admin
October 10, 2025
Pooja Yadav, Exchange4Media
10 October 2025
Over the years, India’s e-commerce market has been dominated by the duopoly of Amazon and Flipkart. These platforms have not only captured consumer attention but also shaped how brands spend their marketing budgets. In parallel to this, the concept of retail media networks (RMNs), marketplaces selling ad placements to brands directly, has also grown rapidly. Not only this, it is emerging as one of the fastest-growing channels in digital advertising.
As a result, the industry is witnessing a wave of new retail media platforms entering the market. From grocery and pharmacy marketplaces to Q-comm platforms, D2C marketplaces, and ONDC pilots, all are attempting to carve out space for themselves. Yet despite these new entrants, Amazon and Flipkart continue to command the lion’s share of shopper-marketing rupees, leaving little oxygen, even for challenger players like eBay, even as it retools its India strategy.
Retail media is now outpacing social and video in growth, and in India, this expansion remains concentrated around these two dominant players. According to several experts e4m spoke with, Amazon and Flipkart dominate because of their massive logged-in traffic at the point of purchase, first-party data, and closed-loop attribution linking impressions directly to GMV. These platforms succeed by combining large logged-in audiences, direct attribution from impressions to sales, and first-party data insulated from signal loss-advantages most challengers cannot match.
Adding to this, Shradha Agarwal, Co-Founder & CEO of Grapes, highlighted the key hurdles brands face when allocating budgets to newer networks like ONDC or eBay. She noted that brands consider three main factors: whether the network can deliver the same sales efficiency, whether it reaches new users or just shoppers already accessible on Amazon, and whether the scale is meaningful. Quoting an example, she said if a brand is already generating 10 crore on Amazon, it may question whether investing in a new platform that delivers only 25 lakh is worth the effort.
Vaibhav Jain, Head of Media at First Economy, pointed out, the biggest barriers to scaling budgets across newer retail media networks like eBay or ONDC or any other, are fragmented infrastructure, limited data maturity, and inconsistent measurement. Many platforms still lack robust first-party data systems and unified reporting standards, making it difficult for brands to validate ROI at the level provided by Amazon or Flipkart.
Everyone’s building a network – but is there room?
Despite the dominance of Amazon and Flipkart, the retail media landscape is attracting new entrants, including grocery and pharmacy marketplaces, Q-commerce platforms, D2C marketplaces, and ONDC pilots, all attempting to carve out space for themselves. Among these challengers, eBay has recently re-entered India with a markedly different approach focussing on building technical and export-led capabilities rather than competing directly in the domestic consumer market.
Against this backdrop, eBay has reopened its India chapter with a Global Capability Centre (GCC) in Bengaluru, planning to host over 300 engineers across AI/ML, product, design, and data analytics. Unlike its previous consumer-facing stints in 2005 and 2013, this pivot is capability and export-led, not a direct battle with domestic marketplaces. Globally, eBay earns revenue through Promoted Listings and other advertising products, but in India, it has historically lacked domestic shopper scale and first-party data, the two critical ingredients that make retail media profitable.
This time, eBay appears to be betting on cross-border trade, technology-led capabilities, and potentially new ad-tech opportunities a model that could differentiate it from established players like Amazon and Flipkart.
Speaking on this, Lloyd Mathias, business strategist and angel investor, said, “Retail media takes off only when you have a large front-end site like Amazon or Flipkart, where advertisers want to reach shoppers at the point of purchase. I don’t think retail media is going to be a big revenue driver for eBay at all.”
Adding to this, seasoned e-commerce analyst and Datum Intelligence advisor Satish Meena noted, “Retail-media economics depend on domestic shopper traffic and first-party data both of which eBay currently lacks in India. The realistic play is export-facing promotions, enabling Indian sellers to advertise SKUs to international buyers on eBay’s global sites. That’s valuable but niche, and unlikely to rival Flipkart or Amazon’s India-scale retail-media businesses.”
Devangshu Dutta of Third Eyesight stated, “On the trade front, the company appears to be prioritising exports from India rather than competing in the domestic market, which is already hypercompetitive and price-driven.”
Until eBay establishes a stronger consumer-facing presence, retail media will not be a priority, as per experts. In the near term, its strategy is likely to focus on export-facing ads, promoting Indian sellers to global buyers. Looks like this approach is unlikely to challenge Amazon or Flipkart in India.
