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October 10, 2025
Pooja Yadav, Exchange4Media
10 October 2025
Over the years, India’s e-commerce market has been dominated by the duopoly of Amazon and Flipkart. These platforms have not only captured consumer attention but also shaped how brands spend their marketing budgets. In parallel to this, the concept of retail media networks (RMNs), marketplaces selling ad placements to brands directly, has also grown rapidly. Not only this, it is emerging as one of the fastest-growing channels in digital advertising.
As a result, the industry is witnessing a wave of new retail media platforms entering the market. From grocery and pharmacy marketplaces to Q-comm platforms, D2C marketplaces, and ONDC pilots, all are attempting to carve out space for themselves. Yet despite these new entrants, Amazon and Flipkart continue to command the lion’s share of shopper-marketing rupees, leaving little oxygen, even for challenger players like eBay, even as it retools its India strategy.
Retail media is now outpacing social and video in growth, and in India, this expansion remains concentrated around these two dominant players. According to several experts e4m spoke with, Amazon and Flipkart dominate because of their massive logged-in traffic at the point of purchase, first-party data, and closed-loop attribution linking impressions directly to GMV. These platforms succeed by combining large logged-in audiences, direct attribution from impressions to sales, and first-party data insulated from signal loss-advantages most challengers cannot match.
Adding to this, Shradha Agarwal, Co-Founder & CEO of Grapes, highlighted the key hurdles brands face when allocating budgets to newer networks like ONDC or eBay. She noted that brands consider three main factors: whether the network can deliver the same sales efficiency, whether it reaches new users or just shoppers already accessible on Amazon, and whether the scale is meaningful. Quoting an example, she said if a brand is already generating 10 crore on Amazon, it may question whether investing in a new platform that delivers only 25 lakh is worth the effort.
Vaibhav Jain, Head of Media at First Economy, pointed out, the biggest barriers to scaling budgets across newer retail media networks like eBay or ONDC or any other, are fragmented infrastructure, limited data maturity, and inconsistent measurement. Many platforms still lack robust first-party data systems and unified reporting standards, making it difficult for brands to validate ROI at the level provided by Amazon or Flipkart.
Everyone’s building a network – but is there room?
Despite the dominance of Amazon and Flipkart, the retail media landscape is attracting new entrants, including grocery and pharmacy marketplaces, Q-commerce platforms, D2C marketplaces, and ONDC pilots, all attempting to carve out space for themselves. Among these challengers, eBay has recently re-entered India with a markedly different approach focussing on building technical and export-led capabilities rather than competing directly in the domestic consumer market.
Against this backdrop, eBay has reopened its India chapter with a Global Capability Centre (GCC) in Bengaluru, planning to host over 300 engineers across AI/ML, product, design, and data analytics. Unlike its previous consumer-facing stints in 2005 and 2013, this pivot is capability and export-led, not a direct battle with domestic marketplaces. Globally, eBay earns revenue through Promoted Listings and other advertising products, but in India, it has historically lacked domestic shopper scale and first-party data, the two critical ingredients that make retail media profitable.
This time, eBay appears to be betting on cross-border trade, technology-led capabilities, and potentially new ad-tech opportunities a model that could differentiate it from established players like Amazon and Flipkart.
Speaking on this, Lloyd Mathias, business strategist and angel investor, said, “Retail media takes off only when you have a large front-end site like Amazon or Flipkart, where advertisers want to reach shoppers at the point of purchase. I don’t think retail media is going to be a big revenue driver for eBay at all.”
Adding to this, seasoned e-commerce analyst and Datum Intelligence advisor Satish Meena noted, “Retail-media economics depend on domestic shopper traffic and first-party data both of which eBay currently lacks in India. The realistic play is export-facing promotions, enabling Indian sellers to advertise SKUs to international buyers on eBay’s global sites. That’s valuable but niche, and unlikely to rival Flipkart or Amazon’s India-scale retail-media businesses.”
