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August 6, 2025
Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025
It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.
Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.
That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.
Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.
In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.
He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”
Where The Model Broke?
In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”
But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.
And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.
As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.
In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.
In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.
Scaling Without Steering
In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.
For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.
Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.
Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.
The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.
(Published in Forbes India)
admin
August 5, 2025
Aakriti Bansal, Medianama
August 5, 2025
MediaNama’s Take: Swiggy is shifting from individual convenience to workplace capture. With DeskEats and Corporate Rewards, the company is embedding itself directly into the workday. This move is not just about food delivery. It is about becoming part of employees’ daily routines. More repetition leads to more orders, stronger retention, and access to a new layer of user behaviour: professional identity.
This approach draws from older models like office canteens and Sodexo meal cards. However, Swiggy reworks it for the app economy. Instead of fixed menus or closed ecosystems, it offers personalized choices tied to employer-subsidised benefits. That creates stickiness. When a company supports one app and offers discounts, switching becomes less likely.
The key question now is whether this integration creates lasting value or opens up new responsibilities. These include questions around consent, profiling, and where to draw the line between workplace systems and digital platforms.
What’s the News
Swiggy rolled out DeskEats, a curated food delivery collection for working professionals, in 30 cities and over 7,000 corporate hubs, according to Storyboard18. MediaNama also reviewed the feature on the Swiggy app. The collection includes categories like Stress Munchies, Healthy Nibbles, One-Handed Grabbies, and Deadline Desserts, aimed at common workday cravings.
During the pilot, DeskEats reached 14,000 companies and 1.5 lakh employees. Users can find it in the app by typing “Office” or “Work.”
Swiggy also launched Corporate Rewards, which lets users access benefits by verifying their work email. These include flat Rs 225 off food orders, Rs 2,000 off on Dineout, and Rs 100 off on Instamart.
On LinkedIn, Swiggy VP Deepak Maloo described Corporate Rewards as the professional version of its earlier Student Rewards program which offers perks like free deliveries, flat Rs 200 discounts, and deals starting at Rs 49, tailored for students aged 18–25 across India.
Financial Context
Swiggy may have launched DeskEats while under pressure to control its burn. In Q1 FY26, it spent Rs 1,036 crore on ads—a 132% jump and posted a loss of Rs 1,197 crore. DeskEats and Corporate Rewards offer a way to stabilise repeat orders without over-relying on discounts or ad spending.
The company’s adjusted Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA) loss widened to Rs 813 crore. Overall, food delivery revenue grew by 20.2% year-over-year to Rs 2,080 crore, with order volume growing by 23.3%. At the same time, newer formats like ultrafast Bolt and SNACC are aimed at increasing consumption frequency and improving retention. These efforts signal Swiggy’s larger bet on everyday integration to drive value.
Platform Strategy and Corporate Integration
DeskEats gives Swiggy access to dense, time-sensitive demand during work hours. Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, says this helps streamline operations: “By integrating directly with workplaces, Swiggy can anchor itself in employees’ daily routines and provide a more predictable stream of orders.”
He adds, “Scheduled office meals create habitual consumption patterns and increase customer lifetime value, especially when the employer endorses a single platform and offers a favourable price-value mix.”
“This is the age-old model followed by contracted office canteens or cafeterias as well, but updated to the mobile app era, with more flexibility in terms of the items that an individual can order based on their own preferences”, Dutta added.
Furthermore Dutta opined, “Adoption is likely to be more in the larger cities where there is a greater concentration of demand and out-of-home consumption is higher among migrant professionals with high discretionary spending power.”
Data, Consent, and Workplace Targeting
To access Corporate Rewards, users verify with their work email. Swiggy hasn’t said whether it collects additional employee data or whether employers see usage metrics. It’s also unclear if enrolment is opt-in or automatic.
This concern mirrors recent questions raised about Zepto, which began recommending mood-specific product bundles like “Crampy” or “Ragey” based on user searches for PMS. Critics pointed out that such inferences may not be accurate and are often made without the user’s explicit awareness. Zepto’s privacy policy permits broad data collection, including health and behavioural patterns, but lacks clear disclosure on profiling. While Swiggy may not be doing this visibly, the direction of workplace-linked behaviour data raises similar concerns under India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA), which still doesn’t regulate inferred or behavioural data clearly.