What it would take to break the duopoly
While eBay’s strategy has been called smart, opportunities remain. Harish Bijoor, Founder, Harish Bijoor Consults Inc, noted that communication formats are evolving. with peer-to-peer engagement gaining reliability over top-down approaches. Amazon and Flipkart follow top-down models, whereas eBay could differentiate itself through 1:1 consumer interaction.
After two failed attempts at cracking India’s consumer market, eBay’s third innings (as some may call) is fundamentally different. It is no longer chasing domestic consumers but enabling Indian sellers to export globally, leveraging eBay’s global logistics, trust programs, and buyer base. The company is also partnering with government export initiatives, MSME councils, and logistics providers, while buildin technical, analytic, and product capabilities through the Bengaluru GCC.
Mandar Lande, co-founder of Waayu, a platform working with ONDC and MSMEs to enable digital commerce, said that eBay is unlikely to build a traditional retail media business in India without a large consumer marketplace. “eBay lacks the first-party shopper data and traffic scale that power retail media networks like Amazon Ads or Flipkart Ads. However, it could still build a niche ad-tech play focused on export sellers, cross-border insights, and global buyer intent analytics essentially an “export intelligence and seller marketing’ platform rather than a domestic retail media business. While it won’t rival Amazon Ads in India, it can carve out a high-value B2B media niche rooted in cross-border commerce rather than local eyeballs.”
For challenger brands like eBay aiming to break into India’s retail media landscape, success will depend on proving incremental sales rather than just impressions, offering unique audiences, maintaining pricing flexibility, and providing ease of buying through self-serve tools and standardised metrics.
Experts told eam that while retail media and ad-tech may not be immediate revenue drivers, eBay’s export-first strategy allows the company to build scale, technology, and credibility, setting the stage for potential consumer-facing or advertising initiatives in the future.
Jain mentioned, “Closed-loop measurement is central to shifting brand spend beyond Amazon and Flipkart. It offers verifiable proof of performance, linking ad exposure directly to sales. Challenger retail media networks that can deliver credible attribution and comparable ROAs will gain traction faster. Measurement sophistication isn’t just an advantage; it’s the entry ticket to serious brand consideration.”
Speaking about how self-serve tools, standardised metrics, and competitive CPC/CPM rates influence a brand’s willingness to experiment with challenger retail media networks, Jain told e4m that these elements are critical for encouraging experimentation. They simplify campaign management, enable agility, and allow brands to benchmark performance fairly against established players.
From a brand execution perspective, Agarwal emphasised that the availability of self-serve tools is crucial for experimentation. Advertising on commerce platforms was previously cumbersome, but self-serve options now allow brands to launch campaigns at any budget, large or small, providing flexibility and control. When pricing is competitive and reporting is standardised, brands are more willing to test new networks. Early experiments have shown that allocating even a portion of retail media budgets to challenger platforms can deliver meaningful incremental sales, although such cases remain limited.
Reality check for 2025 plans
Brands in India are increasingly looking to diversify their retail media spend and reduce costs, but in a market dominated by Amazon and Flipkart, certainty still drives allocation decisions. Amazon Ads India revenue surged to 8,342 crore in FY25, a 25% year-on-year increase, while Flipkart Ads has grown 600% since 2020, capturing a significant share of marketplace marketing budgets. Until challengers can match these giants on shopper intent, identity, and attribution, most retail media budgets will remain top-heavy.
While many new entrants are trying to add variety at the edges by offering niche audiences, alternative ad formats, and export-focussed solutions, However, breaking into the core of India’s retail media market requires domestic scale, robust attribution frameworks, and access to unique audiences that cannot be replicated elsewhere.
Experts point to several structural barriers for newer networks. Fragmented infrastructure, limited first-party data, and inconsistent measurement make it difficult for brands to validate ROI at the level provided by Amazon or Flipkart.
(Published in Exchange4media)
admin
September 22, 2025
Christina Moniz, Financial Express
22 September 2025
It is already the largest player among organised fumiture makers with over 15% of the market. With 1,000 stores, it has the widest retail store footprint among organised players. The 102-year-old brand is also the second-largest revenue con-tributor to the parent enterprise.
So why is Interio tinkering with its name, logo and colour attributes?
