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January 28, 2026
What does it actually take to build a fashion brand in India?
This panel (“Beyond the Noise- How D2c Fashion Brands Are Reinventing Retail”) at the 25th Edition of India Fashion Forum focussed on some real answers, in a refreshing, down-to-earth conversation moderated by Devangshu Dutta (Founder, Third Eyesight), with the founders of DeMoza (Agnes Raja George), The Mom Store (Surbhi Bhatia), Miraggio (Mohit Jain), BeyondBound (Tejasvi Madan), and Bari (Sameer Khan Lodhi).
No fluff, no “disrupting the industry” talk. Just founders being honest about what’s worked, what hasn’t, and what they’d do differently. A few things that struck a chord:
• Every single brand started because the founder couldn’t find something they personally wanted: inclusive activewear, affordable handbags that didn’t look cheap, good maternity wear. Sometimes the simplest observation is the best business idea.
• Inventory management came up often. One founder took their inventory cycle from 6 months down to 4. Another re-shuffles stock every 15 days based on what’s selling where. Unglamorous? Yes, but this is what actually keeps a business alive.
• The marketing conversation highlighted a move away from traditional advertising toward things that actually make people feel something. One founder talked about turning a farmhouse into a full “apricot colour” experience for customers. Another shoots content with real customers, not influencers.
• And the most memorable line of the whole discussion came from the most experienced founder in the room sharing a learning: “I won’t open stores fast.” No explanation needed, really.
Building a brand is exciting. Keeping it alive is the harder, quieter work. This panel was a good reminder of that. Worth a watch if you’re building something in this space.
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December 15, 2025
By Saumyangi Yadav, Entrepreneur India
Dec 15, 2025
India’s D2C ecosystem has grown rapidly over the past five years, but scale remains elusive. While thousands of brands have launched and many have crossed early revenue milestones, only a small fraction manage to break past INR 100 crore in annual revenue. According to a new report by DSG Consumer Partners, based on a survey of over 100 Indian D2C founders and operators, the problem is not demand or product-market fit, it is how brands attempt to scale.
The report shows that around 60–65 per cent of Indian D2C brands remain stuck in the INR 1–50 crore revenue band, with very few reaching the INR 100 crore mark. This stage marks the point where early traction exists, but growth begins to strain unit economics, teams, and operating systems.
Insights from over 100 D2C founders reveal that India’s fastest-growing brands win on fundamentals rather than speed alone. Clear product-market fit, disciplined data tracking, strong unit economics, creative velocity, and an early focus on retention consistently separate scalable brands from those that plateau. Founders also admit that performance marketing mistakes, pricing missteps, and weak creative systems slow growth far more than budget constraints. In a booming D2C landscape, capability gaps in operations, brand-building, and supply-chain depth are widening the divide between breakout brands and those stuck in the performance plateau.
Industry observers argue that this is where many brands mistake rapid online growth for sustainable scale.
As Devangshu Dutta, Founder & CEO, Third Eyesight, explains, “Scaling up online can be very rapid, but is also capital-hungry in terms of CAC. Given the intense competition, the lack of customer stickiness and the power of platforms, there is a constant churn of marketing spend which is a huge bleed for growing brands.”
CAC Inflation is The Real Constraint
One of the clearest findings from the playbook is that acquisition efficiency, rising CAC and unstable ROAS, is the single biggest blocker to growth, cited by more founders than funding or category expansion. Moreover, over 70 per cent of brands rely on Meta as their primary acquisition channel, increasing vulnerability to auction pressure and platform-driven volatility.
Dutta links this directly to the limits of a digital-only mindset. “Limited offline expansion can trap brands in narrow urban digital markets, blocking broader scale,” he said.
This over-reliance on online performance marketing often leads to growth that looks strong on dashboards but weak on cash flow.
Highlighting their report, Pooja Shirali, Vice President, DSG Consumer Partners, said, “Across over 90 consumer brands we’ve partnered with at DSGCP, one truth is clear: brands that master Meta’s ecosystem don’t just grow, they change their entire trajectory through strategic clarity and disciplined execution. The real drivers of scale have less to do with viral moments, and everything to do with the long-term fundamentals that make milestones like the first INR 100 crore predictable, not accidental.”
Why Omnichannel is Unavoidable
The report suggests that brands that scale sustainably are those that reduce overdependence on paid digital acquisition and expand their distribution footprint. However, offline expansion brings its own complexity.
Dutta stresses that omnichannel is not an optional add-on, but a strategic shift. “D2C brands must adopt an omnichannel approach, blending online with offline retail for sustainable and scalable reach. Clearly the channels work very differently and management teams have to be prepared and capitalised for the long haul to tackle acquiring customers with channel-appropriate strategies,” he adds.
This aligns with the DSGCP report’s broader insight that scale breaks down when brands fail to adapt operating models as they grow.
Even within digital channels, performance weakens over time. The playbook finds that 62 per cent of founders report creative fatigue, where repeated creatives fail to sustain ROAS despite higher spends. At the same time, 55 per cent admit to under-investing in CRM and retention, with most brands reporting repeat purchase rates of just 10–30 per cent.