Devangshu Dutta of Third Eyesight stated, “On the trade front, the company appears to be prioritising exports from India rather than competing in the domestic market, which is already hypercompetitive and price-driven.”
Until eBay establishes a stronger consumer-facing presence, retail media will not be a priority, as per experts. In the near term, its strategy is likely to focus on export-facing ads, promoting Indian sellers to global buyers. Looks like this approach is unlikely to challenge Amazon or Flipkart in India.
What it would take to break the duopoly
While eBay’s strategy has been called smart, opportunities remain. Harish Bijoor, Founder, Harish Bijoor Consults Inc, noted that communication formats are evolving. with peer-to-peer engagement gaining reliability over top-down approaches. Amazon and Flipkart follow top-down models, whereas eBay could differentiate itself through 1:1 consumer interaction.
After two failed attempts at cracking India’s consumer market, eBay’s third innings (as some may call) is fundamentally different. It is no longer chasing domestic consumers but enabling Indian sellers to export globally, leveraging eBay’s global logistics, trust programs, and buyer base. The company is also partnering with government export initiatives, MSME councils, and logistics providers, while buildin technical, analytic, and product capabilities through the Bengaluru GCC.
Mandar Lande, co-founder of Waayu, a platform working with ONDC and MSMEs to enable digital commerce, said that eBay is unlikely to build a traditional retail media business in India without a large consumer marketplace. “eBay lacks the first-party shopper data and traffic scale that power retail media networks like Amazon Ads or Flipkart Ads. However, it could still build a niche ad-tech play focused on export sellers, cross-border insights, and global buyer intent analytics essentially an “export intelligence and seller marketing’ platform rather than a domestic retail media business. While it won’t rival Amazon Ads in India, it can carve out a high-value B2B media niche rooted in cross-border commerce rather than local eyeballs.”
For challenger brands like eBay aiming to break into India’s retail media landscape, success will depend on proving incremental sales rather than just impressions, offering unique audiences, maintaining pricing flexibility, and providing ease of buying through self-serve tools and standardised metrics.
Experts told eam that while retail media and ad-tech may not be immediate revenue drivers, eBay’s export-first strategy allows the company to build scale, technology, and credibility, setting the stage for potential consumer-facing or advertising initiatives in the future.
Jain mentioned, “Closed-loop measurement is central to shifting brand spend beyond Amazon and Flipkart. It offers verifiable proof of performance, linking ad exposure directly to sales. Challenger retail media networks that can deliver credible attribution and comparable ROAs will gain traction faster. Measurement sophistication isn’t just an advantage; it’s the entry ticket to serious brand consideration.”
Speaking about how self-serve tools, standardised metrics, and competitive CPC/CPM rates influence a brand’s willingness to experiment with challenger retail media networks, Jain told e4m that these elements are critical for encouraging experimentation. They simplify campaign management, enable agility, and allow brands to benchmark performance fairly against established players.
From a brand execution perspective, Agarwal emphasised that the availability of self-serve tools is crucial for experimentation. Advertising on commerce platforms was previously cumbersome, but self-serve options now allow brands to launch campaigns at any budget, large or small, providing flexibility and control. When pricing is competitive and reporting is standardised, brands are more willing to test new networks. Early experiments have shown that allocating even a portion of retail media budgets to challenger platforms can deliver meaningful incremental sales, although such cases remain limited.
Reality check for 2025 plans
Brands in India are increasingly looking to diversify their retail media spend and reduce costs, but in a market dominated by Amazon and Flipkart, certainty still drives allocation decisions. Amazon Ads India revenue surged to 8,342 crore in FY25, a 25% year-on-year increase, while Flipkart Ads has grown 600% since 2020, capturing a significant share of marketplace marketing budgets. Until challengers can match these giants on shopper intent, identity, and attribution, most retail media budgets will remain top-heavy.