“We want to move away from being viewed as a functional brand to more of a design-led lifestyle one. We have a wider range of offerings that are more modular and aesthetic,” says Reshu Saraf, head of marketing communications at Interio by Godrej.
As a first step, it has a new logo and name change – from Godrej Interio to Interio by Godrej. The brand has earmarked ₹50 crore towards an integrated campaign across TV, digital, outdoor and in-store branding to promote its new proposition over the next year. Overall, it will invest ₹300 crore in expansion and technology with the goal to more than double revenues to ₹10,000 crore by FY29.
Younger consumers don’t see furniture as utility but as lifestyle, observes Puneet Pandey, strategy head and managing partner, OPEN Strategy & Design. “By moving from ‘solid and sturdy’ to ‘stylish and aesthetic’, the brand earns the right to play at higher price points as well. Design-led positioning will also unlock repeat purchase since people no longer wait a decade to change their furniture based on utility; they want constant upgrades to refresh their living spaces as their tastes evolve,” he notes, adding that Interio needs to make the marketing leap from “catalogue to culture”.
Saraf says the brand is also building differentiation with its customer experience. “We’re using digital tools for store walkthroughs and visualisers to help visualise our products in the home. Our product portfolio, which is deeply personalised ane tailored for Indian sensibilities, it is a major differentiator that few other brands offer,” she points out.
E-commerce is also a focus area with the brand looking to increase the revenue share from 15% to 20-22% by 2029. The company is leveraging Al to improve the search functionand sharpen personalisation. Saraf adds the that offline too, the brand will have large format experience centres to help people envision what their rooms could look like, along with mid-size and small-format stores.
Interio also plans to widen its retail store footprint from 1,000 to 1,500 by 2029.
As per industry estimates, the Indian furniture market is set to grow at 11% annually to reach $64.1 billion by 2032 from $30.6 billion in 2025. It is this growth momentum that Interio is looking to cash in on.
Built-in differentiation
Although a significant chunk of Interio’s business comes from its home remodelling services, within the furniture category, it competes with global players like IKEA and digital-first brands like Pepperfry. The challenge for Interio in this market is to embed the design-led positioning in its productsandcus-tomer experience, says Nisha Sam-path, managing partner at Bright Angles Consulting.
One of its biggest advantages is the Godrej brand. “The Godrej brand stands for many values prized in interiors such as quality, trust, reliability and durability with a ‘Made in India’ tag. However, the brand has not been so successful in building an image of cutting-edge design and innovation. These are new values that can make the brand more contemporary,” she remarks.
Devangshu Dutta, CEO of Third Eyesight concurs, pointing out aside from nimble competition, Interio’s key challenges also come from the dual pressures of increasing consumer expectations for rapid delivery and customisation on the one hand, with aggressive price competition on the other.
(Published in Financial Express – Brandwagon)
admin
August 6, 2025
Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025
It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.
Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.
That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.
Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.
In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.
He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”
Where The Model Broke?
In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”
But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.
And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.
As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.
In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.
In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.
Scaling Without Steering
In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.
For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.
Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.
Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.
The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.
(Published in Forbes India)
admin
August 5, 2025
Aakriti Bansal, Medianama
August 5, 2025
MediaNama’s Take: Swiggy is shifting from individual convenience to workplace capture. With DeskEats and Corporate Rewards, the company is embedding itself directly into the workday. This move is not just about food delivery. It is about becoming part of employees’ daily routines. More repetition leads to more orders, stronger retention, and access to a new layer of user behaviour: professional identity.
This approach draws from older models like office canteens and Sodexo meal cards. However, Swiggy reworks it for the app economy. Instead of fixed menus or closed ecosystems, it offers personalized choices tied to employer-subsidised benefits. That creates stickiness. When a company supports one app and offers discounts, switching becomes less likely.
The key question now is whether this integration creates lasting value or opens up new responsibilities. These include questions around consent, profiling, and where to draw the line between workplace systems and digital platforms.
What’s the News
Swiggy rolled out DeskEats, a curated food delivery collection for working professionals, in 30 cities and over 7,000 corporate hubs, according to Storyboard18. MediaNama also reviewed the feature on the Swiggy app. The collection includes categories like Stress Munchies, Healthy Nibbles, One-Handed Grabbies, and Deadline Desserts, aimed at common workday cravings.
During the pilot, DeskEats reached 14,000 companies and 1.5 lakh employees. Users can find it in the app by typing “Office” or “Work.”