As this model scales, it raises questions under India’s DPDPA especially around purpose limitation and workplace-based profiling.
Why This Matters
Swiggy’s push into the workplace mirrors a broader shift across the food delivery market. Zomato recently launched ‘Zomato for Enterprise,’ a corporate food expense management platform that allows employees to charge business orders directly to their companies. With features like budgeting, ordering rules, and account toggling between work and personal use, Zomato is positioning itself as a paperless, digital alternative to legacy players like Sodexo. According to CEO Deepinder Goyal, over 100 companies have already onboarded the platform.
This move signals intensifying competition in the enterprise food space. While Zomato focuses on billing and reimbursements through employer-tied accounts, Swiggy is targeting recurring workplace consumption through curated menus and behavioural nudges. Both platforms appear to be building business-facing verticals that go beyond consumer ordering, aiming to lock in institutional clients and expand platform dependency within the workspace.
Unanswered Questions
MediaNama reached out to Swiggy with the following questions. The article will be updated when we receive a response:
Is Swiggy positioning DeskEats and Corporate Rewards as part of a larger shift into corporate benefits?
How do companies sign up for Corporate Rewards? Are there different plans or models based on company size?
What employee data does Swiggy collect when someone signs up using their work email?
Are DeskEats and Corporate Rewards linked to Swiggy One or any other paid subscription?
How many companies and users are currently active on DeskEats?
Does Swiggy plan to scale this into a standalone B2B vertical?(Published in Medianama)
admin
July 27, 2025
Alenjith K Johny & Ajay Rag, Economic Times
Jul 27, 2025
Startups in the 60-minute fashion delivery segment are betting on features such as ‘try and buy’ and artificial intelligence (AI)-powered virtual try-ons to tackle high return rates, a key pain point in the segment. These tools are helping increase conversion rates and reduce returns while offering greater flexibility to buyers, said industry executives.
Mumbai-based Knot, which recently raised funding from venture capital firm Kae Capital, said partner brands that typically see return rates of about 20% on their direct-to-consumer websites are witnessing sub-1% returns through offline stores, a trend it is now replicating through these digital features.
“Our partner brands, which have offline stores, would typically witness 20% returns on their direct to consumer websites. But for the same purchases on offline stores, the returns are less than 1%. That is the idea. With the ‘try and buy’ feature, users can make a very decisive purchase at their doorstep,” Archit Nanda, CEO of Knot, told ET.
Return rates among users of the company’s virtual try-on feature are similarly much lower than the platform’s overall user base, he said.
Other venture-backed quick fashion delivery startups such as Bengaluru-based Slikk, Mumbai-based Zilo and Gurugram-based Zulu Club are also testing similar features to increase conversions and reduce returns.
“Returns play as big a part as maybe forward delivery does. Because these are expensive products, giving the customer his or her money back also plays a very critical role,” said Akshay Gulati, cofounder and CEO of Slikk.
Instant returns
Slikk is piloting an ‘instant returns’ feature where, like its 60-minute delivery service, returns are also completed within an hour. Once a return request is made on the app, a delivery partner picks up the product and refunds the amount instantly. The startup claims its return rate is 40-50% lower than that of traditional marketplaces and that it doesn’t charge customers any extra fees for returns.
Some users said they were satisfied with the delivery speed and trial window but pointed out that the app does not provide any return status updates until the product reaches the warehouse.
“I received my order within 60 minutes and had enough time to try it out. However, after returning the product, I didn’t receive any notification in the application until the delivery agent reached the warehouse,” said Mohammed Shibili, a working professional based in Bengaluru, who tried Slikk’s feature.
Investor interest
Investors tracking the segment estimate that try-and-buy and virtual try-on features can reduce return rates by 15-20 percentage points, translating into substantial cost savings for both platforms and brands.
“Features like try and buy are a huge cost save, not just for the platform but also for the brand. The brand otherwise would lose that inventory till it comes back and can’t make the sale on it. But now, that’s all getting quickly turned around. So, for the brand, it’s a win-win situation as well as for the customer where the money is not getting stuck till it gets the returns refunded,” said Sunitha Viswanathan, partner at Kae Capital.
