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August 18, 2025
Hiral Goyal, The Morning Context
18 August 2025
A trend that has been playing out through big and small changes over the last two decades is that in urban India the kirana store is easily replaceable.
When it comes to buying groceries, urban Indians have a number of options. They can visit a fancy supermarket run by a conglomerate or order online through a number of e-commerce and instant-delivery companies. And if the above doesn’t seem easy enough, they can hop over to a nearby mom-and-pop store.
It would appear it is now the turn of smaller towns in the country to witness the kirana disruption. Even though 99% of grocery shopping in these tier-3 cities is done through neighborhood general stores, there are startups that believe this is an outdated and inefficient form of retail and a change is in order.
One such company is SuperK. The startup’s mission is to build a grocery store model in small towns that has all of the advantages of modern retail packed in a compact 800-square-foot store. This is what Anil Thontepu and Neeraj Menta had set out to do when they founded the company in 2019. The idea was to bring a modern trade-like grocery shopping experience to small-town India a wide assortment of products at a better value.
“There is a cost-efficient world of general trade and a customer-loving world of modern retail,” says Thontepu. “We wanted to see if we can bridge this gap…and do something for the small-town people by bringing the best of both these worlds.”
Over the past five years, the Bengaluru-headquartered startup has opened over 130 stores across 80 towns in Andhra Pradesh. And it doesn’t want to stop there. The company wants to expand to another 300 towns in Andhra Pradesh and nearby states of Karnataka and Telangana over the next 24, months. That’s quite an ambitious target. But the founders believe the market size for Superk is so large that they should be able to build a Rs 2,000-3,000 стоore ($228-342 million) annual business from Andhra and Telangana alone.
To fuel this expansion, Superk raised Rs 100 crore ($11.7 million) in Series B funding last month. The round, led by Binny Bansal’s 3STATE Ventures and CaratLane founder Mithun Sacheti, valued Superk at 2-2.5x its previous valuation of Rs 160 crore (about $18.25 million) in 202/
Now, Superk is not entirely unique. It competes with startups like Frendy, Apna Mart and Wheelocity, which are also trying to organize the retail market in India’s smaller towns. What sets SuperK apart is its larger, bolder approach. Grocery chain Apna Mart, for instance, runs franchisee stores in tier-2 or tier-3 markets and also offers 15-minute home delivery, SuperK’s focus is only on supermarkets. Frendy operates mini-marts and micro-kiranas in villages and towns with fewer than 10,000 people, but SuperK targets small towns with populations between 20,000 and 500,000. And Wheelocity supplies only fresh produce to rural areas, while Superk sells dry groceries as well as packaged consumer goods.
This rather radical shift in focus-away from tier-1 and tier-2 cities-ties in with India’s changing consumption pattern. “Consumer mindsets are changing even in smaller cities,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder and chief executive of Third Eyesight, adding that these consumers are beginning to favour more modern retail environments. And NielsenIQ’s latest report says rural markets in India grew twice as fast as cities between April and June 2025.
In this landscape, SuperK fits like a glove, with its franchise-first approach. Thanks to an asset-light model, the company has the agility to go deeper into smaller towns.
But it won’t be all that easy either. As Dutta says, “Changing grocery habits is a long, capital-intensive game.” Moreover, big retail chains are also jumping on the bandwagon. Hypermarket chain Vishal Mega Mart, for instance, already operates 47% of its stores in tier-3 cities and plans to expand into cities with populations exceeding 50,000. Supermarket chain operator DMart is also focusing on tier-2 and tier-3 cities.
However, Superk founders believe they are prepared for the challenge. Menta says the startup has arrived at a business model that is scalable, sustainable and, more importantly, offers value to its customers.
It’s too early to say whether they will be successful in this endeavour. That said, SuperK appears to have built a smart retail business for small-town India.
Refining small-town retail
SuperK’s founders have drawn inspiration from domestic and international retail chains like DMart and Costco. But they haven’t duplicated their strategies and made their own tweaks instead. For instance, large retail chains usually run company-owned and company operated, or COCO, stores. Though this approach is more cost-intensive than the franchise model, it allows a company to ensure a uniform customer experience across all outlets:
Superk doesn’t do that. It runs only franchise-owned and franchise-operated (FOFO) stores, which are no bigger than 800 sq ft. The company is not the first to have experimented with this model, but Thontepu believes that everyone else before them “did not try with the right spirit”. A franchise-owned store, argues co-founder Menta, is run differently from a company-owned store one has to keep in mind the store owner’s incentives, needs and concerns.
Under the franchise model, entrepreneurs invest between Rs 12 lakh (about $13,690) and Rs 15 lakh (about $17,110) to set up a Superk store. Of this, Rs 4 lakh (nearly $4,560) is spent on the store fit-out and infrastructure, the rest goes towards buying inventory. These stores, according to Menta, typically achieve a breakeven point after six months. On average, a retail store takes longer than that-12-15 months to reach breakeven.