Swiggy also launched Corporate Rewards, which lets users access benefits by verifying their work email. These include flat Rs 225 off food orders, Rs 2,000 off on Dineout, and Rs 100 off on Instamart.
On LinkedIn, Swiggy VP Deepak Maloo described Corporate Rewards as the professional version of its earlier Student Rewards program which offers perks like free deliveries, flat Rs 200 discounts, and deals starting at Rs 49, tailored for students aged 18–25 across India.
Financial Context
Swiggy may have launched DeskEats while under pressure to control its burn. In Q1 FY26, it spent Rs 1,036 crore on ads—a 132% jump and posted a loss of Rs 1,197 crore. DeskEats and Corporate Rewards offer a way to stabilise repeat orders without over-relying on discounts or ad spending.
The company’s adjusted Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA) loss widened to Rs 813 crore. Overall, food delivery revenue grew by 20.2% year-over-year to Rs 2,080 crore, with order volume growing by 23.3%. At the same time, newer formats like ultrafast Bolt and SNACC are aimed at increasing consumption frequency and improving retention. These efforts signal Swiggy’s larger bet on everyday integration to drive value.
Platform Strategy and Corporate Integration
DeskEats gives Swiggy access to dense, time-sensitive demand during work hours. Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, says this helps streamline operations: “By integrating directly with workplaces, Swiggy can anchor itself in employees’ daily routines and provide a more predictable stream of orders.”
He adds, “Scheduled office meals create habitual consumption patterns and increase customer lifetime value, especially when the employer endorses a single platform and offers a favourable price-value mix.”
“This is the age-old model followed by contracted office canteens or cafeterias as well, but updated to the mobile app era, with more flexibility in terms of the items that an individual can order based on their own preferences”, Dutta added.
Furthermore Dutta opined, “Adoption is likely to be more in the larger cities where there is a greater concentration of demand and out-of-home consumption is higher among migrant professionals with high discretionary spending power.”
Data, Consent, and Workplace Targeting
To access Corporate Rewards, users verify with their work email. Swiggy hasn’t said whether it collects additional employee data or whether employers see usage metrics. It’s also unclear if enrolment is opt-in or automatic.
This concern mirrors recent questions raised about Zepto, which began recommending mood-specific product bundles like “Crampy” or “Ragey” based on user searches for PMS. Critics pointed out that such inferences may not be accurate and are often made without the user’s explicit awareness. Zepto’s privacy policy permits broad data collection, including health and behavioural patterns, but lacks clear disclosure on profiling. While Swiggy may not be doing this visibly, the direction of workplace-linked behaviour data raises similar concerns under India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA), which still doesn’t regulate inferred or behavioural data clearly.
As this model scales, it raises questions under India’s DPDPA especially around purpose limitation and workplace-based profiling.
Why This Matters
Swiggy’s push into the workplace mirrors a broader shift across the food delivery market. Zomato recently launched ‘Zomato for Enterprise,’ a corporate food expense management platform that allows employees to charge business orders directly to their companies. With features like budgeting, ordering rules, and account toggling between work and personal use, Zomato is positioning itself as a paperless, digital alternative to legacy players like Sodexo. According to CEO Deepinder Goyal, over 100 companies have already onboarded the platform.
This move signals intensifying competition in the enterprise food space. While Zomato focuses on billing and reimbursements through employer-tied accounts, Swiggy is targeting recurring workplace consumption through curated menus and behavioural nudges. Both platforms appear to be building business-facing verticals that go beyond consumer ordering, aiming to lock in institutional clients and expand platform dependency within the workspace.
Unanswered Questions
MediaNama reached out to Swiggy with the following questions. The article will be updated when we receive a response:
Is Swiggy positioning DeskEats and Corporate Rewards as part of a larger shift into corporate benefits?
How do companies sign up for Corporate Rewards? Are there different plans or models based on company size?
What employee data does Swiggy collect when someone signs up using their work email?
Are DeskEats and Corporate Rewards linked to Swiggy One or any other paid subscription?
How many companies and users are currently active on DeskEats?
Does Swiggy plan to scale this into a standalone B2B vertical?(Published in Medianama)
admin
July 27, 2025
Alenjith K Johny & Ajay Rag, Economic Times
Jul 27, 2025
Startups in the 60-minute fashion delivery segment are betting on features such as ‘try and buy’ and artificial intelligence (AI)-powered virtual try-ons to tackle high return rates, a key pain point in the segment. These tools are helping increase conversion rates and reduce returns while offering greater flexibility to buyers, said industry executives.
