How Swiggy & Zomato Are Hitting The Brakes In The Race To Be Everything Everywhere All At Once

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May 25, 2025

Gargi Sarkar, Inc42

25 May 2025

SUMMARY: Swiggy and Zomato are scaling back non-core bets such as 10-minute food delivery, private labels, and event logistics to sharpen focus on core businesses and improve profitability. Both companies are betting on platform fees and selective verticals like quick commerce and ticketing, but analysts warn that financial discipline, not endless expansion, is key to long-term sustainability. The foodtech duo is stuck in a balancing act of rationalising what works and doesn’t. However, going ahead, this rationalisation game is only going to get more pronounced as they will strive to shield their core bread and butter businesses

For foodtech giants Swiggy and Zomato (now Eternal), the last few years have been about engaging in a battle for expansion, so much so that it has become difficult to tell them apart.

From quick commerce and cloud kitchens to intercity food delivery and even selling tickets for events and concerts, the two companies appear to be aping each other’s every move to be everything everywhere all at once.

However, what began as a bold bet to dominate every possible vertical falling under the ambit of food, lifestyle and entertainment is now undergoing a major course correction.

For starters, both are reconsidering their blitzkrieg, and while at it, they are gracefully stepping away from non-core bets, diluting underperforming or experimental units to focus on core operations to drive profitability.

For context: Zomato, which once saw the future of food logistics in ultra-fast deliveries, gave up on its 15-minute food delivery service, Quick, four months after its launch in January. It has also pulled the plug on its home-made meal service, Zomato Everyday. Tailored for office-goers and budget-conscious consumers, the service was floated in January 2025.

Swiggy, too, has made similar retreats. It suspended Swiggy Genie, its courier and pick-up-and-drop service that had gained popularity during the pandemic. The company also gave up on its private label food business by entering a strategic agreement with Kouzina, a chain of virtual restaurants, granting it exclusive rights to operate Swiggy’s digital-first food brands.

So, what has triggered this metaphorical fission in strategy?

One possible reason could be the growing realisation that profitability hinges on diversifying smartly rather than untamed expansion.

A market analyst, who did not wish to be named, pointed out that the duo’s attempt to rule their customers’ wallets for everything from food to groceries and entertainment to lifestyle has been quite ambitious. “The course correction was overdue,” the analyst said.

He believes that foodtechs are now forced to burn the visceral fat in the form of non-core businesses because those have been slowing them down, also eating into the revenues of core businesses and impacting operational efficiencies.

“Moreover, the more the segments, the higher the chances of operational hiccups. Managing logistics, customer experience, and quality control across a wide array of verticals inevitably leads to fragmentation and strain on core operations,” he added.

State Of Eternal Affairs: Zomato’s Diversification Saga

Eternal’s push to transform Zomato into a broader lifestyle platform in 2024 was not only about ambition but also a strategic response to a slowing core business — food delivery, according to industry observers.

Also, a glance at the table below reveals how the company has seen a marginal QoQ increase in its monthly transacting users.

In terms of monthly transacting customers, Zomato’s food delivery growth began strong with a 6.84% QoQ jump in Q1, but momentum quickly slowed, and Q2 saw only a 1.97% sequential rise, followed by a slight decline of 0.97% in Q3. This dip signalled stagnation, and although Q4 showed a mild recovery (1.95%), overall FY25 growth of the company’s monthly transacting users (food delivery) was modest at just 2.96%

Interestingly, Eternal founder and CEO Deepinder Goyal, too, acknowledged a slowdown in the company’s food delivery business while announcing the company’s Q4 FY25 results. He said the slowdown was due to rising competition from quick commerce platforms and weak discretionary spending. Goyal added that services like Zepto Cafe, Swiggy Snacc, and Blinkit Bistro, too, were eating into demand for restaurant deliveries.

In terms of Zomato’s food delivery numbers, average monthly transacting numbers grew to 20.9 Mn in Q4 FY25 from 20.5 Mn in Q4 FY24. Net order value (NOV) growth also remained subdued at 14% YoY versus the 20% YoY growth guidance.

Hence, the company was under pressure to unlock new revenue streams. Blinkit’s success became the reference point, and the company started envisioning similar success stories with other verticals too, a former Zomato employee said.

