Experts Say 2026 Will Reward Discipline, Not Scale, in India’s D2C Sector

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January 6, 2026

Saumyangi Yadav, Entrepreneur India
Jan 6, 2026

After years of rapid growth and a sharp reset, India’s direct-to-consumer (D2C) sector is expected to settle into a more balanced phase. The period of easy funding, aggressive customer acquisition and scale-at-all-costs expansion is clearly over, experts suggest. Now, what lies ahead in 2026 is a shift towards steadier growth driven by better execution, stronger retention and clearer brand positioning.

According to Bain and Flipkart, India’s e-retail market is projected to reach $170–190 billion in GMV by 2030, driven by a growing online shopper base and evolving commerce models. As adoption deepens across Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities, high-frequency categories such as grocery and lifestyle are expected to drive a larger share of growth, making repeat purchase and habit formation critical for D2C brands.

Against this backdrop, 2026 is shaping up as the year when D2C brands are judged less on ambition and more on outcomes.

A Post-Hype Phase of D2C

Industry observers say the D2C ecosystem has clearly moved beyond its hype-driven phase. Devangshu Dutta, Founder and Chief Executive of retail consultancy Third Eyesight, describes the current moment as one of structural correction rather than contraction.

“India’s D2C ecosystem is in a post-hype phase where growth may be slower but structurally healthier,” Dutta says, adding, “Earlier growth cycles prioritised visibility and sales at the expense of profitability and consistency. Now, success is being measured by repeat rates, contribution margins and the ability to fund growth internally.”

Tighter funding is also driving this shift. With D2C investments slowing and overall capital remaining cautious, brands are now being pushed to show predictability rather than promise. Tracxn data shows Indian D2C startups raised USD 757 million in 2024, significantly lower than previous years, while overall PE-VC investments in India remained flat at USD 33 billion in 2025, according to Venture Intelligence.

As a result, Dutta notes that many D2C companies are rationalising portfolios, tightening inventory cycles and optimising supply chains. Marketing strategies, too, are evolving, with greater emphasis on retention, community-building and owned channels instead of discount-led growth.

Uniqueness Will Define Winners

If capital discipline is one defining force, speed is another. Harish Bijoor, business and brand strategy expert, argues that D2C’s next phase will be shaped by how brands respond to a faster, more fragmented commerce environment.

“The e-commerce revolution led to a more refined orientation of D2C, and that has now given way to a q-commerce revolution that is even faster,” Bijoor says, adding, “The D2C revolution is going to be leveraged by speed. A whole host of players will invest time, energy and innovation into this.”

In Bijoor’s view, traditional e-commerce is now the slowest layer in a spectrum where quick commerce is the fastest, and D2C sits in between. In such a landscape, competing purely on price is no longer sustainable. He believes differentiation will increasingly come from uniqueness and premium positioning rather than ubiquity.

“When you know that you get a particular great-tasting biryani at just one place with no branches, you will go to that place. That uniqueness is what will distinguish D2C commerce in the future,” he says.

Bijoor adds that many D2C brands have been trapped in price wars under the guise of differentiation. He also argued that brands that premiumise and resist excessive omnichannel dilution are more likely to build desirability and long-term value.

Consumers Move Beyond Metros

Structural shifts in demand are reshaping how and where D2C brands grow. India now has one of the world’s largest and most diverse online consumer bases, with growth increasingly driven by Tier-2, Tier-3 and smaller towns rather than metros alone. Internet adoption continues to deepen across rural and semi-urban India, expanding the addressable market well beyond early digital buyers.

This widening base is changing the nature of growth. Consumers are becoming more deliberate in how they spend, weighing value, quality and trust more carefully than before.

As Devangshu Dutta notes, Indian consumers have always been discerning, but rising living costs and economic uncertainty have made them even more thoughtful, pushing brands to earn repeat demand rather than rely on impulse or discount-led purchases.

“Value is not just about discounts,” he says. “It’s a balance of price, performance and trust. For D2C brands, repeat consumption has to be earned through consistent quality, transparent pricing and dependable service.”

High-frequency categories such as grocery, lifestyle and general merchandise are expected to drive much of this expansion. Bain estimates these segments will account for two out of every three e-retail dollars by 2030, reinforcing the importance of habit formation and retention-led models.

Quick Commerce Expands Discovery, Not Profitability

Quick commerce has emerged as a powerful but complex growth lever for D2C brands. The format now accounts for a significant share of India’s e-grocery demand and has scaled into a multi-billion-dollar market, becoming a key discovery channel for food and everyday consumption brands.

However, expansion beyond metros remains challenging. RedSeer data shows non-metro markets contribute just over 20 per cent of quick commerce GMV, even as platforms scale to over 150 cities, with breakeven economics in smaller towns requiring significantly higher throughput.

