admin
August 18, 2025
Hiral Goyal, The Morning Context
18 August 2025
A trend that has been playing out through big and small changes over the last two decades is that in urban India the kirana store is easily replaceable.
When it comes to buying groceries, urban Indians have a number of options. They can visit a fancy supermarket run by a conglomerate or order online through a number of e-commerce and instant-delivery companies. And if the above doesn’t seem easy enough, they can hop over to a nearby mom-and-pop store.
It would appear it is now the turn of smaller towns in the country to witness the kirana disruption. Even though 99% of grocery shopping in these tier-3 cities is done through neighborhood general stores, there are startups that believe this is an outdated and inefficient form of retail and a change is in order.
One such company is SuperK. The startup’s mission is to build a grocery store model in small towns that has all of the advantages of modern retail packed in a compact 800-square-foot store. This is what Anil Thontepu and Neeraj Menta had set out to do when they founded the company in 2019. The idea was to bring a modern trade-like grocery shopping experience to small-town India a wide assortment of products at a better value.
“There is a cost-efficient world of general trade and a customer-loving world of modern retail,” says Thontepu. “We wanted to see if we can bridge this gap…and do something for the small-town people by bringing the best of both these worlds.”
Over the past five years, the Bengaluru-headquartered startup has opened over 130 stores across 80 towns in Andhra Pradesh. And it doesn’t want to stop there. The company wants to expand to another 300 towns in Andhra Pradesh and nearby states of Karnataka and Telangana over the next 24, months. That’s quite an ambitious target. But the founders believe the market size for Superk is so large that they should be able to build a Rs 2,000-3,000 стоore ($228-342 million) annual business from Andhra and Telangana alone.
To fuel this expansion, Superk raised Rs 100 crore ($11.7 million) in Series B funding last month. The round, led by Binny Bansal’s 3STATE Ventures and CaratLane founder Mithun Sacheti, valued Superk at 2-2.5x its previous valuation of Rs 160 crore (about $18.25 million) in 202/
Now, Superk is not entirely unique. It competes with startups like Frendy, Apna Mart and Wheelocity, which are also trying to organize the retail market in India’s smaller towns. What sets SuperK apart is its larger, bolder approach. Grocery chain Apna Mart, for instance, runs franchisee stores in tier-2 or tier-3 markets and also offers 15-minute home delivery, SuperK’s focus is only on supermarkets. Frendy operates mini-marts and micro-kiranas in villages and towns with fewer than 10,000 people, but SuperK targets small towns with populations between 20,000 and 500,000. And Wheelocity supplies only fresh produce to rural areas, while Superk sells dry groceries as well as packaged consumer goods.
This rather radical shift in focus-away from tier-1 and tier-2 cities-ties in with India’s changing consumption pattern. “Consumer mindsets are changing even in smaller cities,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder and chief executive of Third Eyesight, adding that these consumers are beginning to favour more modern retail environments. And NielsenIQ’s latest report says rural markets in India grew twice as fast as cities between April and June 2025.
In this landscape, SuperK fits like a glove, with its franchise-first approach. Thanks to an asset-light model, the company has the agility to go deeper into smaller towns.
But it won’t be all that easy either. As Dutta says, “Changing grocery habits is a long, capital-intensive game.” Moreover, big retail chains are also jumping on the bandwagon. Hypermarket chain Vishal Mega Mart, for instance, already operates 47% of its stores in tier-3 cities and plans to expand into cities with populations exceeding 50,000. Supermarket chain operator DMart is also focusing on tier-2 and tier-3 cities.
However, Superk founders believe they are prepared for the challenge. Menta says the startup has arrived at a business model that is scalable, sustainable and, more importantly, offers value to its customers.
It’s too early to say whether they will be successful in this endeavour. That said, SuperK appears to have built a smart retail business for small-town India.
Refining small-town retail
SuperK’s founders have drawn inspiration from domestic and international retail chains like DMart and Costco. But they haven’t duplicated their strategies and made their own tweaks instead. For instance, large retail chains usually run company-owned and company operated, or COCO, stores. Though this approach is more cost-intensive than the franchise model, it allows a company to ensure a uniform customer experience across all outlets:
Superk doesn’t do that. It runs only franchise-owned and franchise-operated (FOFO) stores, which are no bigger than 800 sq ft. The company is not the first to have experimented with this model, but Thontepu believes that everyone else before them “did not try with the right spirit”. A franchise-owned store, argues co-founder Menta, is run differently from a company-owned store one has to keep in mind the store owner’s incentives, needs and concerns.