This was when the company got engulfed in the wave of diversification, paving the path for Zomato’s yet another bold move (besides Blinkit) — the INR 2,078 Cr acquisition of Paytm’s movies and events ticketing business, Insider, in August last year.

The acquisition that was planned with the launch of the ‘District’ app meant but one thing — declaration of war against BookMyShow, the lone behemoth in the realm of the entertainment ticketing segment. Even the company knew the path wouldn’t be all rainbows and sunshine.

In its Q4 FY24 earnings call, the management acknowledged that while the gross order value (GOV) of the going-out vertical continues to grow at over 100% YoY, the business still operates at an adjusted EBITDA loss of -2 to -2.5% of net order value (NOV).

Besides, given that the transition of users from Paytm’s ticketing business and Zomato’s dining out platform to the District app requires sustained investment, the company doesn’t expect the business to turn profitable in the near term.

But Zomato expects losses to eventually see stability at current levels.

“However, even with plateauing losses, the company will have to keep spending on creating supply. This means: curating new event experiences, forging partnerships and acquiring new users for the District app… and all of this translates into one thing — prolonged burn,” the market analyst added.

Moving on, Zomato’s ambition to become a lifestyle super app didn’t just manifest into flashy verticals like events, entertainment, and ticketing — it also showed up in its renewed aggression in food delivery, the very space where it first made its name.

Therefore, Zomato began piloting a 15-minute food delivery service in select parts of Mumbai and Bengaluru early this year.

But the company now finds the initiative extremely difficult to operationalise as it has failed to generate incremental demand.

“Customers do not necessarily want food fast, they just want it reliably. A 10-minute turnaround without full control over the supply chain leads to poor customer experiences, operational stress, and negligible upside. Instead of delighting users, it makes the company vulnerable to inconsistent quality and frequent delays,” a Zomato insider added.

Satish Meena, the founder of Datum Intelligence, opined that without controlling the entire supply chain, delivering food items within 10 to 15 minutes cannot be a profitable proposition.

Swiggy’s U-Turns

In 2024, also the year of its public listing, Swiggy aggressively expanded its service offerings, launching several new verticals to diversify beyond its core food delivery business.

Among the most prominent launches was Bolt, a 10-minute food delivery platform. Initially launched in Bengaluru, Chennai and Mumbai, Bolt quickly expanded to over 400 cities, with over 40,000 restaurants, including KFC, McDonald’s and Starbucks.

To complement Bolt, Swiggy introduced Snacc, a separate app for instant delivery of snacks, beverages, and small meals within 15 minutes.

Continuing to diversify its portfolio, Swiggy launched Pyng, an AI-powered platform that bridges users with verified experts like yoga teachers or chartered accountants.

With this, Swiggy marked its entry into the on-demand services marketplace, making professional services easier to access.

Apart from these customer-facing services, Swiggy also entered events via Scenes and the B2B space with Assure, to keep pace with Zomato.

Interestingly, Swiggy, too, has begun consolidating its operations. The company has shut down Genie, its hyperlocal courier business, which competed with Porter, Borzo and Uber.

According to a competitor, sourcing delivery riders specifically for packages is a challenge, particularly in cities like Bengaluru. For Swiggy, which was already managing fleets for food delivery and quick commerce through Instamart, sustaining a separate rider network for Genie only added to the complexity.

In another such move, Swiggy exited its private label food business by transferring exclusive rights for its digital-first brands, including The Bowl Company and Homely, to cloud kitchen operator Kouzina.

Balance Sheet Blues

Imperative to highlight that the rollbacks by Zomato and Swiggy are rooted in the growing pressures on their respective balance sheets.

After diversifying at a breakneck speed, they are now faced with the hard realities of cost structures that don’t always align with revenue potential.

In Q4 FY25, Zomato and Swiggy both reported robust top-line growth. Zomato’s revenue surged to INR 5,833 Cr, largely buoyed by its three core pillars — the food delivery business (INR 1,739 crore), Blinkit’s quick commerce arm (INR 769 Cr), and Hyperpure, its B2B supply chain vertical, which posted a 99% YoY growth in revenue to INR 1,840 Cr.

However, despite the momentum, the company’s net profit declined sharply to INR 39 Cr in the quarter, largely thanks to ongoing investments in Blinkit and newer bets like the ‘District’ lifestyle app.

