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February 27, 2026
Samar Srivastava, Forbes India
Feb 27, 2026
India’s young consumers are discovering the next big beauty serum, protein bar or sneaker brand not in a mall, but on Instagram reels, YouTube shorts and quick-commerce apps that promise 10-minute delivery. What began as a trickle of digital-first labels a decade ago has now become a full-blown wave. Direct-to-consumer (D2C) brands—built online, fuelled by social media and venture capital—have reshaped India’s consumer landscape and forced legacy companies to rethink everything from marketing to distribution.
India today has more than 800 active D2C brands across beauty, personal care, fashion, food, home and electronics, according to industry estimates and consulting reports. The Indian D2C market is estimated at $12–15 billion in 2025, up from under $5 billion in 2020, and growing at 25–30 percent annually. The pandemic accelerated online adoption, but the structural drivers—cheap data, digital payments and over 750 million internet users—were already in place.
Unlike traditional FMCG brands that relied on distributors and kirana stores, D2C brands such as Mamaearth, boAt, Licious and Sugar Cosmetics built their early traction online. Customer acquisition happened through performance marketing; feedback loops were immediate; product iterations were rapid.
Importantly, these brands are discovered online—but as they scale, consumers buy them both online and offline, increasingly through quick-commerce platforms such as Blinkit, Zepto and Swiggy Instamart, as well as modern trade and general trade stores. The omnichannel play is now central to their growth strategy.
According to Anil Kumar, founder and chief executive of Redseer Strategy Consultants, the ecosystem is maturing in measurable ways. Brands are taking lesser time to reach ₹100 crore or ₹500 crore revenue benchmarks and, once there, mortality rates are coming down. There is also an acceptance that if a brand is not profitable in a 3–5 year timeframe, that needs to be corrected. “There is a lot of emphasis on growing profitably and not just through GMV,” he says.
Big Cheques, Bigger Exits
The D2C boom would not have been possible without capital. Between 2014 and 2022, Indian D2C startups raised over $5 billion in venture and growth funding. Peak years like 2021 alone saw more than $1.2 billion invested in the segment. Beauty, personal care and fashion accounted for nearly 50 percent of total inflows, followed by food and beverages.
Some brands scaled independently; others found strategic buyers. Among the most prominent exits:
> Hindustan Unilever acquired a majority stake in Minimalist, reportedly valuing the actives-led skincare brand at over ₹3,000 crore. For Hindustan Unilever, the annual run rate from sales of its D2C portfolio is estimated at around ₹1,000 crore, underscoring how material digital-first brands have become to its growth strategy.
> ITC Limited bought Yoga Bar for about ₹175 crore in 2023 to strengthen its health foods portfolio.
> Emami acquired a majority stake in The Man Company, expanding its digital-first play.
> Tata Consumer Products acquired Soulfull as part of its health and wellness strategy.
> Marico invested in brands such as Beardo and True Elements.
Private equity has also entered aggressively at the growth stage. ChrysCapital invested in The Man Company; L Catterton backed Sugar Cosmetics; General Atlantic invested in boAt; and Sequoia Capital India (now Peak XV Partners) was an early backer of multiple consumer brands.
Valuations were often steep. boAt was valued at over $1.2 billion at its peak. Mamaearth’s parent, Honasa Consumer, listed in 2023 at a valuation of around ₹10,000 crore. Across categories, brands crossing ₹500 crore in annual revenue began attracting buyout interest, with deal sizes ranging from ₹150 crore to over ₹3,000 crore depending on scale and profitability.
Yet exits have not always been smooth. “While it takes 7-8 years to build a brand most funds that invest in them have a timeline of 3-5 years before they need an exit,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a retail consultancy. This timing mismatch can create pressure—pushing brands to scale aggressively, sometimes at the cost of margins.
Integration Pains and the Profitability Pivot
For large FMCG companies, buying D2C brands offers speed: Access to younger consumers, premium positioning and digital marketing expertise. But integration brings challenges.
Founder-led organisations operate with rapid decision cycles, test-and-learn marketing and flat hierarchies. Large corporations often work with layered approvals, structured brand calendars and rigid cost controls. Cultural friction can lead to talent exits if autonomy is curtailed too quickly.
Margins are another sticking point. In the early growth phase, many D2C brands spent 30–40 percent of revenue on digital advertising. Rising customer acquisition costs post-2021, combined with higher logistics expenses, squeezed contribution margins. As brands entered offline retail, distributor and retailer margins of 20–35 percent further compressed profitability.
Large acquirers, used to EBITDA margins of 18–25 percent in mature FMCG portfolios, often discovered that digital-first brands operated at low single-digit margins—or were loss-making at scale. Rationalising ad spends, optimising supply chains and pruning SKUs became essential.
