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February 27, 2026
Samar Srivastava, Forbes India
Feb 27, 2026
India’s young consumers are discovering the next big beauty serum, protein bar or sneaker brand not in a mall, but on Instagram reels, YouTube shorts and quick-commerce apps that promise 10-minute delivery. What began as a trickle of digital-first labels a decade ago has now become a full-blown wave. Direct-to-consumer (D2C) brands—built online, fuelled by social media and venture capital—have reshaped India’s consumer landscape and forced legacy companies to rethink everything from marketing to distribution.
India today has more than 800 active D2C brands across beauty, personal care, fashion, food, home and electronics, according to industry estimates and consulting reports. The Indian D2C market is estimated at $12–15 billion in 2025, up from under $5 billion in 2020, and growing at 25–30 percent annually. The pandemic accelerated online adoption, but the structural drivers—cheap data, digital payments and over 750 million internet users—were already in place.
Unlike traditional FMCG brands that relied on distributors and kirana stores, D2C brands such as Mamaearth, boAt, Licious and Sugar Cosmetics built their early traction online. Customer acquisition happened through performance marketing; feedback loops were immediate; product iterations were rapid.
Importantly, these brands are discovered online—but as they scale, consumers buy them both online and offline, increasingly through quick-commerce platforms such as Blinkit, Zepto and Swiggy Instamart, as well as modern trade and general trade stores. The omnichannel play is now central to their growth strategy.
According to Anil Kumar, founder and chief executive of Redseer Strategy Consultants, the ecosystem is maturing in measurable ways. Brands are taking lesser time to reach ₹100 crore or ₹500 crore revenue benchmarks and, once there, mortality rates are coming down. There is also an acceptance that if a brand is not profitable in a 3–5 year timeframe, that needs to be corrected. “There is a lot of emphasis on growing profitably and not just through GMV,” he says.
Big Cheques, Bigger Exits
The D2C boom would not have been possible without capital. Between 2014 and 2022, Indian D2C startups raised over $5 billion in venture and growth funding. Peak years like 2021 alone saw more than $1.2 billion invested in the segment. Beauty, personal care and fashion accounted for nearly 50 percent of total inflows, followed by food and beverages.
Some brands scaled independently; others found strategic buyers. Among the most prominent exits:
> Hindustan Unilever acquired a majority stake in Minimalist, reportedly valuing the actives-led skincare brand at over ₹3,000 crore. For Hindustan Unilever, the annual run rate from sales of its D2C portfolio is estimated at around ₹1,000 crore, underscoring how material digital-first brands have become to its growth strategy.
> ITC Limited bought Yoga Bar for about ₹175 crore in 2023 to strengthen its health foods portfolio.
> Emami acquired a majority stake in The Man Company, expanding its digital-first play.
> Tata Consumer Products acquired Soulfull as part of its health and wellness strategy.
> Marico invested in brands such as Beardo and True Elements.
Private equity has also entered aggressively at the growth stage. ChrysCapital invested in The Man Company; L Catterton backed Sugar Cosmetics; General Atlantic invested in boAt; and Sequoia Capital India (now Peak XV Partners) was an early backer of multiple consumer brands.
Valuations were often steep. boAt was valued at over $1.2 billion at its peak. Mamaearth’s parent, Honasa Consumer, listed in 2023 at a valuation of around ₹10,000 crore. Across categories, brands crossing ₹500 crore in annual revenue began attracting buyout interest, with deal sizes ranging from ₹150 crore to over ₹3,000 crore depending on scale and profitability.
Yet exits have not always been smooth. “While it takes 7-8 years to build a brand most funds that invest in them have a timeline of 3-5 years before they need an exit,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a retail consultancy. This timing mismatch can create pressure—pushing brands to scale aggressively, sometimes at the cost of margins.
Integration Pains and the Profitability Pivot
For large FMCG companies, buying D2C brands offers speed: Access to younger consumers, premium positioning and digital marketing expertise. But integration brings challenges.
Founder-led organisations operate with rapid decision cycles, test-and-learn marketing and flat hierarchies. Large corporations often work with layered approvals, structured brand calendars and rigid cost controls. Cultural friction can lead to talent exits if autonomy is curtailed too quickly.
Margins are another sticking point. In the early growth phase, many D2C brands spent 30–40 percent of revenue on digital advertising. Rising customer acquisition costs post-2021, combined with higher logistics expenses, squeezed contribution margins. As brands entered offline retail, distributor and retailer margins of 20–35 percent further compressed profitability.