Old model, new infrastructure
Flipkart-owned fashion etailer Myntra had introduced try and buy back in 2016 to attract traditional shoppers to online retail. However, the feature didn’t scale up due to supply chain limitations, according to industry executives.
“Back when Myntra launched ‘try and buy’, there was no hyperlocal delivery infrastructure. Deliveries were through national courier services. That model isn’t feasible to try and buy unless you have your own hyperlocal delivery fleet,” the founder of a fashion delivery startup said on condition of anonymity.
The founder added that while Myntra operated from large warehouses located on the outskirts of cities, the new-age supply chains are built within cities, allowing faster deliveries and enabling features like try and buy.
By the end of last year, Myntra had launched M-Now, an ultra-fast delivery service currently live in Bengaluru, Mumbai and Delhi, with pilots in other cities. The company said daily orders through M-Now doubled in the last quarter.
“Although it’s still early, our observations so far suggest that the quick delivery model, with its reduced wait time, attracts high-intent customers, leading to naturally lower return rates,” said a spokesperson for Myntra.
The etailer did not confirm whether the try-and-buy feature is being tested under M-Now.
Viability concerns persist
Despite the benefits, the long-term viability of these features is open to question, experts said.
“There is a cost to also providing these services (like try and buy), and whether that becomes viable at all is a question mark at this point of time. I think that’s what the concern is, and it has not been that viable,” said Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a management consulting firm focused on consumer goods and retail industries.
He added that when platforms offer the try-and-buy feature, delivery executives have to wait while customers try on products, which increases the cost per delivery and reduces the number of deliveries that can be completed. Despite that, some items may still be returned, further impacting operational efficiency.
However, startups are experimenting with these features mainly on higher-margin products to offset operational costs, Dutta said, as return rates across fashion categories can range from under 10% to as high as 40% for certain items.
(Published in Economic Times)
admin
July 10, 2025
Alka Jain, Outlook Business
10 July 2025
Just when Blinkit, Instamart and Zepto were slowing down in their quick commerce game, Amazon’s entry may spur them towards a more aggressive race. The ecommerce giant has begun offering deliveries in as little as ten minutes in Delhi after Bengaluru, under the name ‘Amazon Now’.
“We are excited with the initial customer response and positive feedback, especially from Prime members. Based on this, we are now expanding the service over the next few months addressing immediate customer needs while maintaining Amazon’s standards for safety, quality and reliability,” the company said in an official statement.
Till now, the company was moving at its own pace with the idea that Indian consumers would wait a day or two for their deliveries. But the game has changed now—convenience is king here. Online shoppers want everything from milk to mobile chargers within a few minutes at their doorsteps.
And the big three of the quick commerce market—Blinkit, Instamart, Zepto—have cracked the consumer code perfectly. This trend has nudged Amazon and Flipkart to enter the 10-minute delivery segment. It started as an experiment in the larger ecommerce sector but has now become a necessity for online retailers.
Kathryn McLay, chief executive of Walmart International—an American multinational retail corporation—revealed that quick commerce now accounts for 20% of India’s ecommerce market and is growing at a rate of 50% annually. According to a Morgan Stanley report, the market is expected to reach $57bn by 2030.
Hence, Amazon could not afford to stay on the sidelines. The company has already pumped $11bn into Indian market since 2013 and recently announced another $233mn to upgrade its infrastructure and speed up deliveries. In addition, it has also opened five fulfilment centres across the country.
Despite continued investment, there are doubts if Amazon can disrupt the quick commerce game. Industry experts state that the ecommerce major’s late entry could upend the fragile unit economics of the space. It can even reignite discount wars and increase burn rate (a company spending its cash reserve while going through loss) for the incumbents, once the ecommerce giants begin to exert pressure and begin to capture market share.
Open Market, Thin Margins
Given the growth momentum and market size, quick commerce start-up Kiko.live cofounder Alok Chawla believes that there is definitely headroom to accommodate another player in the quick commerce market. However, margins may remain negative for a couple of years due to high business and delivery costs.
As per data, the average order value of ₹350–₹400 yields a gross margin of approximately 20% but high fulfilment and delivery costs (₹50–₹60 per order) significantly reduce overall profitability, often cancelling out most of the gains.