Under the franchise model, entrepreneurs invest between Rs 12 lakh (about $13,690) and Rs 15 lakh (about $17,110) to set up a Superk store. Of this, Rs 4 lakh (nearly $4,560) is spent on the store fit-out and infrastructure, the rest goes towards buying inventory. These stores, according to Menta, typically achieve a breakeven point after six months. On average, a retail store takes longer than that-12-15 months to reach breakeven.
Superk fills the shelves by procuring its inventory directly from brands as well as distributors. “The inventory is recommended by us through a mobile application. Store owners have an option to make certain changes within the limits that we have set for them,” says Thontepu. Revenue is shared and the model is similar to the one followed by nearly all retailers in India. Franchisees earn varying levels of margins on different kinds of products, depending on how easy or tough it is to sell those items. For instance, staples like dal and rice have lower margins, while confectionary items and products that need greater effort to sell enjoy higher margins of up to 20%.
In addition to this, there’s a private label business, especially loose items like pulses. In fact, private labelling is part of the company’s efforts to bring some standardization in India’s unorganized retail market. “A customer coming to our store should be able to blindly expect consistent quality on the product they’re buying,” says Menta. “We have organized our sourcing, processing, cleaning, packaging, testing. Everything that a brand would do to provide a great-quality product to their customer.”
Unlike distributors or other retailers who operate franchise models though, Superk claims that it does not dump its inventory on store owners. Menta says the franchise structure is designed in a way that Superk does not benefit from selling unnecessary stock to store owners. “If I lose, he will lose. If he loses, I lose. That is the way (the structure) is created. We, in fact, recommend owners to remove some products if they are not selling.” says Menta.
On the customer side of things, Superk’s value proposition comes down to offering the best prices. More than a year ago, for instance, it introduced a membership programme that offers customers cashback that is redeemable on their future purchases. “If they pay Rs 300 [approximately $3.5) for a six-month membership, they get 10% cashback on all purchases that they are making up to Rs 300 every month,” explains Thontepu. He says 35-40% of Superk’s more than 500,000 customers are enrolled in this programme.
All of this sounds good even promising in theory. But will it be enough to build a sustainable and scalable retail business?
A long, hard look
Let’s first look at what really works in SuperK’s favour.
One, the focus on selling staples under a private label brand. This has been done successfully before. One example is Nilgiri’s, one of India’s oldest supermarket chains.
Founded in 1905, Niligiri’s operated under a franchise model and sold dairy, baked goods, chocolates and other items produced under its own brand. The supermarket chain was sold by debt-ridden Future Group for Rs 67 crore ($7.65 million) in 2023, less than one-third the price the latter paid to acquire the company from private equity firm Actis in 2014. However, its history is worth learning from.
Shomik Mukherjee, a Delhi-based consumer goods advisor who was a partner at Actis while the firm was in control of Nilgiri’s, recalls the value proposition created by Nilgiri’s private label products. “In the case of private labels, it is essential for a company to have a reason why people will walk into that store. For Nilgiri’s, it was bakery and dairy products,” says Mukherjee. Owning a private label that brought in customers also ensured that franchisee owners had incentives to continue working with Nilgiri’s. “It is about giving the franchisees a safe portfolio of private label goods that are desired by customer instead of something that is shoved down the franchisees’ throat to derive margin,” he says.
You see, the overall grocery business operates on a very low margin. But private labelling, says Satish Meena, founder of Datum Intelligence, offers the highest margins – 35-40% – in the grocery business, after fresh produce, making it a lucrative business to get into.
Superk, which sells essential items through its private label, has the opportunity to earn better margins in grocery retail. More importantly, private labelling holds the potential to become SuperK’s identity and boost customer retention and loyalty.
Two, SuperK’s franchise model allows it to expand to more locations rapidly as compared to a regular modern trade chain with company-owned stores, says Mukherjee. This model makes SuperK’s business asset-light and brings down the cost of running a network of stores. “Under this model, the franchisor does not incur the upfront cost of opening a store or having to deal with the trouble of hiring and replacing store managers,” he adds. Since most store owners in a franchise model are landowners, there is a greater stability in operations as well, he explains. Moreover, Superk stores are quite small (800 sq ft), allowing easier availability of property.