While many new entrants are trying to add variety at the edges by offering niche audiences, alternative ad formats, and export-focussed solutions, However, breaking into the core of India’s retail media market requires domestic scale, robust attribution frameworks, and access to unique audiences that cannot be replicated elsewhere.
Experts point to several structural barriers for newer networks. Fragmented infrastructure, limited first-party data, and inconsistent measurement make it difficult for brands to validate ROI at the level provided by Amazon or Flipkart.
(Published in Exchange4media)
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September 15, 2025
Shabori Das & Sagar Malviya, Economic Times
15 September 2025
ITC Foods is making a strategic entry into fresh packaged foods including short shelf-life cookies, cakes, and chapatis, among others, part of its broader aim to ride the surge in quick commerce demand, said Hemant Malik, chief executive of the food division of ITC.
The move is also prompted by the cigarette-to-snack maker’s aim to capture India’s growing appetite for convenience-led, freshly-made food with shelf life of a few days, instead of 12-24 months for other food products, with quicker fulfilment systems.
“There is a growing consumer demand for fresh packaged food products, powered by enhanced accessibility and convenience provided by the surge in quick commerce platforms,” Malik told ET, adding that the company has extended its Sunfeast and and Aashirvaad brands into these categories.
ITC has created a hyper-local production and distribution ecosystem to enable next-day delivery from oven to doorstep in a country where supply chains are often fragmented and 75% of the sales are through local kiranas. The company said its small-batch model, scaled across urban micro-markets, will help maintain freshness while sidestepping the usual constraints of long-haul logistics and warehouse storage.
“We are leveraging tech-enabled capabilities, supply chain efficiencies including hyper-local agile production and rapid fulfilment together with focus on fresh sourcing,” Malik added.
Analysts however noted that relying solely on quick commerce won’t ensure scale while limited shelf life could require bigger retail channels including modern and general trade.
“These products will need to move fast. So inventory management in terms of space for quick commerce will be challenging,” said Devangshu Dutta, founder of retail consulting firm Third Eyesight. “And in case of quick commerce, it will need to have catchment focus as not every micromarket in a city will have demand for such products.”
“In the case of large FMCG companies, scalability is always what is needed, and quick commerce alone will not help with that. Eventually modern trade and general trade for these shorter shelf life products will be considered,” he said.
ITC’s packaged food business clocked ₹18,270 crore in gross sales during FY25, up 6% on-year.
Quick commerce platforms such as Blinkit, Swiggy Instamart, and Zepto have made it easier than ever to deliver ultra-fresh products within hours–and they have been tapped by local bakeries and direct-to-consumer companies including Theobroma, Baker’s Dozen, and Id Fresh.
Over the past few months, mainstream companies including Hindustan Unilever, Marico, Adani Wilmar and Parle have carved out separate sales and distribution teams for quick commerce, responding to the need for a faster turnaround in stocking as well as a distinct portfolio for the segment.
(Published in Economic Times)
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September 5, 2025
Pooja Yadav, Exchange4Media
4 September 2025
Quick commerce today is no longer just about delivering groceries in 10 minutes. It has emerged as one of India’s most coveted retail media channels, where brands are willing to pay a steep premium for visibility.
If FY25 was about building scale, FY26 is definitely shaping up to be about pricing power. With consumer adoption of 10–20-minute delivery apps surging, advertisers are competing for limited inventory, pushing ad rates up by 30–50% year-on-year.
“Ad rates on quick commerce platforms have surged by 30–40% year-onyear, especially during high-impact windows like festive seasons and major cricket events. This is fuelled by rising user engagement and proven performance outcomes. With more sophisticated ad formats and attribution models now in play, advertisers increasingly view the premium as justified,” added Uday Mohan, COO, Havas Media India & Havas Play.
Scale, Pricing & Soaring Ad Rates
While agencies point to surging demand, market data shows that platforms themselves are firming up monetisation models with steep onboarding thresholds.
