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October 7, 2026
Vidya Sathyapriyan, ET Brand Equity
7 October 2026
Every single month, leather-goods brand Hidesign changes the storefront of its airport stores. The reason: “You can’t bore the man or woman who’s coming to the airport every week,” says founder Dilip Kapur.
But then what makes the airport shopper any different from someone walking into a high-street or mall store? Affluent? Sure. Willing to spend? Mostly. Time-poor and seeking convenience? Definitely.
That mix presents a particular challenge for brands: understanding what and why travellers will buy, and how quickly they can buy it.
Some have learnt to make the often lopsided economics work. Others are running an expensive billboard with a billing counter attached.
Crunching Numbers
The economics are punishing.
Airport rents, minimum guarantees, revenue-share, staffing and operating costs can make them significantly more expensive than conventional retail. For example, a good mall in Chennai charges roughly Rs. 350-800 per sq ft monthly in retail rent, compared with Rs. 150-200 per sq. ft. on the high street. Airport rentals can rise to as much as Rs. 6,000 per sq. ft. Similar differentials play out in other major cities.
Yet brands keep signing on because the alternative would be an advertising site with no retail attached. “A hoarding is for all and sundry and 1D,” says S. Shriram, founder of Miles2Go Consulting Services. “In the airport, captive audience, engagement is 3D and sometimes even 4D – touch and feel, trial, buy, and even return elsewhere.”
For deep-pocketed brands, spending on airport visibility can be justified even when store-level profitability is modest or even non-existent. Others gotta move on.
Go Colors, for instance, is rationalising stores at airports where the economics are not working. “The opportunity remains strong, but the location must justify the cost of access to the consumer,” says CMO Vatsal Koolwal. “As a broad benchmark, rentals in the range of 15-20% of revenue can work, provided the rest of the cost structure is managed effectively.”
The right sell
Six of Hidesign’s top-10 stores in India are at airports, says Kapur. The average Hidesign airport store generates roughly twice the turnover of an average mall store, while its smaller footprint pushes sales per square foot even higher.
A key reason is the skew in merchandise mix towards gifting.
Around 40% of the products sold in Hidesign’s airport stores are gifts. “If you have a product which can be gifted, can be purchased quickly and is work-oriented, you’ve covered most of the problematic variables.”
An overwhelming majority of domestic air travellers are men, who may not spend two hours browsing a mall, but can quickly buy a premium handbag for someone back home. Time is their scarcest resource, not money.
“Those are breaks (from routine). These are things that they would normally not have time to do,” adds Forest Essentials executive director Samrath Bedi on why premium skincare too commands attention in an airport environment.
But categories such as perfumes, cosmetics, watches, sunglasses, travel accessories and bags have an obvious advantage – they can be bought quickly and generally don’t require fitting rooms or extensive trial. As Pravat Paikray, VP-Commercial, Bangalore International Airport, says, these “one-size-fits-all” categories perform well.
Right-Sizing
Apparel, jewellery and other categories involving multiple sizes, fits or lengthy considerations have a harder job.
“Standalone apparel and niche lifestyle stores would typically be loss-making,” says founder, Third Eyesight, Devangshu Dutta.
Shriram believes even these categories are being held back by conventional merchandising assumptions. He points out that a business traveller does not necessarily need another blazer simply because they are at an airport. What they may need is a pair of track pants for an overnight trip, a gift for someone at home, or a product they discover while waiting for a flight.
For instance, Ramraj Cotton’s proposition works partly because of its local-brand resonance and partly because of its gifting-driven merchandising. “There are a lot of combos which work very well for gifting,” says Radhakrishnan. He says passengers are usually concerned about weight restrictions, so the store even repackages the items as per requirement. The brand declined Brand Equity’s interview request.
Airport merchandise can carry a 20-40% premium, he says, because the customer is paying partly for convenience. The traveller does not necessarily want to step out into the city just to save a few hundred rupees.