The franchise model, however, is not entirely foolproof. One of the inherent problems is the difficulty in implementing standard operating procedures (SOPs) across all stores. And the problem only worsens as the company expands operations to different cities. While Superk stores boast a no-frills fit-out that can be easily set up anywhere, how these stores are maintained through the wear and tear over the years is yet to be seen.
A bigger fear is that the store owner may start running their own store without the Superk branding. “If Superk loses the franchisee owner, it also loses the location in which the store was operating,” says Mukherjee.
Moreover, most franchisee owners in the retail business typically tend to be experienced general store owners who might not be willing to adopt new technology. “Since they have run a store before, they think they know how and what to order for inventory and may not follow SuperK’s tech-enabled recommendations,” says Mukherjee.
There’s another problem. While the founders claim to have seen considerable success (35-40% sign-ups) in the rollout of SuperK’s membership programme for customers, Third Eyesight’s Dutta raises concerns about its future growth. “Indian consumers’ price sensitivity limits membership fee potential,” he says. According to him, the programme’s value in the tier-3 market lies more in customer acquisition and retention than direct revenue generation. “Long-term success requires a cashback programme to drive purchase frequency and basket size increases to offset the costs,” says Dutta.
Menta, however, has a different view. He says SuperK’s subscription is designed in a way that benefits customers only when they make full basket purchases. Moreover, the company has different pricing slabs for membership depending on the various basket sizes, which makes the model more viable. Considering the programme is a little more than a year old, it is still too early to judge whether it will find a lot of takers in small towns.
For now, the founders are in no hurry to expand their business across India. “There is no reason to go into five states. Then, you are spread thin and your economics will not work out. It’s a business of managing operations at a very low cost,” says Menta. The plan is to stick to one region and continue to go deeper into it. “A lot of our competitors who started five years ago spread to so many places that it became very difficult for them to manage,” he adds.
This is also the crux of how Thontepu and Menta are building SuperK. By implementing what they have learnt not only from their own experiments, but also from the failures and successes of other businesses. While there’s no guarantee that Superk will become a roaring success, it does appear to have set an example by starting small and growing patiently. And if the latest funding is any proof, investors are interested.
(With inputs from Neethi Lisa Rojan)
(Published in The Morning Context)
admin
July 10, 2025
Alka Jain, Outlook Business
10 July 2025
Just when Blinkit, Instamart and Zepto were slowing down in their quick commerce game, Amazon’s entry may spur them towards a more aggressive race. The ecommerce giant has begun offering deliveries in as little as ten minutes in Delhi after Bengaluru, under the name ‘Amazon Now’.
“We are excited with the initial customer response and positive feedback, especially from Prime members. Based on this, we are now expanding the service over the next few months addressing immediate customer needs while maintaining Amazon’s standards for safety, quality and reliability,” the company said in an official statement.
Till now, the company was moving at its own pace with the idea that Indian consumers would wait a day or two for their deliveries. But the game has changed now—convenience is king here. Online shoppers want everything from milk to mobile chargers within a few minutes at their doorsteps.
And the big three of the quick commerce market—Blinkit, Instamart, Zepto—have cracked the consumer code perfectly. This trend has nudged Amazon and Flipkart to enter the 10-minute delivery segment. It started as an experiment in the larger ecommerce sector but has now become a necessity for online retailers.
Kathryn McLay, chief executive of Walmart International—an American multinational retail corporation—revealed that quick commerce now accounts for 20% of India’s ecommerce market and is growing at a rate of 50% annually. According to a Morgan Stanley report, the market is expected to reach $57bn by 2030.
Hence, Amazon could not afford to stay on the sidelines. The company has already pumped $11bn into Indian market since 2013 and recently announced another $233mn to upgrade its infrastructure and speed up deliveries. In addition, it has also opened five fulfilment centres across the country.
Despite continued investment, there are doubts if Amazon can disrupt the quick commerce game. Industry experts state that the ecommerce major’s late entry could upend the fragile unit economics of the space. It can even reignite discount wars and increase burn rate (a company spending its cash reserve while going through loss) for the incumbents, once the ecommerce giants begin to exert pressure and begin to capture market share.