Large acquirers, used to EBITDA margins of 18–25 percent in mature FMCG portfolios, often discovered that digital-first brands operated at low single-digit margins—or were loss-making at scale. Rationalising ad spends, optimising supply chains and pruning SKUs became essential.
The funding slowdown between 2022 and 2024 triggered a reset. Marketing spends were cut by as much as 25–40 percent across several startups. Growth moderated from 80–100 percent annually during peak years to 25–40 percent for more mature brands—but unit economics improved.
Quick-commerce has emerged as a structural growth lever. For categories such as personal care, snacking and health foods, these platforms now account for 10–25 percent of urban revenues for scaled brands, improving inventory turns and reducing dependence on paid digital acquisition.
The next phase of India’s D2C journey will be less about blitz scaling and more about disciplined brand building—balancing growth, profitability and exit timelines. What began as a disruption is now part of the mainstream consumer playbook. And as capital becomes more selective, only brands that combine strong gross margins, repeat purchase rates above 35–40 percent and sustainable EBITDA pathways will endure.
(Published in Forbes India)
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February 6, 2026
Anees Hussain and Kartikay Kashyap, Financial Express / Brand Wagon
6 February 2026
Swiggy Instamart’s Noice has consciously rejected every aesthetic that defines platform house brands. Its visual identity doesn’t sport minimalist colours or whites, no clean sans-serif, no ‘discount alternative’ signalling. Instead it uses Indian truck art inspired design with neon colours and bold text. That design architecture also personifies Swiggy’s big gamble.
Noice isn’t just a private label chasing margin expansion. It’s a differentiation play by a company that’s losing ground in a war in which being faster and cheaper is no longer enough. Early data suggests that Noice is finding traction. In namkeens, sweets, and western snacks, Noice holds a 4.4% market share on Instamart as of December 2025, competing against category leaders like Haldiram’s (16.7%) and Lay’s (9%), according to 1digitalstack.ai. This segment generated between ₹41-60 crore per month in the September-December period, with Noice’s share translating to roughly ₹1.8-2.6 crore a month. In beverages (fruit juice, mocktails, energy drinks, tea, coffee and soda), Noice more than doubled its platform sales share -from 2.6% in July to 5.8% by December. The brand now ranks 12th overall, ahead of Coolberg and gaining on established players. Category leader Real’s share fell from 12.3% to 9.5% over the same period. The beverage category generated ₹13,920.3 crore per month during July-December, with Noice’s December share of 5.8% representing about ₹88 lakh in monthly sales. Modest but shows velocity.
Bhushan Kadam, senior vice president, White Rivers Media, says the platform enjoys certain struc-tural advantages: “Swiggy has a credible shot at building Noice into a meaningful private label play because quick commerce (q-commerce) in India is still in a high-growth phase and Swiggy already has the scale, infrastructure, and customer base to drive repeat consumption.”
Swiggy’s own performance with private labels on q-commerce has been positive. Its Supreme Harvest brand, spanning pulses, oils, spices, and dry fruits has achieved just over 20% platform penetration, accord-ing to 1digitalstack.ai. The broader private label landscape offers both encouragement and caution. Tata Digital-owned BigBasket (BB) remains the clear winner, with private labels accounting for nearly 33% of its total revenue. But BB has a crucial advantage: Sourcing infrastructure inherited from Tata’s retail operations that provides scale – and supply chain depth that pure-play q-commerce platforms are still only building.
Noice isn’t Swiggy’s first experiment with owned brands. In May 2025, the company sold its cloud kitchen brands – The Bowl Company, Homely, Soul Rasa, Istah – to Kouzina Food Tech after years of trying to operate its own restaurants. Those brands required Swiggy to manage kitchens, hire chefs, and compete with thousands of independent restaurants. Unit economics never worked out.
Noice represents a fundamentally different model. Instead of large manufacturers optimised for extended shelf lives, Noice works with regional food makers producing in small batches. Launched mid last year with 200 SKUs across 40 manufacturers, it has expanded to over 350 products from 60 makers across 20-plus categories. Packaged versions of items like paneer and rasgullas from the mithai shop fail to resonate with consumers because they might use preservatives and taste artificial. Other offerings include biscuits made with butter instead of margarine, Punjabi lassi with seven-day shelf life delivered everyday like milk.