Both the data and expert opinion point to a common theme: brands that cross the INR 100 crore mark are structurally different. They obsess over unit economics, processes, and capital efficiency rather than topline growth alone.
As Dutta puts it, “Scalable brands that cross the growth hump have leadership obsessed with unit economics and omnichannel execution rather than chasing vanity metrics. Cash always was and is king, especially at early stages of growth.”
He adds that execution strength matters as much as strategy. “They are able to grow and steer teams that build and replicate processes fast rather than spending time, effort and money reinventing all the time, and do so without constant CXO intervention.”
As competition intensifies and capital becomes more selective, the next generation of INR 100 crore D2C brands is likely to be defined not by speed, but by the ability to compound cash flows, institutionalise processes, and scale distribution beyond digital platforms.
Saumyangi is a Senior Correspondent at Entrepreneur India with over three years of experience in journalism. She has reported on education, social, and civic issues, and currently covers the D2C and consumer brand space.
(Published in Entrepreneur India)
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November 13, 2025
Saumyangi Yadav,Entrepreneur
Nov 13, 2025
India’s consumer landscape is undergoing a decisive shift in 2025. While D2C brands that once thrived on digital-only distribution are now aggressively building an offline footprint, legacy FMCG majors are simultaneously acquiring digital-first brands to strengthen their portfolios and tap into new consumer behaviours.
As analysts suggest, these trends signal a maturing phase for India’s D2C ecosystem, one that blends physical retail and strategic consolidation.
Offline Push Accelerates
According to a recent CBRE report, ‘India’s D2C Revolution: The New Retail Order’, D2C brands leased nearly 5.95 lakh sq ft of retail space between January and June 2025, accounting for 18 per cent of all retail leasing during this period, up sharply from 8 per cent in the first half of 2024. Fashion and apparel dominated the expansion, contributing close to 60 per cent of D2C leasing, followed by homeware and furnishings and jewellery at about 12 per cent each, while health and personal care brands accounted for roughly six per cent. The shift is equally visible in the choice of retail formats: 46 per cent of D2C leasing went to high streets, 40 per cent to malls, and the remaining to standalone stores, reflecting the category’s growing focus on visibility, trial and experiential discovery.
Experts suggest that it represents a strategic pivot to blended engagement.
As Devangshu Dutta, CEO of Third Eyesight, notes, “India’s D2C surge is powered by digital-first consumers, tremendous improvement in seamless logistics, and low-cost market entry, supported subsequently by substantial amounts of investor capital chasing those startups that stand out from the competition. Yet, lasting success demands a more holistic view: the divide between online and offline is a business construct, not a consumer reality. The larger chunk of retail sales still happens through physical channels and, for brands that want to be mainstream, an omnichannel presence is absolutely essential.”
This also aligns with the broader market outlook. The India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), in its Indian FMCG Industry Analysis (October 2025), estimates the value of India’s D2C market at USD 80 billion in 2024, with expectations of crossing USD 100 billion in 2025. Much of this growth is being led by categories that combine frequent purchase cycles with strong digital discovery, beauty, personal care, and food and beverage segments where consumers are open to experimentation but demand authenticity, transparency, and a compelling product narrative.
“The Gen Z and millennial consumer cohorts value newness but also authenticity and unique product stories, which are best communicated in spaces that are controlled by the brand,” Dutta added, “In the launch and growth phases, this could be the brand’s digital presence including website and social media, but over time this can include pop-up stores, kiosks, shop-in-shops and even exclusive brand stores.”
CBRE’s data reflects this shift clearly, with D2C brands increasingly opting for flexible store formats and high-street locations to maximise traffic and visibility.
M&A Gains Momentum
Parallel to the offline push is a noticeable wave of consolidation. Large FMCG companies are accelerating acquisitions to capture emerging consumer niches and strengthen their digital-native capabilities.
In recent years, Hindustan Unilever has acquired Minimalist; Marico has bought Beardo, Just Herbs, True Elements, and Plix; ITC has taken over Yoga Bar; and Emami has secured full ownership of The Man Company. These deals, reported widely across business media in 2024 and 2025, point to the need for established companies to fast-track entry into high-growth, ingredient-forward, and youth-focused categories without the lead time of in-house incubation.
“Legacy FMCG companies are acquiring D2C brands to rapidly gain access to new consumer segments, product innovation, and digital-native capabilities, including direct engagement and insights. Such deals enable large companies to diversify portfolios, accelerate entry into trending segments by-passing the initial launch risks, and rejuvenate their brands with modern digital marketing expertise,” Dutta explained.
Challenges and Risks
But the acquisitions do not come without risk and challenges, analysts warned.
“However, integrating D2C operations also poses challenges, including cultural differences, the risk of stifling entrepreneurial agility, and the need to harmonise data and omnichannel strategies. The ability to nurture acquired brands without diluting their distinctive appeal will determine acquisition success,” Dutta added.
