Quick fashion delivery startups lean on AI, try-and-buy to cut costly returns

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July 27, 2025

Alenjith K Johny & Ajay Rag, Economic Times
Jul 27, 2025

Startups in the 60-minute fashion delivery segment are betting on features such as ‘try and buy’ and artificial intelligence (AI)-powered virtual try-ons to tackle high return rates, a key pain point in the segment. These tools are helping increase conversion rates and reduce returns while offering greater flexibility to buyers, said industry executives.

Mumbai-based Knot, which recently raised funding from venture capital firm Kae Capital, said partner brands that typically see return rates of about 20% on their direct-to-consumer websites are witnessing sub-1% returns through offline stores, a trend it is now replicating through these digital features.

“Our partner brands, which have offline stores, would typically witness 20% returns on their direct to consumer websites. But for the same purchases on offline stores, the returns are less than 1%. That is the idea. With the ‘try and buy’ feature, users can make a very decisive purchase at their doorstep,” Archit Nanda, CEO of Knot, told ET.

Return rates among users of the company’s virtual try-on feature are similarly much lower than the platform’s overall user base, he said.

Other venture-backed quick fashion delivery startups such as Bengaluru-based Slikk, Mumbai-based Zilo and Gurugram-based Zulu Club are also testing similar features to increase conversions and reduce returns.

“Returns play as big a part as maybe forward delivery does. Because these are expensive products, giving the customer his or her money back also plays a very critical role,” said Akshay Gulati, cofounder and CEO of Slikk.

Instant returns

Slikk is piloting an ‘instant returns’ feature where, like its 60-minute delivery service, returns are also completed within an hour. Once a return request is made on the app, a delivery partner picks up the product and refunds the amount instantly. The startup claims its return rate is 40-50% lower than that of traditional marketplaces and that it doesn’t charge customers any extra fees for returns.

Some users said they were satisfied with the delivery speed and trial window but pointed out that the app does not provide any return status updates until the product reaches the warehouse.

“I received my order within 60 minutes and had enough time to try it out. However, after returning the product, I didn’t receive any notification in the application until the delivery agent reached the warehouse,” said Mohammed Shibili, a working professional based in Bengaluru, who tried Slikk’s feature.

Investor interest

Investors tracking the segment estimate that try-and-buy and virtual try-on features can reduce return rates by 15-20 percentage points, translating into substantial cost savings for both platforms and brands.

“Features like try and buy are a huge cost save, not just for the platform but also for the brand. The brand otherwise would lose that inventory till it comes back and can’t make the sale on it. But now, that’s all getting quickly turned around. So, for the brand, it’s a win-win situation as well as for the customer where the money is not getting stuck till it gets the returns refunded,” said Sunitha Viswanathan, partner at Kae Capital.

Old model, new infrastructure

Flipkart-owned fashion etailer Myntra had introduced try and buy back in 2016 to attract traditional shoppers to online retail. However, the feature didn’t scale up due to supply chain limitations, according to industry executives.

“Back when Myntra launched ‘try and buy’, there was no hyperlocal delivery infrastructure. Deliveries were through national courier services. That model isn’t feasible to try and buy unless you have your own hyperlocal delivery fleet,” the founder of a fashion delivery startup said on condition of anonymity.

The founder added that while Myntra operated from large warehouses located on the outskirts of cities, the new-age supply chains are built within cities, allowing faster deliveries and enabling features like try and buy.

By the end of last year, Myntra had launched M-Now, an ultra-fast delivery service currently live in Bengaluru, Mumbai and Delhi, with pilots in other cities. The company said daily orders through M-Now doubled in the last quarter.

“Although it’s still early, our observations so far suggest that the quick delivery model, with its reduced wait time, attracts high-intent customers, leading to naturally lower return rates,” said a spokesperson for Myntra.

The etailer did not confirm whether the try-and-buy feature is being tested under M-Now.

Viability concerns persist

Despite the benefits, the long-term viability of these features is open to question, experts said.

“There is a cost to also providing these services (like try and buy), and whether that becomes viable at all is a question mark at this point of time. I think that’s what the concern is, and it has not been that viable,” said Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a management consulting firm focused on consumer goods and retail industries.

He added that when platforms offer the try-and-buy feature, delivery executives have to wait while customers try on products, which increases the cost per delivery and reduces the number of deliveries that can be completed. Despite that, some items may still be returned, further impacting operational efficiency.

However, startups are experimenting with these features mainly on higher-margin products to offset operational costs, Dutta said, as return rates across fashion categories can range from under 10% to as high as 40% for certain items.

(Published in Economic Times)

Shiprocket Unveils Shunya AI: What The E-Commerce AI Shift Means for MSMEs

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July 16, 2025

Prabhanu Kumar Das, Medianama
16 July 2025

E-commerce logistics platform Shiprocket announced the launch of Shunya.ai, a sovereign AI model developed in India to support the country’s Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), on July 11. The company claims that it is India’s first multimodal AI stack, built in partnership with US-based Ultrasafe Inc.