“Indian customers will not be willing to pay high shipping charges for convenience. But the market will continue to grow due to cart subsidies and shipping discounts. On top of this, profitability also remains quite some time away,” he says.
Even a survey by Grant Thornton Bharat, a professional services firm, shows that 81% of Indian quick commerce users cite discounts and offers as one of the main reasons they shop on platforms like Blinkit and Instamart.
But the fact is Amazon has extremely deep pockets, which means, the trio will once again have to get into aggressive discounting to protect their turf, said Chawla, indicating the possibility of higher cash burn quarters ahead.
In February, reports revealed that Indian quick commerce companies, including new entrants, were burning cash to the tune of ₹1,300–₹1,500 crore on a monthly basis. But a few months later, Aadit Palicha, chief executive of Zepto, a fast-growing 10-minute delivery platform, claimed that the company had slashed its operating cash burn by 50% in the previous quarter.
Still, the path to profitability remains shaky. Though Amazon can get an advantage of its existing huge customer base that is habitual of making online purchases including those in similar categories.
The real challenge lies beneath the surface because ecommerce and quick commerce operate on fundamentally different engines.
E-Comm vs Q-Comm: A Different Game
It may seem like a simple extension of what Amazon already does: deliver products. But in practice, the logistics, timelines and cost structures behind traditional ecommerce and quick commerce are different, said Somdutta Singh, founder and chief executive of Assiduus Global, a cross-border ecommerce accelerator that helps brands scale on global marketplaces through end-to-end solutions.
She explains the difference using a hypothetical situation: let’s say you order a phone case in Mumbai, which is picked from a nearby fulfilment centre. It will be added to a pre-routed delivery run with 30-50 other stops. This batching on the basis of route optimisation, keeps last-mile costs low, somewhere around ₹40–₹80.
But if you order the same item in a smaller town like Alleppey, it may first travel mid-mile from a hub in Cochin, then be handed off to a local partner like India Post. This increases the delivery time but keeps costs manageable through scale and planned routing.
This setup suits well in ecommerce business, which is built for reach and variety, not for speed. However, quick commerce runs on a completely different playbook because speed becomes priority here.
For instance, you order a pack of chips and a cold drink via Zepto in Andheri. These items are already stocked in a dark store within one to two kilometers of your home. The moment you place the order; someone picks it off the shelf. A rider is dispatched almost immediately and heads directly to your address.
There is no mid-mile movement, no routing logic and no batching. Each trip is a solo run. Delivery often happens within 10 to 15 minutes. This kind of speed relies on a dense network of local stores and a steady flow of short-range riders. But it also means higher costs.
“With no bundling of orders and lower average cart sizes, usually ₹250 to ₹300, the delivery cost per order can shoot up to ₹60 to ₹120. That is a heavy operational burden. Unlike traditional ecommerce, where cost efficiency scales with distance and order volume, quick commerce is constrained by geography and time pressure,” she explains.
So, it becomes more than just a category expansion for e-commerce platforms like Amazon and Flipkart. It marks a pivot in their “logistics thinking” and signals a broader shift in entry strategies. What once worked must now be retooled for hyperlocal and real-time operations.
Speed over Scale Not Easy
There are multiple challenges ahead for Amazon to make its presence felt and stay competitive in the quick commerce space. Firstly, it must build an operations and logistics layer that enables sub-15-minute deliveries, along with a technology stack to support it, according to Mit Desai, practice member at Praxis Global Alliance, a management consulting firm.
Second, it needs to build a dark store network to succeed in the space which is crucial to meet the 10-15 minutes delivery promise. Experts believe that a hybrid model will be the most successful in India—a mix of micro warehouses, partner stores and dark stores.
Desai states that Amazon’s existing capabilities can give it a base to build on, but it would also have to account for complexities and differences that come with the quick commerce business.
“For Amazon, the challenge will be operations. Can they build 700+ dark stores? Can they go hyperlocal? Can they navigate the chaos of Gurugram rain, Bengaluru traffic or the lanes of Dadar?” wonders Madhav Kasturia, founder and chief executive of Zippee, a quick commerce fulfilment start-up focused on hyperlocal deliveries and dark store management.