The funding slowdown between 2022 and 2024 triggered a reset. Marketing spends were cut by as much as 25–40 percent across several startups. Growth moderated from 80–100 percent annually during peak years to 25–40 percent for more mature brands—but unit economics improved.
Quick-commerce has emerged as a structural growth lever. For categories such as personal care, snacking and health foods, these platforms now account for 10–25 percent of urban revenues for scaled brands, improving inventory turns and reducing dependence on paid digital acquisition.
The next phase of India’s D2C journey will be less about blitz scaling and more about disciplined brand building—balancing growth, profitability and exit timelines. What began as a disruption is now part of the mainstream consumer playbook. And as capital becomes more selective, only brands that combine strong gross margins, repeat purchase rates above 35–40 percent and sustainable EBITDA pathways will endure.
(Published in Forbes India)
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January 30, 2026
Vashnavi Kasthuril, MINT
Mumbai, 30 January 2026
Reliance Consumer Products Ltd (RCPL) plans to enter the bottled iced tea market this coming summer with the relaunch of “Brew House”, three people close to the development told Mint. The people added that the brand—for which the company received approval on 23 July 2025, according to the commerce ministry records—is expected to be relaunched within the next two months. The oil-to-retail conglomerate acquired the brand in 2024 for an undisclosed amount.
The iced teas will be launched in two flavours, lemon and peach, for an entry price of ₹20 for a 200ml bottle, according to two of the three people. “The product was initially supposed to be launched for ₹10 for a 200ml bottle, but after the goods and services (GST) recast, the ready-to-drink segment falls under the ~40% GST bracket, so the company decided to start with ₹20 instead,” said one of the three people, all of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity. RCPL did not immediately respond to Mint’s emailed queries. However, multiple distributors also confirmed to Mint that “Brew House” will launch within the next two months.
FMCG ambitions
Apart from relaunching Brew House, RCPL is also evaluating launching other niche-category drinks. RCPL is also working on several new concepts, such as kombucha, prebiotic sodas, and ayurvedic drinks. RCPL now has the focus and capability to build a specialized route to market for these kinds of offerings. RCPL’s larger ambition is to be a full-scale fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) company, spanning categories across home care, food, beverages, and snacks, said the second person.
In August 2025, RCPL, the packaged consumer goods arm of Reliance Industries Ltd, acquired a majority stake in a joint venture with Naturedge Beverages Pvt. Ltd, the Mumbai-based company behind the herbal functional drink Shunya. Shunya offers zero-sugar, zero-calorie herbal beverages infused with Indian super-herbs such as ashwagandha, brahmi, khus, kokum, and green tea across India.
“When Reliance acquires a brand, one can be sure of product innovations, and you will see the same here,” said the third person. To be sure, the company has expanded its beverage portfolio to include a diverse range of beverages across mass and value segments, ranging from carbonated soft drinks under the Campa brand to packaged drinking water, sodas, mixers, energy and sports drinks, and traditional Indian refreshments such as nimbu pani, fruit beverages, and milkshakes. RCPL is also present in packaged foods through brands such as SIL, which sells noodles and other staples.
Brew House was launched in May 2017 by Siddhartha Jain under Positive Food Ventures Pvt. Ltd in Gurugram as a premium ready-to-drink iced tea brand positioned as a healthier alternative to carbonated and sugar-heavy beverages. It differentiated itself through real, whole-leaf brewing, lower sugar content and the absence of preservatives. Targeting urban, health-conscious consumers, the brand initially built distribution through cafés, hotels, restaurants, multiplexes and airports before expanding into modern trade and online channels. Its portfolio included flavours such as lemon and peach, sold in 300-350ml glass or premium PET bottles priced at ₹40-80. Singapore-based Food Empire Group later acquired a majority-stake to scale operations, before RCPL acquired the brand in 2024 for an undisclosed amount.
“The relaunch has been a bit slow. It’s available in small batches at Reliance Retail stores for now, but the company’s waiting for the right product, price point, and strategy before scaling it up. Over 2025, the focus has been on building distribution through larger beverage categories and investing in back-end capabilities, including automatic brewing equipment,” said the third person. RCPL has focused on building distribution through larger categories first. It’s difficult for a small, standalone brand to create reach, but a broad portfolio allows scale. Once that foundation is in place, the company can create a separate vertical for niche beverages like iced tea, the person added.
The niche drinks market
The ready-to-drink (RTD) iced tea category in India has long been shaped by major multinational brands and legacy beverage players, though it has remained a relatively niche segment compared with carbonated drinks. Hindustan Unilever Limited and PepsiCo first introduced Lipton Ice Tea in the country in the early 2000s through a joint venture, but the product was pulled back after an initial launch as consumers at the time were not widely ready for iced tea. It was later reintroduced in select markets with PET bottle formats in flavours such as lemon and green tea variants in 2011.