“Noice seems to be purpose-built for q-commerce: Impulse driven categories, low switching costs and algorithmic discovery. That alone fixes the biggest flaw of Swiggy’s past private label experiment,” says Ankur Sharma, cofounder, Brandshark. It is trying to do things for which customers come back to the platform – “products that are not there on any other platform”, adds Satish Meena, advisor, Datum Intelligence.
Uphill climb
Unlike other private label brands owned by Blinkit and Zepto who largely deal in non-perishable products, Swiggy-owned-Noice currently has a 50-50 split between perishable and non-perishable categories. Perishable products fetch 25-45% margins compared to 15-25% on non-perishable private labels and just 10-15% on third-party FMCG brands. Short shelf lives that enable freshness also mean higher wastage risk if demand forecasting fails. The solution Swiggy is testing hinges on shifting the capex risk entirely to small manufacturers while using its distribution scale as a leverage.
That apart, competition in q-commerce has intensified sharply over the past year. Reliance Retail’s JioMart, Flipkart Minutes, and Amazon Now have entered meaningfully with aggressive pricing. Zepto slashed minimum order values and waived customer fees at ₹149. Swiggy waived platform fees – but only on higher-value baskets at ₹299, essentially ceding low-AOV (average order value) products that drive frequency. In the meantime, market leader Blinkit’s gross order value reached nearly twice that of Instamart’s.
In q-commerce’s brutal pricing war, it is execution that will determine if Noice becomes a genuine differentiator or just another private label. “Proving Noice is not ‘just another’ private label would be the biggest challenge for the company,” says Devangshu Dutta,, founder and CEO, Third Eyesight.
(Published in Financial Express/Brand Wagon)
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February 2, 2026
Sakshi Sadashiv, MINT
Bengaluru, 02 Feb 2026
BRND.ME, a roll-up commerce company, expects to complete its reverse flip (change of headquarters) from Singapore to India by March, clearing a key regulatory hurdle as it prepares to tap Indian public markets with an IPO.
Despite the rise of private labels from quick-commerce giants such as Swiggy Instamart and Zepto, CEO Ananth Narayanan remains confident. He argues that BRND.ME’s core categories—spanning complex, value-added products such as specialized haircare and niche party supplies—possess a level of brand loyalty and complexity that is difficult for generic retail labels to replicate. While private labels are currently displacing national brands in high-frequency, simple categories like dairy and staples, Narayanan believes the company’s core categories remain protected from this encroachment as they drive searches.
Having shifted its strategy from aggressive acquisitions to organic scaling, the company is now doubling down on its four largest brands: MyFitness (peanut butter), Botanic Hearth (haircare), Majestic Pure (aromatherapy), and PartyPropz (celebration supplies).
About 10-15% of BRND.ME’s India business currently comes from quick commerce, a channel the company plans to scale, Narayanan said. The company is the leader in party supplies on quick-commerce platforms, benefiting from impulse-driven demand. “People forget birthdays and anniversaries, so it’s a classic category to build a brand on quick commerce,” he said. The category contributes about ₹200 crore of revenue. The company also leads the peanut butter category through MyFitness, with a 30% market share on all quick commerce platforms and annual revenue of ₹270 crore.
The company’s revenue run rate stands at about $200 million. Male consumers worried about male-pattern baldness now account for about 35% of haircare sales. The company aims for a 10-fold jump in aromatherapy and haircare sales from $6 million to $60 million within four years, led by Majestic Pure and Botanic Hearth.
Drawing on his experience running Myntra, Narayanan said that private labels typically have a ceiling. “Even when we pushed hard on private labels at Myntra, they never went beyond 25-30% of the overall portfolio. That tends to remain the case as the categories we operate in are very hard to displace because we drive searches.”
This dynamic is already visible across several quick-commerce categories. The peanut butter segment is heavily consolidated on Blinkit, with Pintola and MyFitness together accounting for about 73% of sales, according to data from Datum Intelligence. Similar patterns have emerged in other categories. Blinkit’s popcorn segment, for instance, has rapidly consolidated into a duopoly, with 4700BC and Act II controlling 99% of sales.
Private labels muscling in
While Blinkit has consciously avoided launching private-label products on its platform, Swiggy has done so through Noice, and Zepto through Relish and Daily Good. For established brands, these private labels are becoming harder to ignore. Swiggy has scaled Noice aggressively, expanding the portfolio from about 200 to 350 stock keeping units (SKUs) and onboarding more manufacturing partners while moving beyond staples into categories such as beverages and ready-to-cook foods. These products are aimed at delivering significantly higher margins of 35-40%, compared with 10-15% on third-party brands, Mint reported earlier.