As per market estimations, Swiggy Instamart offers tiered onboarding packages ranging from ₹4.5 lakh to ₹10 lakh, adjustable against advertising spends over a three-month period. Zepto reportedly asks new or small brands to commit anywhere between ₹2 lakh and ₹7 lakh per month on ads, depending on the category. Blinkit, on the other hand, charges ₹25,000 per SKU per state as a non-refundable onboarding fee, which is credited to the brand’s ad wallet.
This aggressive push comes against the backdrop of a sector that has grown at breakneck speed. According to CareEdge Analytics’ July 2025 data, India’s quick commerce market was valued at around ₹64,000 crore in FY25, growing at a staggering 142% CAGR during FY22–FY25 on the back of evolving consumer preferences, hyperlocal infrastructure, and a low base.
The momentum is expected to continue with strong double-digit growth over the next few years, as adoption deepens in Tier II & III cities, delivery networks expand, and instant fulfilment becomes mainstream.
At the same time, platforms are pivoting from pure hypergrowth to sustainable profitability—tapping into advertising, subscriptions, private labels and tech-led inventory optimization as key revenue levers. This shift is being enabled by India’s expanding digital backbone: with over 1.12 billion mobile connections and 806 million internet users (a 6.5% YoY rise), the country is projected to cross 900 million internet users by the end of 2025. Rising smartphone penetration in both urban and rural areas, aided by affordable data and policy support, has created one of the world’s largest online consumer pools, with 270 million e-shoppers in 2024, making India the second-largest e-retail market globally.
Unsurprisingly, advertisers are flocking to these platforms because that’s where their consumers are. Even though seller commissions contribute the bulk of revenues (68–74%), ad placements and brand boosts already account for 9–11%. Industry data shows that ad rates on quick commerce apps have climbed by 30–50% in just a year, with premiums doubling during high-impact windows like festivals and cricket tournaments. This steep inflation reflects both rising consumer traffic and the limited nature of in-app inventory, pushing brands to pay top dollar for guaranteed visibility at the point of purchase.
Bain’s ‘How India Shops Online 2025’ report also underscores this momentum: beauty, personal care, and snacking categories are already outpacing overall e-retail growth, and these are the very segments leaning most aggressively into quick commerce ads.
“Ad rates on quick commerce platforms have jumped by nearly 40–50% compared to last year. This spike reflects that premium brands are willing to pay for immediacy and guaranteed visibility, where ad placement directly links to instant purchase behaviour,” said Mandar Lande, founder of Waayu, a zero-commission food delivery app in India.
According to Aditya Aima, Managing Director, Growth Markets; Co-MD, India & MENA, AnyMind Group, ad rates on quick commerce platforms have not only risen but demand has intensified. “The surge is fuelled by three dynamics: sticky consumer behavior with high visit frequency, dense purchase intent compared to social or entertainment platforms, and the scarcity of ad real estate.”
Quick commerce becomes a strategic channel
For brands, quick commerce has moved far beyond being a fulfillment partner. It has become a strategic advertising channel, especially for those in fast-moving and competitive categories like beauty, wellness, snacks, and personal care. The platforms offer not just last-mile delivery but also front-of-shelf visibility in an increasingly cluttered digital environment.
According to Seshu Kumar Tirumala, Chief Buying and Merchandising Officer, bigbasket, “Brands are moving beyond purely search-centric strategies and increasingly adopting immersive display activations with formats like Spotlight Videos, Banners with Add-to-Cart (ATC), targeted banners, and ATC widgets. For established brands, most investments still flow into performance-led formats such as Sponsored/PLA ads, while a portion is reserved for top-funnel initiatives like storytelling, new launches, and high-visibility events. Emerging or smaller brands usually begin with awareness and consideration campaigns before shifting focus toward performance once they’ve built stronger customer connections.” Unlike marketplaces or social media, quick commerce blends data-led targeting, high engagement, and measurable ROI.
