Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025

It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.

Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.

That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.

Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.

In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.

He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”

Where The Model Broke?

In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”

But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.

And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.

As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.

In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.

In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.

Scaling Without Steering

In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.

For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.

Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.

Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.

The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.

(Published in Forbes India)

In a startup world, founders are typically creators first while investors see themselves as the monitors. Therefore, conflicts between the two are almost a default feature of a relationship that in effect funds a dream. From ‘off’ chemistry to differences of opinion to what some founders see as shackles on entrepreneurial freedom, the reasons could be any or a mix of all. Watch this discussion, with a mega-panel of intense start-up founders on the one hand and investors with VC funds on the other, addressing the pain points on Cash, Control, Creativity, Chemistry and Culture in a supercharged encounter. Session Anchor, Devangshu Dutta (Founder, Third Eyesight) reflected, “Those who have heard classical music jugalbandi or witnessed jazz musicians jamming will appreciate the creative tension, the give and take that was the thread throughout this discussion, reflecting the reality of the relationship between entrepreneurs and VCs.”

Watch the video

INVESTORS:
Ankita Balotia, VP, Fireside Ventures
Aashish Vanigota, Principal – Investments, IvyCap Ventures Advisors Private Limited
Bhawna Bhatnagar, Co-founder, We Founder Circle
Nitya Agarwal, VP-Investments, 3one4 Capital
Harmanpreet Singh, Founder & Managing Partner, Prath Ventures
Vamshi Reddy, Partner, Kalaari Capital
Zoeb Ali Khan, Vice President, Sauce.vc

D2C FOUNDERS:
Abdus Samad, Founder, Sam & Marshall Eyewear
Akshay Mahendru, Co-Founder & CEO, The Pet Point & Nootie
Malvika Jain, Founder, SEREKO
Nitin Jain, Founder, Indigifts
Puneet Tyagi, Egoss Shoes
Radhika Dang, CEO & Founder, The Good Karma Company
Rahul Aggarwal, Coffeeza
Udit Toshniwal, Founder & Director, The Pant Project
Vaani Chugh, Co-founder & Director, D’chica
Yash Kotak, Co-founder, Bombay Hemp Co.
Yashesh Mukhi, Co-founder, Chupps

T. Surendar, The Morning Context

25 March 2020

Standing on the porch of the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Mumbai suburbs, Diwakar Vaish, co-founder of Noida-based AgVa Healthcare, was trying to catch the attention of software industry executives. This is at the annual conference hosted by IT trade body Nasscom. Vaish’s stall was a side-show for startups to exhibit digital technologies in the healthcare sector.

On a cool, breezy February day, the atmosphere was nothing as grim you would expect in a hospital emergency ward. Vaish’s rig, comprising an iPad-like device on a short steel column mounted on wheels with dangling wires, was a cost-effective version of a ventilator used in critical care. There wasn’t much excitement about his solution, as few executives really understood the medical problem he aimed to solve.

Today, a robotic engineer by training, Vaish is super busy.

It is not easy to get him on the phone, as AgVa’s ventilator is suddenly in demand from all parts of the country. The company is running three shifts fulfilling orders, which have been pouring in since it became apparent that Indian hospitals did not have enough ventilators for patients rendered ill by the novel coronavirus.

Unwittingly, the need for ventilators has once again drawn attention to India’s medical devices industry or the lack of it. So much so that Anand Mahindra, chairman of the $17 billion Mahindra group, which has interests in automobiles, software and resorts, said that he was finding ways to manufacture ventilators in his factories. It isn’t easy putting together a ventilator, not when you are racing against time, but Mahindra is a hardy businessman with deep pockets, and maybe, just maybe, he will succeed.

In many ways, the Indian medical devices industry is an anomaly. India has a space programme, a nuclear programme, it is among the few countries that has developed patented medicines and a low cost version of anything from power turbines to trucks but when it comes to medical equipment, it fares poorly.

India is also the biggest supplier of FDA-approved drugs to the US, the biggest pharmaceutical market in the world. Even as the Indian market for medical equipment has grown at double-digit rates in the last five years to Rs 1 lakh crore, two-thirds of its needs are met by foreign companies such as Philips, GE Healthcare, Siemens and Abbott.