Private labels now contribute an estimated 6-8% of quick-commerce sales, up from 1-2% two years ago, according to data from 1digitalstack.ai, though penetration in perishables remains limited because of supply-chain complexity and quality concerns. A broader push into fresh categories could lift private-label share to 10-15%. Noice has already captured 3.4% of wafer sales and 1.9% of biscuit sales on the platform within months of its launch, according to 1digitalstack.ai data. The two categories are dominated by Lay’s and Britannia, which have a market share of about 35% each in their respective segments.
Zepto’s private-label push spans multiple everyday categories, including Relish for meat products, Daily Good for staples, Chyll for ice cubes and juices, and Aaha! for snacks, sweets, cereals and batters.
This growing presence creates a structural ‘trap’ for digital-first brands. Devangshu Dutta, chief executive at Third Eyesight, a consultancy firm, said, “Brands that are overly dependent on a single sales platform remain structurally vulnerable to being replaced by the platform’s own private labels, which are designed to capitalise on product opportunities that already have proven demand.” Platforms, he explained, tend to dominate high-frequency purchases, often undercutting brands on both price and visibility.
Persistently high online customer acquisition costs add to the pressure, particularly if the customer relationship is owned by the platform rather than the brand. “This has been one of the significant friction points for all digital-only brands, and weighs especially heavily on companies that have online-heavy portfolios with multiple brands in play,” Dutta added.
(Published in Mint)
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December 29, 2025
Yash Bhatia, Impact Magazine
29 December 2025
App, Tap, Pay and Zoom it’s delivered – that is Quick commerce for you. And in India, the narrative has so far been defined by speed, scale, high SKU counts, and the dominance of dark stores. Last week, however, Instamart nudged that model by opening an experiential store in Gurugram, allowing consumers to see and feel select products available on the platform.
The Bengaluru-based company has positioned the outlet not as a conventional retail store, but as a compact experiential format with a sharply curated assortment of around 100–200 SKUs, compared to the 15,000–20,000 SKUs typically housed in a dark store. Spanning roughly 400 sq. ft., the space is about one-tenth the size of a standard 4,000 sq. ft. dark store.
Under this model, sales proceeds are paid directly to sellers. This differs from Instamart’s regular arrangement, where payments are routed through the platform and later settled with sellers after deducting the platform’s share. IMPACT reached out to Instamart for further details, but the company declined to comment.
Sources close to the development say that Instamart has enabled sellers to open branded experiential stores in and around residential societies as part of a targeted consumer experiment. These are not conventional retail outlets, but compact experiential formats with a highly curated SKU assortment, focused on categories where consumers prefer to assess the products first-hand before purchasing, such as fresh fruits, vegetables, pulses, new product launches, and selected D2C brands. The initiative is largely centred on fresh categories and allows sellers to experiment with Instamart’s branding and service ecosystem.
Devangshu Dutta, Founder, Third Eyesight, a retail consultancy firm, says that physical presence plays a vital role in anchoring trust, particularly in premium products, groceries, and fresh produce. “Experiencing a product or brand physically can significantly enhance perceived value and help create stickiness. For this reason, offline stores continue to remain integral to the consumer products sector,” he explains.
Built on the promise of speed and convenience, quick commerce brands have come under growing scrutiny for quality and hygiene lapses at dark stores. Over the past year, several reports have flagged issues ranging from poor storage conditions and compromised freshness to the sale of expired or damaged products, particularly in food and grocery categories.
In some instances, regulatory inspections have led to licence suspensions after authorities identified hygiene violations at fulfilment centres. “Trust is what builds loyalty, and the shift is clearly moving from minutes to confidence,” says Shankar Shinde, Co-Founder, Aisles and Shelves, a behaviour-led brand consultancy in India. Shinde adds that the emergence of offline formats such as Instamart’s physical store aligns with this transition, particularly in grocery and fresh categories where consumers place a high premium on quality and consistency. “Physical touchpoints help reduce consumer anxiety, especially in a market like India, where shoppers still prefer hand-picked fresh produce such as fruits and vegetables,” he explains.
Against this backdrop, the opening of experiential centres could emerge as one way for quick commerce players to rebuild consumer trust by allowing shoppers to experience products in person before purchasing. IMPACT also reached out to Blinkit and Zepto for their views, but both declined to comment.