Open Market, Thin Margins
Given the growth momentum and market size, quick commerce start-up Kiko.live cofounder Alok Chawla believes that there is definitely headroom to accommodate another player in the quick commerce market. However, margins may remain negative for a couple of years due to high business and delivery costs.
As per data, the average order value of ₹350–₹400 yields a gross margin of approximately 20% but high fulfilment and delivery costs (₹50–₹60 per order) significantly reduce overall profitability, often cancelling out most of the gains.
“Indian customers will not be willing to pay high shipping charges for convenience. But the market will continue to grow due to cart subsidies and shipping discounts. On top of this, profitability also remains quite some time away,” he says.
Even a survey by Grant Thornton Bharat, a professional services firm, shows that 81% of Indian quick commerce users cite discounts and offers as one of the main reasons they shop on platforms like Blinkit and Instamart.
But the fact is Amazon has extremely deep pockets, which means, the trio will once again have to get into aggressive discounting to protect their turf, said Chawla, indicating the possibility of higher cash burn quarters ahead.
In February, reports revealed that Indian quick commerce companies, including new entrants, were burning cash to the tune of ₹1,300–₹1,500 crore on a monthly basis. But a few months later, Aadit Palicha, chief executive of Zepto, a fast-growing 10-minute delivery platform, claimed that the company had slashed its operating cash burn by 50% in the previous quarter.
Still, the path to profitability remains shaky. Though Amazon can get an advantage of its existing huge customer base that is habitual of making online purchases including those in similar categories.
The real challenge lies beneath the surface because ecommerce and quick commerce operate on fundamentally different engines.
E-Comm vs Q-Comm: A Different Game
It may seem like a simple extension of what Amazon already does: deliver products. But in practice, the logistics, timelines and cost structures behind traditional ecommerce and quick commerce are different, said Somdutta Singh, founder and chief executive of Assiduus Global, a cross-border ecommerce accelerator that helps brands scale on global marketplaces through end-to-end solutions.
She explains the difference using a hypothetical situation: let’s say you order a phone case in Mumbai, which is picked from a nearby fulfilment centre. It will be added to a pre-routed delivery run with 30-50 other stops. This batching on the basis of route optimisation, keeps last-mile costs low, somewhere around ₹40–₹80.
But if you order the same item in a smaller town like Alleppey, it may first travel mid-mile from a hub in Cochin, then be handed off to a local partner like India Post. This increases the delivery time but keeps costs manageable through scale and planned routing.
This setup suits well in ecommerce business, which is built for reach and variety, not for speed. However, quick commerce runs on a completely different playbook because speed becomes priority here.
For instance, you order a pack of chips and a cold drink via Zepto in Andheri. These items are already stocked in a dark store within one to two kilometers of your home. The moment you place the order; someone picks it off the shelf. A rider is dispatched almost immediately and heads directly to your address.
There is no mid-mile movement, no routing logic and no batching. Each trip is a solo run. Delivery often happens within 10 to 15 minutes. This kind of speed relies on a dense network of local stores and a steady flow of short-range riders. But it also means higher costs.
“With no bundling of orders and lower average cart sizes, usually ₹250 to ₹300, the delivery cost per order can shoot up to ₹60 to ₹120. That is a heavy operational burden. Unlike traditional ecommerce, where cost efficiency scales with distance and order volume, quick commerce is constrained by geography and time pressure,” she explains.
So, it becomes more than just a category expansion for e-commerce platforms like Amazon and Flipkart. It marks a pivot in their “logistics thinking” and signals a broader shift in entry strategies. What once worked must now be retooled for hyperlocal and real-time operations.
Speed over Scale Not Easy
There are multiple challenges ahead for Amazon to make its presence felt and stay competitive in the quick commerce space. Firstly, it must build an operations and logistics layer that enables sub-15-minute deliveries, along with a technology stack to support it, according to Mit Desai, practice member at Praxis Global Alliance, a management consulting firm.
Second, it needs to build a dark store network to succeed in the space which is crucial to meet the 10-15 minutes delivery promise. Experts believe that a hybrid model will be the most successful in India—a mix of micro warehouses, partner stores and dark stores.
Desai states that Amazon’s existing capabilities can give it a base to build on, but it would also have to account for complexities and differences that come with the quick commerce business.