Superk fills the shelves by procuring its inventory directly from brands as well as distributors. “The inventory is recommended by us through a mobile application. Store owners have an option to make certain changes within the limits that we have set for them,” says Thontepu. Revenue is shared and the model is similar to the one followed by nearly all retailers in India. Franchisees earn varying levels of margins on different kinds of products, depending on how easy or tough it is to sell those items. For instance, staples like dal and rice have lower margins, while confectionary items and products that need greater effort to sell enjoy higher margins of up to 20%.
In addition to this, there’s a private label business, especially loose items like pulses. In fact, private labelling is part of the company’s efforts to bring some standardization in India’s unorganized retail market. “A customer coming to our store should be able to blindly expect consistent quality on the product they’re buying,” says Menta. “We have organized our sourcing, processing, cleaning, packaging, testing. Everything that a brand would do to provide a great-quality product to their customer.”
Unlike distributors or other retailers who operate franchise models though, Superk claims that it does not dump its inventory on store owners. Menta says the franchise structure is designed in a way that Superk does not benefit from selling unnecessary stock to store owners. “If I lose, he will lose. If he loses, I lose. That is the way (the structure) is created. We, in fact, recommend owners to remove some products if they are not selling.” says Menta.
On the customer side of things, Superk’s value proposition comes down to offering the best prices. More than a year ago, for instance, it introduced a membership programme that offers customers cashback that is redeemable on their future purchases. “If they pay Rs 300 [approximately $3.5) for a six-month membership, they get 10% cashback on all purchases that they are making up to Rs 300 every month,” explains Thontepu. He says 35-40% of Superk’s more than 500,000 customers are enrolled in this programme.
All of this sounds good even promising in theory. But will it be enough to build a sustainable and scalable retail business?
A long, hard look
Let’s first look at what really works in SuperK’s favour.
One, the focus on selling staples under a private label brand. This has been done successfully before. One example is Nilgiri’s, one of India’s oldest supermarket chains.
Founded in 1905, Niligiri’s operated under a franchise model and sold dairy, baked goods, chocolates and other items produced under its own brand. The supermarket chain was sold by debt-ridden Future Group for Rs 67 crore ($7.65 million) in 2023, less than one-third the price the latter paid to acquire the company from private equity firm Actis in 2014. However, its history is worth learning from.
Shomik Mukherjee, a Delhi-based consumer goods advisor who was a partner at Actis while the firm was in control of Nilgiri’s, recalls the value proposition created by Nilgiri’s private label products. “In the case of private labels, it is essential for a company to have a reason why people will walk into that store. For Nilgiri’s, it was bakery and dairy products,” says Mukherjee. Owning a private label that brought in customers also ensured that franchisee owners had incentives to continue working with Nilgiri’s. “It is about giving the franchisees a safe portfolio of private label goods that are desired by customer instead of something that is shoved down the franchisees’ throat to derive margin,” he says.
You see, the overall grocery business operates on a very low margin. But private labelling, says Satish Meena, founder of Datum Intelligence, offers the highest margins – 35-40% – in the grocery business, after fresh produce, making it a lucrative business to get into.
Superk, which sells essential items through its private label, has the opportunity to earn better margins in grocery retail. More importantly, private labelling holds the potential to become SuperK’s identity and boost customer retention and loyalty.
Two, SuperK’s franchise model allows it to expand to more locations rapidly as compared to a regular modern trade chain with company-owned stores, says Mukherjee. This model makes SuperK’s business asset-light and brings down the cost of running a network of stores. “Under this model, the franchisor does not incur the upfront cost of opening a store or having to deal with the trouble of hiring and replacing store managers,” he adds. Since most store owners in a franchise model are landowners, there is a greater stability in operations as well, he explains. Moreover, Superk stores are quite small (800 sq ft), allowing easier availability of property.
The franchise model, however, is not entirely foolproof. One of the inherent problems is the difficulty in implementing standard operating procedures (SOPs) across all stores. And the problem only worsens as the company expands operations to different cities. While Superk stores boast a no-frills fit-out that can be easily set up anywhere, how these stores are maintained through the wear and tear over the years is yet to be seen.
A bigger fear is that the store owner may start running their own store without the Superk branding. “If Superk loses the franchisee owner, it also loses the location in which the store was operating,” says Mukherjee.
Moreover, most franchisee owners in the retail business typically tend to be experienced general store owners who might not be willing to adopt new technology. “Since they have run a store before, they think they know how and what to order for inventory and may not follow SuperK’s tech-enabled recommendations,” says Mukherjee.
There’s another problem. While the founders claim to have seen considerable success (35-40% sign-ups) in the rollout of SuperK’s membership programme for customers, Third Eyesight’s Dutta raises concerns about its future growth. “Indian consumers’ price sensitivity limits membership fee potential,” he says. According to him, the programme’s value in the tier-3 market lies more in customer acquisition and retention than direct revenue generation. “Long-term success requires a cashback programme to drive purchase frequency and basket size increases to offset the costs,” says Dutta.
Menta, however, has a different view. He says SuperK’s subscription is designed in a way that benefits customers only when they make full basket purchases. Moreover, the company has different pricing slabs for membership depending on the various basket sizes, which makes the model more viable. Considering the programme is a little more than a year old, it is still too early to judge whether it will find a lot of takers in small towns.