Meanwhile, Swiggy clocked INR 4,410 Cr in revenue in Q4, up 45% YoY, but saw its net loss nearly double to INR 1,081 Cr. The widening losses were fuelled by surging operational expenses.

“All of this explains the strategic pullbacks witnessed lately, Swiggy exiting Genie and private labels, Zomato pulling the plug on services like Quick and Legends. The rationalisation marks a reset, indicating that while growth via diversification was necessary, financial discipline and profitability are in the spotlight,” the market analyst said.

Platform Fee To The Rescue… But For How Long?

While it won’t be easy for Zomato and Swiggy to suddenly change course, the future of these two foodtech giants is all about heading towards a more focussed set of revenue streams driven by value rather than FOMO.

In the process, both foodtech giants appear to have struck gold with the platform fee, which has grown from just INR 2 in 2023 to INR 10 today.

But the real question is: Can rising platform fee help the duo neutralise the impact of aggressive expansion? Or is rationalisation the only way forward?

Devangshu Dutta, the founder of Third Eyesight, thinks otherwise. He believes that the companies will not stop looking for new revenue streams, even as they will continue to amputate the ones that offer little value.

“All of these companies have to look for growth, which is a given. If their existing businesses are not delivering the kind of growth they need to justify their stock price or valuation, then they have to look at new avenues.”

According to him, we are bound to see a flurry of experiments, trials of different services and new verticals as these companies attempt to expand their addressable markets.

At the end of the day, the foodtech duo is stuck in a balancing act of rationalising what works and doesn’t. However, going ahead, this rationalisation game is only going to get more pronounced as they will strive to shield their core bread and butter businesses.

[Edited by Shishir Parasher]

(Published in Inc42)

Why Kay Beauty outshone 82°E: It’s beyond skin-deep, say experts

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May 7, 2025

Shalinee Mishra, Exchange4Media
May 7, 2025

Bollywood’s biggest stars, Katrina Kaif and Deepika Padukone, have reputed beauty businesses to their names — Kay Beauty and 82°East, respectively.

Kay Beauty, launched in late 2019 in partnership with Nykaa, has crossed the ₹200 crore revenue mark in 2024. In contrast, 82°E, launched by Deepika in November 2022, has managed around ₹25 crore, according to industry estimates.

Both actors have massive social media pull, strong brand equity, and sizable fan followings. They are matched in popularity, but the same cannot be said about their respective brands. One clearly has an edge over the other. In this case, it is Kay Beauty.

What went wrong with 82°E?

A core difference between the two brands is pricing.

Kay Beauty’s average product is priced affordably at around ₹299, making it accessible to a large portion of Indian beauty consumers. It hits the sweet spot of mass affordability and aspirational branding.

Katrina seems to have built the line keeping in mind India’s price-sensitive but beauty-conscious audience, especially women who look for functional, everyday products without shelling out a fortune.

On the other hand, 82°E positions itself as a luxury skincare brand, with products starting at ₹2,500 and going up to nearly ₹4,000. While targeting the premium market is a valid strategy, it demands either a very clear value proposition or a unique, standout offering that sets it apart from both domestic and global competitors.

According to multiple marketing and retail experts, 82°E currently lacks such a defining “hero” product. In contrast, top-tier global brands like Estée Lauder (Advanced Night Repair) and L’Occitane (Immortelle Divine Cream) have built their entire portfolio identity around one or two iconic products.

Devangshu Dutta, CEO of retail consultancy Third Eyesight, cautions against overestimating the power of celebrity equity alone. “Celebrity involvement, even with an equity stake, doesn’t automatically ensure brand success,” he says. “What matters is how well the product and brand resonate with the end consumer. Many factors—category selection, pricing, accessibility, and retail strategy—determine scalability.”

He adds, “A high-priced D2C brand with limited-use products will always scale slower than a more affordably priced, high-rotation brand with widespread retail availability.”

Missing the emotional connect

Another crucial area where 82°E falters is brand recall without Deepika. Experts argue that if Deepika’s face were to be removed from the branding, very little would remain to emotionally anchor consumers.

While celebrity-founded brands enjoy the initial boost of recognition, long-term consumer connection demands storytelling, product efficacy, and relevance.