“For Amazon, the challenge will be operations. Can they build 700+ dark stores? Can they go hyperlocal? Can they navigate the chaos of Gurugram rain, Bengaluru traffic or the lanes of Dadar?” wonders Madhav Kasturia, founder and chief executive of Zippee, a quick commerce fulfilment start-up focused on hyperlocal deliveries and dark store management.
Another challenge can be repeat, loyal customers. As of now, customers check prices across platforms, and order where prices are the lowest. So, Amazon will have to spend heavily on discounts to gain market share. Chawla says retention will remain a problem because Zepto’s growth has also slowed down after a reduction in discounting burn.
However, Singh highlights that Amazon may not roll out everything in one shot. “We will likely see small-scale pilots, co-branded dark stores, local partnerships, new rider networks, tested in top cities before any nationwide push. They will also reveal whether it is viable to retrofit scale-driven e-commerce infrastructure into something that runs well in a hyperlocal loop,” she added.
Profitability Remains a Concern
While the quick commerce space is becoming increasingly dynamic with new entrants, the core question remains: is it a sustainable business model? The path to profitability is still fraught with operational complexity, margin constraints and uncertainty in consumer behaviour.
“Margins in quick commerce were never pretty to begin with,” says Kasturia. Yet he remains optimistic about the market because India’s grocery market is still largely untapped online.
As per data, India’s grocery and essentials market is over $600bn, of which online commerce is just three to four percent. Even quick commerce is sitting at ₹7,000–₹9,000 crore gross merchandise value today. So, the market isn’t crowded. It’s just early.
“We are barely scratching the surface,” he says, arguing that whoever wins customer behaviour, will lead the game. For example, in tier 1 cities, users no longer compare prices—they compare time.
For Amazon, this is both an opportunity and a constraint. Experts believe that the ecommerce giant can stand out by focusing on trust, hygiene and reliability—areas where existing players sometimes falter.
Kasturia says that the platform should not even chase everything, rather focus on profitable categories like fruits, dairy and personal care. “Build strong private labels. Nail density before geography and don’t discount blindly,” he adds.
The key is to build for reorders, not virality. That’s when customer acquisition cost (CAC) drops, margins compound and a player stops bleeding money per order. And to reduce the cost of dark stores, Chawla suggests an alternative route.
“Riding to neighbourhood stores for long-tail stock keeping unit can cut real estate and wastage costs,” he says, adding that it can decentralise inventory without owning all of it.
To follow this playbook, Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a management consulting and services firm, says that every player needs to invest hundreds of crores before the model begins to show surplus cash. It will demand multiple, interlocked shifts—in pricing strategy, tech backbone, category mix, and even brand positioning.
Amazon’s entry doesn’t merely add another contender in the 10-minute delivery race—it rewrites the playbook for every player. The real question now is: can the frontrunners hold their turf, or will Amazon’s scale and deep pockets tip the balance of power?
Devangshu Dutta
June 30, 2025
In every strategy meeting today, one metric is invariably mentioned: Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC). Whether you’re a well-funded corporate retailer, or raising your first angel round, or a well-established digital duopolist brand scaling Series C, CAC is one of the key performance metrics. “Real” spend that is neatly broken down by channel, optimised by funnel tweaks, scrutinised to the last rupee or dollar.
But there’s a metric we almost never hear about that could be costing brands far more in the long run.
Let’s call it Customer Forfeiture Cost (CFC), the residual lifetime value that is lost when a customer walks away from your business not because of price, competition, or even shifting needs, but because of a “burn”: a delivery missed or messed up, a refund that took weeks, an arrogant customer service call, or a product that failed spectacularly against the promise. In other words, when your brand hurts someone enough to make them walk away. Probably for ever.
It’s a paradox: brands are pumping thousands of crores into acquiring users, but they’re bleeding value at the other end. Yet, while CAC is a line item in every financial statement, CFC is invisible in management dashboards. CEOs don’t announce, “We’ve cut our forfeiture cost by 20% this quarter.”
Yet. every CXO knows it exists. The NPS scores, the social media complaints, the “never again” comments in reviews, the sinking feeling when repeat purchase rates fall.
Why CFC Matters More Than Ever
In every business, during the early stages each sale is a victory. Whether it was the retail chains that grew in the 1990s and early-2000s or the digital upstarts that came up through 2010s and 2020s, scale has been the mantra, and investors have poured money into scaling through the growing consumption of India 1 and India 2 customers.