Front of the Queue
Paikray says Bengaluru airport explicitly designs its retail proposition around this time constraint. Brands are expected to adapt their store design, assortment, staffing, service and operations rather than simply transplanting their city format. “If a brand has 100 stores, don’t come and open 101st store in an airport, ” he says.
For Forest Essentials, what changes is also the reason the consumer is being shown the product, says Bedi. Hydration for flying, sleep on long journeys, stress relief, gifting, replenishment, etc. “It’s just about how you angle it.”
Bengaluru airport is also lowering the barriers for brands to test the market by using pop-up stores to let newer brands test travel retail without committing to long-term contracts.
Paikray says challenger and D2C brands are increasingly considering airports earlier in their expansion journeys.
But the opportunity is not on auto-pilot. Only those who adapt can turn the minutes before boarding into something more valuable than visibility – a sale.
(Published in ET Brand Equity)
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October 5, 2026
Sagar Malviya, Economic Times
5 October 2026
Reliance Retail and 7-Eleven are ending their five-year franchisee deal in India, closing most of the nearly 60 convenience stores they operated under the partnership, after struggling to make the format profitable, people familiar with the matter said.
A handful of outlets are clearing the inventory before shutting, they said. 7-Eleven may look for another Indian partner to keep a foothold in the market, although no decision has been made, the people said.
The exit highlights an unusual squeeze that convenience stores are facing in India, with millions of small kirana stores that have long served consumers’ immediate needs on one side and quick-commerce companies that are bringing the same snacks, groceries and daily essentials to doorsteps within minutes on the other.
Reliance and 7-Eleven did not respond to ET’s queries.
The partnership, struck in 2021, was intended to bring the world’s largest convenience-store chain to India through Reliance’s retail network. But the business struggled to achieve the scale needed to offset the relatively high costs of running branded stores.
The 7-India Convenience Retail venture reported revenue of about ₹92 crore ($10.6 million) and a net loss of nearly ₹90 crore in the year ended March 2026, according to its financial statements.
“Reliance wants to reach consumers across every channel, but sustainability ultimately matters. Convenience stores have faced increasing pressure from quick commerce since the pandemic, with both formats offering similar assortments and serving the same immediate-needs occasions,” said Devangshu Dutta, founder and CEO of Third Eyesight, a consumer-sector consultancy.
“Kiranas operate with far lower overheads and different margin expectations than corporate-run convenience stores. Reliance’s exit could therefore signal a broader rethink of the format, particularly in markets where quick commerce has become a strong alternative.”
Globally convenience stores have become powerful retail businesses in several markets despite the expansion of supermarkets and hypermarkets. 7-Eleven in Japan, Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore; Lawson in Japan and Oxxo in Mexico are among the largest retailers in their respective markets.
7-Eleven’s Japanese parent, Seven & i Holdings, operates more than 85,000 stores globally, making it one of the world’s largest retail networks. Yet the company has been restructuring its overseas operations and closing stores in North America as consumer behaviour and store economics change.
In India, however, organised convenience retail has struggled to replicate the success seen in other Asian and emerging markets. EasyDay, More and Spencer’s have either shut stores or shrank their smaller-format networks over the years, underscoring the difficulty of building profitable neighbourhood stores at scale.
Packaged consumer goods companies continue to derive roughly three-fourths of their sales from small neighbourhood stores, underlining the strength of the traditional distribution network. Quick commerce platforms are, meanwhile, expanding rapidly.
That makes it difficult for organised convenience stores to charge a premium or generate sufficient sales density to cover higher rents, staffing, inventory and logistics costs.
Convenience retail works best when operators achieve high store density and productivity, supported by strong supply chains and differentiated offerings such as fresh food and private labels.
Reliance initially expanded the 7-Eleven network in Mumbai and other markets, but the footprint remained small compared with the company’s wider retail operations.
(Published in Economic Times)
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July 13, 2026
Viveat Susan Pinto, S Shanthi (Financial Express)
13 July 2026
India’s new-age coffee chains are accelerating expansion despite continuing losses, as investors bet that the country’s under-penetrated branded cafe market can deliver long-term growth.