Praveen Govindu, partner at Deloitte India, cautions that while quick commerce has helped many D2C brands gain discovery, particularly in food and beverage, it is not a sustainable growth engine on its own.

“From a customer acquisition standpoint, quick commerce is not fundamentally different from traditional e-commerce,” Govindu says, adding, “It is an expensive channel, and competition will only intensify. Over the long term, brands cannot rely on burning capital there.”

Omnichannel Enters Its Toughest Phase Yet

As digital acquisition costs rise, India’s ad market is projected to grow nearly 8 per cent in 2025 to Rs 1.37 lakh crore, with digital accounting for almost half of the spends, brands are being pushed to diversify distribution. Yet omnichannel presence alone is no longer enough.

“Many brands talk about omnichannel, personalisation and seamless journeys, but in practice these efforts are still disjointed. In 2026, the focus will shift from intent to execution,” Govindu says.

RedSeer projects India’s retail market to cross USD 2 trillion by 2030, with nearly 90 per cent of consumption still happening offline. For D2C brands, this makes offline expansion unavoidable, but success will depend on consistent execution across pricing, inventory, service and communication.

Consumers, Govindu notes, do not consciously differentiate between online, offline or social platforms. “They simply want a consistent experience,” he says. “Even small inconsistencies can erode trust.”

AI-Led Discovery and Experience

Perhaps the most transformative force shaping 2026 will be the evolution of buying journeys themselves. Govindu sees the rise of AI-led and agentic commerce as a major inflection point.

“Conversational platforms and AI-driven assistants will increasingly influence discovery, purchase, fulfilment and post-sales experiences. What earlier happened across multiple touchpoints is now beginning to happen in one place,” he says.

This convergence amplifies the importance of content-led discovery, owned data and deep consumer understanding. Brands that can unify storytelling, commerce and service into a coherent narrative are more likely to build loyalty in an environment where switching costs are low and alternatives are abundant.

Whether growth comes through D2C websites, marketplaces, quick commerce or offline stores, experts agree that the real differentiator will be a brand’s ability to build durable consumer relationships. As investors shift focus from short-term metrics to long-term value creation like retention, margins and brand strength, the next phase of India’s D2C story is less about rapid expansion and more about refinement.

(Published in Entrepreneur India)

Saumyangi is a Senior Correspondent at Entrepreneur India with over three years of experience in journalism. She has reported on education, social, and civic issues, and currently covers the D2C and consumer brand space.

Offline Surge and M&A Push Define Next Stage of India’s D2C Growth

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November 13, 2025

Saumyangi Yadav,Entrepreneur
Nov 13, 2025

India’s consumer landscape is undergoing a decisive shift in 2025. While D2C brands that once thrived on digital-only distribution are now aggressively building an offline footprint, legacy FMCG majors are simultaneously acquiring digital-first brands to strengthen their portfolios and tap into new consumer behaviours.

As analysts suggest, these trends signal a maturing phase for India’s D2C ecosystem, one that blends physical retail and strategic consolidation.

Offline Push Accelerates

According to a recent CBRE report, ‘India’s D2C Revolution: The New Retail Order’, D2C brands leased nearly 5.95 lakh sq ft of retail space between January and June 2025, accounting for 18 per cent of all retail leasing during this period, up sharply from 8 per cent in the first half of 2024. Fashion and apparel dominated the expansion, contributing close to 60 per cent of D2C leasing, followed by homeware and furnishings and jewellery at about 12 per cent each, while health and personal care brands accounted for roughly six per cent. The shift is equally visible in the choice of retail formats: 46 per cent of D2C leasing went to high streets, 40 per cent to malls, and the remaining to standalone stores, reflecting the category’s growing focus on visibility, trial and experiential discovery.

Experts suggest that it represents a strategic pivot to blended engagement.

As Devangshu Dutta, CEO of Third Eyesight, notes, “India’s D2C surge is powered by digital-first consumers, tremendous improvement in seamless logistics, and low-cost market entry, supported subsequently by substantial amounts of investor capital chasing those startups that stand out from the competition. Yet, lasting success demands a more holistic view: the divide between online and offline is a business construct, not a consumer reality. The larger chunk of retail sales still happens through physical channels and, for brands that want to be mainstream, an omnichannel presence is absolutely essential.”

This also aligns with the broader market outlook. The India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), in its Indian FMCG Industry Analysis (October 2025), estimates the value of India’s D2C market at USD 80 billion in 2024, with expectations of crossing USD 100 billion in 2025. Much of this growth is being led by categories that combine frequent purchase cycles with strong digital discovery, beauty, personal care, and food and beverage segments where consumers are open to experimentation but demand authenticity, transparency, and a compelling product narrative.