For a product priced between ₹2700–₹3900, the experience and results need to justify the cost. But user feedback suggests the perceived benefits don’t dramatically exceed what one might get from a ₹999 serum in the market.

Katrina’s Kay Beauty, in contrast, positioned itself as a homegrown solution for Indian skin types, with products that worked well for deeper skin tones and humidity-prone weather.

The brand tapped into inclusivity and practicality—two emotional hooks that resonate deeply with Indian consumers. Additionally, it responded to functional needs by launching waterproof and sweat-resistant products, which especially make sense during monsoons.

On Instagram, Katrina actively promotes her products, collaborates with influencers, and shares content that resonates with her target audience. In contrast, Deepika’s brand presence on social media lacks the same level of relatability and consistent engagement, suggesting a need for a more tailored and active digital strategy.

Link: https://www.instagram.com/reel/DI_wjSRoZTM/? utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=MzRlODBiNWFlZA==

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DIWHG1DSR5f/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=MzRlODBiNWFlZA==

Retail footprint and distribution strategy

Skincare, particularly in the premium category, remains an experiential purchase. Consumers often want to try and test products before committing, especially at a higher price point. 82°E launched as a D2C-only brand, relying heavily on its website and social media advertising for discovery and sales with no store opening.

The strategy meant substantial upfront investment in paid media and influencer partnerships to generate traction, but lacked the physical visibility or tactile experience needed to convert high-end skincare buyers.

In contrast, Kay Beauty quickly became visible across Nykaa’s extensive online and offline retail network, giving shoppers a chance to explore products across price tiers in-store and online. The Nykaa tie-up served not only as a strong distribution engine but also as a brand endorsement in itself, given the platform’s dominant position in Indian beauty retail.

As Kushal Sanghvi, a media and marketing strategist, puts it, “Kay Beauty got its pricing, packaging, promotion, and place—basically the key P’s of marketing—spot on. Deepika’s brand, though elegant, is caught in a niche premium wellness space with limited scale.”

Kay Beauty was developed with a clear understanding of what works in India: colour cosmetics tailored for Indian skin tones and seasonal weather. The brand focused on frequently-used products like lipsticks, kajal, and foundation sticks that had both a functional and emotional appeal, allowing it to drive repeat purchases.

In contrast, 82°E focused on skincare rooted in self-care and holistic wellness, a space that is already crowded with local and international competitors, and where product effectiveness needs to be proven over time. Moreover, Indian consumers still tend to see skincare as utilitarian, rather than indulgent, which makes higher pricing even more of a challenge.

Short-Term Results vs. Long-Term Vision

It’s important to contextualise these figures within brand age. Luxury brands, globally, have often taken decades to establish loyalty. From Estée Lauder to Chanel, brand equity is built slowly through repeated use, reliable results, and consistent positioning.

But time alone won’t change the equation unless the core approach is recalibrated. If Deepika’s brand intends to build a long-lasting business, it will need to think beyond elite appeal and D2C strategy. Offline presence, a wider retail network, and possibly a reimagining of its product portfolio to include lower price points or trial-sized options could open the door to a broader consumer base.

India’s beauty and wellness market is growing at over 15% year-on-year, and opportunities abound at both the premium and affordable ends of the spectrum. But clarity of positioning and accessibility remain critical to long-term success.

(Published in Exchange4Media)

India’s Kirana Stores May Suffer The Fate Of Once-Ubiquitous Telephone Booths

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September 16, 2024

Sesa Sen, NDTV Profit
16 September 2024

As India’s economy grows and digital technologies reshape consumer behavior, the future of kirana stores—the quintessential neighbourhood grocery shops—hangs precariously in the balance.

These soap-to-staple sellers, once impervious to change, now confront an existential threat from quick commerce players like Blinkit, Instamart, Zepto, and from modern retailers such as DMart and Star Bazaar, raising a pivotal question: Can kiranas survive the pressure of change, or will they die a slow death?

The All India Consumer Products Distributors Federation, that represents four lakh packaged goods distributors and stockists, has recently raised alarms, urging Union Minister for Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal to investigate the unchecked proliferation of quick commerce platforms and its potential ramifications for small traders.