Import domination is all pervasive extending to even non-critical but common equipment like sonography machines, dentistry chairs and diagnostic equipment. Less than five Indian companies had revenue of more than Rs 500 crore a year and 90% were classified as small scale, with annual revenue less than Rs 10 crore. The biggest player in the domestic market is the Rs 1,300 crore Mumbai-based Transasia Bio-Medicals, which makes in vitro diagnostic solutions that are exported to Western markets too.

“For a long time, the government was the biggest buyer of medical equipment and they always preferred imported equipment. That meant that it was not lucrative for local entrepreneurs to invest their capital in the sector,” says G.S.K. Velu, managing director of Trivitron Healthcare, which makes and exports imaging equipment.

The proliferation of private hospitals in the last two decades also did not change things much. With well-entrenched foreign players and a liberal import duty structure to make available the best facilities in India, there were few local companies of scale who could invest big money to fend off competition. AgVa’s ventilators were priced at a fifth of the ones sold by the foreign competitors, yet it couldn’t make inroads into big hospitals. “It’s almost as if our cost was our barrier to sell. Being critical equipment, customers had a lot of inertia to even place test orders,” says Vaish.

Thanks to meagre domestic manufacturing. India also could not set standards of equipment specifications to suit the local needs. It had to tweak its own equipment standards to fall in line with those of foreign manufacturers. For example, in the US, defibrillators used to restore heartbeats by giving shock to patients had to last at least two shock cycles. But, in India, since access to hospitals and medical care was not as easy. patients arrive long after they have suffered heart attacks and Indian doctors use defibrillators for even 10 cycles at a time.

The local standards did not specify this need and as a result many imported defibrillators were not of much use in Indian conditions. “We still don’t have an act to regulate medical devices and it falls under the drugs category. Everything is still borrowed from the West,” says Aniruddha Atre, co-founder and director of Pune-based Jeevtronics Pvt. Ltd, which makes the world’s first hand-cranked defibrillator.

Trivitron’s Velu says that the share of locally produced medical equipment will increase within the next decade. This will be a combination of help from the government which will enforce more domestic manufacturing by overseas firms and increased entrepreneurship.

There is also a view that more global manufacturing will come to India, as firms de-risk their strategy of manufacturing everything in China. “In the past, when labour costs went up in the Chinese west coast, Indian garment companies were beneficiaries of increased orders even though other countries like Bangladesh and Vietnam too got a big share of it. The availability of labour and ability to scale up operations is something global players look for and to that extent India will always be an important outsourcing destination,” said Devangshu Dutta, managing partner at consultancy firm Third Eyesight.

The trend started even before the COVID-19 pandemic as companies in the US began to brace themselves for a trade war with China. For example, a US-based company has started sourcing Indian tyres at a 10-15% premium as it wants to diversify its risk from China. “India has witnessed a surge in mobile phone manufacturing. This is bound to increase the ecosystem in electronic manufacturing which in turn create ecosystems for industries like medical equipment,” says Sharad Verma, senior partner who oversees industrials at Boston Consulting Group.

The timing is also right for increase in local manufacturing, argues Verma. One of the important criteria for that is viable domestic consumption. It’s happened time and again in sectors like automobiles, mobile phones and more recently in manufacture of metro bogies after domestic consumption has reached a scale where it makes sense for companies to set up manufacturing facilities. “The industry is no longer small and the incidence of medical technology will only go up from here making it viable for even foreign companies to look at a manufacturing set up in India,” says Verma.

It will be interesting to see how it all plays out. The sector, so far, hasn’t seen much by way of private equity or venture investment. The most prominent one was an investment by a Morgan Stanley fund and Samara Capital in Surat-based Sahajanand Medical Technologies and Fidelity Growth Partners’s investment in Trivitron. But starting 2014, a government fund run by the Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council-incubated several companies who are slowly bringing their products to market. As some of these products hit home, especially in the wake of COVID-19, the action is definitely bound to pick up.

(published in The Morning Context)