Today customer acquisition isn’t cheap. The same person who clicked impulsively in 2020 now thinks twice before confirming payment. In this landscape, retention isn’t optional, it’s existential.
Every lost customer isn’t just a refund processed, or a cart abandoned. It’s the long tail of future repeat purchases that will never happen, negative word of mouth and brand distrust in the customer’s circle of influence, and increased future CAC due to declining organic reach.
Way back in 1967, management consultant Peter Drucker wrote in his book “The Effective Executive”: “What gets measured, gets managed”.
Today your CAC may be Rs. 500-1,000. If the average customer life time value (LTV) is Rs. 10,000, and a single burn causes churn after just one order worth Rs. 2,000, your CFC is Rs. 8,000, and that doesn’t even include reputational spillover.
Why We Don’t Measure It
Yes, CFC is hard to quantify. It’s not as easily attributable as ad spends. There’s usually no neat model telling you why someone never returned, because tech stacks aren’t typically designed to track emotional exits. And let’s face it, introspection about broken relationships is uncomfortable, even for management teams.
But that doesn’t mean it’s not real. If a customer leaves because your delivery executive messed up, or because your app crashed during checkout twice in a row, that’s on you, not the market. And in a business climate where sustainable growth is the mantra, LTV is king.
Ignoring CFC is like watching your roof leak and blaming the rain.
Toward a New Discipline
Brands and retailers must start measuring CFC, the value lost when customers disengage due to friction, mistrust, or neglect, and then start working on reducing it. This can be done by:
The Competitive Edge We’re Not Using
In a crowded space where everyone’s vying for eyeballs, trust is the true moat. Customers don’t expect perfection – they do expect accountability, authenticity, and recovery when things go wrong.
Brands that understand and act on Customer Forfeiture Costs will quietly start building a powerful edge: deeper brand loyalty, lower CAC over time thanks to referrals and repeats and greater lifetime value per user.
In other words, real, compounding value.
As the Indian brand ecosystem matures, Customer Forfeiture Cost needs to be as visible and valued as CAC. Acquisition is the invitation; experience is the relationship. Relationships, once broken, are expensive to rebuild; if they can be rebuilt at all.
In the end, growth isn’t just about who comes in. It’s about who stays, and why.
(Written by Devangshu Dutta, Founder of Third Eyesight, this was published in Financial Express on 2 July 2025)
admin
May 19, 2025
Aakriti Bansal, Medianama
May 19, 2025
Zepto has launched Zepto Atom, a paid analytics product for consumer brands. The tool offers live dashboards with minute-level updates, PIN-code level performance maps, and Zepto GPT, an in-house Natural Language Processing (NLP) assistant trained on internal data.
While Blinkit and Swiggy Instamart have not announced comparable offerings, Zepto is pitching Atom as a first-of-its-kind play in quick commerce data access.
The launch comes as Zepto gears up for a public offering. The company is in talks to sell $250 million in secondary shares to Indian investors to boost local ownership ahead of its IPO. With a $5 billion valuation and a presence in just 15 cities, Zepto is seeking new ways to expand both revenue and market influence.
A strategic product in the lead-up to IPO
Zepto’s push to monetise platform tools comes at a time when it is attempting to raise its domestic shareholder base to 50%, reportedly as part of regulatory preparation for a future IPO. CLSA, in its 2024 App-racadabra report, estimates Zepto holds 28% of India’s quick commerce market despite a limited presence, trailing Blinkit at 39%.
With Zepto Atom, the company appears to turn its data infrastructure into a service layer for brands. This raises questions about how user behaviour transforms into brand-facing insight.
Zepto’s Multi-Lever Margin Play
Zepto’s cost structure is divided into warehouse transport, dark store operations, last-mile delivery, and corporate overheads. According to CLSA’s App-racadabra report, the company has achieved measurable efficiency gains across each of these categories. For instance, long-haul warehouse transport costs fell from Rs 1.7 per order in March 2022 to Rs 0.8 in February 2024. Handling costs inside dark stores declined from Rs 11 per order in June 2023 to under Rs 10 by January 2024. Last-mile delivery expenses dropped 20% between December 2023 and February 2024, from Rs 50 to Rs 40 per order.
HDFC Securities highlights three key levers for e-commerce profitability: raising average order values via premium or bundled products, improving take rates through ads and private labels, and reducing last-mile costs through better routing. Zepto has pursued these through initiatives like Zepto Café, Relish (in-house food and meat brands), the Zepto Pass loyalty program, and now Zepto Atom—signaling a multi-pronged approach to expand margins beyond logistics.