This announcement comes at the heels of Shiprocket filing a confidential draft red herring prospectus (DHRP) with the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in May 2025 for their Initial Public Offering (IPO). The company is expected to raise around Rs 2500 crore in its IPO.
What does the AI model offer?

As per Shiprocket’s website, Shunya.ai is built on a freemium model, with unlimited access priced at Rs 499 a month for MSMEs. It is directly integrated into the Shiprocket platform and offers AI agents across multiple languages. According to the company, the agents can perform the following tasks:

  1. Catalogue management and creation: It automates the creation and management of catalogues, and enables product listings in multiple languages.
  2. Ad campaign creation: It can assist in generating marketing campaigns in multiple languages as well as in creating the advertising content.
  3. Automated customer support: Offers AI chatbots for customer support.
  4. Streamlining delivery and logistics: The model can find the most efficient and affordable methods for delivery, as well as tracking orders.

Shiprocket CEO Saahil Goel stated, “We’ve adapted Shunya.ai from the ground up for Indian languages, commerce workflows, and MSME needs. By embedding it directly into our platform, we’re giving over 1,50,000 sellers instant access to tools that are intelligent, local, and scalable, levelling the playing field for businesses across Bharat.” Notably, Larsen and Toubro’s AI cloud arm, Cloudfiniti is reportedly providing the underlying GPU infrastructure, ensuring that all data processing and storage remains within India.

This AI model does offer multiple benefits but it will not level the playing field against big players, as per Devangshu Dutta who is the founder of specialist consulting firm, Third Eyesight.

“While Shunya AI can help small businesses compete better, it won’t completely level the playing field. Large companies still have greater organisational capacity and capability to respond to the insights offered, including more data and bigger budgets. The real benefit for small businesses is improving how they work and serve customers within their current markets, rather than suddenly competing with giants,” Dutta said.

The E-Commerce AI Pivot

This is not the first time that an Indian e-commerce platform has unveiled a B2B AI service through its existing platform. Zepto recently launched Zepto Atom in May 2025, a real-time tool that offers consumer brands available on the platform minute-level updates, PIN-code level performance maps, and Zepto GPT, a Natural Language Processing (NLP) assistant trained on internal data that brands can query about their stock keeping units (SKUs) and performance data.

Zomato and its e-commerce arm Blinkit have also been growing their AI capabilities. Analytics India Magazine previously reported that the company’s generative AI team has grown from 3 to 20 engineers in the time-span of a year. Zomato introduced a personalised AI food assistant for users, and also uses AI in its backend to optimise delivery times and improve consumer support. Blinkit also released the Recipe Rover AI in May 2023, an AI assistant for recipes.

Other companies like Swiggy with ‘What to Eat’ AI, Myntra’s MyFashionGPT AI shopping assistant, and Amazon’s Rufus have also adopted AI assistants on their platform as a tool for the consumer.

The issue of merchant stickiness

Dutta asserts that this shift means platforms like Zepto and Shiprocket are changing from being service providers to becoming data intelligence companies. They are generating, or are in the process of generating revenue through transactional data that flows through the company.

“While this can create better insights and automation for merchants on these platforms, it also could make the merchants more dependent on the platforms. Once a merchant builds its operations around a platform’s specific AI tools and insights, it becomes much harder to switch to a competitor – creating stronger merchant stickiness. We already see this in infrastructure and core services such as banking and financial services, enterprise cloud services, building management etc. and the same is likely to happen in AI-enabled process management”, he said.

Why this matters

As Shiprocket is preparing for an IPO, Shunya.ai becomes another means to generate revenue for the company. This app can extend Shiprocket’s reach to local physical stores and MSMEs, by offering them the opportunity to provide the same experiences and support to the consumer that larger retailers and e-commerce platforms do, while automating delivery automation, cataloguing, and customer support.

Furthermore, the launch of this model is also part of the larger trend of AI integration and automation, both within e-commerce platforms for their consumers and within the back-end for optimisation.

Competition in these sectors and merchant stickiness may also become an issue, as businesses hosted on these e-commerce services may become reliant on specific AI tools and their outputs.

Questions of data privacy are also important when it comes to service companies moving towards data intelligence: How do these AI models gather and use data? The consent of end-consumers in these B2B models, data storage, and security are all issues that need to be studied as e-commerce and retails pivots towards AI.

Some Unanswered Questions

MediaNama has reached out to Shiprocket with the following questions and will update the article when we receive a response.

