relied on distributors and kirana stores, D2C brands such as Mamaearth, boAt, Licious and Sugar Cosmetics built their early traction online. Customer acquisition happened through performance marketing; feedback loops were immediate; product iterations were rapid.
Importantly, these brands are discovered online—but as they scale, consumers buy them both online and offline, increasingly through quick-commerce platforms such as Blinkit, Zepto and Swiggy Instamart, as well as modern trade and general trade stores. The omnichannel play is now central to their growth strategy.
According to Anil Kumar, founder and chief executive of Redseer Strategy Consultants, the ecosystem is maturing in measurable ways. Brands are taking lesser time to reach ₹100 crore or ₹500 crore revenue benchmarks and, once there, mortality rates are coming down. There is also an acceptance that if a brand is not profitable in a 3–5 year timeframe, that needs to be corrected. “There is a lot of emphasis on growing profitably and not just through GMV,” he says.
Big Cheques, Bigger Exits
The D2C boom would not have been possible without capital. Between 2014 and 2022, Indian D2C startups raised over $5 billion in venture and growth funding. Peak years like 2021 alone saw more than $1.2 billion invested in the segment. Beauty, personal care and fashion accounted for nearly 50 percent of total inflows, followed by food and beverages.
Some brands scaled independently; others found strategic buyers. Among the most prominent exits:
> Hindustan Unilever acquired a majority stake in Minimalist, reportedly valuing the actives-led skincare brand at over ₹3,000 crore. For Hindustan Unilever, the annual run rate from sales of its D2C portfolio is estimated at around ₹1,000 crore, underscoring how material digital-first brands have become to its growth strategy.
> ITC Limited bought Yoga Bar for about ₹175 crore in 2023 to strengthen its health foods portfolio.
> Emami acquired a majority stake in The Man Company, expanding its digital-first play.
> Tata Consumer Products acquired Soulfull as part of its health and wellness strategy.
> Marico invested in brands such as Beardo and True Elements.
Private equity has also entered aggressively at the growth stage. ChrysCapital invested in The Man Company; L Catterton backed Sugar Cosmetics; General Atlantic invested in boAt; and Sequoia Capital India (now Peak XV Partners) was an early backer of multiple consumer brands.
Valuations were often steep. boAt was valued at over $1.2 billion at its peak. Mamaearth’s parent, Honasa Consumer, listed in 2023 at a valuation of around ₹10,000 crore. Across categories, brands crossing ₹500 crore in annual revenue began attracting buyout interest, with deal sizes ranging from ₹150 crore to over ₹3,000 crore depending on scale and profitability.
Yet exits have not always been smooth. “While it takes 7-8 years to build a brand most funds that invest in them have a timeline of 3-5 years before they need an exit,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a retail consultancy. This timing mismatch can create pressure—pushing brands to scale aggressively, sometimes at the cost of margins.
Integration Pains and the Profitability Pivot
For large FMCG companies, buying D2C brands offers speed: Access to younger consumers, premium positioning and digital marketing expertise. But integration brings challenges.
Founder-led organisations operate with rapid decision cycles, test-and-learn marketing and flat hierarchies. Large corporations often work with layered approvals, structured brand calendars and rigid cost controls. Cultural friction can lead to talent exits if autonomy is curtailed too quickly.
Margins are another sticking point. In the early growth phase, many D2C brands spent 30–40 percent of revenue on digital advertising. Rising customer acquisition costs post-2021, combined with higher logistics expenses, squeezed contribution margins. As brands entered offline retail, distributor and retailer margins of 20–35 percent further compressed profitability.
Large acquirers, used to EBITDA margins of 18–25 percent in mature FMCG portfolios, often discovered that digital-first brands operated at low single-digit margins—or were loss-making at scale. Rationalising ad spends, optimising supply chains and pruning SKUs became essential.
The funding slowdown between 2022 and 2024 triggered a reset. Marketing spends were cut by as much as 25–40 percent across several startups. Growth moderated from 80–100 percent annually during peak years to 25–40 percent for more mature brands—but unit economics improved.
Quick-commerce has emerged as a structural growth lever. For categories such as personal care, snacking and health foods, these platforms now account for 10–25 percent of urban revenues for scaled brands, improving inventory turns and reducing dependence on paid digital acquisition.
The next phase of India’s D2C journey will be less about blitz scaling and more about disciplined brand building—balancing growth, profitability and exit timelines. What began as a disruption is now part of the mainstream consumer playbook. And as capital becomes more selective, only brands that combine strong gross margins, repeat purchase rates above 35–40 percent and sustainable EBITDA pathways will endure.