For now, the founders are in no hurry to expand their business across India. “There is no reason to go into five states. Then, you are spread thin and your economics will not work out. It’s a business of managing operations at a very low cost,” says Menta. The plan is to stick to one region and continue to go deeper into it. “A lot of our competitors who started five years ago spread to so many places that it became very difficult for them to manage,” he adds.
This is also the crux of how Thontepu and Menta are building SuperK. By implementing what they have learnt not only from their own experiments, but also from the failures and successes of other businesses. While there’s no guarantee that Superk will become a roaring success, it does appear to have set an example by starting small and growing patiently. And if the latest funding is any proof, investors are interested.
(With inputs from Neethi Lisa Rojan)
(Published in The Morning Context)
admin
July 16, 2025
Prabhanu Kumar Das, Medianama
16 July 2025
E-commerce logistics platform Shiprocket announced the launch of Shunya.ai, a sovereign AI model developed in India to support the country’s Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), on July 11. The company claims that it is India’s first multimodal AI stack, built in partnership with US-based Ultrasafe Inc.
This announcement comes at the heels of Shiprocket filing a confidential draft red herring prospectus (DHRP) with the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in May 2025 for their Initial Public Offering (IPO). The company is expected to raise around Rs 2500 crore in its IPO.
What does the AI model offer?
As per Shiprocket’s website, Shunya.ai is built on a freemium model, with unlimited access priced at Rs 499 a month for MSMEs. It is directly integrated into the Shiprocket platform and offers AI agents across multiple languages. According to the company, the agents can perform the following tasks:
Shiprocket CEO Saahil Goel stated, “We’ve adapted Shunya.ai from the ground up for Indian languages, commerce workflows, and MSME needs. By embedding it directly into our platform, we’re giving over 1,50,000 sellers instant access to tools that are intelligent, local, and scalable, levelling the playing field for businesses across Bharat.” Notably, Larsen and Toubro’s AI cloud arm, Cloudfiniti is reportedly providing the underlying GPU infrastructure, ensuring that all data processing and storage remains within India.
This AI model does offer multiple benefits but it will not level the playing field against big players, as per Devangshu Dutta who is the founder of specialist consulting firm, Third Eyesight.
“While Shunya AI can help small businesses compete better, it won’t completely level the playing field. Large companies still have greater organisational capacity and capability to respond to the insights offered, including more data and bigger budgets. The real benefit for small businesses is improving how they work and serve customers within their current markets, rather than suddenly competing with giants,” Dutta said.
The E-Commerce AI Pivot
This is not the first time that an Indian e-commerce platform has unveiled a B2B AI service through its existing platform. Zepto recently launched Zepto Atom in May 2025, a real-time tool that offers consumer brands available on the platform minute-level updates, PIN-code level performance maps, and Zepto GPT, a Natural Language Processing (NLP) assistant trained on internal data that brands can query about their stock keeping units (SKUs) and performance data.
Zomato and its e-commerce arm Blinkit have also been growing their AI capabilities. Analytics India Magazine previously reported that the company’s generative AI team has grown from 3 to 20 engineers in the time-span of a year. Zomato introduced a personalised AI food assistant for users, and also uses AI in its backend to optimise delivery times and improve consumer support. Blinkit also released the Recipe Rover AI in May 2023, an AI assistant for recipes.
Other companies like Swiggy with ‘What to Eat’ AI, Myntra’s MyFashionGPT AI shopping assistant, and Amazon’s Rufus have also adopted AI assistants on their platform as a tool for the consumer.
The issue of merchant stickiness
Dutta asserts that this shift means platforms like Zepto and Shiprocket are changing from being service providers to becoming data intelligence companies. They are generating, or are in the process of generating revenue through transactional data that flows through the company.
“While this can create better insights and automation for merchants on these platforms, it also could make the merchants more dependent on the platforms. Once a merchant builds its operations around a platform’s specific AI tools and insights, it becomes much harder to switch to a competitor – creating stronger merchant stickiness. We already see this in infrastructure and core services such as banking and financial services, enterprise cloud services, building management etc. and the same is likely to happen in AI-enabled process management”, he said.
Why this matters
As Shiprocket is preparing for an IPO, Shunya.ai becomes another means to generate revenue for the company. This app can extend Shiprocket’s reach to local physical stores and MSMEs, by offering them the opportunity to provide the same experiences and support to the consumer that larger retailers and e-commerce platforms do, while automating delivery automation, cataloguing, and customer support.
Furthermore, the launch of this model is also part of the larger trend of AI integration and automation, both within e-commerce platforms for their consumers and within the back-end for optimisation.
Competition in these sectors and merchant stickiness may also become an issue, as businesses hosted on these e-commerce services may become reliant on specific AI tools and their outputs.
Questions of data privacy are also important when it comes to service companies moving towards data intelligence: How do these AI models gather and use data? The consent of end-consumers in these B2B models, data storage, and security are all issues that need to be studied as e-commerce and retails pivots towards AI.
Some Unanswered Questions
MediaNama has reached out to Shiprocket with the following questions and will update the article when we receive a response.