  1. How does Shunya AI differentiate itself from other global or domestic AI tools being used in the logistics and e-commerce sectors such as Zepto Atom or Shopify Magic?
  2. What data is Shunya AI trained on? Is the training dataset sourced exclusively from Shiprocket’s operations, or are third-party data streams also used?
  3. What data will Shunya AI’s marketing campaign models access? How will it ensure privacy and data protection of the end consumer of the business who is using these models?
  4. How does Shiprocket ensure compliance with Indian data protection laws, especially given the scale of customer and seller data being used?

(Published in Medianama)

Amazon Arrives Late, But Can It Upset the Quick Commerce Apple Cart for Front-Runners?

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July 10, 2025

Alka Jain, Outlook Business
10 July 2025

Just when Blinkit, Instamart and Zepto were slowing down in their quick commerce game, Amazon’s entry may spur them towards a more aggressive race. The ecommerce giant has begun offering deliveries in as little as ten minutes in Delhi after Bengaluru, under the name ‘Amazon Now’.

“We are excited with the initial customer response and positive feedback, especially from Prime members. Based on this, we are now expanding the service over the next few months addressing immediate customer needs while maintaining Amazon’s standards for safety, quality and reliability,” the company said in an official statement.

Till now, the company was moving at its own pace with the idea that Indian consumers would wait a day or two for their deliveries. But the game has changed now—convenience is king here. Online shoppers want everything from milk to mobile chargers within a few minutes at their doorsteps.

And the big three of the quick commerce market—Blinkit, Instamart, Zepto—have cracked the consumer code perfectly. This trend has nudged Amazon and Flipkart to enter the 10-minute delivery segment. It started as an experiment in the larger ecommerce sector but has now become a necessity for online retailers.

Kathryn McLay, chief executive of Walmart International—an American multinational retail corporation—revealed that quick commerce now accounts for 20% of India’s ecommerce market and is growing at a rate of 50% annually. According to a Morgan Stanley report, the market is expected to reach $57bn by 2030.

Hence, Amazon could not afford to stay on the sidelines. The company has already pumped $11bn into Indian market since 2013 and recently announced another $233mn to upgrade its infrastructure and speed up deliveries. In addition, it has also opened five fulfilment centres across the country.

Despite continued investment, there are doubts if Amazon can disrupt the quick commerce game. Industry experts state that the ecommerce major’s late entry could upend the fragile unit economics of the space. It can even reignite discount wars and increase burn rate (a company spending its cash reserve while going through loss) for the incumbents, once the ecommerce giants begin to exert pressure and begin to capture market share.

Open Market, Thin Margins

Given the growth momentum and market size, quick commerce start-up Kiko.live cofounder Alok Chawla believes that there is definitely headroom to accommodate another player in the quick commerce market. However, margins may remain negative for a couple of years due to high business and delivery costs.

As per data, the average order value of ₹350–₹400 yields a gross margin of approximately 20% but high fulfilment and delivery costs (₹50–₹60 per order) significantly reduce overall profitability, often cancelling out most of the gains.

“Indian customers will not be willing to pay high shipping charges for convenience. But the market will continue to grow due to cart subsidies and shipping discounts. On top of this, profitability also remains quite some time away,” he says.

Even a survey by Grant Thornton Bharat, a professional services firm, shows that 81% of Indian quick commerce users cite discounts and offers as one of the main reasons they shop on platforms like Blinkit and Instamart.

But the fact is Amazon has extremely deep pockets, which means, the trio will once again have to get into aggressive discounting to protect their turf, said Chawla, indicating the possibility of higher cash burn quarters ahead.

In February, reports revealed that Indian quick commerce companies, including new entrants, were burning cash to the tune of ₹1,300–₹1,500 crore on a monthly basis. But a few months later, Aadit Palicha, chief executive of Zepto, a fast-growing 10-minute delivery platform, claimed that the company had slashed its operating cash burn by 50% in the previous quarter.

Still, the path to profitability remains shaky. Though Amazon can get an advantage of its existing huge customer base that is habitual of making online purchases including those in similar categories.

The real challenge lies beneath the surface because ecommerce and quick commerce operate on fundamentally different engines.

E-Comm vs Q-Comm: A Different Game

It may seem like a simple extension of what Amazon already does: deliver products. But in practice, the logistics, timelines and cost structures behind traditional ecommerce and quick commerce are different, said Somdutta Singh, founder and chief executive of Assiduus Global, a cross-border ecommerce accelerator that helps brands scale on global marketplaces through end-to-end solutions.

She explains the difference using a hypothetical situation: let’s say you order a phone case in Mumbai, which is picked from a nearby fulfilment centre. It will be added to a pre-routed delivery run with 30-50 other stops. This batching on the basis of route optimisation, keeps last-mile costs low, somewhere around ₹40–₹80.

But if you order the same item in a smaller town like Alleppey, it may first travel mid-mile from a hub in Cochin, then be handed off to a local partner like India Post. This increases the delivery time but keeps costs manageable through scale and planned routing.