Coca-Cola and Nestle’s joint venture, Nestea, also experimented with bottled lemon RTD iced tea in the early 2010s, initially available in 400ml packs at around ₹25, before its broader rollout was scaled back while the JV evaluated consumer feedback. Aside from multinational brands, Indian companies such as Wagh Bakri have sold iced tea products, including peach-flavour premix packs, retailing around ₹95-100 for 250gm sizes online, though these are often powder mixes rather than RTD bottles.
Currently, Lipton’s bottled RTD iced tea is available in 350ml packs online at roughly ₹60, while powdered iced tea mixes such as Nestle’s 400gm pouches are priced at ₹200-230. In contrast, RCPL’s relaunch of Brew House will be brought to market in 200ml PET bottles at ₹20, undercutting these legacy players and signalling an aggressive pricing strategy.
To be sure, RCPL used a similar strategic playbook when it relaunched Campa Cola, one of India’s once-iconic soft drink brands. Campa, first introduced in the 1970s and marketed with the slogan “The Great Indian Taste”, was a household name in the pre-liberalization era but faded in the 1990s after global giants Coca-Cola and PepsiCo entered the market. Reliance acquired the brand from Pure Drinks Group in 2022 for around ₹22 crore and formally relaunched it in 2023 with variants such as Campa Cola, Campa Lemon, and Campa Orange, initially through its own retail channels and then nationwide.
Reliance’s move into iced tea aligns with its broader FMCG and retail strategy of identifying categories with long-term growth potential, according to Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight and co-founder of PVC Partners. While iced tea remains a niche within India’s overall beverage market, Dutta said it is seeing steady, organic growth, driven by the rise of cafe culture, increased eating out, and younger consumers’ demand for non-alcoholic alternatives. “Whether it’s consumed as a standalone iced tea or used as part of a cocktail or some kind of concoction, it’s a category that’s seeing increasing interest,” he said.
Reliance’s key advantage, Dutta added, lies in its distribution muscle and captive shelf space across its retail network, which allows it to scale new products more effectively than smaller, standalone brands. “Anything they put on those shelves and price well becomes an opportunity for growth,” he said, adding that the entry of a large player like Reliance is likely to expand the overall market rather than intensify competition.
(Published in Mint)
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December 15, 2025
By Saumyangi Yadav, Entrepreneur India
Dec 15, 2025
India’s D2C ecosystem has grown rapidly over the past five years, but scale remains elusive. While thousands of brands have launched and many have crossed early revenue milestones, only a small fraction manage to break past INR 100 crore in annual revenue. According to a new report by DSG Consumer Partners, based on a survey of over 100 Indian D2C founders and operators, the problem is not demand or product-market fit, it is how brands attempt to scale.
The report shows that around 60–65 per cent of Indian D2C brands remain stuck in the INR 1–50 crore revenue band, with very few reaching the INR 100 crore mark. This stage marks the point where early traction exists, but growth begins to strain unit economics, teams, and operating systems.
Insights from over 100 D2C founders reveal that India’s fastest-growing brands win on fundamentals rather than speed alone. Clear product-market fit, disciplined data tracking, strong unit economics, creative velocity, and an early focus on retention consistently separate scalable brands from those that plateau. Founders also admit that performance marketing mistakes, pricing missteps, and weak creative systems slow growth far more than budget constraints. In a booming D2C landscape, capability gaps in operations, brand-building, and supply-chain depth are widening the divide between breakout brands and those stuck in the performance plateau.
Industry observers argue that this is where many brands mistake rapid online growth for sustainable scale.
As Devangshu Dutta, Founder & CEO, Third Eyesight, explains, “Scaling up online can be very rapid, but is also capital-hungry in terms of CAC. Given the intense competition, the lack of customer stickiness and the power of platforms, there is a constant churn of marketing spend which is a huge bleed for growing brands.”
CAC Inflation is The Real Constraint
One of the clearest findings from the playbook is that acquisition efficiency, rising CAC and unstable ROAS, is the single biggest blocker to growth, cited by more founders than funding or category expansion. Moreover, over 70 per cent of brands rely on Meta as their primary acquisition channel, increasing vulnerability to auction pressure and platform-driven volatility.
Dutta links this directly to the limits of a digital-only mindset. “Limited offline expansion can trap brands in narrow urban digital markets, blocking broader scale,” he said.
This over-reliance on online performance marketing often leads to growth that looks strong on dashboards but weak on cash flow.
Highlighting their report, Pooja Shirali, Vice President, DSG Consumer Partners, said, “Across over 90 consumer brands we’ve partnered with at DSGCP, one truth is clear: brands that master Meta’s ecosystem don’t just grow, they change their entire trajectory through strategic clarity and disciplined execution. The real drivers of scale have less to do with viral moments, and everything to do with the long-term fundamentals that make milestones like the first INR 100 crore predictable, not accidental.”