Third Wave Coffee plans to open 100 cafes this financial year while targeting company-wide break-even. Blue Tokai aims to expand from 240 outlets to 800 by FY30 and is preparing for an eventual public listing. Nothing Before Coffee (NBC), which has grown to 114 cafes across 45 cities, plans to more than double its network over the next two years.
The expansion comes even as profitability remains elusive. Investors, however, are increasingly prioritising store-level economics over headline profits, arguing that India’s cafe market is still in its early stages of growth.
“The earlier failures in the cafe segment were largely capital-discipline failures, not failures of the category itself,” said Vish Narain, managing partner at Pulsar Capital, which is backing Blue Tokai’s international expansion.
“Chains expanded store count before proving unit economics. Investors today understand that India’s per-capita coffee consumption is still in its early stages. They are reading past shutdowns as wrong execution, not wrong thesis,” he said.
Dissecting the Balance Sheets
The numbers highlight the challenge.
Heissette Beverages, the parent of Third Wave Coffee, accumulated losses of Rs 320 crore between FY21 and FY25, while total assets stood at Rs 538 crore at the end of FY25, according to Tracxn. Muhavra Enterprises, Blue Tokai’s parent, reported accumulated losses of Rs 175 crore over the same period, with total assets of nearly Rs 370 crore. Financials for FY26 are not yet available with Tracxn.
NBC accumulated losses of nearly Rs 3 crore over FY24 and FY25 against total assets of Rs 18 crore. Mumbai-based premium chain Subko Coffee, with 16 outlets in India and one in Dubai, posted losses of Rs 45 crore over five years, while total assets stood at Rs 61 crore at the end of FY25.
Third Wave Coffee said around 90% of its outlets are Ebitda-positive and expects to achieve company-wide break-even during FY27. Blue Tokai, backed by Verlinvest, is targeting profitability by March 2028.
NBC declined to specify a profitability timeline but said it has adopted a franchisee-invested, company-operated (FICO) model to reduce cash burn while retaining operational control.
“FICO lets us expand quickly with franchisee capital while keeping operational control,” said Ankesh Jain, co-founder and chief executive officer, Nothing Before Coffee.
Structural Shifts
Experts attribute the investor interest partly to improving outlet economics as operators shift from large dine-in formats to compact grab-and-go and cloud-kitchen models.
“These formats materially cut capex per outlet and shrink payback timelines, making the category venture-fundable rather than just a slow-and-steady, self-funded business,” said Krishna Dev Pathak, investment banker and advisor to early-stage startups.
Lower capital requirements have strengthened unit economics, reinforcing investor confidence despite delayed company-level profitability.
Investors are also betting on a broader shift in consumer behaviour. Anuj Kejriwal, chief executive officer and managing director of Anarock Retail, said rising incomes, urbanisation and changing preferences are gradually moving India from “a tea economy to a coffee economy”. The shift is widening the addressable market for organised coffee chains beyond the metros into smaller cities.
Consumers increasingly use cafes as workspaces, meeting points and all-day dining destinations, prompting chains to diversify into food, desserts, packaged coffee, vending solutions and merchandise.
“The cafe model is now well established as part of consumers’ lifestyles,” said Devangshu Dutta, founder and chief executive of retail consultancy Third Eyesight.
Challenges remain. Rentals in premium locations have surged, coffee prices remain volatile, and labour and supply-chain costs continue to pressure margins.
For now, investors appear willing to fund rapid expansion, betting that disciplined execution and improving unit economics will eventually turn India’s cafe boom into a profitable business.
(Published in Financial Express)
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February 27, 2026
Samar Srivastava, Forbes India
Feb 27, 2026
India’s young consumers are discovering the next big beauty serum, protein bar or sneaker brand not in a mall, but on Instagram reels, YouTube shorts and quick-commerce apps that promise 10-minute delivery. What began as a trickle of digital-first labels a decade ago has now become a full-blown wave. Direct-to-consumer (D2C) brands—built online, fuelled by social media and venture capital—have reshaped India’s consumer landscape and forced legacy companies to rethink everything from marketing to distribution.