This setup suits well in ecommerce business, which is built for reach and variety, not for speed. However, quick commerce runs on a completely different playbook because speed becomes priority here.

For instance, you order a pack of chips and a cold drink via Zepto in Andheri. These items are already stocked in a dark store within one to two kilometers of your home. The moment you place the order; someone picks it off the shelf. A rider is dispatched almost immediately and heads directly to your address.

There is no mid-mile movement, no routing logic and no batching. Each trip is a solo run. Delivery often happens within 10 to 15 minutes. This kind of speed relies on a dense network of local stores and a steady flow of short-range riders. But it also means higher costs.

“With no bundling of orders and lower average cart sizes, usually ₹250 to ₹300, the delivery cost per order can shoot up to ₹60 to ₹120. That is a heavy operational burden. Unlike traditional ecommerce, where cost efficiency scales with distance and order volume, quick commerce is constrained by geography and time pressure,” she explains.

So, it becomes more than just a category expansion for e-commerce platforms like Amazon and Flipkart. It marks a pivot in their “logistics thinking” and signals a broader shift in entry strategies. What once worked must now be retooled for hyperlocal and real-time operations.

Speed over Scale Not Easy

There are multiple challenges ahead for Amazon to make its presence felt and stay competitive in the quick commerce space. Firstly, it must build an operations and logistics layer that enables sub-15-minute deliveries, along with a technology stack to support it, according to Mit Desai, practice member at Praxis Global Alliance, a management consulting firm.

Second, it needs to build a dark store network to succeed in the space which is crucial to meet the 10-15 minutes delivery promise. Experts believe that a hybrid model will be the most successful in India—a mix of micro warehouses, partner stores and dark stores.

Desai states that Amazon’s existing capabilities can give it a base to build on, but it would also have to account for complexities and differences that come with the quick commerce business.

“For Amazon, the challenge will be operations. Can they build 700+ dark stores? Can they go hyperlocal? Can they navigate the chaos of Gurugram rain, Bengaluru traffic or the lanes of Dadar?” wonders Madhav Kasturia, founder and chief executive of Zippee, a quick commerce fulfilment start-up focused on hyperlocal deliveries and dark store management.

Another challenge can be repeat, loyal customers. As of now, customers check prices across platforms, and order where prices are the lowest. So, Amazon will have to spend heavily on discounts to gain market share. Chawla says retention will remain a problem because Zepto’s growth has also slowed down after a reduction in discounting burn.

However, Singh highlights that Amazon may not roll out everything in one shot. “We will likely see small-scale pilots, co-branded dark stores, local partnerships, new rider networks, tested in top cities before any nationwide push. They will also reveal whether it is viable to retrofit scale-driven e-commerce infrastructure into something that runs well in a hyperlocal loop,” she added.

Profitability Remains a Concern

While the quick commerce space is becoming increasingly dynamic with new entrants, the core question remains: is it a sustainable business model? The path to profitability is still fraught with operational complexity, margin constraints and uncertainty in consumer behaviour.

“Margins in quick commerce were never pretty to begin with,” says Kasturia. Yet he remains optimistic about the market because India’s grocery market is still largely untapped online.

As per data, India’s grocery and essentials market is over $600bn, of which online commerce is just three to four percent. Even quick commerce is sitting at ₹7,000–₹9,000 crore gross merchandise value today. So, the market isn’t crowded. It’s just early.

“We are barely scratching the surface,” he says, arguing that whoever wins customer behaviour, will lead the game. For example, in tier 1 cities, users no longer compare prices—they compare time.

For Amazon, this is both an opportunity and a constraint. Experts believe that the ecommerce giant can stand out by focusing on trust, hygiene and reliability—areas where existing players sometimes falter.

Kasturia says that the platform should not even chase everything, rather focus on profitable categories like fruits, dairy and personal care. “Build strong private labels. Nail density before geography and don’t discount blindly,” he adds.

The key is to build for reorders, not virality. That’s when customer acquisition cost (CAC) drops, margins compound and a player stops bleeding money per order. And to reduce the cost of dark stores, Chawla suggests an alternative route.

“Riding to neighbourhood stores for long-tail stock keeping unit can cut real estate and wastage costs,” he says, adding that it can decentralise inventory without owning all of it.

To follow this playbook, Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a management consulting and services firm, says that every player needs to invest hundreds of crores before the model begins to show surplus cash. It will demand multiple, interlocked shifts—in pricing strategy, tech backbone, category mix, and even brand positioning.

Amazon’s entry doesn’t merely add another contender in the 10-minute delivery race—it rewrites the playbook for every player. The real question now is: can the frontrunners hold their turf, or will Amazon’s scale and deep pockets tip the balance of power?