Mumbai-based Knot, which recently raised funding from venture capital firm Kae Capital, said partner brands that typically see return rates of about 20% on their direct-to-consumer websites are witnessing sub-1% returns through offline stores, a trend it is now replicating through these digital features.
“Our partner brands, which have offline stores, would typically witness 20% returns on their direct to consumer websites. But for the same purchases on offline stores, the returns are less than 1%. That is the idea. With the ‘try and buy’ feature, users can make a very decisive purchase at their doorstep,” Archit Nanda, CEO of Knot, told ET.
Return rates among users of the company’s virtual try-on feature are similarly much lower than the platform’s overall user base, he said.
Other venture-backed quick fashion delivery startups such as Bengaluru-based Slikk, Mumbai-based Zilo and Gurugram-based Zulu Club are also testing similar features to increase conversions and reduce returns.
“Returns play as big a part as maybe forward delivery does. Because these are expensive products, giving the customer his or her money back also plays a very critical role,” said Akshay Gulati, cofounder and CEO of Slikk.
Instant returns
Slikk is piloting an ‘instant returns’ feature where, like its 60-minute delivery service, returns are also completed within an hour. Once a return request is made on the app, a delivery partner picks up the product and refunds the amount instantly. The startup claims its return rate is 40-50% lower than that of traditional marketplaces and that it doesn’t charge customers any extra fees for returns.
Some users said they were satisfied with the delivery speed and trial window but pointed out that the app does not provide any return status updates until the product reaches the warehouse.
“I received my order within 60 minutes and had enough time to try it out. However, after returning the product, I didn’t receive any notification in the application until the delivery agent reached the warehouse,” said Mohammed Shibili, a working professional based in Bengaluru, who tried Slikk’s feature.
Investor interest
Investors tracking the segment estimate that try-and-buy and virtual try-on features can reduce return rates by 15-20 percentage points, translating into substantial cost savings for both platforms and brands.
“Features like try and buy are a huge cost save, not just for the platform but also for the brand. The brand otherwise would lose that inventory till it comes back and can’t make the sale on it. But now, that’s all getting quickly turned around. So, for the brand, it’s a win-win situation as well as for the customer where the money is not getting stuck till it gets the returns refunded,” said Sunitha Viswanathan, partner at Kae Capital.
Old model, new infrastructure
Flipkart-owned fashion etailer Myntra had introduced try and buy back in 2016 to attract traditional shoppers to online retail. However, the feature didn’t scale up due to supply chain limitations, according to industry executives.
“Back when Myntra launched ‘try and buy’, there was no hyperlocal delivery infrastructure. Deliveries were through national courier services. That model isn’t feasible to try and buy unless you have your own hyperlocal delivery fleet,” the founder of a fashion delivery startup said on condition of anonymity.
The founder added that while Myntra operated from large warehouses located on the outskirts of cities, the new-age supply chains are built within cities, allowing faster deliveries and enabling features like try and buy.
By the end of last year, Myntra had launched M-Now, an ultra-fast delivery service currently live in Bengaluru, Mumbai and Delhi, with pilots in other cities. The company said daily orders through M-Now doubled in the last quarter.
“Although it’s still early, our observations so far suggest that the quick delivery model, with its reduced wait time, attracts high-intent customers, leading to naturally lower return rates,” said a spokesperson for Myntra.
The etailer did not confirm whether the try-and-buy feature is being tested under M-Now.
Viability concerns persist
Despite the benefits, the long-term viability of these features is open to question, experts said.
“There is a cost to also providing these services (like try and buy), and whether that becomes viable at all is a question mark at this point of time. I think that’s what the concern is, and it has not been that viable,” said Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a management consulting firm focused on consumer goods and retail industries.
He added that when platforms offer the try-and-buy feature, delivery executives have to wait while customers try on products, which increases the cost per delivery and reduces the number of deliveries that can be completed. Despite that, some items may still be returned, further impacting operational efficiency.
However, startups are experimenting with these features mainly on higher-margin products to offset operational costs, Dutta said, as return rates across fashion categories can range from under 10% to as high as 40% for certain items.
(Published in Economic Times)