Another challenge can be repeat, loyal customers. As of now, customers check prices across platforms, and order where prices are the lowest. So, Amazon will have to spend heavily on discounts to gain market share. Chawla says retention will remain a problem because Zepto’s growth has also slowed down after a reduction in discounting burn.
However, Singh highlights that Amazon may not roll out everything in one shot. “We will likely see small-scale pilots, co-branded dark stores, local partnerships, new rider networks, tested in top cities before any nationwide push. They will also reveal whether it is viable to retrofit scale-driven e-commerce infrastructure into something that runs well in a hyperlocal loop,” she added.
Profitability Remains a Concern
While the quick commerce space is becoming increasingly dynamic with new entrants, the core question remains: is it a sustainable business model? The path to profitability is still fraught with operational complexity, margin constraints and uncertainty in consumer behaviour.
“Margins in quick commerce were never pretty to begin with,” says Kasturia. Yet he remains optimistic about the market because India’s grocery market is still largely untapped online.
As per data, India’s grocery and essentials market is over $600bn, of which online commerce is just three to four percent. Even quick commerce is sitting at ₹7,000–₹9,000 crore gross merchandise value today. So, the market isn’t crowded. It’s just early.
“We are barely scratching the surface,” he says, arguing that whoever wins customer behaviour, will lead the game. For example, in tier 1 cities, users no longer compare prices—they compare time.
For Amazon, this is both an opportunity and a constraint. Experts believe that the ecommerce giant can stand out by focusing on trust, hygiene and reliability—areas where existing players sometimes falter.
Kasturia says that the platform should not even chase everything, rather focus on profitable categories like fruits, dairy and personal care. “Build strong private labels. Nail density before geography and don’t discount blindly,” he adds.
The key is to build for reorders, not virality. That’s when customer acquisition cost (CAC) drops, margins compound and a player stops bleeding money per order. And to reduce the cost of dark stores, Chawla suggests an alternative route.
“Riding to neighbourhood stores for long-tail stock keeping unit can cut real estate and wastage costs,” he says, adding that it can decentralise inventory without owning all of it.
To follow this playbook, Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a management consulting and services firm, says that every player needs to invest hundreds of crores before the model begins to show surplus cash. It will demand multiple, interlocked shifts—in pricing strategy, tech backbone, category mix, and even brand positioning.
Amazon’s entry doesn’t merely add another contender in the 10-minute delivery race—it rewrites the playbook for every player. The real question now is: can the frontrunners hold their turf, or will Amazon’s scale and deep pockets tip the balance of power?
admin
June 7, 2025
Pooja Yadav, Inc42
7 Jun 2025
SUMMARY: Nearly two decades after its founding, Myntra has made its first international foray with the launch of‘Myntra Global’ in Singapore. Armed with 100+ Indian brands and over 35,000 styles, it is betting big on the 6.5 Lakh-strong Indian diaspora. Shipping directly from India without local warehousing helps avoid upfront costs but could lead to expensive shipping, long delivery times, and tough return logistics.
Nearly two decades after its incorporation in 2007, Myntra announced last month that it marked its first international foray under the new ‘Myntra Global’ banner. The fashion ecommerce marketplace has launched its operations in Singapore.
The Flipkart-owned platform aims to leverage brand loyalty to drive cross-border commerce by tapping into the Indian diaspora of around 6.5 Lakh people in the island nation.
However, while the brand’s intent is clear, the timing and choice of market raise some concerns. For starters, Singapore isn’t going to be an easy market, especially for a newbie like Myntra. This is because the region is filled to the brim with players like Shopee, Shein, Lazada, and Zalora that enjoy a strong brand recognition and stickiness.
Then, experts believe, Singapore-based shoppers are highly selective, constantly seeking great deals and ahead of the rapidly evolving fashion trends. This, among other factors, could make Myntra’s Singapore entry arduous.
So, what makes industry observers say so? Why isn’t Singapore a promising market for Myntra to begin with? What are the stakes at play here — the hits and the misses? Let’s get right into these questions to make sense of Myntra’s Singapore foray.
A Strategic Experiment?
Myntra’s entry into Singapore isn’t just about going global, it’s a strategic experiment to understand how Indian fashion resonates beyond borders.
According to CEO Nandita Sinha, the core of this launch is Myntra’s attempt to test the waters and understand the product-market fit for Indian fashion in an overseas setting.