Why Omnichannel is Unavoidable
The report suggests that brands that scale sustainably are those that reduce overdependence on paid digital acquisition and expand their distribution footprint. However, offline expansion brings its own complexity.
Dutta stresses that omnichannel is not an optional add-on, but a strategic shift. “D2C brands must adopt an omnichannel approach, blending online with offline retail for sustainable and scalable reach. Clearly the channels work very differently and management teams have to be prepared and capitalised for the long haul to tackle acquiring customers with channel-appropriate strategies,” he adds.
This aligns with the DSGCP report’s broader insight that scale breaks down when brands fail to adapt operating models as they grow.
Even within digital channels, performance weakens over time. The playbook finds that 62 per cent of founders report creative fatigue, where repeated creatives fail to sustain ROAS despite higher spends. At the same time, 55 per cent admit to under-investing in CRM and retention, with most brands reporting repeat purchase rates of just 10–30 per cent.
Both the data and expert opinion point to a common theme: brands that cross the INR 100 crore mark are structurally different. They obsess over unit economics, processes, and capital efficiency rather than topline growth alone.
As Dutta puts it, “Scalable brands that cross the growth hump have leadership obsessed with unit economics and omnichannel execution rather than chasing vanity metrics. Cash always was and is king, especially at early stages of growth.”
He adds that execution strength matters as much as strategy. “They are able to grow and steer teams that build and replicate processes fast rather than spending time, effort and money reinventing all the time, and do so without constant CXO intervention.”
As competition intensifies and capital becomes more selective, the next generation of INR 100 crore D2C brands is likely to be defined not by speed, but by the ability to compound cash flows, institutionalise processes, and scale distribution beyond digital platforms.
Saumyangi is a Senior Correspondent at Entrepreneur India with over three years of experience in journalism. She has reported on education, social, and civic issues, and currently covers the D2C and consumer brand space.
(Published in Entrepreneur India)
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August 6, 2025
Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025
It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.
Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.
That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.
Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.
In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.
He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”
Where The Model Broke?
In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”
But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.
And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.
As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.
In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.
In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.
Scaling Without Steering
In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.
For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.
Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.
Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.
The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.
(Published in Forbes India)
Devangshu Dutta
March 30, 2010
Last week, Starbucks unveiled its strategy for profitable global growth, having taken approximately US$ 600 million out of costs in since January 2008.
About 3 years ago in a leaked memo, chairman Howard Schultz had raised concern about how, in the race to scale and to become consistent, Starbucks was losing sight of all critical things that had made it successful in the first place. (“The Commoditization of the Starbucks Experience – Soul Searching by Howard Schultz“).
In January 2008, Schultz took on an active role as CEO in a bid to stem the rot (“Leadership Change at Starbucks – The Barista Returns“).
These two years have been eventful. Shortly after Schultz stepped in, Starbucks announced that it would close 600 under-performing stores in the US. That was well before the “financial tsunami”. In 2009, another 200 in the US and 100 globally were identified for closure, and the company also scaled back on its 2009 expansion plan for 200 new stores.
At its shareholders’ meeting last week, Starbucks presented a more confident face, and outlined a return to growth with plans to expand its presence and “accelerate profitable growth in both the U.S. retail business and in key international markets”. (This profitable growth mantra was also recited in last year’s shareholder meeting.)
However, while the business is looking better, it is far from fixed.
The environment is different. Globally, consumer wallets are leaner, competitors are meaner, and Starbucks may yet need to shrink further; the fat ain’t all in the latte.
Yet, there must be much good in the business if, for all its faults, it still gets imitated around the world.
According to Starbucks, it currently has less than 4 percent of the U.S. coffee market with its 6,800 own and 4,400 licensed stores, and less than 1 percent of the global coffee market even with 2,000+ company stores and 3,500 licensed stores. The company sees that as enough headroom to grow.
Schultz has promised to put the tough lessons learned in the last two years to good use. The company currently has approximately 200 fewer stores than it did at the beginning of 2009 even after new store openings during the year. (To put the current number of 16,700+ stores in perspective, the company had a total of “only” 2,600 stores in Q1-2000.)
But there’s something to think about. If the entrepreneur needs to step back in to fix things gone horribly corporate (bland) and wrong, maybe it’s time to acknowledge that there’s a logical limit to the size and scaling-up capability of personalized experience businesses.
Or, as a friend says, scale can be a logical outcome of excellence but excellence is never the logical outcome of scale.
It remains to be seen whether this round of growth will come from the company’s natural strengths or whether Starbucks will return to growth-by-steroids as Schultz eases on the controls.