“The Gen Z and millennial consumer cohorts value newness but also authenticity and unique product stories, which are best communicated in spaces that are controlled by the brand,” Dutta added, “In the launch and growth phases, this could be the brand’s digital presence including website and social media, but over time this can include pop-up stores, kiosks, shop-in-shops and even exclusive brand stores.”

CBRE’s data reflects this shift clearly, with D2C brands increasingly opting for flexible store formats and high-street locations to maximise traffic and visibility.

M&A Gains Momentum

Parallel to the offline push is a noticeable wave of consolidation. Large FMCG companies are accelerating acquisitions to capture emerging consumer niches and strengthen their digital-native capabilities.

In recent years, Hindustan Unilever has acquired Minimalist; Marico has bought Beardo, Just Herbs, True Elements, and Plix; ITC has taken over Yoga Bar; and Emami has secured full ownership of The Man Company. These deals, reported widely across business media in 2024 and 2025, point to the need for established companies to fast-track entry into high-growth, ingredient-forward, and youth-focused categories without the lead time of in-house incubation.

“Legacy FMCG companies are acquiring D2C brands to rapidly gain access to new consumer segments, product innovation, and digital-native capabilities, including direct engagement and insights. Such deals enable large companies to diversify portfolios, accelerate entry into trending segments by-passing the initial launch risks, and rejuvenate their brands with modern digital marketing expertise,” Dutta explained.

Challenges and Risks

But the acquisitions do not come without risk and challenges, analysts warned.

“However, integrating D2C operations also poses challenges, including cultural differences, the risk of stifling entrepreneurial agility, and the need to harmonise data and omnichannel strategies. The ability to nurture acquired brands without diluting their distinctive appeal will determine acquisition success,” Dutta added.

Yet even as the ecosystem expands, challenges remain. Offline stores add operational complexity, inventory planning, staffing, last-mile logistics, and real-time data integration. Still, the bottom line is that India’s D2C sector is moving into a hybrid era defined by tighter omnichannel integration, sharper product storytelling, and portfolio realignment through acquisitions.

(Published in Entrepreneur)

Why Good Glamm Failed: Lessons in overexpansion and the House-of-Brands trap

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August 6, 2025

Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025

It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.

Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.

That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.

Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.

In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.

He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”

Where The Model Broke?

In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”

But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.

And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.

As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.

In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.

In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.

Scaling Without Steering

In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.

For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.

Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.

Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.

The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.

(Published in Forbes India)

Everyone Measures CAC, But Who’s Counting CFC?

Devangshu Dutta

June 30, 2025

In every strategy meeting today, one metric is invariably mentioned: Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC). Whether you’re a well-funded corporate retailer, or raising your first angel round, or a well-established digital duopolist brand scaling Series C, CAC is one of the key performance metrics. “Real” spend that is neatly broken down by channel, optimised by funnel tweaks, scrutinised to the last rupee or dollar.

But there’s a metric we almost never hear about that could be costing brands far more in the long run.

Let’s call it Customer Forfeiture Cost (CFC), the residual lifetime value that is lost when a customer walks away from your business not because of price, competition, or even shifting needs, but because of a “burn”: a delivery missed or messed up, a refund that took weeks, an arrogant customer service call, or a product that failed spectacularly against the promise. In other words, when your brand hurts someone enough to make them walk away. Probably for ever.

It’s a paradox: brands are pumping thousands of crores into acquiring users, but they’re bleeding value at the other end. Yet, while CAC is a line item in every financial statement, CFC is invisible in management dashboards. CEOs don’t announce, “We’ve cut our forfeiture cost by 20% this quarter.”

Yet. every CXO knows it exists. The NPS scores, the social media complaints, the “never again” comments in reviews, the sinking feeling when repeat purchase rates fall.

Why CFC Matters More Than Ever

In every business, during the early stages each sale is a victory. Whether it was the retail chains that grew in the 1990s and early-2000s or the digital upstarts that came up through 2010s and 2020s, scale has been the mantra, and investors have poured money into scaling through the growing consumption of India 1 and India 2 customers.

Today customer acquisition isn’t cheap. The same person who clicked impulsively in 2020 now thinks twice before confirming payment. In this landscape, retention isn’t optional, it’s existential.

Every lost customer isn’t just a refund processed, or a cart abandoned. It’s the long tail of future repeat purchases that will never happen, negative word of mouth and brand distrust in the customer’s circle of influence, and increased future CAC due to declining organic reach.

Way back in 1967, management consultant Peter Drucker wrote in his book “The Effective Executive”: “What gets measured, gets managed”.