(Published in Medianama)
admin
June 5, 2025
Aakriti Bansal, MediaNama
June 5, 2025
A restaurant owner recently took to X (formerly Twitter) to publicly slam Zomato for “mystery charges” and unauthorised ad placements, reigniting concerns over how the platform treats its small business partners. The tweet, accompanied by screenshots of the restaurant’s earnings dashboard, claimed that despite months of listings, his restaurant received zero payouts, and Zomato allegedly ran ads without his consent.
“Dear @zomato @deepigoyal I’m finally pulling my restaurant off your platform. Congrats! Your mystery service charges, surprise ad placements (without consent), and a POC who ghosts like it’s a talent show—truly inspiring. Small outlets deserve better,” restaurant owner Manish posted on X, under the username @maniyakiduniya.Zomato responded: “We hear you! As mentioned earlier, please share your restaurant ID with us via DM, so that our team can get in touch with you.”
The post has struck a chord among restaurant owners who say Zomato’s ad model bleeds their business dry. In conversations with MediaNama over the week, two restaurant owners and a former manager with Zomato independently confirmed that the platform’s advertising system leaves little room for transparency, choice, or sustainable profit.
The names of the restaurant owners and the former Zomato manager have been withheld to protect their anonymity.
Forced Ad Spending and Diminishing Returns
Restaurant owners say visibility on Zomato is tightly tied to how much they spend on advertising.
“If you don’t run ads, your restaurant won’t even show up unless someone searches for you by name,” one owner told MediaNama. He further added, “From what I’ve seen, the top 10 restaurants you see when you open Zomato are all paying for that spot.”Even ratings and reviews don’t help. For instance, if a user searches for ‘noodles’, only those who have paid for the ad category will show up in the list.
Restaurant owners explained how the ad budget starts small, around Rs. 300–400 per week, but grows rapidly. In one case, as seen by MediaNama in a restaurant’s ad dashboard, spending jumped from Rs. 9,000 to Rs. 15,000 per week in just two to three weeks.
“Some are spending Rs. 18,000 to Rs. 20,000 weekly now on ads just to stay afloat,” an owner explained, noting that these costs are hard to bear for restaurants with weekly sales as low as Rs. 2,500.
“When everyone is pushed to advertise just to stay visible, it raises serious questions about how fair the competition is on the platform,” they said. “It’s not about food quality or ratings anymore, it’s about who pays more,” they added.
A screenshot shared by a restaurant owner showing a decline in sales from ads, offers, and orders with applied discounts, highlighting concerns over the effectiveness of Zomato’s advertising model.
Click Charges with No Sales
Zomato charges restaurants based on clicks, not conversions. This means a restaurant is charged whenever a user taps on its listing after seeing a sponsored ad, regardless of whether the user places an order.
One owner explained, “A single click can cost around Rs. 6. Even if a customer just views the restaurant by clicking on it and doesn’t buy, that money is deducted.” He showed a dashboard with 4,877 clicks – most of which occurred before noon – but no conversions. “They exhaust our daily limit by 12 PM and then tell us to increase ad budgets,” he added.
Another restaurant owner echoed similar concerns in a Reddit conversation reviewed by MediaNama. The owner stated that Zomato counts a ‘visit’ even when a user scrolls past an ad and places an order a day later. “That is on purpose,” he wrote, calling the model “scammy for sure”. He also confirmed that restaurants receive no detailed data on who placed orders via ads versus organically.
Furthermore, the owner noted that Zomato lacks a clear grievance redressal mechanism for ad-related issues, as complaints are often ignored by a restaurant owner’s point of contact.
“There’s no formal audit or independent review if an ad campaign fails,” he said.The Legal Escape Hatch: You Signed the Contract
Restaurant owners say Zomato deducts ad spends automatically, citing terms buried in the onboarding agreement – terms many admit they didn’t fully understand before signing. Once enrolled, there’s no clear way to pause or cancel.
“There’s no way to opt out once it starts, and no refunds either,” one merchant said. “Zomato just says, ‘You came to us,’ whenever we raise concerns,” he added.
But is this consent truly informed? “It’s a honeytrap,” the merchant said. “There’s no other option but to keep spending on ads if you want to stay relevant on the platform,” he explained.
Price Parity, Platform Pressure, and Squeezed Margins
Another major source of concern is Zomato’s price parity push. According to one owner, the company convinced restaurants to upload their table-rate menu on the platform by offering to lower commission fees. However, this strategy has backfired for many.
“They promised lower commission if we maintained the same prices online and offline. But now we pay Good and Services Tax (GST), high commissions, and ad spends on top of that. Our margins are cut down to 5–10%,” he said. Commissions alone can go up to 35–40% every month, forcing smaller restaurants to comply just to remain competitive.
In effect, merchants are footing the bill for everything: discounts, ads, visibility, and commissions, while Zomato gains from each layer.
Coupons and Data Obscurity
The dashboard Zomato offers shows data like clicks and visits, but it hides key financial insights that would help merchants make informed decisions. “They will show you how much you sold, but not how much you are paying to the platform,” one owner said.
Restaurant owners also said they have little to no control over how Zomato spends their ad budget. “We don’t know when our ads are shown, or to whom. There’s no data on which campaign worked better, or what to change,” one merchant said. Without visibility into targeting and performance strategy, many feel they are blindly spending in hopes of visibility.