Many brands pair Q-comm placements with collab ads on Meta, Google, and Criteo to build visibility while keeping consumers engaged across the funnel. This creates a sharper, closed-loop system where awareness, consideration, and conversion happen almost instantly. “D2C brands have been rapidly scaling up ad spends on quick commerce platforms, up to 40–50% year-on-year, with a significant share during the festive season. Among the key reasons are fast-growing adoption of Qcomm by consumers and better ROI than marketplaces,” said Shrikant Shenoy, AVP at Lodestar UM.
What sets this instant delivery model apart is its ability to compress the purchase journey. Marketplaces drive comparisons, and social platforms spark discovery, but Q-comm taps into impulse buying with SKU-level attribution.
“The quick delivery model encourages impulse purchases and immediate gratification shopping, which is particularly valuable for D2C brands. Qcomm platforms have lower competition density, and ad formats are more native and less cluttered than traditional e-commerce,” said Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight.
“When someone opens Blinkit or Zepto, they’re usually in active purchase mode, not just browsing. For consumables, personal care, or lifestyle products, this is the sweet spot of marketing,” Dutta noted.
“Ad rates on quick commerce have gone up by more than 20% in the last year. If you want a prime slot, say a homepage banner in a big city, you might even be paying 50% more than last year. Because every brand wants it. When a Blinkit or Swiggy placement can move your product in minutes, not weeks, those ads aren’t just distribution, they are discovery,” said Mohit Singh, Head of Product at Zippee, a quick commerce logistics platform.
Meanwhile, pricing pressures are only going up. Ratnakar Bharti, VP, Media, Mudramax said, “Quick commerce isn’t just ‘fast delivery’ anymore, it has become high-intent retail media sitting right next to the ‘add to cart’ button, with sales that can be measured in real time. Quick commerce platforms say their ads business grew 5X in a year to about $200M ARR. At that kind of scale, inventory quality improves, targeting gets sharper, and the medium starts looking like the next big retail media play.”
“In a nutshell, expect meaningfully higher prices in peak weeks — often up to 2x — and a higher year-round floor price due to steeper minimums and fees. The trade-off is harder proof of sales at the exact SKU, which is why demand and prices are rising,” Bharti added.
“Brands pay a premium for Q-Comm because it drives sales at the point of purchase. What began as experimental spends has now become a steady line item in media plans, thanks to strong ROI and proven results,” added Jatin Kapoor, MD, AdsFlourish.
Beauty, beverages & snacking lead the charge
Notably, not all categories are leaning on quick commerce equally. Industry executives point out that beauty & personal care, beverages, snacking, and wellness are the biggest spenders, given their high repeatability, impulse-driven nature, and urban skew.
Beauty and personal care brands, for instance, are using Q-comm not just to drive trial packs and quick replenishment, but also to run festival-led campaigns targeting affluent millennials. Similarly, beverages and packaged snacks are thriving on the “in-the-moment” consumption occasions that these apps uniquely enable.
“The biggest spenders are beverages, beauty, packaged foods, and wellness. Those categories thrive on impulse and repeat consumption, which is exactly what quick commerce delivers best,” Singh added. As per many industry experts, wellness and lifestyle brands, too, are seeing outsized returns. From daily supplements to discreet personal care items, quick commerce is proving to be a low-friction purchase environment with high conversion rates.
“Quick commerce platforms have lower competition density, and ad formats are more native and less cluttered than traditional e-commerce,” explained Dutta.
Media buyers also note that Q-comm platforms are evolving fast, offering more contextual in-app placements and data-driven targeting. This is creating a level playing field for challenger brands that lack legacy shelf space in offline retail.
“Quick commerce advertising is inherently contextual. A beverage or snack brand running an IPL campaign is literally tapping into the consumer’s 15-minute window of intent, it’s that instant,” added Mohan.