Amazon Hastening Deliveries in Competitive India

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July 1, 2025

Sankalp Phartiyal, Bloomberg
1 July 2025

Just last week, Amazon.com Inc.’s India unit announced the launch of five new fulfillment centers to speed up e-commerce deliveries across the South Asian country’s smaller towns and cities. The online shopping giant’s statement included the words fast, faster and fastest nine times. That’s because delivery speed has never mattered more in India than it does now.

Homegrown firms such as Eternal Ltd.’s Blinkit, Swiggy Ltd.’s Instamart and Zepto are now delivering everything from pricey herbal skincare to Bluetooth speakers in just 10 minutes, making Amazon’s overnight shipping look comparatively lethargic. With one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies and a swelling middle class that’s looking for instant gratification, India is growing ever more important — and demanding.

It’s no surprise that the as-yet-unprofitable Amazon India is investing another $233 million to boost its delivery network and infrastructure in the country this year. It’s already committed more than $11 billion in India, the bulk of which has gone toward building online retail from the ground up. Its upstart rivals, also in the red, are driving a behavioral shift and are quickly building up their order volumes to the point where they’ll be able to strike distribution deals with consumer brands at an Amazon-like scale. That’s the mood music I’m hearing from local investors and it’s why Amazon is actively trying to counteract these nascent fast-commerce players.

Take me as an example of changing habits. Last week, I found myself bereft of shaving supplies on the morning of a day that featured an important meeting. I ordered a razor, brush and shaving cream via Swiggy and they were with me within 10 minutes. That sort of convenience is (probably) why I neglected
to restock my bathroom cabinet in advance — I simply don’t need to spend time planning small purchases anymore.

What does this mean for Amazon? Well, beyond everyday conveniences, Amazon and Walmart Inc.’s Flipkart may also lose out on higher-ticket purchases such as smartphones and other consumer electronics. Why wait in line or for days for the latest iPhone if an army of scooter riders is ready to drop it off at your doorstep almost instantly? And, specific to Amazon, how compelling will Prime delivery be if there are superior alternatives?

The Seattle-based online retailer was once driven out of China by regulations promoting domestic names, “which had deep and patient capital, and strong capabilities,” said Devangshu Dutta, head of retail consultancy firm Third Eyesight. “Because of this, it becomes that much more important for Amazon to succeed in India, as it’s now the world’s largest market by users. The consumption numbers will also grow with time.”

It’s no overstatement to say that quick commerce could redefine online shopping for Indians, setting a precedent unique to the country. We’ve already seen that happen with UPI, the state-backed peer-to-peer digital payments system that’s outshined credit cards. The company that best adapts to and serves the demands of India’s growing online consumer base will command a share of a rapidly growing e-commerce arena that’s today worth $60 billion in gross merchandise value, according to Bain & Co.

Amazon’s already shifting gears in a highly visible way. Last month, it launched “Now,” a 10-minute delivery service, in some parts of the southern tech hub of Bangalore. That marks its experimental foray into quick commerce. The company is also taking baby steps to plug the money bleed, now charging all
online shoppers 5 rupees ($0.06) in marketplace fees. That’s negligible per transaction, but need I remind you that India is the world’s most populous country and hundreds of millions shop on Amazon?

Even while operating from a position of considerable strength, Amazon sees the rise of its more quick-witted rivals and the shift in consumer behavior, and it’s taking action. To avert those young companies building a comparable retail empire to its own, Amazon will have to show it still has the agility to outrace all comers.

–With assistance from Brunella Tipismana Urbano.

To view this story in Bloomberg click here:
https://blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories/SYPVYEDWLU68

How Zomato’s Opaque Ad Model Is Squeezing Small Restaurants’ Margins and Forcing Unsustainable Spending

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June 5, 2025

Aakriti Bansal, MediaNama
June 5, 2025

A restaurant owner recently took to X (formerly Twitter) to publicly slam Zomato for “mystery charges” and unauthorised ad placements, reigniting concerns over how the platform treats its small business partners. The tweet, accompanied by screenshots of the restaurant’s earnings dashboard, claimed that despite months of listings, his restaurant received zero payouts, and Zomato allegedly ran ads without his consent.

“Dear @zomato @deepigoyal I’m finally pulling my restaurant off your platform. Congrats! Your mystery service charges, surprise ad placements (without consent), and a POC who ghosts like it’s a talent show—truly inspiring. Small outlets deserve better,” restaurant owner Manish posted on X, under the username @maniyakiduniya.

Zomato responded: “We hear you! As mentioned earlier, please share your restaurant ID with us via DM, so that our team can get in touch with you.”

The post has struck a chord among restaurant owners who say Zomato’s ad model bleeds their business dry. In conversations with MediaNama over the week, two restaurant owners and a former manager with Zomato independently confirmed that the platform’s advertising system leaves little room for transparency, choice, or sustainable profit.

The names of the restaurant owners and the former Zomato manager have been withheld to protect their anonymity.