But why Singapore? Well, the choice was driven by data. Myntra has found that about 10–15% of its web traffic comes from international markets, and Singapore stands out as a concentrated and engaged segment.
According to Statista (2024), approximately 6.5 Lakh Indians reside in Singapore, with around 3 Lakh Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs). Sinha pointed out, “While analysing our data and exploring potential market opportunities, we discovered that nearly 30,000 of these users are visiting our platform every month.”
This organic interest gave the company confidence to make Singapore its first stop under the Myntra Global banner. The platform has gone live in Singapore with 35,000+ styles, which it now plans to scale up to 1 Lakh in the near future.
However, what’s interesting is that Myntra is betting big on desi styles and brands to cater to the Indian diaspora in Singapore. The platform has launched a curated lineup of over 100 Indian brands, including popular names like Aurelia, Global Desi, AND, Libas, Rustorange, Mochi, W, The Label Life, House of Pataudi, Chumbak, Anouk, Bombay Dyeing, and Rare Rabbit.
Whether it’s ethnic wear, fusion fashion, or home décor, the idea is to spotlight Indian design and craftsmanship. Not to mention, Myntra sees significant potential for cultural occasions such as festivals, weddings and special celebrations.
As per Devangshu Dutta, the founder and chief executive of Third Eyesight, Singapore is an ideal market for Myntra’s international test run due to several reasons. For one, it is a digitally advanced, high-income market with a significant Indian diaspora that is familiar with the brands Myntra offers.
“This makes it a natural nucleus for testing an out-of-India offering,” Dutta said, adding that Singapore’s relatively small size makes it easier to manage the complexities of merchandising across different segments, potentially making it a more efficient testing ground.
Moreover, if the business succeeds, Singapore could serve as a strategic launchpad for Myntra to expand into other Southeast Asian markets. However, for now, Myntra’s Singapore launch is less about scale and more about learning.
Ankur Bisen, senior partner and head at Technopak Advisors, said that Myntra’s recent expansion makes strong strategic sense. This is because it is no longer an Indian company, and expanding to Singapore and Southeast Asia offers significant scale and growth opportunities.
“Unlike a purely Indian company, Myntra can explore multiple markets simultaneously and is not restricted to focussing solely on India,” Bisen said.
However, not everything is rainbows and sunshine, as Myntra’s success will only hinge on pricing, local adaptation, and understanding the distinct preferences of the Indian diaspora in Singapore that may be different from Indian buyers. In simple terms, one size may not fit all.
Then, shipping delays and high logistics costs could dilute the value proposition, especially in a market like Singapore where consumers are used to fast and affordable service.
Imperative to mention that Myntra currently has no plans to set up a warehouse in Singapore. Myntra CEO Sinha mentioned that products would be shipped directly from India, where the inventory will be maintained by the brands themselves.
“Myntra Global was not intended to be a localised service tailored to the Singapore market or any other international location. Instead, the focus would remain on serving global consumers from India, with no immediate plans for physical expansion or local warehousing.”
What Could Go Wrong?
Expanding into a new market is always a risky affair. Some potential pitfalls for Myntra could be logistics complexities, return management, and supply chain localisation.
Yash Dholakia, partner, Sauce.vc, too, pointed out that execution risks extend beyond pricing and scale to include logistics, returns, and supply chain.
Dholakia added that Singapore is a different ballgame altogether, as its distinct retail landscape is not an easy feat. “The fashion industry’s fast-changing nature calls for a sharp understanding of Singapore’s diverse, millennial consumers, who have unique cultural preferences and social media-driven buying habits.”
Moreover, many second- or third-generation PIOs see themselves mainly as Singaporean and have different cultural and fashion preferences.
Therefore, assumptions that what works in India will work for this class of consumers may lead to failure.
To hedge this, Myntra will have to take a fully local approach, which will include setting up independent teams on the ground to understand and address these local differences, rather than just copying and pasting its India playbook.
Moreover, from a branding and market reach perspective, targeting just the 10–15% Indian diaspora in Singapore restricts Myntra’s audience significantly. The fashion market in the city-state is already competitive, with several efficient players offering fast and affordable options.