Coupon codes, too, are deducted from the restaurant’s share, even if the platform offers them without informing the merchant. “Whatever discount a customer sees, it’s cut from our side. Zomato’s share is tiny, about 15%. We bear the rest,” the merchant added.
If a platform issues discounts unilaterally but bills restaurants for them, is that a fair bargain?
Opaque Categories and Manipulated Targeting
Merchants also highlighted how Zomato divides ad rates by cuisine categories — North Indian, Chinese, etc. — and even by customer frequency. “There are eight to 10 customer categories, each with a different ad rate,” an owner said. “Frequent buyers are more expensive to target”, he added.
The platform nudges merchants to buy targeted ads by showing graphics and dashboards that suggest potential boosts. But when profits drop, and merchants reach out, they are told that competition has increased significantly since they last got in touch with Zomato and they should spend more.
“It’s a vicious cycle. They’ll say: ‘Try a brand title ad or pay Rs. 300 extra to reach daily customers.’ The game never ends,” revealed the restaurant owner.Inside Zomato: How Ads Shape Visibility
A former Zomato manager told MediaNama that restaurants not running ads don’t get deliberately penalised, but they do end up losing visibility. “Those who run ads automatically rise in rankings. So the others fall behind,” he said. Even a high-rated restaurant may slip if competitors outspend it.
For context, how much a restaurant pays for ads often depends on their rapport with the specific Zomato account manager and their business goals. “If a restaurant wants aggressive growth, we push it to the top line: high spend, high return. Others stay in the down line: lower investment, slower scale,” he said.
Ad pricing, he said, is not standardised. “It varies depending on what the manager thinks the client can afford and how much they are willing to push.”
He added that Zomato’s discovery algorithm changes every five to six months, which makes it difficult for restaurants to adapt or plan long-term. “The idea is to keep the system rotating so one client doesn’t dominate.”
Performance tracking for restaurants, he said, is mostly transparent except for one missing piece: acquisition data. “Zomato doesn’t show how many customers came through advertising. That’s where it becomes murky.”
He admitted Zomato doesn’t intervene if a restaurant complains about bad ad results. “It depends on the manager’s willingness but hardly anyone did it because of too many internal disputes on this issue.”
Why Ad Revenue Matters So Much
Ad revenue, the former Zomato manager said, is especially crucial in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities.
“In big cities, order values are high, so aggregators can survive on commissions. But in smaller cities, ad income is the main driver as the order values are comparatively low”, the former manager added.Zomato’s Q4FY25 Shareholders’ Letter reflects this reliance: the company’s advertising and sales promotion expenses rose to Rs. 1,972 crore on a consolidated basis in FY25, up from Rs. 1,432 crore in FY24. While these are expenses borne by the platform, they highlight how advertising has become a structural lever in both customer acquisition and revenue generation.
Elsewhere, an HDFC Securities report states that quick commerce companies have theoretical levers to improve margins, such as increasing take rates, including higher ad income. It also observes that Blinkit would need to improve its take rates from 18.5% to 22% to reach a 5% adjusted EBITDAM (Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, Amortisation, and Management Fees), with ad revenue identified as a key lever to meet that target.
However, the report notes that heightened competition may keep some of these levers non-operational.
Zomato‘s Response
In response to MediaNama’s queries, a Zomato spokesperson shared the following statement:
“All marketing collaborations such as ads, promotions, and discounts etc., as well as commercials, are mutually discussed with our restaurant partners before being switched on, switched off or modified. Our multi-factor authentication system ensures that partners retain full control and give explicit consent which is registered before any changes go live. We also maintain robust escalation mechanisms, allowing partners to raise concerns and receive prompt, satisfactory resolutions through the Restaurant Partner App as well as centralised helpline numbers.
We continue to see restaurants having confidence in our partnership and are taking a proactive step to improve and enhance our interactions and processes. For our smaller restaurant partners, we work extra hard to make it easier for them to grow with us. There are always opportunities to improve and we are committed to working on them, on-time.”
While Zomato says it maintains robust escalation mechanisms and explicit partner consent, restaurant owners who spoke to MediaNama described a different reality: one of automatic deductions, limited control, and opaque ad operations.
What Zomato’s Policy Says and Doesn’t
According to Zomato’s Sponsored Listing Service terms, merchants are expected to make full payments in advance. Refunds are not guaranteed, and Zomato has full discretion on ad placements, sizes, and category changes.
The company “assumes no liability or responsibility for any… click frauds, technological issues or other potentially invalid activity that affects the cost of Service.” It also “does not warrant the results from use of Service, and the Merchant assumes all risk and responsibility.”
The Sponsored Listing Service terms grant Zomato broad rights to use merchant content, brand names, and logos, while limiting the company’s liability to the amount of fee paid during a term. These terms become legally binding once the Service Request Form (SRF) is signed.
While Zomato offers a merchant dashboard to track visits, it does not disclose the full breakdown of how ad money is being spent or how much value is being returned. One merchant noted that visibility data only started appearing in the last five to six months. Before that, they had no metrics at all.
Swiggy’s Self Serve Ads: A More Transparent Model?