(Published in Forbes India)
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November 13, 2025
Saumyangi Yadav,Entrepreneur
Nov 13, 2025
India’s consumer landscape is undergoing a decisive shift in 2025. While D2C brands that once thrived on digital-only distribution are now aggressively building an offline footprint, legacy FMCG majors are simultaneously acquiring digital-first brands to strengthen their portfolios and tap into new consumer behaviours.
As analysts suggest, these trends signal a maturing phase for India’s D2C ecosystem, one that blends physical retail and strategic consolidation.
Offline Push Accelerates
According to a recent CBRE report, ‘India’s D2C Revolution: The New Retail Order’, D2C brands leased nearly 5.95 lakh sq ft of retail space between January and June 2025, accounting for 18 per cent of all retail leasing during this period, up sharply from 8 per cent in the first half of 2024. Fashion and apparel dominated the expansion, contributing close to 60 per cent of D2C leasing, followed by homeware and furnishings and jewellery at about 12 per cent each, while health and personal care brands accounted for roughly six per cent. The shift is equally visible in the choice of retail formats: 46 per cent of D2C leasing went to high streets, 40 per cent to malls, and the remaining to standalone stores, reflecting the category’s growing focus on visibility, trial and experiential discovery.
Experts suggest that it represents a strategic pivot to blended engagement.
As Devangshu Dutta, CEO of Third Eyesight, notes, “India’s D2C surge is powered by digital-first consumers, tremendous improvement in seamless logistics, and low-cost market entry, supported subsequently by substantial amounts of investor capital chasing those startups that stand out from the competition. Yet, lasting success demands a more holistic view: the divide between online and offline is a business construct, not a consumer reality. The larger chunk of retail sales still happens through physical channels and, for brands that want to be mainstream, an omnichannel presence is absolutely essential.”
This also aligns with the broader market outlook. The India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), in its Indian FMCG Industry Analysis (October 2025), estimates the value of India’s D2C market at USD 80 billion in 2024, with expectations of crossing USD 100 billion in 2025. Much of this growth is being led by categories that combine frequent purchase cycles with strong digital discovery, beauty, personal care, and food and beverage segments where consumers are open to experimentation but demand authenticity, transparency, and a compelling product narrative.
“The Gen Z and millennial consumer cohorts value newness but also authenticity and unique product stories, which are best communicated in spaces that are controlled by the brand,” Dutta added, “In the launch and growth phases, this could be the brand’s digital presence including website and social media, but over time this can include pop-up stores, kiosks, shop-in-shops and even exclusive brand stores.”
CBRE’s data reflects this shift clearly, with D2C brands increasingly opting for flexible store formats and high-street locations to maximise traffic and visibility.
M&A Gains Momentum
Parallel to the offline push is a noticeable wave of consolidation. Large FMCG companies are accelerating acquisitions to capture emerging consumer niches and strengthen their digital-native capabilities.
In recent years, Hindustan Unilever has acquired Minimalist; Marico has bought Beardo, Just Herbs, True Elements, and Plix; ITC has taken over Yoga Bar; and Emami has secured full ownership of The Man Company. These deals, reported widely across business media in 2024 and 2025, point to the need for established companies to fast-track entry into high-growth, ingredient-forward, and youth-focused categories without the lead time of in-house incubation.
“Legacy FMCG companies are acquiring D2C brands to rapidly gain access to new consumer segments, product innovation, and digital-native capabilities, including direct engagement and insights. Such deals enable large companies to diversify portfolios, accelerate entry into trending segments by-passing the initial launch risks, and rejuvenate their brands with modern digital marketing expertise,” Dutta explained.
Challenges and Risks
But the acquisitions do not come without risk and challenges, analysts warned.
“However, integrating D2C operations also poses challenges, including cultural differences, the risk of stifling entrepreneurial agility, and the need to harmonise data and omnichannel strategies. The ability to nurture acquired brands without diluting their distinctive appeal will determine acquisition success,” Dutta added.
Yet even as the ecosystem expands, challenges remain. Offline stores add operational complexity, inventory planning, staffing, last-mile logistics, and real-time data integration. Still, the bottom line is that India’s D2C sector is moving into a hybrid era defined by tighter omnichannel integration, sharper product storytelling, and portfolio realignment through acquisitions.
(Published in Entrepreneur)
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August 6, 2025
Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025
It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.
Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.
That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.
Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.