“Myntra’s edge would primarily be Indian ethnic wear, which restricts its ability to emerge as a broad-market contender,” Dholakia said.
Per Dutta, relying heavily on the Indian diaspora may provide a strong initial boost, but this may not sustain for too long.
A Launchpad For D2C Brands
This is not the first time Myntra has tried to enter an international market. In 2020, Myntra partnered with UAE-based platforms, noon and Namshi, to enter the Middle East with a few Indian brands.
However, its current expansion into Singapore looks more ambitious with a cavalry of over 100+ Indian brands.
To strengthen its footprint in Singapore, Myntra is offering free shipping across a wide range of categories, including women’s fashion, kidswear, and home essentials.
Myntra is offering products across a wide range of price buckets. In the women’s tops category, prices start as low as INR 350 with brands like Tokyo Talkies, and go up to INR 4,800 with brands like Berrylush, DressBerry, and Vishudh. Western dresses also extend up to INR 7,100. In ethnic wear, kurtas range from INR 833 to over INR 3,800, while sarees are priced between INR 1,200 and INR 18,000.
“In terms of pricing, it’s ultimately the brands themselves that determine their price positioning on the platform. As they begin listing and transacting with consumers, they will decide how they want to price their products,” said Sinha.
In addition, what could work in its favour is the opportunity to give the global audience a taste of fast-growing Indian D2C brands.
Many Indian internet-first brands haven’t had the chance to engage with global consumers before, but this expansion lets them showcase their products directly to the Indian diaspora in Singapore.
Besides, the expansion will allow Indian brands to understand new consumer preferences, optimise their product mix for cross-border demand, and grow their presence beyond India.
This pilot could indeed spark broader cross-border opportunities for Indian D2C brands. But it demands localised marketing, deep consumer understanding, and a willingness to adapt to regional preferences.
For brands used to making for Indian buyers, this could be a steep but rewarding learning curve. If executed well, it offers them not just an entry into Singapore but a scalable template for global expansion.
The Cross-Border Gamble
Myntra’s global play comes at a time when the ecommerce platform posted a net profit of INR 30.9 Cr in FY24 versus a loss of INR 782.4 Cr in FY23. This turnaround came on the back of a 15% increase in its operational revenue and tighter cost control.
The platform generates revenue through a mix of transaction fees from sellers, logistics services, advertising, and its private labels. To move towards profitability, Myntra brought down its total expenses to INR 5,123 Cr in FY24 from INR 5,290.1 Cr in FY23.
However, its recent entry into Singapore may bring new financial challenges, even as Myntra has opted not to set up a warehouse in Singapore. It would rather ship products from India through third-party logistics providers.
So, is the fashion major being penny-wise and pound-foolish?
Probably. While this asset-light model avoids upfront capital expenditure, it introduces risks such as longer delivery times, higher logistics costs, customs delays and complicated return processes that could sour customer sentiment. For a platform that just turned profitable, these are crucial levers that could strain margins.
Further, even though Myntra is not offering exchange and returns currently, once it does, it could complicate things further.
This is because shipping a 2 Kg fashion parcel from India to Singapore costs an estimated INR 2,800 to INR 3,500, inclusive of air freight, GST, and last-mile delivery. Reverse logistics could add another INR 1,200 to INR 2,000 per item, pushing the total cost per cross-border order significantly higher.
According to Dibyanshu Tripathi, cofounder and CEO of Hexalog, a logistics company, cross-border logistics could significantly impact Myntra’s profitability as it expands into Southeast Asia.
“Sustaining margins will be challenging with high per-order shipping costs, return expenses, and longer delivery timelines that may affect customer satisfaction. Without localised infrastructure or cost efficiencies, profitability in new markets may be hard to maintain despite revenue growth,” Tripathi said.
In contrast, players such as Lenskart and Nike have structured their global expansions with supply chain control at the core.
All in all, Myntra’s Singapore foray is a bold experiment aimed at testing global appetite for Indian fashion, especially among the diaspora.
While the move offers promising opportunities for Indian D2C brands and cross-border growth, it’s also fraught with challenges. For one, with a lack of local infrastructure, high shipping costs and a diaspora divided between two cultures, sustaining this expansion may prove tough. Can Myntra turn its Singapore pitch into a lasting global success story?
(Published on Inc42)