Forced Ad Spending and Diminishing Returns

Restaurant owners say visibility on Zomato is tightly tied to how much they spend on advertising.

“If you don’t run ads, your restaurant won’t even show up unless someone searches for you by name,” one owner told MediaNama. He further added, “From what I’ve seen, the top 10 restaurants you see when you open Zomato are all paying for that spot.”

Even ratings and reviews don’t help. For instance, if a user searches for ‘noodles’, only those who have paid for the ad category will show up in the list.

Restaurant owners explained how the ad budget starts small, around Rs. 300–400 per week, but grows rapidly. In one case, as seen by MediaNama in a restaurant’s ad dashboard, spending jumped from Rs. 9,000 to Rs. 15,000 per week in just two to three weeks.

“Some are spending Rs. 18,000 to Rs. 20,000 weekly now on ads just to stay afloat,” an owner explained, noting that these costs are hard to bear for restaurants with weekly sales as low as Rs. 2,500.

“When everyone is pushed to advertise just to stay visible, it raises serious questions about how fair the competition is on the platform,” they said. “It’s not about food quality or ratings anymore, it’s about who pays more,” they added.

A screenshot shared by a restaurant owner showing a decline in sales from ads, offers, and orders with applied discounts, highlighting concerns over the effectiveness of Zomato’s advertising model.
Click Charges with No Sales

Zomato charges restaurants based on clicks, not conversions. This means a restaurant is charged whenever a user taps on its listing after seeing a sponsored ad, regardless of whether the user places an order.

One owner explained, “A single click can cost around Rs. 6. Even if a customer just views the restaurant by clicking on it and doesn’t buy, that money is deducted.” He showed a dashboard with 4,877 clicks – most of which occurred before noon – but no conversions. “They exhaust our daily limit by 12 PM and then tell us to increase ad budgets,” he added.

Another restaurant owner echoed similar concerns in a Reddit conversation reviewed by MediaNama. The owner stated that Zomato counts a ‘visit’ even when a user scrolls past an ad and places an order a day later. “That is on purpose,” he wrote, calling the model “scammy for sure”. He also confirmed that restaurants receive no detailed data on who placed orders via ads versus organically.

Furthermore, the owner noted that Zomato lacks a clear grievance redressal mechanism for ad-related issues, as complaints are often ignored by a restaurant owner’s point of contact.

“There’s no formal audit or independent review if an ad campaign fails,” he said.

The Legal Escape Hatch: You Signed the Contract

Restaurant owners say Zomato deducts ad spends automatically, citing terms buried in the onboarding agreement – terms many admit they didn’t fully understand before signing. Once enrolled, there’s no clear way to pause or cancel.

“There’s no way to opt out once it starts, and no refunds either,” one merchant said. “Zomato just says, ‘You came to us,’ whenever we raise concerns,” he added.

But is this consent truly informed? “It’s a honeytrap,” the merchant said. “There’s no other option but to keep spending on ads if you want to stay relevant on the platform,” he explained.

Price Parity, Platform Pressure, and Squeezed Margins

Another major source of concern is Zomato’s price parity push. According to one owner, the company convinced restaurants to upload their table-rate menu on the platform by offering to lower commission fees. However, this strategy has backfired for many.

“They promised lower commission if we maintained the same prices online and offline. But now we pay Good and Services Tax (GST), high commissions, and ad spends on top of that. Our margins are cut down to 5–10%,” he said. Commissions alone can go up to 35–40% every month, forcing smaller restaurants to comply just to remain competitive.

In effect, merchants are footing the bill for everything: discounts, ads, visibility, and commissions, while Zomato gains from each layer.

Coupons and Data Obscurity

The dashboard Zomato offers shows data like clicks and visits, but it hides key financial insights that would help merchants make informed decisions. “They will show you how much you sold, but not how much you are paying to the platform,” one owner said.

Restaurant owners also said they have little to no control over how Zomato spends their ad budget. “We don’t know when our ads are shown, or to whom. There’s no data on which campaign worked better, or what to change,” one merchant said. Without visibility into targeting and performance strategy, many feel they are blindly spending in hopes of visibility.

Coupon codes, too, are deducted from the restaurant’s share, even if the platform offers them without informing the merchant. “Whatever discount a customer sees, it’s cut from our side. Zomato’s share is tiny, about 15%. We bear the rest,” the merchant added.

If a platform issues discounts unilaterally but bills restaurants for them, is that a fair bargain?

Opaque Categories and Manipulated Targeting

Merchants also highlighted how Zomato divides ad rates by cuisine categories — North Indian, Chinese, etc. — and even by customer frequency. “There are eight to 10 customer categories, each with a different ad rate,” an owner said. “Frequent buyers are more expensive to target”, he added.