Their concerns are not unfounded. Data suggests that the share of modern retail, including online commerce, which is currently below 10%, is set to cross 30% over the next 3-5 years. Much of this growth will come at the cost of traditional retail.

“Unless the government takes on an activist role to support the smallest of business owners, the shift toward large corporate formats is inevitable,” according to Devangshu Dutta, head of retail consultancy Third Eyesight.

Casualties Of The Boom

Madan Sachdev, a second-generation grocer operating Vandana Stores in eastern Delhi, has thrived in the recent years, adapting to the digital age by taking orders via WhatsApp and employing extra hands for home delivery.

Despite having weathered the storm of competition from giants like Amazon and BigBazaar, he now finds himself disheartened, as his monthly sales have halved to about Rs 30,000, all thanks to quick commerce.

Sachdev is worried about meeting expenses such as rent, his children’s education, and other household bills. He finds himself at a crossroads, uncertain about how to modernise his store or adopt new-age strategies in order to attract customers in an increasingly competitive market.

India’s $600 billion grocery market, a cornerstone for quick commerce, is largely dominated by more than 13 million local mom-and-pop stores.

Retailers like Sachdev are also seeing a steep decline in their profit margins from FMCG companies, which now hover around 10-12%, down from the 18-20% margins seen before the Covid-19 pandemic. The consumer goods companies are instead offering higher margins to quick commerce platforms so that they can afford the price tags.

Quick deliveries account for $5 billion, or 45%, of the country’s $11 billion online grocery market, according to Goldman Sachs. It is projected to capture 70% of the online grocery market, forecasted to grow to $60 billion by 2030, as consumers increasingly prioritise convenience and speed.

Many of the mom-and-pop shops are family-run and have been in business for generations. Yet they lack the resources to modernise and compete effectively with larger chains. Modern retail businesses, including quick commerce, begin with significantly more capital, thanks to funding from corporate investors, venture capital, private equity, and public markets.

“They can scale quickly and capture market share due to a superior product-service mix, larger infrastructure, and more robust business processes,” said Dutta.

Moreover, their ability to engage in price competition poses a challenge for small retailers and distributors, making it difficult for them to compete.

“This is something that has happened worldwide, in the largest markets, and I don’t think India will be an exception,” Dutta said, adding that it would be incomplete to single out a specific format of corporate business such as quick commerce as the sole villain in this situation.

“India is a tough, friction-laden environment at any given point in time, including government processes which don’t make it any easier,” he said.

Peer Pressure

Data from research firm Kantar shows that general trade, which comprises kirana and paan-beedi shops, have grown 4.2% on a 12-month basis in June, while quick commerce grew 29% during the same period.

Shoppers are becoming more omnichannel, rather than gravitating towards one particular channel, said Manoj Menon, director- commercial, Kantar Worldpanel, South Asia. “While the growth [for quick commerce and e-commerce] might appear to have declined compared to a year ago, a point to note is that the base for these channels has significantly grown. Therefore, achieving this level of growth is still commendable.”

Consumer goods companies such as Hindustan Unilever Ltd., Dabur India Ltd., Tata Consumer Products Ltd., etc., have acknowledged the salience of quick commerce to their packaged food, personal and homecare products. The platform currently comprises roughly 40% of their digital sales.

“We are working all the major players in the quick commerce space and devising product mix and portfolio. This is a very high growth channel for us,” according to Mohit Malhotra, chief executive officer, Dabur India.

Elara Capital analysts have pointed out that the share of quick commerce is expected to rise to60% in the near future with e-commerce and modern trade turning costlier for FMCG brands than quick commerce. “The larger brands tend to make better margins on quick-commerce platforms versus e-commerce due to lower discounts on the former,” it said in a report.

However, it is too premature to draw a parallel between kirana and quick commerce in terms of competition, given the significant size difference.

The average spend per consumer on FMCG in kirana stores stands at Rs. 21,285 annually while the same is Rs. 4,886 for quick commerce, according to Menon.

Rural Vs Urban Divide

Quick commerce is still an urban phenomenon. In contrast, in rural settings, where internet penetration is still catching up and access to large retail chains is limited, kirana stores continue to thrive.