With ad rates on quick commerce platforms climbing 30–50% year-on-year, it’s clear the medium is shifting from experimental budgets to a core retail media channel. However, with competition heating up, festive weeks commanding 2X pricing, and minimum spends rising, the question is: how long before quick commerce ads start resembling the crowded, high-cost landscape of traditional e-commerce marketplaces?
(Published in Exchange4Media)
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August 18, 2025
Hiral Goyal, The Morning Context
18 August 2025
A trend that has been playing out through big and small changes over the last two decades is that in urban India the kirana store is easily replaceable.
When it comes to buying groceries, urban Indians have a number of options. They can visit a fancy supermarket run by a conglomerate or order online through a number of e-commerce and instant-delivery companies. And if the above doesn’t seem easy enough, they can hop over to a nearby mom-and-pop store.
It would appear it is now the turn of smaller towns in the country to witness the kirana disruption. Even though 99% of grocery shopping in these tier-3 cities is done through neighborhood general stores, there are startups that believe this is an outdated and inefficient form of retail and a change is in order.
One such company is SuperK. The startup’s mission is to build a grocery store model in small towns that has all of the advantages of modern retail packed in a compact 800-square-foot store. This is what Anil Thontepu and Neeraj Menta had set out to do when they founded the company in 2019. The idea was to bring a modern trade-like grocery shopping experience to small-town India a wide assortment of products at a better value.
“There is a cost-efficient world of general trade and a customer-loving world of modern retail,” says Thontepu. “We wanted to see if we can bridge this gap…and do something for the small-town people by bringing the best of both these worlds.”
Over the past five years, the Bengaluru-headquartered startup has opened over 130 stores across 80 towns in Andhra Pradesh. And it doesn’t want to stop there. The company wants to expand to another 300 towns in Andhra Pradesh and nearby states of Karnataka and Telangana over the next 24, months. That’s quite an ambitious target. But the founders believe the market size for Superk is so large that they should be able to build a Rs 2,000-3,000 стоore ($228-342 million) annual business from Andhra and Telangana alone.
To fuel this expansion, Superk raised Rs 100 crore ($11.7 million) in Series B funding last month. The round, led by Binny Bansal’s 3STATE Ventures and CaratLane founder Mithun Sacheti, valued Superk at 2-2.5x its previous valuation of Rs 160 crore (about $18.25 million) in 202/
Now, Superk is not entirely unique. It competes with startups like Frendy, Apna Mart and Wheelocity, which are also trying to organize the retail market in India’s smaller towns. What sets SuperK apart is its larger, bolder approach. Grocery chain Apna Mart, for instance, runs franchisee stores in tier-2 or tier-3 markets and also offers 15-minute home delivery, SuperK’s focus is only on supermarkets. Frendy operates mini-marts and micro-kiranas in villages and towns with fewer than 10,000 people, but SuperK targets small towns with populations between 20,000 and 500,000. And Wheelocity supplies only fresh produce to rural areas, while Superk sells dry groceries as well as packaged consumer goods.
This rather radical shift in focus-away from tier-1 and tier-2 cities-ties in with India’s changing consumption pattern. “Consumer mindsets are changing even in smaller cities,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder and chief executive of Third Eyesight, adding that these consumers are beginning to favour more modern retail environments. And NielsenIQ’s latest report says rural markets in India grew twice as fast as cities between April and June 2025.
In this landscape, SuperK fits like a glove, with its franchise-first approach. Thanks to an asset-light model, the company has the agility to go deeper into smaller towns.
But it won’t be all that easy either. As Dutta says, “Changing grocery habits is a long, capital-intensive game.” Moreover, big retail chains are also jumping on the bandwagon. Hypermarket chain Vishal Mega Mart, for instance, already operates 47% of its stores in tier-3 cities and plans to expand into cities with populations exceeding 50,000. Supermarket chain operator DMart is also focusing on tier-2 and tier-3 cities.