The platform nudges merchants to buy targeted ads by showing graphics and dashboards that suggest potential boosts. But when profits drop, and merchants reach out, they are told that competition has increased significantly since they last got in touch with Zomato and they should spend more.

“It’s a vicious cycle. They’ll say: ‘Try a brand title ad or pay Rs. 300 extra to reach daily customers.’ The game never ends,” revealed the restaurant owner.

Inside Zomato: How Ads Shape Visibility

A former Zomato manager told MediaNama that restaurants not running ads don’t get deliberately penalised, but they do end up losing visibility. “Those who run ads automatically rise in rankings. So the others fall behind,” he said. Even a high-rated restaurant may slip if competitors outspend it.

For context, how much a restaurant pays for ads often depends on their rapport with the specific Zomato account manager and their business goals. “If a restaurant wants aggressive growth, we push it to the top line: high spend, high return. Others stay in the down line: lower investment, slower scale,” he said.

Ad pricing, he said, is not standardised. “It varies depending on what the manager thinks the client can afford and how much they are willing to push.”

He added that Zomato’s discovery algorithm changes every five to six months, which makes it difficult for restaurants to adapt or plan long-term. “The idea is to keep the system rotating so one client doesn’t dominate.”

Performance tracking for restaurants, he said, is mostly transparent except for one missing piece: acquisition data. “Zomato doesn’t show how many customers came through advertising. That’s where it becomes murky.”

He admitted Zomato doesn’t intervene if a restaurant complains about bad ad results. “It depends on the manager’s willingness but hardly anyone did it because of too many internal disputes on this issue.”
Why Ad Revenue Matters So Much

Ad revenue, the former Zomato manager said, is especially crucial in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities.

“In big cities, order values are high, so aggregators can survive on commissions. But in smaller cities, ad income is the main driver as the order values are comparatively low”, the former manager added.

Zomato’s Q4FY25 Shareholders’ Letter reflects this reliance: the company’s advertising and sales promotion expenses rose to Rs. 1,972 crore on a consolidated basis in FY25, up from Rs. 1,432 crore in FY24. While these are expenses borne by the platform, they highlight how advertising has become a structural lever in both customer acquisition and revenue generation.

Elsewhere, an HDFC Securities report states that quick commerce companies have theoretical levers to improve margins, such as increasing take rates, including higher ad income. It also observes that Blinkit would need to improve its take rates from 18.5% to 22% to reach a 5% adjusted EBITDAM (Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, Amortisation, and Management Fees), with ad revenue identified as a key lever to meet that target.

However, the report notes that heightened competition may keep some of these levers non-operational.

Zomato‘s Response

In response to MediaNama’s queries, a Zomato spokesperson shared the following statement:

“All marketing collaborations such as ads, promotions, and discounts etc., as well as commercials, are mutually discussed with our restaurant partners before being switched on, switched off or modified. Our multi-factor authentication system ensures that partners retain full control and give explicit consent which is registered before any changes go live. We also maintain robust escalation mechanisms, allowing partners to raise concerns and receive prompt, satisfactory resolutions through the Restaurant Partner App as well as centralised helpline numbers.

We continue to see restaurants having confidence in our partnership and are taking a proactive step to improve and enhance our interactions and processes. For our smaller restaurant partners, we work extra hard to make it easier for them to grow with us. There are always opportunities to improve and we are committed to working on them, on-time.”

While Zomato says it maintains robust escalation mechanisms and explicit partner consent, restaurant owners who spoke to MediaNama described a different reality: one of automatic deductions, limited control, and opaque ad operations.

What Zomato’s Policy Says and Doesn’t

According to Zomato’s Sponsored Listing Service terms, merchants are expected to make full payments in advance. Refunds are not guaranteed, and Zomato has full discretion on ad placements, sizes, and category changes.

The company “assumes no liability or responsibility for any… click frauds, technological issues or other potentially invalid activity that affects the cost of Service.” It also “does not warrant the results from use of Service, and the Merchant assumes all risk and responsibility.”

The Sponsored Listing Service terms grant Zomato broad rights to use merchant content, brand names, and logos, while limiting the company’s liability to the amount of fee paid during a term. These terms become legally binding once the Service Request Form (SRF) is signed.

While Zomato offers a merchant dashboard to track visits, it does not disclose the full breakdown of how ad money is being spent or how much value is being returned. One merchant noted that visibility data only started appearing in the last five to six months. Before that, they had no metrics at all.

Swiggy’s Self Serve Ads: A More Transparent Model?

Swiggy says its ad platform puts control in the hands of restaurant partners. Through the Self Serve Ads tool, restaurants can create their own campaigns, adjust daily spends, and track how those campaigns perform. The company promotes the tool as flexible and cost-effective, with no upfront payments.