Swiggy says its ad platform puts control in the hands of restaurant partners. Through the Self Serve Ads tool, restaurants can create their own campaigns, adjust daily spends, and track how those campaigns perform. The company promotes the tool as flexible and cost-effective, with no upfront payments.
The onboarding process is laid out step-by-step: restaurants upload documents like GST and Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) certificates, complete Know Your Customer (KYC), and sign a Partnership Agreement after a verification visit from a Swiggy representative, As per Swiggy, commissions are based on location and whether a restaurant opts for extra promotions.
Compared to Zomato’s Sponsored Listings model, which some restaurant owners say they didn’t fully understand when signing up, Swiggy’s approach looks more structured and consent-driven, at least on the surface.
But that clarity doesn’t always hold up. One of the restaurant owners told MediaNama that Swiggy’s model isn’t entirely different from Zomato’s. “You have to pay them if you want your restaurant to show up in search. It’s the same thing, just framed differently,” the owner said, suggesting that visibility on the platform often comes at a cost, regardless of how the ad system is marketed.
Advertising as a Structural Lever in Quick Commerce
Restaurant owners have flagged the rising costs and opacity of advertising on platforms like Zomato. But industry research shows that this isn’t just a revenue stream but it’s central to how delivery platforms, especially in quick commerce, are designed to operate.
A September 2024 report by CLSA, titled App-racadabra- Magic Behind Instant Delivery Liberating Customers, found that ad revenue makes up around 3.5% to 4.5% of gross merchandise value (GMV) on Zepto. That figure is only expected to grow as more brands start recognising the significance of quick commerce.
Interestingly, Zepto doesn’t just run ads for brands that sell on its platform. It also allows companies to advertise even if they aren’t listed, using spaces like the order tracking page, according to the report.
Quick commerce platforms can also use past purchase data to deliver more targeted ads and push higher-value products – what the report calls driving “premiumisation” of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).
Zomato’s quick commerce arm, Blinkit, is expected to lean heavily on ads to hit profitability targets. CLSA notes that Blinkit’s margins could eventually exceed those of food delivery, given the larger potential for ad revenue and the shift toward higher-margin categories.
The report adds that quick commerce is especially useful for smaller or direct-to-consumer (D2C) brands. These businesses can tap into a pan-India audience without having to build their own distribution networks.
The CLSA findings reinforce how advertising isn’t just about visibility, but it is baked into the business model. As margins tighten, discovery on these apps is no longer organic but paid.
Expert View: Power, Visibility, and Platform Dependence
These patterns mirror broader trends across retail and platform ecosystems, not just food delivery.
Devangshu Dutta, the Founder and Chief Executive of specialist consulting firm Third Eyesight, told MediaNama that these dynamics are not unique to Zomato or even food delivery.
“Advertising and promotion focussing on specific brands or products is standard across various platforms and formats. It is an outcome of the balance of power between the platform and the supplier brand, and is equally true of physical retail chains, online marketplaces and aggregation platforms such as Zomato,” he said.
Brands or restaurant chains with deeper pockets tend to secure greater visibility—whether through premium shelf space in physical stores or prominent placements like sponsored listings and banners on delivery platforms.
“Demand-side concentration inevitably favours larger suppliers and brands who can fund visibility, whether it is through endcap displays in a retail aisle or sponsored banners or top-of-search-list positions on an app,” Dutta stated.However, he noted that some established brands may choose to bypass platform dependence altogether.
“If brands are well-established or have other means to ensure that their message and product reaches the target consumer, they may choose to opt out of the channel, as many restaurants have done with Zomato and Swiggy,” Dutta explained.
How Can Restaurants Push Back?
In the context of restaurants displaying resistance to food delivery apps, one of the restaurant owners said that small restaurants need to come together.
“There should be local unions who can stand up to Zomato. And there should be a blanket rule on how much ad spend is allowed, so merchants don’t fall into this trap,” the owner said.He added that Zomato seems to earn more from merchants than from customers. “Whatever we pay to be visible, it all goes into the platform’s pocket”, he explained.
Further, he argued that without collective action, individual pushback rarely works. “The minute we stop ad spend, our listings drop to the bottom. So we need to walk together. If even 30% of merchants stop ads at once, it will force a reaction.”
Why This Matters
As India’s online food delivery market continues to grow, so does the reliance of small businesses on platforms like Zomato. However, these platforms are acting as gatekeepers by deciding who gets seen, how often, and at what price.
By tying discovery to opaque algorithms and costly ad spends, they tilt the playing field in favour of businesses that can afford to pay more. In such a system, can small restaurants survive?
And the issue goes beyond advertising. Zomato recently paused its 50:50 refund-sharing policy after public backlash and partner complaints. Restaurant owners said the company auto-enabled the policy and deducted money without consent or clear explanation. As with ads, there was no transparent opt-out process or formal appeal.
Together, these practices raise broader concerns: Should platform-led monetisation come with stricter disclosure norms? Can regulators step in to ensure pricing fairness and transparency in merchant contracts? And what role can merchant collectives play in counterbalancing this power?
For now, many restaurant owners feel caught in a system that offers visibility and participation at a cost they cannot afford and exit without impact.