Kushal Bhatnagar, Associate Partner, Redseer Strategy Consultants, believes the move is aimed at unlocking incremental growth by tapping into offline-first consumers who are not yet active on quick commerce, while also catering to the offline purchase missions of existing quick commerce users. He notes that quick commerce currently reaches only about 75–80 million annual transacting users as of CY2025, even as over 90% of India’s grocery consumption continues to take place offline.
Beyond expanding reach, Bhatnagar sees offline formats as a way to address deeper trust barriers within the category. He adds that such formats can help deepen consumer confidence, particularly in categories where apprehensions around quality and freshness persist in quick commerce deliveries, concerns that are partly alleviated when consumers can experience products first-hand. Additionally, he points out that this approach benefits brands, especially emerging ones that are largely confined to quick commerce or a limited set of platforms, by giving them greater physical retail visibility without requiring heavy investment in traditional distribution networks.
Viewed through a financial lens, the move also carries implications for how quick commerce platforms justify value. Saurabh Parmar, fractional CMO, believes the initiative signals a shift from promise to performance, with a stronger emphasis on optimisation and a more realistic assessment of long-term value creation. He notes that while quick commerce has expanded into Tier 2 markets and seen growth in user numbers, these metrics alone still fall short of fully justifying current valuations. In this context, an offline presence becomes another lever to strengthen the overall business case.
At the same time, Parmar cautions that offline formats cannot replace the core proposition of quick commerce. He adds that experiential centres enhance brand credibility and make quick commerce feel closer to conventional retail, with the potential to eventually extend into other facets of e-commerce. However, he emphasises that quick commerce must continue to remain the frontline, as the sector’s valuations are fundamentally anchored in its speed-led proposition.
Retail experts, meanwhile, view physical touchpoints as a long-standing mechanism for building trust rather than a structural shift.
Dutta adds that such formats complement existing digital trust mechanisms such as delivery consistency, speed, ratings, and reviews by making brands feel tangible and accountable rather than abstract.
Bhatnagar notes that quick commerce currently has an average monthly transacting user base of around 40 million as of CY2025, leaving significant headroom for growth when compared to India’s overall e-commerce base of nearly 300 million active transacting users.
Beyond expanding the user base, he adds that experiential stores can also support wallet-share expansion across categories, which remains a key growth lever for the sector. “Non-grocery segments such as beauty and personal care, electronics, and fashion currently contribute about 25% of quick commerce GMV (Gross Merchandise Value), a share that is expected to rise further. Within groceries as well, platforms can drive incremental growth by building greater depth in fresh produce and staples,” Bhatnagar highlights.
From an operational perspective, however, the offline format is viewed more as a supporting layer than a core growth engine. Dutta sees Instamart’s offline presence as an experimental add-on rather than a replacement for its delivery-led model. The operating processes and economics differ significantly from those of quick commerce delivery, positioning physical formats as a complement to the speed proposition rather than an alternative. If the model proves viable and is backed by sufficient resources, it could eventually lead to a parallel scale-up of dark stores and experiential formats across different catchments.
For now, Instamart’s offline foray remains a tightly scoped experiment rather than a strategic pivot. Its significance lies less in square footage and more in what it signals about the evolving priorities of quick commerce. As the category matures, speed alone may no longer be sufficient to secure trust, loyalty, or long-term value. Experiential touchpoints, if deployed selectively, could help platforms bridge the gap between digital convenience and physical reassurance, particularly in categories where quality perception continues to remain fragile.
(Published in IMPACT)
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November 18, 2025
Chris Kay, Krishn Kaushik and Andrea Rodrigues in Mumbai
Nov 18 2025
Just before dawn, Kashif Sameer joins dozens of couriers zipping across Mumbai to deliver items stocked in a basement of a shopping mall run by Reliance Industries.
“I make between 20 and 30 deliveries in a day,” said the 25-year-old, who had just driven a mile across the chaotic roads of the Indian megacity to drop off groceries ordered 15 minutes earlier. “It is very popular with customers.”
The buzzing activity at the so-called dark store, a mini-warehouse operated by Reliance’s ecommerce platform JioMart, is part of a renewed push by the conglomerate’s chair and Asia’s richest man, Mukesh Ambani, to reassert his company’s position in India’s retail market.
It has added hundreds of dark stores to operate a total of nearly 20,000 physical outlets this year — almost double its pre-pandemic size — as it battles for dominance against Blinkit, Swiggy and Zepto in the country’s ballooning quick-commerce market.
“It’s a question of who runs out of money first,” said Arvind Singhal, chair of retail consultancy The Knowledge Company. “We will see some kind of a shakeout.”