Today your CAC may be Rs. 500-1,000. If the average customer life time value (LTV) is Rs. 10,000, and a single burn causes churn after just one order worth Rs. 2,000, your CFC is Rs. 8,000, and that doesn’t even include reputational spillover.

Why We Don’t Measure It

Yes, CFC is hard to quantify. It’s not as easily attributable as ad spends. There’s usually no neat model telling you why someone never returned, because tech stacks aren’t typically designed to track emotional exits. And let’s face it, introspection about broken relationships is uncomfortable, even for management teams.

But that doesn’t mean it’s not real. If a customer leaves because your delivery executive messed up, or because your app crashed during checkout twice in a row, that’s on you, not the market. And in a business climate where sustainable growth is the mantra, LTV is king.

Ignoring CFC is like watching your roof leak and blaming the rain.

Toward a New Discipline

Brands and retailers must start measuring CFC, the value lost when customers disengage due to friction, mistrust, or neglect, and then start working on reducing it. This can be done by:

  • Tracking negative exits: Build feedback loops for poor customer satisfaction scores, refund requests, support escalations, and analyse their downstream effect on churn.
  • Building burn indicators: Assign internal scores to incidents where customers express betrayal or frustration, and combine qualitative feedback (customer calls, social posts) with purchase history to gauge how and when you lost someone.
  • Incentivising retention, not just acquisition: Perhaps most important, align teams across functions, not just marketing, to reduce friction and foster delight. Your logistics, tech, and customer service teams are as responsible for growth as your ad agency.

The Competitive Edge We’re Not Using

In a crowded space where everyone’s vying for eyeballs, trust is the true moat. Customers don’t expect perfection – they do expect accountability, authenticity, and recovery when things go wrong.

Brands that understand and act on Customer Forfeiture Costs will quietly start building a powerful edge: deeper brand loyalty, lower CAC over time thanks to referrals and repeats and greater lifetime value per user.

In other words, real, compounding value.

As the Indian brand ecosystem matures, Customer Forfeiture Cost needs to be as visible and valued as CAC. Acquisition is the invitation; experience is the relationship. Relationships, once broken, are expensive to rebuild; if they can be rebuilt at all.

In the end, growth isn’t just about who comes in. It’s about who stays, and why.

(Written by Devangshu Dutta, Founder of Third Eyesight, this was published in Financial Express on 2 July 2025)

Rise of pet parents sparks scramble for fundraising

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May 5, 2025

Mint, 5 May 2026

Priyamvada C., Sneha Shah

Urban India’s pet parents are driving a wave of investor interest in the pet care space. A clutch of startups such as Heads Up For Tails, Supertails, and Vetic are now in fundraising talks amid rising demand for premium products and services

While Supertails looks to raise about ₹200 crore by the end of this year, Heads Up For Tails is eyeing an investment from domestic investment firm 360 One Asset over the next few months, according to mul tiple people familiar with the matter.

Vetic, a tech-enabled chain of pet clinics, is looking to raise a sizeable round and has begun discussions with investors, they said, adding that some of these transactions may see existing investors part exit their stake.

Supertails and Vetic did not immediately respond to Mint’s requests for a comment. While 360 One declined to comment, Heads Up For Tails’ founder Rashi Narang denied the development.

Investor interest in pet care surged in the years following the pandemic, driven by a wave of new pet adoptions and rising disposable incomes. In 2023, pet care startups raised a record $66.3 million across 16 rounds, led by one major transaction ― Drool’s $60 million fundraise.

While 2023 saw a funding spike driven by Drool’s large deal, overall funding activity in 2024 was more broad-based, with fundraising at $17.9 million spanning 13 rounds, as per Tracxn.

“Pet ownership in India is estimated to be less than 10% of overall households, but growing at a rapid pace with rising incomes, especially among urban consumers. In developed economies, pet ownership can exceed three in four households, and that headroom for growth is reflected among the upper income segments in India,” said Devangshu Dutta, chief executive of Third Eyesight, a management consulting firm.

He added that urban couples and singles in many cases are even opting to become “pet parents” instead of having children.

Platforms such as Supertails, Drools and Heads Up For Tails have been the big beneficiaries of this shift. Drools raised $60 million from LVMH-backed private equity firm L Catterton in 2023, while Supertails raised $15 million led by RPSG Capital Ventures in February last year.

Similarly, Supertails, which is in talks to acquire Blue 7 Vets, a multi speciality veterinary clinic, as part of its strategy to expand offline, will also raise capital to fund the acquisition of new customers, investments in technology, and the expansion of healthcare services, including Super-tails Pharmacy and build an omni-channel experience for consumers.

The company raised about $15 million in its series B funding round last year led by RPSG Capital Ventures and existing investors Fireside Ventures, Saama Capital, DSG Consumer Partners and Sauce VC.

(Published in Mint)