According to Naveen Malpani, partner, Grant Thornton Bharat, while the growth of quick commerce is undeniable, this channel is not poised to replace traditional retail, which still has a wider reach in the country. “It will complement older models, filling a niche for immediate, smaller purchases. Also, a 10-20-minute delivery may not have a strong market pull in rural markets where distance and time are not much of a concern.”

Yet many others believe, even in these areas, the challenge is palpable.

The small businesses are beginning to feel the sting of same slow decline that once befell the ubiquitous telephone booths in the era of mobile phone, according to Sameer Gandotra, chief executive officer of Frendy, a start-up that is building ‘mini DMart’ in small towns where giants like Reliance and Tatas have yet to establish their presence.

As rural customers slowly start to embrace digital shopping and seek more variety, kirana stores must adapt or risk becoming obsolete, he said.

Besides, the popularity of quick commerce is set to challenge the dominance of incumbent e-commerce platforms, especially in categories such as beauty and personal care, packaged foods and apparel.

“Quick commerce is primarily operational in metros and tier 1 markets, which is impacting the sales of traditional companies in these areas. However, if quick-commerce players were to extend their operations to tier 2 and tier 3, it would even challenge companies such as DMart and Nykaa, and would pare sales and profitability,” noted analysts at Elara Securities.

Frendy’s Gandotra believes the journey for kirana stores is not a lost cause, but it requires strategic interventions. Many kirana store owners struggle to integrate point-of-sale systems, inventory management software, or even digital payment solutions. These stores need to embrace technology.

Another aspect is the need for policy support. Regulations to ensure fair competition can prevent monopolisation by large retailers. Additionally, subsidies, tax benefits, and grants for infrastructure improvements can help small businesses adapt to changing market dynamics. With renewed support, kirana stores can continue to be the backbone of Indian retail.

Nonetheless, there will be some who’ll be left behind during this shift. Analysts at Elara Capital warn that the swift rise of quick-commerce platforms, combined with aggressive discounting, could wipe off 25-30% of traditional grocery stores.

(Published on NDTV Profit)

D2C – Founders v Investors (video; panel discussion)

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August 30, 2024

In a startup world, founders are typically creators first while investors see themselves as the monitors. Therefore, conflicts between the two are almost a default feature of a relationship that in effect funds a dream. From ‘off’ chemistry to differences of opinion to what some founders see as shackles on entrepreneurial freedom, the reasons could be any or a mix of all. Watch this discussion, with a mega-panel of intense start-up founders on the one hand and investors with VC funds on the other, addressing the pain points on Cash, Control, Creativity, Chemistry and Culture in a supercharged encounter. Session Anchor, Devangshu Dutta (Founder, Third Eyesight) reflected, “Those who have heard classical music jugalbandi or witnessed jazz musicians jamming will appreciate the creative tension, the give and take that was the thread throughout this discussion, reflecting the reality of the relationship between entrepreneurs and VCs.”

Watch the video

INVESTORS:
Ankita Balotia, VP, Fireside Ventures
Aashish Vanigota, Principal – Investments, IvyCap Ventures Advisors Private Limited
Bhawna Bhatnagar, Co-founder, We Founder Circle
Nitya Agarwal, VP-Investments, 3one4 Capital
Harmanpreet Singh, Founder & Managing Partner, Prath Ventures
Vamshi Reddy, Partner, Kalaari Capital
Zoeb Ali Khan, Vice President, Sauce.vc

D2C FOUNDERS:
Abdus Samad, Founder, Sam & Marshall Eyewear
Akshay Mahendru, Co-Founder & CEO, The Pet Point & Nootie
Malvika Jain, Founder, SEREKO
Nitin Jain, Founder, Indigifts
Puneet Tyagi, Egoss Shoes
Radhika Dang, CEO & Founder, The Good Karma Company
Rahul Aggarwal, Coffeeza
Udit Toshniwal, Founder & Director, The Pant Project
Vaani Chugh, Co-founder & Director, D’chica
Yash Kotak, Co-founder, Bombay Hemp Co.
Yashesh Mukhi, Co-founder, Chupps

How Shein-Reliance Nexus Will Shake Up India’s Online Fashion Market

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July 20, 2024

Gargi Sarkar, Inc42

20 July 2024

The Indian government’s ban on Chinese apps and products in 2020 saw two massive casualties. Everyone knows about TikTok, but fast fashion brand Shein was equally as big in India four years ago.