However, Superk founders believe they are prepared for the challenge. Menta says the startup has arrived at a business model that is scalable, sustainable and, more importantly, offers value to its customers.
It’s too early to say whether they will be successful in this endeavour. That said, SuperK appears to have built a smart retail business for small-town India.
Refining small-town retail
SuperK’s founders have drawn inspiration from domestic and international retail chains like DMart and Costco. But they haven’t duplicated their strategies and made their own tweaks instead. For instance, large retail chains usually run company-owned and company operated, or COCO, stores. Though this approach is more cost-intensive than the franchise model, it allows a company to ensure a uniform customer experience across all outlets:
Superk doesn’t do that. It runs only franchise-owned and franchise-operated (FOFO) stores, which are no bigger than 800 sq ft. The company is not the first to have experimented with this model, but Thontepu believes that everyone else before them “did not try with the right spirit”. A franchise-owned store, argues co-founder Menta, is run differently from a company-owned store one has to keep in mind the store owner’s incentives, needs and concerns.
Under the franchise model, entrepreneurs invest between Rs 12 lakh (about $13,690) and Rs 15 lakh (about $17,110) to set up a Superk store. Of this, Rs 4 lakh (nearly $4,560) is spent on the store fit-out and infrastructure, the rest goes towards buying inventory. These stores, according to Menta, typically achieve a breakeven point after six months. On average, a retail store takes longer than that-12-15 months to reach breakeven.
Superk fills the shelves by procuring its inventory directly from brands as well as distributors. “The inventory is recommended by us through a mobile application. Store owners have an option to make certain changes within the limits that we have set for them,” says Thontepu. Revenue is shared and the model is similar to the one followed by nearly all retailers in India. Franchisees earn varying levels of margins on different kinds of products, depending on how easy or tough it is to sell those items. For instance, staples like dal and rice have lower margins, while confectionary items and products that need greater effort to sell enjoy higher margins of up to 20%.
In addition to this, there’s a private label business, especially loose items like pulses. In fact, private labelling is part of the company’s efforts to bring some standardization in India’s unorganized retail market. “A customer coming to our store should be able to blindly expect consistent quality on the product they’re buying,” says Menta. “We have organized our sourcing, processing, cleaning, packaging, testing. Everything that a brand would do to provide a great-quality product to their customer.”
Unlike distributors or other retailers who operate franchise models though, Superk claims that it does not dump its inventory on store owners. Menta says the franchise structure is designed in a way that Superk does not benefit from selling unnecessary stock to store owners. “If I lose, he will lose. If he loses, I lose. That is the way (the structure) is created. We, in fact, recommend owners to remove some products if they are not selling.” says Menta.
On the customer side of things, Superk’s value proposition comes down to offering the best prices. More than a year ago, for instance, it introduced a membership programme that offers customers cashback that is redeemable on their future purchases. “If they pay Rs 300 [approximately $3.5) for a six-month membership, they get 10% cashback on all purchases that they are making up to Rs 300 every month,” explains Thontepu. He says 35-40% of Superk’s more than 500,000 customers are enrolled in this programme.
All of this sounds good even promising in theory. But will it be enough to build a sustainable and scalable retail business?
A long, hard look
Let’s first look at what really works in SuperK’s favour.
One, the focus on selling staples under a private label brand. This has been done successfully before. One example is Nilgiri’s, one of India’s oldest supermarket chains.
Founded in 1905, Niligiri’s operated under a franchise model and sold dairy, baked goods, chocolates and other items produced under its own brand. The supermarket chain was sold by debt-ridden Future Group for Rs 67 crore ($7.65 million) in 2023, less than one-third the price the latter paid to acquire the company from private equity firm Actis in 2014. However, its history is worth learning from.