Whether brands will act on the data that Atom delivers, remains an open question.
Granular offtake data is rarely made available to brands, whether it is by offline retailers or by online platforms; so far brands have been largely flying blind, especially when it comes to marketplaces. In that sense, Zepto’s Atom can be a huge enabler and gamechanger,” Devangshu Dutta, Founder, Third Eyesight, told MediaNama.
Not All Brands May Be Ready
Zepto Atom lets brands monitor impressions, conversions, share of voice, and customer retention in near real-time.
“While having access to real-time geographical and time-stamped sales data is potentially an absolute goldmine for any brand, how useful it is will depend much more on how ready or capable the brand is to use the analysis and make adjustments to its strategy,” said Dutta.
Brands can use Zepto GPT, the NLP assistant embedded in Atom, to query platform data conversationally—for instance, to identify under-indexed Stock Keeping Units (SKUs) in a specific PIN code or analyse what’s driving category sales. However, it remains unclear how brands interpret or act on these insights in practice.
The company has not disclosed Atom’s pricing model. It also hasn’t confirmed whether access will be open to all brands or restricted to high-volume partners. These details will likely determine adoption.
How Atom Fits into the Margin Strategy
Zepto Atom’s real-time sales metrics, SKU-level performance data, and customer retention patterns align closely with the margin levers identified by HDFC Securities. By providing granular insights, Atom enables brands to fine-tune pricing, reposition products, and run targeted campaigns, potentially increasing order values, improving take rates, and optimizing delivery routes. Such adjustments could boost volumes and conversions, benefiting Zepto through higher commissions and ad revenues.
“For Zepto it is certainly a differentiator and could be a driver for additional revenue not just in terms of the subscription fees that they would charge but the incremental impact it could make on the brand partners’ sales and, by extension, on Zepto’s own overall fees/revenues,” said Dutta.
Still, widespread adoption may depend on how well Zepto supports brand onboarding and data literacy. “It may make sense for Zepto to even assist brand-side personnel in understanding how best to use the new tools and also help them create tangible operational changes on their side using the insights.”
Search behaviour and profiling concerns remain unresolved
Earlier this month, Zepto used search behaviour to curate mood-specific product categories such as “Crampy” and “Hangry,” in response to searches related to premenstrual syndrome (PMS)—a recurring condition affecting many women before menstruation. Critics told MediaNama that this kind of emotional profiling could occur without user awareness or consent.
Zepto’s privacy policy states that it collects lifestyle, health, and behavioural data for personalisation and internal analysis. However, the company does not explain whether it stores inferred data, shares it with brands, or applies it to pricing and promotions.
Whether Atom makes any of this data visible to brands remains unclear.
Why This Matters
Zepto Atom signals a shift in how quick commerce platforms are looking to generate value—not just from delivery, but from the data their ecosystems produce. With tools like real-time dashboards and search-linked behavioural insights, Zepto is turning user interactions into assets for brand partnerships.
The move raises larger questions about where platform growth is coming from. Is the business of quick commerce becoming the business of behavioural data? As brands gain new visibility through Atom, the balance between consumer experience and commercial analytics becomes harder to separate.
MediaNama has reached out to Zepto with these questions:
What specific types of consumer behaviour and purchase data are made available to brands through Atom?
Does Zepto Atom include inferred metrics such as user intent, repeat behaviour, or emotional tagging in its brand-facing dashboard?
Are brands shown real-time access to individual-level trends, or only aggregated cohort-level insights?
Are users informed that their platform activity may be used to generate commercial insights for brands?
Can users opt out of this data being shared with third parties via Atom?As of publication, Zepto has not responded. We will update the story when we receive a response.
(Published in Medianama)
admin
March 20, 2025
Sagar Malviya, Economic Times
Mumbai, 20 March 2025
Established beauty product makers such as Forest Essentials, Colorbar, Kama Ayurveda, Body Shop, VLCC Personal Care and Lotus Herbals saw a slowdown in sales growth in FY24, according to the latest Registrar of Companies filings. Consumers favoured new-age rivals such as Minimalist and Pilgrim, specialised derma brands, as well as global labels Shiseido, Innisfree and Eucerin.