Despite its large network of physical stores, Reliance has yet to corner the domestic consumer market like it did with telecoms a decade ago. It faces entrenched competition from established domestic and international rivals, as well as millions of kiranas, family-run convenience stores.
The sprawling Tata Group operates a wide range of consumer businesses, while global multinationals such as Unilever and Nestlé are important players in India’s household goods market.
Reliance Retail, the division that contains all of the conglomerate’s consumer-facing units, had shed tens of thousands of employees and closed underperforming stores following a bloated build-out during the Covid-19 pandemic and slowing middle-class spending.
But India’s most valuable company, which has a market value of more than $225bn and operates across oil refining, telecoms and entertainment, is expanding its retail reach again.
Reliance Retail’s latest results point to a rebound. In the quarter ending September, the unit reported revenue of about $10bn and profit of $390mn, up 18 and 22 per cent respectively from the previous year.
“Reliance’s scale in retail now is unmatched in India,” said Devangshu Dutta, chief executive of consumer advisory company Third Eyesight, in reference to the breadth of the conglomerate’s business. “This scale is unique in India and rare in global retail.”
Ambani’s retail ambitions are being led by his 34-year-old daughter, Isha. In August, she detailed plans for Reliance’s consumer brands subsidiary, which has a portfolio including Lotus Chocolate and the recently revived nostalgic Indian soft drink Campa Cola, to reach $11.7bn in revenue within five years.
Ultimately, the goal was to “become India’s largest FMCG company with a global presence”, said Isha Ambani during Reliance’s annual meeting.
The company told the Financial Times that it continued to “reinforce its position as India’s largest retailer, expanding its nationwide network”.
While Ambani originally indicated that he wanted to list Reliance Jio Infocomm, the telecoms unit, and Reliance Retail by 2024, people familiar with the company said the retail unit was not ready to go public. The billionaire said the Jio listing could happen in the first half of next year.
“Competitive intensity in every category in the discretionary retail side has picked up very sharply,” said Karan Taurani, executive vice-president at Elara Capital, who does not expect Reliance Retail to float for at least two years. “New competitors, new brands have come in and they are challenging the larger incumbents.”
The Ambanis, who operate as gatekeepers for foreign companies seeking access to India’s massive but challenging business landscape, have sought to cement their position through a spate of partnerships with western retail brands.
Foreign brands including West Elm, Pottery Barn and Superdry have stores in Reliance’s shopping malls in upmarket Mumbai. However, those joint ventures have largely struggled to gain traction with shoppers in India, where the per capita income remains less than $3,000.
The conglomerate’s foreign brands business housing these joint ventures lost Rs2.7bn ($30mn) in the financial year through March 2025, according to the latest available accounts. The Knowledge Company’s Singhal called Reliance’s push to bring international names to India “a vanity project”.
Reliance’s high-profile partnership with fast-fashion retailer Shein has also been underwhelming. The company returned to India this year under Reliance’s wing after being booted out in 2020 when relations between New Delhi and Beijing soured following military clashes along their disputed border.
Shein’s app has been downloaded just 11mn times, according to market intelligence firm Sensor Tower. Its discount prices are largely matched, if not undercut, by many Indian ecommerce and fashion retailers, say analysts.
Reliance is investing heavily in quick commerce, where deliveries are promised in 30 minutes or less. Bank of America estimates the market could reach $128bn by 2030.
The field is at present dominated by Blinkit, Swiggy and Zepto, which together control more than 90 per cent of the quick commerce delivery market and compete with Amazon and Walmart-owned Flipkart. None of the companies are profitable.
The Ambanis are eager to catch up. Over the past six months, Reliance has built about 600 dark stores across cities to plug gaps in its vast store network. By contrast, market leader Blinkit operates about 1,800 dark stores.
In quick commerce, “we have to be there because everybody is”, said a person close to the conglomerate. “It is a long-term strategy.”
On a call with analysts last month, Reliance Retail’s finance chief Dinesh Taluja admitted to delays in entering quick commerce. But he insisted that Reliance offered better prices, more variety and wider reach across smaller Indian cities where it is often the only formal retailer.
“The competition today is mainly in the top 10, 20 cities,” Taluja said. “We are present in almost a thousand cities. Competition will take many years to reach where we already have a head start there.”
Still, Reliance was facing an uphill battle, warned Elara’s Taurani. “JioMart is making a late entry,” he said, “it will be very tough to disrupt players here.”
(Published in Financial Times, all copyrights owned by FT)