But the India setback did not halt Shein’s global momentum, just as it did not stop TikTok from becoming what it is today. Shein became the world’s largest online-only fashion company in 2022.

Valued at a staggering $10 Bn, the brand accounted for nearly one-fifth of the global fast-fashion market in 2022, outpacing giants such as Zara and H&M. To put things in context, Shein was founded in 2008, whereas Zara was incorporated in 1975 and H&M in 1947.

In India, Shein set the market on fire. Launched in India in 2018, the brand was already a major player by 2020, dominating online searches and influencer-led content. But the ban in 2020 meant all that came to a halt.

The Indian government’s ban stemmed from fears of Shein’s Chinese parent company storing or transferring data of Indian customers to China. While the ban itself came under a tense geopolitical climate, one could say that Shein’s exit left a gap in India’s fashion market which D2C brands quickly filled.

Brands such as Urbanic, Twenty Dresses, Cilory, attempted to fill the void but couldn’t quite match Shein’s popularity. Indeed, VCs also backed fast fashion and casual wear startups such as The Souled Store, Virgio, NewMe and others which looked to replicate the Shein formula.

Ecommerce unicorn Meesho has also looked to fill the gap with affordable fashion and a similar content-led sales strategy that worked wonders for Shein.

While many of these brands have grown in scale over the past four years, none of them — at least so far — have quite replicated the magic of Shein and how quickly it disrupted the market.

And that’s arguably why Shein’s re-entry into India through a partnership with Reliance Retail is a big deal.

Shein joins the Mukesh Ambani-led conglomerate’s exclusive portfolio of over 50 brands, including Silk Feet, Jivers, Xlerate, Feet Up, Dhuni by Avaasa, Riva, John Player Select, Kidlyboo, and Altair. Besides this, Reliance Retail has similar deals with designer labels such as Kenzo, Y3, Marc Jacobs, ​​Coach, Steve Madden, Kate Spade, among others.

It’s clear why Shein has looked to re-enter India, where the fast fashion industry is projected to reach a size of $30 Bn by FY23, as per a Redseer report. The overall fashion segment grew at a modest 6% YoY in FY24, whereas the fast fashion subsegment surged by up to 40% in the same period. Now, Shein is back to grab a large chunk of the market once again, though there’s definitely a lot different about this Shein.

Reliance Punches Shein’s Ticket To India

The first thing that we need to note is that Shein is not back as a standalone entity, but its products will be available on Reliance Retail’s apps and physical stores. Shein is not operating business in India — Reliance is said to be bringing in former Meta director Manish Chopra to lead the brand.

Shein’s parent entity will receive a licence fee as a share of profits generated solely within India. The operations will be managed by a company wholly owned by Reliance Retail. Crucially, all data and the app itself will be hosted and stored within India, ensuring that Shein has no access to or control over this data.

These are some of the key factors behind Shein’s comeback to India being approved by the government nearly one year ago.

Reliance Retail is set to launch the Chinese fast-fashion label Shein within the coming weeks. Further, to diversify its supply chain and promote domestic industries, Shein reportedly will be sourcing goods from India for its global operation in the Middle East and other markets.

More than anything else, fast fashion brands and indeed other some of the more premium brands need to worry about the Reliance factor. Shein’s brand name and Reliance’s massive resource base are a deadly combo.

Reliance Retail’s fashion ecommerce app Ajio directly competes with Myntra, Nykaa Fashion, Meesho, Amazon India, Flipkart, Tata Cliq, and other platforms. From a distribution point of view, Ajio will be the exclusive storefront for Shein, and exclusivity is a big deal in fashion ecommerce.

Ajio commands around 30% market share based on monthly active users (MAUs), data sourced from AllianceBernstein shows.

Flipkart Group’s Myntra maintains the highest market share in terms of active users, surpassing 50%. However, the report notes a decrease in transaction frequency, with Myntra’s GMV growing only 12% in FY23 compared to 35% in FY22.

“Shein’s re-entry may have a somewhat negative impact on Nykaa Fashion, as Nykaa primarily targets the premium fashion segment. In contrast, Myntra caters to both the mass and premium fashion markets and already has strong brand recognition in the fashion industry. Therefore, the impact on Myntra might be mild, whereas Nykaa Fashion could feel more significant effects,” Karan Taurani, SVP, at Elara Capital said.