Sales growth of established brands mostly in the natural skincare segment, more than halved to single digits during the previous financial year amid a broader economic slump.
In contrast, companies such as L’Oreal, Nykaa and Sephora continued to grow at 12-34% on a significantly bigger base, even as they lost pace.
Direct-to-consumer brand Pilgrim more than doubled its sales, Minimalist’s revenue increased 80% and Foxtale’s sales surged 500% on a lower base.
“With most consumers tightening their budget on discretionary spends in FY24, they seem to have opted for brands that give instant benefits compared to natural products, which take time to be effective,” said Devangshu Dutta, founder of retail consulting firm Third Eyesight.
Over the past few years, there has been a flurry of beauty product launches, which have depended on platforms such as Nykaa and Tira for sales.
In the past two years, Nykaa has launched more than 350 brands, or In the past two years, or nearly one new label every alternate day on average.
This includes international brands such as CeraVe, Uriage and Versed, as well as home-grown brands such as Foxtale and Hyphen.
Reliance Retail, which entered beauty retailing with Tira two years ago, now sells nearly 1,000 brands, including exclusive labels such as Akind, Augustinus Badee, Allies of Skin, Kundal and Patchology.
“10 years ago we were only competing against big guys,” Vincent Karney, global chief executive of Beiersdorf, maker of Eucerin, Nivea and La Prakrit, told ET last month. “Now we have those local brands, and we have to become a bit more agile.”
On Nykaa, Fenty Beauty by Rihanna is the highest-selling brand in lipcare while Eucerin has become its biggest premium dermo-cosmetic serum. South Korean beauty brands Axis-Y, Tirtir and Numbuzin grew over 60% in 2024, with sales of toners increasing 104%, serums 45%, moisturisers 52% and sunscreens 154% on the platform.
VLCC and Colorbar did not respond to ET queries, while Forest Essentials was not reachable.
In January, Mike Jatania, cofounder and executive chairman of The Body Shop and Aurea Group, told ET, “There would be continuation of new entrants. Inflation is still a global issue and we will see the pressure. Competitive environment will be a challenge… 70% of our stores are showing decent growth. We have closed some stores and opened a few also, that’s the nature of the business.”
Ingredients Matter
Warnery of Beiersdorf emphasised the need to stay focused on “big innovation, by being able to talk to GenZ, (a position) which might be filled in by those local brands coming with basic ingredients.”
The likes of Minimalist, Ordinary and Pilgrim disclose active ingredients at a granular level, specifying the exact percentage of acid used in the product to appeal to GenZ users (those born between 1997 and early 2010s), who are said to be far more conscious of what they use on their skin compared to millennials (those born during 1980s to mid-1990s) and Gen X (those born from about 1965 to 1980).
Shoppers Stop, which manages brands such as Estee Lauder, Shiseido, Bobbi Brown, Mac and Clinique in India, sees the overall beauty market driven by companies focusing on consumers across age groups, and not just younger ones. Both natural and dermatological products are expected to find takers.
“While most new age brands tap younger cohorts, their pocket size allows them to mostly buy affordable products and the more affluent consumers opt for established global brands that have proven themselves since decades,” said Biju Kassim, chief executive, beauty, at Shoppers Stop. “Beauty is still not a habit in India and with hundreds of brands being launched, the focus is to grow penetration. There is also a shift from care to cure, driven by derma-recommended products and brands disclosing active ingredients, but it is still a niche sub-segment.”
Dutta of Third Eyesight sees the current trend as temporary. “We expect growth of (established) companies to bounce back in the current fiscal, driven by a strong demand for beauty,” he said, pointing especially to online platforms. India’s beauty and personal care market is expected to reach $34 billion by 2028, up from $21 billion now, driven by an online surge and a growing preference for high quality, premium beauty products according to a report by Nykaa and consulting firm Redseer.
Nicolas Hieronimus, chief executive of cosmetics giant L’Oreal, last year said consumers in India are more demanding and are not just settling for very basic things like putting an ingredient in a product such as salicylic acid or collagen. “That’s where L’Oreal has the best cards to play, and that’s where we really thrive,” he had told ET.
Beiersdorf, Unilever, L’Oreal and Shiseido, among the world’s largest cosmetics companies, have all identified India as a key growth driver, citing the burgeoning population and growing affinity for beauty products.
(Published in Economic Times)