Yet even as the ecosystem expands, challenges remain. Offline stores add operational complexity, inventory planning, staffing, last-mile logistics, and real-time data integration. Still, the bottom line is that India’s D2C sector is moving into a hybrid era defined by tighter omnichannel integration, sharper product storytelling, and portfolio realignment through acquisitions.
(Published in Entrepreneur)
admin
August 6, 2025
Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025
It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.
Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.
That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.
Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.
In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.
He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”
Where The Model Broke?
In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”
But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.
And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.
As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.
In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.
In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.
Scaling Without Steering
In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.
For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.
Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.
Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.
The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.
(Published in Forbes India)
admin
July 27, 2025
Alenjith K Johny & Ajay Rag, Economic Times
Jul 27, 2025
Startups in the 60-minute fashion delivery segment are betting on features such as ‘try and buy’ and artificial intelligence (AI)-powered virtual try-ons to tackle high return rates, a key pain point in the segment. These tools are helping increase conversion rates and reduce returns while offering greater flexibility to buyers, said industry executives.
Mumbai-based Knot, which recently raised funding from venture capital firm Kae Capital, said partner brands that typically see return rates of about 20% on their direct-to-consumer websites are witnessing sub-1% returns through offline stores, a trend it is now replicating through these digital features.
“Our partner brands, which have offline stores, would typically witness 20% returns on their direct to consumer websites. But for the same purchases on offline stores, the returns are less than 1%. That is the idea. With the ‘try and buy’ feature, users can make a very decisive purchase at their doorstep,” Archit Nanda, CEO of Knot, told ET.
Return rates among users of the company’s virtual try-on feature are similarly much lower than the platform’s overall user base, he said.
Other venture-backed quick fashion delivery startups such as Bengaluru-based Slikk, Mumbai-based Zilo and Gurugram-based Zulu Club are also testing similar features to increase conversions and reduce returns.
“Returns play as big a part as maybe forward delivery does. Because these are expensive products, giving the customer his or her money back also plays a very critical role,” said Akshay Gulati, cofounder and CEO of Slikk.
Instant returns
Slikk is piloting an ‘instant returns’ feature where, like its 60-minute delivery service, returns are also completed within an hour. Once a return request is made on the app, a delivery partner picks up the product and refunds the amount instantly. The startup claims its return rate is 40-50% lower than that of traditional marketplaces and that it doesn’t charge customers any extra fees for returns.
Some users said they were satisfied with the delivery speed and trial window but pointed out that the app does not provide any return status updates until the product reaches the warehouse.
“I received my order within 60 minutes and had enough time to try it out. However, after returning the product, I didn’t receive any notification in the application until the delivery agent reached the warehouse,” said Mohammed Shibili, a working professional based in Bengaluru, who tried Slikk’s feature.
Investor interest
Investors tracking the segment estimate that try-and-buy and virtual try-on features can reduce return rates by 15-20 percentage points, translating into substantial cost savings for both platforms and brands.
“Features like try and buy are a huge cost save, not just for the platform but also for the brand. The brand otherwise would lose that inventory till it comes back and can’t make the sale on it. But now, that’s all getting quickly turned around. So, for the brand, it’s a win-win situation as well as for the customer where the money is not getting stuck till it gets the returns refunded,” said Sunitha Viswanathan, partner at Kae Capital.
Old model, new infrastructure
Flipkart-owned fashion etailer Myntra had introduced try and buy back in 2016 to attract traditional shoppers to online retail. However, the feature didn’t scale up due to supply chain limitations, according to industry executives.
“Back when Myntra launched ‘try and buy’, there was no hyperlocal delivery infrastructure. Deliveries were through national courier services. That model isn’t feasible to try and buy unless you have your own hyperlocal delivery fleet,” the founder of a fashion delivery startup said on condition of anonymity.
The founder added that while Myntra operated from large warehouses located on the outskirts of cities, the new-age supply chains are built within cities, allowing faster deliveries and enabling features like try and buy.
By the end of last year, Myntra had launched M-Now, an ultra-fast delivery service currently live in Bengaluru, Mumbai and Delhi, with pilots in other cities. The company said daily orders through M-Now doubled in the last quarter.
“Although it’s still early, our observations so far suggest that the quick delivery model, with its reduced wait time, attracts high-intent customers, leading to naturally lower return rates,” said a spokesperson for Myntra.
The etailer did not confirm whether the try-and-buy feature is being tested under M-Now.
Viability concerns persist
Despite the benefits, the long-term viability of these features is open to question, experts said.
“There is a cost to also providing these services (like try and buy), and whether that becomes viable at all is a question mark at this point of time. I think that’s what the concern is, and it has not been that viable,” said Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a management consulting firm focused on consumer goods and retail industries.
He added that when platforms offer the try-and-buy feature, delivery executives have to wait while customers try on products, which increases the cost per delivery and reduces the number of deliveries that can be completed. Despite that, some items may still be returned, further impacting operational efficiency.
However, startups are experimenting with these features mainly on higher-margin products to offset operational costs, Dutta said, as return rates across fashion categories can range from under 10% to as high as 40% for certain items.
(Published in Economic Times)