He added that Shein is part of a broader strategy by Reliance Retail to expand its portfolio of brands. In that sense, Shein is just another addition to its portfolio.

A Myntra executive admitted to Inc42 that Ajio has an edge when it comes to exclusivity, but added that Myntra has also introduced Gen Z-focussed features which are gaining fast traction. Myntra’s focus on in-house brands or private labels is paying off, however, at the same time, the company is also looking to snap up more exclusive brand partnerships.

Should D2C Brands Worry?

One thing that Ajio cannot afford to do is give Shein more prominence. Fashion ecommerce marketplaces are quick to see gaps in terms of sales of particular brands and look to woo them to their side. In this regard, Shein will be competing with a number of D2C brands as well as international labels in fast fashion.

As per Inc42 data, between 2018 and 2023, D2C fashion brands captured almost 93% of the total funding raised in the Indian fashion ecommerce space.

The Myntra executive quoted above believes that Shein will definitely disrupt D2C fashion brands in India as many of them target the Gen Z audience, but they are also looking to protect margins and break into the premium segment.

The D2C landscape in fashion includes the likes of Andamen, House Of Rare, Bombay Shirt Company, Snitch, Damensch, The Souled Store among others. And there are houses of brands such as Mensa Brands, TMRW and others which combined have dozens of brands across categories in fashion. It’s not easy to stand out, and Shein will have to fight for its space on the aisles.

Most of these brands are looking to widen their net margins by adding premium products. Premiumisation is a major thesis among Indian D2C brands right now as they realise many of them are targeting a very limited cream of the market.

On the other hand, Shein has built its reputation on affordability. So is Shein actually directly competing with these players? Market experts believe that Shein is not successful just because of its pricing, but its use of data.

“Brands with the right product and high-quality service should attract customers who are not price-sensitive. A price-oriented brand is not a major threat; the real risk is if your product fails to keep up with market trends. Fashion-driven brands could take your business away if your product quality and service do not meet customer expectations. However, if your product is trendy, the quality is high, and your service is good, you should be safe in retaining customers who are not focused on price,” Devangshu Dutta, founder and CEO of Third Eyesight, said.

Those in the industry do believe that one brand cannot conquer the fashion market. That simply does not happen with the fashion industry, which is why there is so much depth in the market. Shein’s success will lead to the emergence of more D2C brands that look to mimic the data-led, trend-first model.

“The potential of the Indian market is evident, and it’s becoming increasingly exciting. This means that many companies will emerge in this category to serve this customer base. It validates the hypothesis we had two and a half years ago: the Indian consumer is evolving, and fashion should evolve along with them. From that perspective, Shein’s entry justifies and validates our hypothesis,” the founder of a Bengaluru-based GenZ-focussed fashion brand said.

Good brands always emerge from intense competitive churn, and Indian brands have the potential to go global if they hit it big. “Competing against Shein and building a successful business will open new opportunities for us and strengthen our execution and agility,” the founded quoted above added.
Is Shein Ready For Second Innings?

Now, coming back to Shein, it remains to be seen if it will be able to gain popularity like its first stint in India. One must remember that Shein tried to make a comeback in India in 2021 after the government’s ban through ecommerce giant Amazon, but the brand supposedly did not get much traction.

“I think the case of visibility is different when comparing Amazon and Reliance Retail. Through Reliance Retail, the visibility could be much higher compared to Amazon because Reliance Retail already has a very wide portfolio of fashion brands, including more than 25-30 luxury brands across various categories. It’s all about creating visibility, generating buzz, and going to market together in terms of marketing efforts. Reliance has a very strong omnichannel presence, both online and offline,” Elara Capital’s Taurani said.

While Amazon is, of course, a large ecommerce phenomenon, the platform is not a primary port-of-call for online fashion shoppers. This is why Shein could potentially perform better with Reliance Retail.

“We have to wait and see how Shein performs in India. We will need to observe how this unfolds to comment on its visibility and performance, both online and offline. In marketplaces, brands compete daily, and Shein’s strength has always been its designs. We’ll have to closely watch how Reliance leverages this strength,” an industry analyst said.

(Published on Inc42)