Shomik Mukherjee, a Delhi-based consumer goods advisor who was a partner at Actis while the firm was in control of Nilgiri’s, recalls the value proposition created by Nilgiri’s private label products. “In the case of private labels, it is essential for a company to have a reason why people will walk into that store. For Nilgiri’s, it was bakery and dairy products,” says Mukherjee. Owning a private label that brought in customers also ensured that franchisee owners had incentives to continue working with Nilgiri’s. “It is about giving the franchisees a safe portfolio of private label goods that are desired by customer instead of something that is shoved down the franchisees’ throat to derive margin,” he says.
You see, the overall grocery business operates on a very low margin. But private labelling, says Satish Meena, founder of Datum Intelligence, offers the highest margins – 35-40% – in the grocery business, after fresh produce, making it a lucrative business to get into.
Superk, which sells essential items through its private label, has the opportunity to earn better margins in grocery retail. More importantly, private labelling holds the potential to become SuperK’s identity and boost customer retention and loyalty.
Two, SuperK’s franchise model allows it to expand to more locations rapidly as compared to a regular modern trade chain with company-owned stores, says Mukherjee. This model makes SuperK’s business asset-light and brings down the cost of running a network of stores. “Under this model, the franchisor does not incur the upfront cost of opening a store or having to deal with the trouble of hiring and replacing store managers,” he adds. Since most store owners in a franchise model are landowners, there is a greater stability in operations as well, he explains. Moreover, Superk stores are quite small (800 sq ft), allowing easier availability of property.
The franchise model, however, is not entirely foolproof. One of the inherent problems is the difficulty in implementing standard operating procedures (SOPs) across all stores. And the problem only worsens as the company expands operations to different cities. While Superk stores boast a no-frills fit-out that can be easily set up anywhere, how these stores are maintained through the wear and tear over the years is yet to be seen.
A bigger fear is that the store owner may start running their own store without the Superk branding. “If Superk loses the franchisee owner, it also loses the location in which the store was operating,” says Mukherjee.
Moreover, most franchisee owners in the retail business typically tend to be experienced general store owners who might not be willing to adopt new technology. “Since they have run a store before, they think they know how and what to order for inventory and may not follow SuperK’s tech-enabled recommendations,” says Mukherjee.
There’s another problem. While the founders claim to have seen considerable success (35-40% sign-ups) in the rollout of SuperK’s membership programme for customers, Third Eyesight’s Dutta raises concerns about its future growth. “Indian consumers’ price sensitivity limits membership fee potential,” he says. According to him, the programme’s value in the tier-3 market lies more in customer acquisition and retention than direct revenue generation. “Long-term success requires a cashback programme to drive purchase frequency and basket size increases to offset the costs,” says Dutta.
Menta, however, has a different view. He says SuperK’s subscription is designed in a way that benefits customers only when they make full basket purchases. Moreover, the company has different pricing slabs for membership depending on the various basket sizes, which makes the model more viable. Considering the programme is a little more than a year old, it is still too early to judge whether it will find a lot of takers in small towns.
For now, the founders are in no hurry to expand their business across India. “There is no reason to go into five states. Then, you are spread thin and your economics will not work out. It’s a business of managing operations at a very low cost,” says Menta. The plan is to stick to one region and continue to go deeper into it. “A lot of our competitors who started five years ago spread to so many places that it became very difficult for them to manage,” he adds.
This is also the crux of how Thontepu and Menta are building SuperK. By implementing what they have learnt not only from their own experiments, but also from the failures and successes of other businesses. While there’s no guarantee that Superk will become a roaring success, it does appear to have set an example by starting small and growing patiently. And if the latest funding is any proof, investors are interested.
(With inputs from Neethi Lisa Rojan)
(Published in The Morning Context)
admin
August 6, 2025
Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025
It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.
Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.
That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.
Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.
In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.
He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”
Where The Model Broke?
In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”
But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.
And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.
As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.
In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.
In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.
Scaling Without Steering
In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.
For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.
Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.
Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.
The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.
(Published in Forbes India)