India today has more than 800 active D2C brands across beauty, personal care, fashion, food, home and electronics, according to industry estimates and consulting reports. The Indian D2C market is estimated at $12–15 billion in 2025, up from under $5 billion in 2020, and growing at 25–30 percent annually. The pandemic accelerated online adoption, but the structural drivers—cheap data, digital payments and over 750 million internet users—were already in place.
Unlike traditional FMCG brands that relied on distributors and kirana stores, D2C brands such as Mamaearth, boAt, Licious and Sugar Cosmetics built their early traction online. Customer acquisition happened through performance marketing; feedback loops were immediate; product iterations were rapid.
Importantly, these brands are discovered online—but as they scale, consumers buy them both online and offline, increasingly through quick-commerce platforms such as Blinkit, Zepto and Swiggy Instamart, as well as modern trade and general trade stores. The omnichannel play is now central to their growth strategy.
According to Anil Kumar, founder and chief executive of Redseer Strategy Consultants, the ecosystem is maturing in measurable ways. Brands are taking lesser time to reach ₹100 crore or ₹500 crore revenue benchmarks and, once there, mortality rates are coming down. There is also an acceptance that if a brand is not profitable in a 3–5 year timeframe, that needs to be corrected. “There is a lot of emphasis on growing profitably and not just through GMV,” he says.
Big Cheques, Bigger Exits
The D2C boom would not have been possible without capital. Between 2014 and 2022, Indian D2C startups raised over $5 billion in venture and growth funding. Peak years like 2021 alone saw more than $1.2 billion invested in the segment. Beauty, personal care and fashion accounted for nearly 50 percent of total inflows, followed by food and beverages.
Some brands scaled independently; others found strategic buyers. Among the most prominent exits:
> Hindustan Unilever acquired a majority stake in Minimalist, reportedly valuing the actives-led skincare brand at over ₹3,000 crore. For Hindustan Unilever, the annual run rate from sales of its D2C portfolio is estimated at around ₹1,000 crore, underscoring how material digital-first brands have become to its growth strategy.
> ITC Limited bought Yoga Bar for about ₹175 crore in 2023 to strengthen its health foods portfolio.
> Emami acquired a majority stake in The Man Company, expanding its digital-first play.
> Tata Consumer Products acquired Soulfull as part of its health and wellness strategy.
> Marico invested in brands such as Beardo and True Elements.
Private equity has also entered aggressively at the growth stage. ChrysCapital invested in The Man Company; L Catterton backed Sugar Cosmetics; General Atlantic invested in boAt; and Sequoia Capital India (now Peak XV Partners) was an early backer of multiple consumer brands.
Valuations were often steep. boAt was valued at over $1.2 billion at its peak. Mamaearth’s parent, Honasa Consumer, listed in 2023 at a valuation of around ₹10,000 crore. Across categories, brands crossing ₹500 crore in annual revenue began attracting buyout interest, with deal sizes ranging from ₹150 crore to over ₹3,000 crore depending on scale and profitability.
Yet exits have not always been smooth. “While it takes 7-8 years to build a brand most funds that invest in them have a timeline of 3-5 years before they need an exit,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a retail consultancy. This timing mismatch can create pressure—pushing brands to scale aggressively, sometimes at the cost of margins.
Integration Pains and the Profitability Pivot
For large FMCG companies, buying D2C brands offers speed: Access to younger consumers, premium positioning and digital marketing expertise. But integration brings challenges.
Founder-led organisations operate with rapid decision cycles, test-and-learn marketing and flat hierarchies. Large corporations often work with layered approvals, structured brand calendars and rigid cost controls. Cultural friction can lead to talent exits if autonomy is curtailed too quickly.
Margins are another sticking point. In the early growth phase, many D2C brands spent 30–40 percent of revenue on digital advertising. Rising customer acquisition costs post-2021, combined with higher logistics expenses, squeezed contribution margins. As brands entered offline retail, distributor and retailer margins of 20–35 percent further compressed profitability.