In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.
He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”
Where The Model Broke?
In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”
But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.
And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.
As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.
In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.
In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.
Scaling Without Steering
In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.
For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.
Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.
Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.
The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.
(Published in Forbes India)
Devangshu Dutta
June 30, 2025
In every strategy meeting today, one metric is invariably mentioned: Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC). Whether you’re a well-funded corporate retailer, or raising your first angel round, or a well-established digital duopolist brand scaling Series C, CAC is one of the key performance metrics. “Real” spend that is neatly broken down by channel, optimised by funnel tweaks, scrutinised to the last rupee or dollar.
But there’s a metric we almost never hear about that could be costing brands far more in the long run.
Let’s call it Customer Forfeiture Cost (CFC), the residual lifetime value that is lost when a customer walks away from your business not because of price, competition, or even shifting needs, but because of a “burn”: a delivery missed or messed up, a refund that took weeks, an arrogant customer service call, or a product that failed spectacularly against the promise. In other words, when your brand hurts someone enough to make them walk away. Probably for ever.
It’s a paradox: brands are pumping thousands of crores into acquiring users, but they’re bleeding value at the other end. Yet, while CAC is a line item in every financial statement, CFC is invisible in management dashboards. CEOs don’t announce, “We’ve cut our forfeiture cost by 20% this quarter.”
Yet. every CXO knows it exists. The NPS scores, the social media complaints, the “never again” comments in reviews, the sinking feeling when repeat purchase rates fall.
Why CFC Matters More Than Ever
In every business, during the early stages each sale is a victory. Whether it was the retail chains that grew in the 1990s and early-2000s or the digital upstarts that came up through 2010s and 2020s, scale has been the mantra, and investors have poured money into scaling through the growing consumption of India 1 and India 2 customers.
Today customer acquisition isn’t cheap. The same person who clicked impulsively in 2020 now thinks twice before confirming payment. In this landscape, retention isn’t optional, it’s existential.
Every lost customer isn’t just a refund processed, or a cart abandoned. It’s the long tail of future repeat purchases that will never happen, negative word of mouth and brand distrust in the customer’s circle of influence, and increased future CAC due to declining organic reach.
Way back in 1967, management consultant Peter Drucker wrote in his book “The Effective Executive”: “What gets measured, gets managed”.
Today your CAC may be Rs. 500-1,000. If the average customer life time value (LTV) is Rs. 10,000, and a single burn causes churn after just one order worth Rs. 2,000, your CFC is Rs. 8,000, and that doesn’t even include reputational spillover.
Why We Don’t Measure It
Yes, CFC is hard to quantify. It’s not as easily attributable as ad spends. There’s usually no neat model telling you why someone never returned, because tech stacks aren’t typically designed to track emotional exits. And let’s face it, introspection about broken relationships is uncomfortable, even for management teams.
But that doesn’t mean it’s not real. If a customer leaves because your delivery executive messed up, or because your app crashed during checkout twice in a row, that’s on you, not the market. And in a business climate where sustainable growth is the mantra, LTV is king.
Ignoring CFC is like watching your roof leak and blaming the rain.
Toward a New Discipline
Brands and retailers must start measuring CFC, the value lost when customers disengage due to friction, mistrust, or neglect, and then start working on reducing it. This can be done by:
The Competitive Edge We’re Not Using
In a crowded space where everyone’s vying for eyeballs, trust is the true moat. Customers don’t expect perfection – they do expect accountability, authenticity, and recovery when things go wrong.
Brands that understand and act on Customer Forfeiture Costs will quietly start building a powerful edge: deeper brand loyalty, lower CAC over time thanks to referrals and repeats and greater lifetime value per user.
In other words, real, compounding value.
As the Indian brand ecosystem matures, Customer Forfeiture Cost needs to be as visible and valued as CAC. Acquisition is the invitation; experience is the relationship. Relationships, once broken, are expensive to rebuild; if they can be rebuilt at all.
In the end, growth isn’t just about who comes in. It’s about who stays, and why.
(Written by Devangshu Dutta, Founder of Third Eyesight, this was published in Financial Express on 2 July 2025)
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May 8, 2024
At the recent Phygital Retail Convention in Mumbai, Devangshu Dutta anchored an engaging “Fireside Chat” with Bhavana Jaiswal of IKEA India and Kapil Makhija of Unicommerce , on retailers engaging with their customers across channels and formats, and the opportunities as well as challenges in managing experiences seamlessly across online and offline interfaces.
Watch the video at this link:
