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February 27, 2026
Samar Srivastava, Forbes India
Feb 27, 2026
India’s young consumers are discovering the next big beauty serum, protein bar or sneaker brand not in a mall, but on Instagram reels, YouTube shorts and quick-commerce apps that promise 10-minute delivery. What began as a trickle of digital-first labels a decade ago has now become a full-blown wave. Direct-to-consumer (D2C) brands—built online, fuelled by social media and venture capital—have reshaped India’s consumer landscape and forced legacy companies to rethink everything from marketing to distribution.
India today has more than 800 active D2C brands across beauty, personal care, fashion, food, home and electronics, according to industry estimates and consulting reports. The Indian D2C market is estimated at $12–15 billion in 2025, up from under $5 billion in 2020, and growing at 25–30 percent annually. The pandemic accelerated online adoption, but the structural drivers—cheap data, digital payments and over 750 million internet users—were already in place.
Unlike traditional FMCG brands that relied on distributors and kirana stores, D2C brands such as Mamaearth, boAt, Licious and Sugar Cosmetics built their early traction online. Customer acquisition happened through performance marketing; feedback loops were immediate; product iterations were rapid.
Importantly, these brands are discovered online—but as they scale, consumers buy them both online and offline, increasingly through quick-commerce platforms such as Blinkit, Zepto and Swiggy Instamart, as well as modern trade and general trade stores. The omnichannel play is now central to their growth strategy.
According to Anil Kumar, founder and chief executive of Redseer Strategy Consultants, the ecosystem is maturing in measurable ways. Brands are taking lesser time to reach ₹100 crore or ₹500 crore revenue benchmarks and, once there, mortality rates are coming down. There is also an acceptance that if a brand is not profitable in a 3–5 year timeframe, that needs to be corrected. “There is a lot of emphasis on growing profitably and not just through GMV,” he says.
Big Cheques, Bigger Exits
The D2C boom would not have been possible without capital. Between 2014 and 2022, Indian D2C startups raised over $5 billion in venture and growth funding. Peak years like 2021 alone saw more than $1.2 billion invested in the segment. Beauty, personal care and fashion accounted for nearly 50 percent of total inflows, followed by food and beverages.
Some brands scaled independently; others found strategic buyers. Among the most prominent exits:
> Hindustan Unilever acquired a majority stake in Minimalist, reportedly valuing the actives-led skincare brand at over ₹3,000 crore. For Hindustan Unilever, the annual run rate from sales of its D2C portfolio is estimated at around ₹1,000 crore, underscoring how material digital-first brands have become to its growth strategy.
> ITC Limited bought Yoga Bar for about ₹175 crore in 2023 to strengthen its health foods portfolio.
> Emami acquired a majority stake in The Man Company, expanding its digital-first play.
> Tata Consumer Products acquired Soulfull as part of its health and wellness strategy.
> Marico invested in brands such as Beardo and True Elements.
Private equity has also entered aggressively at the growth stage. ChrysCapital invested in The Man Company; L Catterton backed Sugar Cosmetics; General Atlantic invested in boAt; and Sequoia Capital India (now Peak XV Partners) was an early backer of multiple consumer brands.
Valuations were often steep. boAt was valued at over $1.2 billion at its peak. Mamaearth’s parent, Honasa Consumer, listed in 2023 at a valuation of around ₹10,000 crore. Across categories, brands crossing ₹500 crore in annual revenue began attracting buyout interest, with deal sizes ranging from ₹150 crore to over ₹3,000 crore depending on scale and profitability.
Yet exits have not always been smooth. “While it takes 7-8 years to build a brand most funds that invest in them have a timeline of 3-5 years before they need an exit,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a retail consultancy. This timing mismatch can create pressure—pushing brands to scale aggressively, sometimes at the cost of margins.
Integration Pains and the Profitability Pivot
For large FMCG companies, buying D2C brands offers speed: Access to younger consumers, premium positioning and digital marketing expertise. But integration brings challenges.
Founder-led organisations operate with rapid decision cycles, test-and-learn marketing and flat hierarchies. Large corporations often work with layered approvals, structured brand calendars and rigid cost controls. Cultural friction can lead to talent exits if autonomy is curtailed too quickly.
Margins are another sticking point. In the early growth phase, many D2C brands spent 30–40 percent of revenue on digital advertising. Rising customer acquisition costs post-2021, combined with higher logistics expenses, squeezed contribution margins. As brands entered offline retail, distributor and retailer margins of 20–35 percent further compressed profitability.
Large acquirers, used to EBITDA margins of 18–25 percent in mature FMCG portfolios, often discovered that digital-first brands operated at low single-digit margins—or were loss-making at scale. Rationalising ad spends, optimising supply chains and pruning SKUs became essential.
The funding slowdown between 2022 and 2024 triggered a reset. Marketing spends were cut by as much as 25–40 percent across several startups. Growth moderated from 80–100 percent annually during peak years to 25–40 percent for more mature brands—but unit economics improved.
Quick-commerce has emerged as a structural growth lever. For categories such as personal care, snacking and health foods, these platforms now account for 10–25 percent of urban revenues for scaled brands, improving inventory turns and reducing dependence on paid digital acquisition.
The next phase of India’s D2C journey will be less about blitz scaling and more about disciplined brand building—balancing growth, profitability and exit timelines. What began as a disruption is now part of the mainstream consumer playbook. And as capital becomes more selective, only brands that combine strong gross margins, repeat purchase rates above 35–40 percent and sustainable EBITDA pathways will endure.
(Published in Forbes India)
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January 6, 2026
Saumyangi Yadav, Entrepreneur India
Jan 6, 2026
After years of rapid growth and a sharp reset, India’s direct-to-consumer (D2C) sector is expected to settle into a more balanced phase. The period of easy funding, aggressive customer acquisition and scale-at-all-costs expansion is clearly over, experts suggest. Now, what lies ahead in 2026 is a shift towards steadier growth driven by better execution, stronger retention and clearer brand positioning.
According to Bain and Flipkart, India’s e-retail market is projected to reach $170–190 billion in GMV by 2030, driven by a growing online shopper base and evolving commerce models. As adoption deepens across Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities, high-frequency categories such as grocery and lifestyle are expected to drive a larger share of growth, making repeat purchase and habit formation critical for D2C brands.
Against this backdrop, 2026 is shaping up as the year when D2C brands are judged less on ambition and more on outcomes.
A Post-Hype Phase of D2C
Industry observers say the D2C ecosystem has clearly moved beyond its hype-driven phase. Devangshu Dutta, Founder and Chief Executive of retail consultancy Third Eyesight, describes the current moment as one of structural correction rather than contraction.
“India’s D2C ecosystem is in a post-hype phase where growth may be slower but structurally healthier,” Dutta says, adding, “Earlier growth cycles prioritised visibility and sales at the expense of profitability and consistency. Now, success is being measured by repeat rates, contribution margins and the ability to fund growth internally.”
Tighter funding is also driving this shift. With D2C investments slowing and overall capital remaining cautious, brands are now being pushed to show predictability rather than promise. Tracxn data shows Indian D2C startups raised USD 757 million in 2024, significantly lower than previous years, while overall PE-VC investments in India remained flat at USD 33 billion in 2025, according to Venture Intelligence.
As a result, Dutta notes that many D2C companies are rationalising portfolios, tightening inventory cycles and optimising supply chains. Marketing strategies, too, are evolving, with greater emphasis on retention, community-building and owned channels instead of discount-led growth.
Uniqueness Will Define Winners
If capital discipline is one defining force, speed is another. Harish Bijoor, business and brand strategy expert, argues that D2C’s next phase will be shaped by how brands respond to a faster, more fragmented commerce environment.
“The e-commerce revolution led to a more refined orientation of D2C, and that has now given way to a q-commerce revolution that is even faster,” Bijoor says, adding, “The D2C revolution is going to be leveraged by speed. A whole host of players will invest time, energy and innovation into this.”
In Bijoor’s view, traditional e-commerce is now the slowest layer in a spectrum where quick commerce is the fastest, and D2C sits in between. In such a landscape, competing purely on price is no longer sustainable. He believes differentiation will increasingly come from uniqueness and premium positioning rather than ubiquity.
“When you know that you get a particular great-tasting biryani at just one place with no branches, you will go to that place. That uniqueness is what will distinguish D2C commerce in the future,” he says.
Bijoor adds that many D2C brands have been trapped in price wars under the guise of differentiation. He also argued that brands that premiumise and resist excessive omnichannel dilution are more likely to build desirability and long-term value.
Consumers Move Beyond Metros
Structural shifts in demand are reshaping how and where D2C brands grow. India now has one of the world’s largest and most diverse online consumer bases, with growth increasingly driven by Tier-2, Tier-3 and smaller towns rather than metros alone. Internet adoption continues to deepen across rural and semi-urban India, expanding the addressable market well beyond early digital buyers.
This widening base is changing the nature of growth. Consumers are becoming more deliberate in how they spend, weighing value, quality and trust more carefully than before.
As Devangshu Dutta notes, Indian consumers have always been discerning, but rising living costs and economic uncertainty have made them even more thoughtful, pushing brands to earn repeat demand rather than rely on impulse or discount-led purchases.
“Value is not just about discounts,” he says. “It’s a balance of price, performance and trust. For D2C brands, repeat consumption has to be earned through consistent quality, transparent pricing and dependable service.”
High-frequency categories such as grocery, lifestyle and general merchandise are expected to drive much of this expansion. Bain estimates these segments will account for two out of every three e-retail dollars by 2030, reinforcing the importance of habit formation and retention-led models.
Quick Commerce Expands Discovery, Not Profitability
Quick commerce has emerged as a powerful but complex growth lever for D2C brands. The format now accounts for a significant share of India’s e-grocery demand and has scaled into a multi-billion-dollar market, becoming a key discovery channel for food and everyday consumption brands.
However, expansion beyond metros remains challenging. RedSeer data shows non-metro markets contribute just over 20 per cent of quick commerce GMV, even as platforms scale to over 150 cities, with breakeven economics in smaller towns requiring significantly higher throughput.
Praveen Govindu, partner at Deloitte India, cautions that while quick commerce has helped many D2C brands gain discovery, particularly in food and beverage, it is not a sustainable growth engine on its own.
“From a customer acquisition standpoint, quick commerce is not fundamentally different from traditional e-commerce,” Govindu says, adding, “It is an expensive channel, and competition will only intensify. Over the long term, brands cannot rely on burning capital there.”
Omnichannel Enters Its Toughest Phase Yet
As digital acquisition costs rise, India’s ad market is projected to grow nearly 8 per cent in 2025 to Rs 1.37 lakh crore, with digital accounting for almost half of the spends, brands are being pushed to diversify distribution. Yet omnichannel presence alone is no longer enough.
“Many brands talk about omnichannel, personalisation and seamless journeys, but in practice these efforts are still disjointed. In 2026, the focus will shift from intent to execution,” Govindu says.
RedSeer projects India’s retail market to cross USD 2 trillion by 2030, with nearly 90 per cent of consumption still happening offline. For D2C brands, this makes offline expansion unavoidable, but success will depend on consistent execution across pricing, inventory, service and communication.
Consumers, Govindu notes, do not consciously differentiate between online, offline or social platforms. “They simply want a consistent experience,” he says. “Even small inconsistencies can erode trust.”
AI-Led Discovery and Experience
Perhaps the most transformative force shaping 2026 will be the evolution of buying journeys themselves. Govindu sees the rise of AI-led and agentic commerce as a major inflection point.
“Conversational platforms and AI-driven assistants will increasingly influence discovery, purchase, fulfilment and post-sales experiences. What earlier happened across multiple touchpoints is now beginning to happen in one place,” he says.
This convergence amplifies the importance of content-led discovery, owned data and deep consumer understanding. Brands that can unify storytelling, commerce and service into a coherent narrative are more likely to build loyalty in an environment where switching costs are low and alternatives are abundant.
Whether growth comes through D2C websites, marketplaces, quick commerce or offline stores, experts agree that the real differentiator will be a brand’s ability to build durable consumer relationships. As investors shift focus from short-term metrics to long-term value creation like retention, margins and brand strength, the next phase of India’s D2C story is less about rapid expansion and more about refinement.
(Published in Entrepreneur India)
Saumyangi is a Senior Correspondent at Entrepreneur India with over three years of experience in journalism. She has reported on education, social, and civic issues, and currently covers the D2C and consumer brand space.
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December 1, 2025
Priyamvada C, Mint
1 Dec 2025
A wave of investor capital is flowing into India’s laboratory-grown diamond (LGD) segment, as fastscaling brands tap rising consumer adoption in a market now worth well over $300 million. New-age brands have raised multiple rounds of capital on the back of growing market share and improving margins.
Actor Shilpa Shetty-backed Limelight, which is in talks to raise its second round of capital this year, joins the growing list of other small brands such as Onya, Giva, Jewelbox, Lucira Jewellery and Aukera, among others, who have snagged monies in recent months. Limelight has appointed Ambit Capital to raise about $20 million to fund its expansion plans, two people familiar with the matter said.
Confirming the fundraise, the six year-old company’s co-founder Pooja Madhavan said the funds will be used towards store expansion and brand building as it looks to touch 100 stores over the next year. “We are in final talks with growth PE funds and reputed family offices (for the fundraise),” she told Mint.
Other similar fundraises include Onya’s ₹5.5 crore in a pre-seed round led by Zeropearl VC last week, Aukera’s $15 million raise led by Peak XV Partners and Aditya Birla Ventures-backed Giva raised ₹530 crore in an internal round led by Premji Invest, Epiq Capital and Edelweiss Discovery Fund, as it looks to scale up its lab-grown diamond offerings.
Nine pure-play lab grown diamond startups collectively raised a record $26.4 million in 2025, compared with $4.7 million across eight startups last year, data from market intelligence provider Tracxn showed.
The development comes as India’s lab-grown diamond jewellery market, valued at about $300-350 million in 2024, expects to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 15% over the next decade, as per consultancy firm Redseer’s estimates. As the market evolves, several prominent jewellery brands will gradually pivot from exclusively natural/mined diamonds in favour of lab-grown alternatives, alongside high-end jewellers incorporating the lab-growns into their select collections, which will drive sales volumes and act as an affordable entry point for consumers.
This segment has particularly picked pace in the last five years, with millennials and gen Z leading this shift, driven by better value, trendier designs from new-age brands, and growing comfort with lab-grown diamonds as a certified, high-quality product. This category has also widened beyond occasional fashion to gifting, daily wear and increasingly bridal, reflecting sustained consumer confidence and a willingness to treat them as a mainstream jewellery option, Rohan Agarwal, partner at Redseer told Mint in an emailed statement.
He further added that new-age brands have steadily gained market share in the mid-ticket gifting and daily wear segment with many trying to push into premium ranges. While the competitive landscape is still evolving, incumbents have already started responding by launching LGD lines of their own, although the extent to which they can challenge remains to be seen.
Major Indian brands that are considering a foray into this category include Malabar Gold & Diamonds, Senco Gold, which has launched the subbrand Sennes and Tata’s Trent, which launched its brand Pome in Westside stores.
Devangshu Dutta, founder and chief executive officer at Delhi-based consulting firm Third Eyesight, echoed the sentiment. He explained that new-age lab grown diamond players are forcing traditional jewellers to introduce LGD options or risk losing younger customers. “Not just precious jewellery brands, even those that started as fashion jewellery are expanding their range with LGD designs.”
“Down the road, there is potentially scope for consolidation as investors tend to prefer a handful of scaled platforms with strong brand recall and robust economics. So, as the category matures, there may be strategic acquisitions by large jewellery houses and corporates, as well as mergers among funded startups,” he added.
Those startups that can combine in-house manufacturing, design capabilities and data-driven retail expansion would be at an advantage, Dutta said. “Key future growth areas for LGD startups include omnichannel retail presence within India, with offline stores especially in demand-dense locations such as the metros and Tier 1 cities, export markets both with potential cost advantages and brand expansion, and extending into fashion jewellery, everyday wear, coloured lab grown stones and even luxury collaborations that position lab grown as aspirational rather than merely budget friendly.”
(Published in Mint)
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August 18, 2025
Hiral Goyal, The Morning Context
18 August 2025
A trend that has been playing out through big and small changes over the last two decades is that in urban India the kirana store is easily replaceable.
When it comes to buying groceries, urban Indians have a number of options. They can visit a fancy supermarket run by a conglomerate or order online through a number of e-commerce and instant-delivery companies. And if the above doesn’t seem easy enough, they can hop over to a nearby mom-and-pop store.
It would appear it is now the turn of smaller towns in the country to witness the kirana disruption. Even though 99% of grocery shopping in these tier-3 cities is done through neighborhood general stores, there are startups that believe this is an outdated and inefficient form of retail and a change is in order.
One such company is SuperK. The startup’s mission is to build a grocery store model in small towns that has all of the advantages of modern retail packed in a compact 800-square-foot store. This is what Anil Thontepu and Neeraj Menta had set out to do when they founded the company in 2019. The idea was to bring a modern trade-like grocery shopping experience to small-town India a wide assortment of products at a better value.
“There is a cost-efficient world of general trade and a customer-loving world of modern retail,” says Thontepu. “We wanted to see if we can bridge this gap…and do something for the small-town people by bringing the best of both these worlds.”
Over the past five years, the Bengaluru-headquartered startup has opened over 130 stores across 80 towns in Andhra Pradesh. And it doesn’t want to stop there. The company wants to expand to another 300 towns in Andhra Pradesh and nearby states of Karnataka and Telangana over the next 24, months. That’s quite an ambitious target. But the founders believe the market size for Superk is so large that they should be able to build a Rs 2,000-3,000 стоore ($228-342 million) annual business from Andhra and Telangana alone.
To fuel this expansion, Superk raised Rs 100 crore ($11.7 million) in Series B funding last month. The round, led by Binny Bansal’s 3STATE Ventures and CaratLane founder Mithun Sacheti, valued Superk at 2-2.5x its previous valuation of Rs 160 crore (about $18.25 million) in 202/
Now, Superk is not entirely unique. It competes with startups like Frendy, Apna Mart and Wheelocity, which are also trying to organize the retail market in India’s smaller towns. What sets SuperK apart is its larger, bolder approach. Grocery chain Apna Mart, for instance, runs franchisee stores in tier-2 or tier-3 markets and also offers 15-minute home delivery, SuperK’s focus is only on supermarkets. Frendy operates mini-marts and micro-kiranas in villages and towns with fewer than 10,000 people, but SuperK targets small towns with populations between 20,000 and 500,000. And Wheelocity supplies only fresh produce to rural areas, while Superk sells dry groceries as well as packaged consumer goods.
This rather radical shift in focus-away from tier-1 and tier-2 cities-ties in with India’s changing consumption pattern. “Consumer mindsets are changing even in smaller cities,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder and chief executive of Third Eyesight, adding that these consumers are beginning to favour more modern retail environments. And NielsenIQ’s latest report says rural markets in India grew twice as fast as cities between April and June 2025.
In this landscape, SuperK fits like a glove, with its franchise-first approach. Thanks to an asset-light model, the company has the agility to go deeper into smaller towns.
But it won’t be all that easy either. As Dutta says, “Changing grocery habits is a long, capital-intensive game.” Moreover, big retail chains are also jumping on the bandwagon. Hypermarket chain Vishal Mega Mart, for instance, already operates 47% of its stores in tier-3 cities and plans to expand into cities with populations exceeding 50,000. Supermarket chain operator DMart is also focusing on tier-2 and tier-3 cities.
However, Superk founders believe they are prepared for the challenge. Menta says the startup has arrived at a business model that is scalable, sustainable and, more importantly, offers value to its customers.
It’s too early to say whether they will be successful in this endeavour. That said, SuperK appears to have built a smart retail business for small-town India.
Refining small-town retail
SuperK’s founders have drawn inspiration from domestic and international retail chains like DMart and Costco. But they haven’t duplicated their strategies and made their own tweaks instead. For instance, large retail chains usually run company-owned and company operated, or COCO, stores. Though this approach is more cost-intensive than the franchise model, it allows a company to ensure a uniform customer experience across all outlets:
Superk doesn’t do that. It runs only franchise-owned and franchise-operated (FOFO) stores, which are no bigger than 800 sq ft. The company is not the first to have experimented with this model, but Thontepu believes that everyone else before them “did not try with the right spirit”. A franchise-owned store, argues co-founder Menta, is run differently from a company-owned store one has to keep in mind the store owner’s incentives, needs and concerns.
Under the franchise model, entrepreneurs invest between Rs 12 lakh (about $13,690) and Rs 15 lakh (about $17,110) to set up a Superk store. Of this, Rs 4 lakh (nearly $4,560) is spent on the store fit-out and infrastructure, the rest goes towards buying inventory. These stores, according to Menta, typically achieve a breakeven point after six months. On average, a retail store takes longer than that-12-15 months to reach breakeven.
Superk fills the shelves by procuring its inventory directly from brands as well as distributors. “The inventory is recommended by us through a mobile application. Store owners have an option to make certain changes within the limits that we have set for them,” says Thontepu. Revenue is shared and the model is similar to the one followed by nearly all retailers in India. Franchisees earn varying levels of margins on different kinds of products, depending on how easy or tough it is to sell those items. For instance, staples like dal and rice have lower margins, while confectionary items and products that need greater effort to sell enjoy higher margins of up to 20%.
In addition to this, there’s a private label business, especially loose items like pulses. In fact, private labelling is part of the company’s efforts to bring some standardization in India’s unorganized retail market. “A customer coming to our store should be able to blindly expect consistent quality on the product they’re buying,” says Menta. “We have organized our sourcing, processing, cleaning, packaging, testing. Everything that a brand would do to provide a great-quality product to their customer.”
Unlike distributors or other retailers who operate franchise models though, Superk claims that it does not dump its inventory on store owners. Menta says the franchise structure is designed in a way that Superk does not benefit from selling unnecessary stock to store owners. “If I lose, he will lose. If he loses, I lose. That is the way (the structure) is created. We, in fact, recommend owners to remove some products if they are not selling.” says Menta.
On the customer side of things, Superk’s value proposition comes down to offering the best prices. More than a year ago, for instance, it introduced a membership programme that offers customers cashback that is redeemable on their future purchases. “If they pay Rs 300 [approximately $3.5) for a six-month membership, they get 10% cashback on all purchases that they are making up to Rs 300 every month,” explains Thontepu. He says 35-40% of Superk’s more than 500,000 customers are enrolled in this programme.
All of this sounds good even promising in theory. But will it be enough to build a sustainable and scalable retail business?
A long, hard look
Let’s first look at what really works in SuperK’s favour.
One, the focus on selling staples under a private label brand. This has been done successfully before. One example is Nilgiri’s, one of India’s oldest supermarket chains.
Founded in 1905, Niligiri’s operated under a franchise model and sold dairy, baked goods, chocolates and other items produced under its own brand. The supermarket chain was sold by debt-ridden Future Group for Rs 67 crore ($7.65 million) in 2023, less than one-third the price the latter paid to acquire the company from private equity firm Actis in 2014. However, its history is worth learning from.
Shomik Mukherjee, a Delhi-based consumer goods advisor who was a partner at Actis while the firm was in control of Nilgiri’s, recalls the value proposition created by Nilgiri’s private label products. “In the case of private labels, it is essential for a company to have a reason why people will walk into that store. For Nilgiri’s, it was bakery and dairy products,” says Mukherjee. Owning a private label that brought in customers also ensured that franchisee owners had incentives to continue working with Nilgiri’s. “It is about giving the franchisees a safe portfolio of private label goods that are desired by customer instead of something that is shoved down the franchisees’ throat to derive margin,” he says.
You see, the overall grocery business operates on a very low margin. But private labelling, says Satish Meena, founder of Datum Intelligence, offers the highest margins – 35-40% – in the grocery business, after fresh produce, making it a lucrative business to get into.
Superk, which sells essential items through its private label, has the opportunity to earn better margins in grocery retail. More importantly, private labelling holds the potential to become SuperK’s identity and boost customer retention and loyalty.
Two, SuperK’s franchise model allows it to expand to more locations rapidly as compared to a regular modern trade chain with company-owned stores, says Mukherjee. This model makes SuperK’s business asset-light and brings down the cost of running a network of stores. “Under this model, the franchisor does not incur the upfront cost of opening a store or having to deal with the trouble of hiring and replacing store managers,” he adds. Since most store owners in a franchise model are landowners, there is a greater stability in operations as well, he explains. Moreover, Superk stores are quite small (800 sq ft), allowing easier availability of property.
The franchise model, however, is not entirely foolproof. One of the inherent problems is the difficulty in implementing standard operating procedures (SOPs) across all stores. And the problem only worsens as the company expands operations to different cities. While Superk stores boast a no-frills fit-out that can be easily set up anywhere, how these stores are maintained through the wear and tear over the years is yet to be seen.
A bigger fear is that the store owner may start running their own store without the Superk branding. “If Superk loses the franchisee owner, it also loses the location in which the store was operating,” says Mukherjee.
Moreover, most franchisee owners in the retail business typically tend to be experienced general store owners who might not be willing to adopt new technology. “Since they have run a store before, they think they know how and what to order for inventory and may not follow SuperK’s tech-enabled recommendations,” says Mukherjee.
There’s another problem. While the founders claim to have seen considerable success (35-40% sign-ups) in the rollout of SuperK’s membership programme for customers, Third Eyesight’s Dutta raises concerns about its future growth. “Indian consumers’ price sensitivity limits membership fee potential,” he says. According to him, the programme’s value in the tier-3 market lies more in customer acquisition and retention than direct revenue generation. “Long-term success requires a cashback programme to drive purchase frequency and basket size increases to offset the costs,” says Dutta.
Menta, however, has a different view. He says SuperK’s subscription is designed in a way that benefits customers only when they make full basket purchases. Moreover, the company has different pricing slabs for membership depending on the various basket sizes, which makes the model more viable. Considering the programme is a little more than a year old, it is still too early to judge whether it will find a lot of takers in small towns.
For now, the founders are in no hurry to expand their business across India. “There is no reason to go into five states. Then, you are spread thin and your economics will not work out. It’s a business of managing operations at a very low cost,” says Menta. The plan is to stick to one region and continue to go deeper into it. “A lot of our competitors who started five years ago spread to so many places that it became very difficult for them to manage,” he adds.
This is also the crux of how Thontepu and Menta are building SuperK. By implementing what they have learnt not only from their own experiments, but also from the failures and successes of other businesses. While there’s no guarantee that Superk will become a roaring success, it does appear to have set an example by starting small and growing patiently. And if the latest funding is any proof, investors are interested.
(With inputs from Neethi Lisa Rojan)
(Published in The Morning Context)
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August 6, 2025
Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025
It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.
Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.
That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.
Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.
In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.
He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”
Where The Model Broke?
In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”
But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.
And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.
As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.
In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.
In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.
Scaling Without Steering
In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.
For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.
Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.
Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.
The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.
(Published in Forbes India)