(Published in MediaNama)
admin
September 16, 2024
Sesa Sen, NDTV Profit
16 September 2024
As India’s economy grows and digital technologies reshape consumer behavior, the future of kirana stores—the quintessential neighbourhood grocery shops—hangs precariously in the balance.
These soap-to-staple sellers, once impervious to change, now confront an existential threat from quick commerce players like Blinkit, Instamart, Zepto, and from modern retailers such as DMart and Star Bazaar, raising a pivotal question: Can kiranas survive the pressure of change, or will they die a slow death?
The All India Consumer Products Distributors Federation, that represents four lakh packaged goods distributors and stockists, has recently raised alarms, urging Union Minister for Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal to investigate the unchecked proliferation of quick commerce platforms and its potential ramifications for small traders.
Their concerns are not unfounded. Data suggests that the share of modern retail, including online commerce, which is currently below 10%, is set to cross 30% over the next 3-5 years. Much of this growth will come at the cost of traditional retail.
“Unless the government takes on an activist role to support the smallest of business owners, the shift toward large corporate formats is inevitable,” according to Devangshu Dutta, head of retail consultancy Third Eyesight.
Casualties Of The Boom
Madan Sachdev, a second-generation grocer operating Vandana Stores in eastern Delhi, has thrived in the recent years, adapting to the digital age by taking orders via WhatsApp and employing extra hands for home delivery.
Despite having weathered the storm of competition from giants like Amazon and BigBazaar, he now finds himself disheartened, as his monthly sales have halved to about Rs 30,000, all thanks to quick commerce.
Sachdev is worried about meeting expenses such as rent, his children’s education, and other household bills. He finds himself at a crossroads, uncertain about how to modernise his store or adopt new-age strategies in order to attract customers in an increasingly competitive market.
India’s $600 billion grocery market, a cornerstone for quick commerce, is largely dominated by more than 13 million local mom-and-pop stores.
Retailers like Sachdev are also seeing a steep decline in their profit margins from FMCG companies, which now hover around 10-12%, down from the 18-20% margins seen before the Covid-19 pandemic. The consumer goods companies are instead offering higher margins to quick commerce platforms so that they can afford the price tags.
Quick deliveries account for $5 billion, or 45%, of the country’s $11 billion online grocery market, according to Goldman Sachs. It is projected to capture 70% of the online grocery market, forecasted to grow to $60 billion by 2030, as consumers increasingly prioritise convenience and speed.
Many of the mom-and-pop shops are family-run and have been in business for generations. Yet they lack the resources to modernise and compete effectively with larger chains. Modern retail businesses, including quick commerce, begin with significantly more capital, thanks to funding from corporate investors, venture capital, private equity, and public markets.
“They can scale quickly and capture market share due to a superior product-service mix, larger infrastructure, and more robust business processes,” said Dutta.
Moreover, their ability to engage in price competition poses a challenge for small retailers and distributors, making it difficult for them to compete.
“This is something that has happened worldwide, in the largest markets, and I don’t think India will be an exception,” Dutta said, adding that it would be incomplete to single out a specific format of corporate business such as quick commerce as the sole villain in this situation.
“India is a tough, friction-laden environment at any given point in time, including government processes which don’t make it any easier,” he said.
Peer Pressure
Data from research firm Kantar shows that general trade, which comprises kirana and paan-beedi shops, have grown 4.2% on a 12-month basis in June, while quick commerce grew 29% during the same period.
Shoppers are becoming more omnichannel, rather than gravitating towards one particular channel, said Manoj Menon, director- commercial, Kantar Worldpanel, South Asia. “While the growth [for quick commerce and e-commerce] might appear to have declined compared to a year ago, a point to note is that the base for these channels has significantly grown. Therefore, achieving this level of growth is still commendable.”
Consumer goods companies such as Hindustan Unilever Ltd., Dabur India Ltd., Tata Consumer Products Ltd., etc., have acknowledged the salience of quick commerce to their packaged food, personal and homecare products. The platform currently comprises roughly 40% of their digital sales.
“We are working all the major players in the quick commerce space and devising product mix and portfolio. This is a very high growth channel for us,” according to Mohit Malhotra, chief executive officer, Dabur India.
Elara Capital analysts have pointed out that the share of quick commerce is expected to rise to60% in the near future with e-commerce and modern trade turning costlier for FMCG brands than quick commerce. “The larger brands tend to make better margins on quick-commerce platforms versus e-commerce due to lower discounts on the former,” it said in a report.
However, it is too premature to draw a parallel between kirana and quick commerce in terms of competition, given the significant size difference.
The average spend per consumer on FMCG in kirana stores stands at Rs. 21,285 annually while the same is Rs. 4,886 for quick commerce, according to Menon.
Rural Vs Urban Divide
Quick commerce is still an urban phenomenon. In contrast, in rural settings, where internet penetration is still catching up and access to large retail chains is limited, kirana stores continue to thrive.
According to Naveen Malpani, partner, Grant Thornton Bharat, while the growth of quick commerce is undeniable, this channel is not poised to replace traditional retail, which still has a wider reach in the country. “It will complement older models, filling a niche for immediate, smaller purchases. Also, a 10-20-minute delivery may not have a strong market pull in rural markets where distance and time are not much of a concern.”