Large acquirers, used to EBITDA margins of 18–25 percent in mature FMCG portfolios, often discovered that digital-first brands operated at low single-digit margins—or were loss-making at scale. Rationalising ad spends, optimising supply chains and pruning SKUs became essential.
The funding slowdown between 2022 and 2024 triggered a reset. Marketing spends were cut by as much as 25–40 percent across several startups. Growth moderated from 80–100 percent annually during peak years to 25–40 percent for more mature brands—but unit economics improved.
Quick-commerce has emerged as a structural growth lever. For categories such as personal care, snacking and health foods, these platforms now account for 10–25 percent of urban revenues for scaled brands, improving inventory turns and reducing dependence on paid digital acquisition.
The next phase of India’s D2C journey will be less about blitz scaling and more about disciplined brand building—balancing growth, profitability and exit timelines. What began as a disruption is now part of the mainstream consumer playbook. And as capital becomes more selective, only brands that combine strong gross margins, repeat purchase rates above 35–40 percent and sustainable EBITDA pathways will endure.
(Published in Forbes India)
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February 18, 2026
Kartikay Kashyap, BrandWagon, Financial Express
18 February 2026
IKEA HAS BEEN around in India for about eight years, with another three years before that spent studying the market. It has developed a range that it deems “locally relevant-like the roti maker, the tava (pan), the belan (rolling pin), and the pressure cooker -which now constitute about 50% of the products it offers in the country. It has shifted its communication strategy to sync with local culture and fit into local spaces and has worked hard to beef up its omnichannel sales model with about 30% of its sales originating online. But profitability has remained elusive for the retailer whose global sales reached approximately €45billion in the 2015 financial year (FY25).
Just for context, the company’s India entity widened its losses by about 29 to 1,325.2 crore in the financial year ending March 31, 2025 (FY25). The revenue also dipped 3 to 1,749.5 crore from 1,809.8 crore in FY25.
So now the brand is taking a leaf out of its China playbook and tweaking its retail formats. Starting last year, it started piloting smaller store sizes ranging from 15,000-20,000 sq ft that are more cost-effective to set up and faster to integrate with its omnichannel model. “The goal is to create a simpler and more efficient shopping experience,” Ingka Group Retail Manager Tolga Oncu had said when the concept was unveiled last August.
Five months on, the furniture retailer is looking to take a step up the ladder – setting up new stores in the 50,000-70,000 sq ft range in the country, which will sit comfortably between its smaller stones (15,000-20,000 sq ft) and big box retail outlets (4 lakh sq ft), Adosh Sharma, country commercial manager at Ikea India told FE recently. Ikea’s broader plan also includes doubling its investments in the country to over 20,000 crore ($2.2 billion) over the next five years and improving local sourcing.
Will all this help the retailer grab a larger share of the highly fragmented furniture and furnishing market in the country? Will the brand achieve profitability in the next two years in keeping with its plans?
Ikea realises copy-pasting its global retail strategy in India is not going to work. That explains its recent moves to tweak store sizes and product design. Over and above the regular 5-M-L strategy, the fourth format the brand is developing comprises no-frills planning and order points, focused on customers who want to design homes or seek complex solutions without distraction.
“Smaller stores, which fulfill purpose-led needs will help them to get closer to their customers,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder & CEO, Third Eyesight.
The furniture and home decor segment has been up against slow purchase cycles in India. Smaller sized stores that are closer to residential arras might help step up the frequency of purchases. “Players are moving towards a higher purchase frequency strategy and smaller stores will help lkea cash in on this opportunity,” says Kushal Bhatnagar, associate partner, Redseer Consultant Strategy. He says quick commerce has helped improve the purchase cycle in the home decor space, and that is something Ikea will likely tap going forwand.
Dutta says Ikea has taken a long-term view on India and the investments in the pipeline is an indication of the opportunity that awaits players.
The brand claims it has served close to 110 million customers in FY25 across channels, and online sales are growing 34% compared to the previous fiscal. While furniture contributed the lion’s share of its revenue, the food business contributed 100% and Ikea for Business (tailored solutions for businesses) another 19% to its topline.
(Published in Financial Express)