The onboarding process is laid out step-by-step: restaurants upload documents like GST and Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) certificates, complete Know Your Customer (KYC), and sign a Partnership Agreement after a verification visit from a Swiggy representative, As per Swiggy, commissions are based on location and whether a restaurant opts for extra promotions.

Compared to Zomato’s Sponsored Listings model, which some restaurant owners say they didn’t fully understand when signing up, Swiggy’s approach looks more structured and consent-driven, at least on the surface.

But that clarity doesn’t always hold up. One of the restaurant owners told MediaNama that Swiggy’s model isn’t entirely different from Zomato’s. “You have to pay them if you want your restaurant to show up in search. It’s the same thing, just framed differently,” the owner said, suggesting that visibility on the platform often comes at a cost, regardless of how the ad system is marketed.

Advertising as a Structural Lever in Quick Commerce

Restaurant owners have flagged the rising costs and opacity of advertising on platforms like Zomato. But industry research shows that this isn’t just a revenue stream but it’s central to how delivery platforms, especially in quick commerce, are designed to operate.

A September 2024 report by CLSA, titled App-racadabra- Magic Behind Instant Delivery Liberating Customers, found that ad revenue makes up around 3.5% to 4.5% of gross merchandise value (GMV) on Zepto. That figure is only expected to grow as more brands start recognising the significance of quick commerce.

Interestingly, Zepto doesn’t just run ads for brands that sell on its platform. It also allows companies to advertise even if they aren’t listed, using spaces like the order tracking page, according to the report.

Quick commerce platforms can also use past purchase data to deliver more targeted ads and push higher-value products – what the report calls driving “premiumisation” of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

Zomato’s quick commerce arm, Blinkit, is expected to lean heavily on ads to hit profitability targets. CLSA notes that Blinkit’s margins could eventually exceed those of food delivery, given the larger potential for ad revenue and the shift toward higher-margin categories.

The report adds that quick commerce is especially useful for smaller or direct-to-consumer (D2C) brands. These businesses can tap into a pan-India audience without having to build their own distribution networks.

The CLSA findings reinforce how advertising isn’t just about visibility, but it is baked into the business model. As margins tighten, discovery on these apps is no longer organic but paid.

Expert View: Power, Visibility, and Platform Dependence

These patterns mirror broader trends across retail and platform ecosystems, not just food delivery.

Devangshu Dutta, the Founder and Chief Executive of specialist consulting firm Third Eyesight, told MediaNama that these dynamics are not unique to Zomato or even food delivery.

“Advertising and promotion focussing on specific brands or products is standard across various platforms and formats. It is an outcome of the balance of power between the platform and the supplier brand, and is equally true of physical retail chains, online marketplaces and aggregation platforms such as Zomato,” he said.

Brands or restaurant chains with deeper pockets tend to secure greater visibility—whether through premium shelf space in physical stores or prominent placements like sponsored listings and banners on delivery platforms.

“Demand-side concentration inevitably favours larger suppliers and brands who can fund visibility, whether it is through endcap displays in a retail aisle or sponsored banners or top-of-search-list positions on an app,” Dutta stated.

However, he noted that some established brands may choose to bypass platform dependence altogether.

“If brands are well-established or have other means to ensure that their message and product reaches the target consumer, they may choose to opt out of the channel, as many restaurants have done with Zomato and Swiggy,” Dutta explained.

How Can Restaurants Push Back?

In the context of restaurants displaying resistance to food delivery apps, one of the restaurant owners said that small restaurants need to come together.

“There should be local unions who can stand up to Zomato. And there should be a blanket rule on how much ad spend is allowed, so merchants don’t fall into this trap,” the owner said.

He added that Zomato seems to earn more from merchants than from customers. “Whatever we pay to be visible, it all goes into the platform’s pocket”, he explained.

Further, he argued that without collective action, individual pushback rarely works. “The minute we stop ad spend, our listings drop to the bottom. So we need to walk together. If even 30% of merchants stop ads at once, it will force a reaction.”

Why This Matters

As India’s online food delivery market continues to grow, so does the reliance of small businesses on platforms like Zomato. However, these platforms are acting as gatekeepers by deciding who gets seen, how often, and at what price.

By tying discovery to opaque algorithms and costly ad spends, they tilt the playing field in favour of businesses that can afford to pay more. In such a system, can small restaurants survive?

And the issue goes beyond advertising. Zomato recently paused its 50:50 refund-sharing policy after public backlash and partner complaints. Restaurant owners said the company auto-enabled the policy and deducted money without consent or clear explanation. As with ads, there was no transparent opt-out process or formal appeal.

Together, these practices raise broader concerns: Should platform-led monetisation come with stricter disclosure norms? Can regulators step in to ensure pricing fairness and transparency in merchant contracts? And what role can merchant collectives play in counterbalancing this power?

For now, many restaurant owners feel caught in a system that offers visibility and participation at a cost they cannot afford and exit without impact.

(Published in MediaNama)