Yet many others believe, even in these areas, the challenge is palpable.
The small businesses are beginning to feel the sting of same slow decline that once befell the ubiquitous telephone booths in the era of mobile phone, according to Sameer Gandotra, chief executive officer of Frendy, a start-up that is building ‘mini DMart’ in small towns where giants like Reliance and Tatas have yet to establish their presence.
As rural customers slowly start to embrace digital shopping and seek more variety, kirana stores must adapt or risk becoming obsolete, he said.
Besides, the popularity of quick commerce is set to challenge the dominance of incumbent e-commerce platforms, especially in categories such as beauty and personal care, packaged foods and apparel.
“Quick commerce is primarily operational in metros and tier 1 markets, which is impacting the sales of traditional companies in these areas. However, if quick-commerce players were to extend their operations to tier 2 and tier 3, it would even challenge companies such as DMart and Nykaa, and would pare sales and profitability,” noted analysts at Elara Securities.
Frendy’s Gandotra believes the journey for kirana stores is not a lost cause, but it requires strategic interventions. Many kirana store owners struggle to integrate point-of-sale systems, inventory management software, or even digital payment solutions. These stores need to embrace technology.
Another aspect is the need for policy support. Regulations to ensure fair competition can prevent monopolisation by large retailers. Additionally, subsidies, tax benefits, and grants for infrastructure improvements can help small businesses adapt to changing market dynamics. With renewed support, kirana stores can continue to be the backbone of Indian retail.
Nonetheless, there will be some who’ll be left behind during this shift. Analysts at Elara Capital warn that the swift rise of quick-commerce platforms, combined with aggressive discounting, could wipe off 25-30% of traditional grocery stores.
(Published on NDTV Profit)
admin
January 10, 2022
Written By Vaishnavi Gupta
UAE-based Tablez has launched a kids’ super store in India
Tablez, the retail arm of UAE-based LuLu Group, has launched its kids’ super store House of Toys in India. Tablez has been around in the country as the master franchisee of brands such as Desigual, Build-A-Bear, Go Sport, Yoyoso, Cold Stone Creamery, and Galito’s. The toy market in India, currently pegged at $1 billion, is estimated to double in size by 2025, according to a FICCI-KPMG report.
All stacked up
The first House of Toys store was unveiled at Global Malls, Bengaluru, in December, 2021. The store offers more than 20,000 products, from feeding bottles, strollers, and bathtubs, to wearable tech, remote-controlled toys, and stationery. Spread across 5,100 sq ft, the store also houses the Build-a-Bear shop, where kids can make their own soft toys. “We have toys starting from Rs 30, going up to Rs 30,000 in our assortment. We have 3,000 toys in the value segment of below Rs 500,” says Adeeb Ahamed, managing director, Tablez.
House of Toys aims to open 12-15 stores by the end of this year, initially in South India, and metros, followed by tier I cities and beyond. Tablez also plans to rebrand at least 10 Toys“R”Us stores in India to House of Toys in the second half of this year. The store’s products are available on Tablez’s own e-commerce platform, and will soon be listed on third-party marketplaces like Amazon and Flipkart. “House of Toys has potential to be one of the top revenue contributors of Tablez,” Ahamed says.
Tablez has been consolidating its presence in the Indian market lately. Last year, Tablez launched Yoyoso’s seventh outlet in India, and opened another outlet, its 33rd, of American ice cream brand Cold Stone Creamery, both in Kerala. Further, it has earmarked an investment of Rs 100 crore for the expansion of sportswear store Go Sport. Fashion brand Desigual, which caters to women in the 25-45 age group, is now present on Tata CLiQ Luxury, and will soon make inroads into Mumbai and Bengaluru, followed by Chandigarh and Hyderabad.
Presently, Tablez operates 80 brand stores in India; it plans to take this number to 250 over the next five years.
Playing smart
Given that more than a quarter of India’s population is under 15 years of age, intuitively, it makes for a “great market for toys,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder, Third Eyesight. He says upper-income households with fewer children tend to buy more toys, games and learning aids, especially since children have been much more confined to the home environment in recent years.
According to Angshuman Bhattacharya, partner and sector leader (consumer products & retail), EY India, the growth of this market has been driven by improved availability and penetration of branded toys, upgradation from manual to automated toys, and improved awareness and availability brought about by e-commerce.
However, any kids category, whether apparel or toys, has been a difficult model to crack, owing to factors such as low SKU proliferation, and difficulty in inventory management, says Bhattacharya.
To stand out in the market, analysts say, brands need to create an authoritative and diverse product mix, which, in turn, requires a relatively large store footprint in high-visibility high-footfall locations. “The stock turnover is also slower than many other product categories, so merchandising and replenishment strategies need to be really smart. Branded merchandise offers lower margins, so private labels and unique products are necessary to add to the margin mix,” Dutta notes.
Deeply understanding a store’s catchment, so that consumer engagement can be kept high through the year — rather than being limited to local celebratory peaks and holidays — could be a useful strategy, say analysts.
Source: financialexpress