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August 6, 2025
Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025
It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.
Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.
That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.
Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.
In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.
He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”
Where The Model Broke?
In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”
But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.
And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.
As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.
In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.
In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.
Scaling Without Steering
In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.
For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.
Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.
Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.
The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.
(Published in Forbes India)
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July 28, 2025
By Meenakshi Verma Ambwani, Hindu Businessline
New Delhi, July 28, 2025
Nykaa said that Kay Beauty, co-founded with actor Katrina Kaif, has crossed the ₹240 crore mark in terms of Gross Merchandise Value.
Stars from the tinsel town are donning the entrepreneurial hat to venture into the beauty and fashion business space. Some have even succeeded in growing their brands sustainably, earning big bucks.
Take for instance Skincare brand Hyphen, co-founded by actor Kriti Sanon with Pep Brands, which recently touched the ₹400 crore-mark in Annual Recurring Revenues.
Tarun Sharma, CEO and co-founder, Hyphen told businessline: “The brand is witnessing healthy growth rate quarter-on-quarter. In the first year itself, it touched ₹100 crore ARR. We had aimed for ₹500 crore ARR in 3-4 years and, within two years, we are at ₹400crore ARR.” Pep Brands led by Sharma owns mCaffeine and Hyphen.
The model that works
Sharma believes an operator-led, celebrity anchored model works better. ”The operator can bring in the necessary financial and execution muscle. If a celeb partners with an operator that has deep expertise in the space, then there is huge potential for growth,” he added.
“Product launches, marketing and distribution are very data-driven at Pep Brands. It guides us on what to launch, when to launch, and how to launch products. That has helped Hyphen in achieving this kind of growth rate. It is by design that the majority of the business of Hyphen is D2C,” Sharma explained.
In May, Nykaa said that Kay Beauty, co-founded with actor Katrina Kaif, has crossed the ₹240 crore mark in terms of Gross Merchandise Value. On an earnings call for Q4FY25, Adwaita Nayar, Executive Director, Chief Executive Officer, Nykaa Fashion, said: “Kay Beauty is one of the fastest-growing brands on the platform. It’s hit about ₹240 crore of GMV. The innovations have been fantastic this year. So, it is quite a premium brand, and I think the consumers are accepting it even at that price point. It’s got great gross margins.”
Earlier this year, Reliance Retail Ventures announced that it has decided to acquire 51 per cent stake in Ed-a-Mamma , a kid and maternity wear brand founded by actor Alia Bhatt. According to some reports, Hrithik Roshan’s sportswear brand HRX is a ₹1,000 crore brand.
Among the recent entrants are Ranbir Kapoor, who has decided to foray in the apparel and accessories space with ARKS. Launched in February, the brand has also launched its first store in Mumbai, followed by a second store in New Delhi and another with Broadway in Hyderabad.
‘Shift in preferences’
Abhinav Verma, co-founder and CEO, ARKS, told businessline: “We are seeing a shift in consumer preferences towards made-in-India brands. We decided to leverage on the strong manufacturing capability that India has to build a brand that is both aspirational and offers value. We are looking to build a ₹100 crore brand in the next 3-4 years with a strong omni-channel strategy.”
“The success of some of these brands demonstrates that building on consumer relevance and with powerful time-bound execution, celebrity ventures can become significant players in a crowded market. With consumer demand for relatability and digital-first branding on the rise, this segment will definitely grow. However, only brands that offer genuine value to consumers, and not just star appeal, are likely to endure,” said Devangshu Dutta, CEO, Third Eyesight.
(Published in The Hindu-Businessline)
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June 1, 2025
Sharleen Dsouza, Business Standard
Mumbai, 1 June 2025
Reliance Consumer Products is in a sweet spot – and it intends to stay there. Launched barely three years ago, the company has already entered the list of India’s top 10 fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) players by revenue in the 2024-25 financial year (FY25).
After making headlines by acquiring Campa Cola in 2022 — and taking the brand overseas in under two years — Reliance Consumer Products quickly expanded into food and non-food categories under the ‘Independence’ brand. Now, it has trained its sights on a new frontier: Confectionery.
This marks the company’s third major focus area after gaining traction in beverages and staples. Though present in biscuits and namkeens, its immediate priority is grabbing a share of the Indian consumer’s pocket change — via candies, chocolates, and toffees.
Its entry into the confectionery business began quietly in 2022 with a pilot of Joyland candies in Uttar Pradesh. It soon went on an acquisition spree — first picking up the 30-year-old Maharashtra-based Toffeeman brand in 2023, followed by a 51 per cent stake in Lotus Chocolates, and then acquiring the 82-
year-old Ravalgaon, home to nostalgic brands like Pan Pasand, Mango Mood, and Laco. It has been steadily building a formidable candy arsenal.
However, the Mukesh Ambani-led company isn’t limiting itself to Re 1 or Rs 2 price points. According to a source, it is developing an end-to-end confectionery portfolio — across toffees, candies, and chocolate-based products — and plans to enter sub-segments like gums, jellies, and lollipops. It is also betting on old-school favourites, launching chocolate-based confections such as eclairs, Lotus Symphony (toffee with a chocolate centre), and Lotus Zellers (moulded chocolate miniatures).
It is piloting distribution in five states — Maharashtra, Karnataka, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh — with plans to go pan-India this fiscal and reach one million outlets, the source added.
Why the big bet? The Indian confectionery market is expected to grow from Rs. 37,900 crore in 2024 to~59,700 crore by 2033, at a compound annual growth rate of 5.2 per cent, according to global consultancy IMARC Group. North India leads the market with a 32.8 per cent share. IMARC adds that modern retail formats, better digital connectivity, and product innovation are driving market penetration in both urban and semi-urban areas.
India’s sweet tooth has deep roots. Parle began selling candies in the 1920s, followed by Ravalgaon —now part of Reliance Consumer Products’ growing portfolio – in the 1940s.
Experts say the company’s strategy from the start was clear: Dominate. And it has the war chest to play the long game.
“Over two decades, Reliance has gained consumer-side experience and enormous momentum through various retail formats, and has figured out vertical integration in procurement,” said Devangshu Dutta, chief executive officer of consultancy Third Eyesight.
“Its experience in staples comes from private labels, and starting with Campa, its acquisitions in food, beverage and FMCG have grown. As a group, it has the muscle and a long-term approach to make a mark in the market.”
Dhanraj Bhagat, partner at Grant Thornton India LLP, pointed out thatthe FMCG market is notoriously tough — especially when scaling regional brands nationally. “But Reliance has deep pockets for brand building,” he said. That’s what sets it apart — it can spend big and be patient, he added.
While the company is making a dent via its distribution penetration strategy, it also needs to spend on publicity, Bhagat added. “Reliance has the money, so it is a different ball game for it as this gives the company the ability to spend and play the long-term game.”
Reliance Consumer Products is also offering higher margins to distributors in categories like Campa and confectionery, giving it a competitive edge. Its aggressive incentives have forced rivals to raise their own distributor margins — a sign of how this sweet battle is heating up.
(Published in Business Standard)
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May 25, 2025
Gargi Sarkar, Inc42
25 May 2025
SUMMARY: Swiggy and Zomato are scaling back non-core bets such as 10-minute food delivery, private labels, and event logistics to sharpen focus on core businesses and improve profitability. Both companies are betting on platform fees and selective verticals like quick commerce and ticketing, but analysts warn that financial discipline, not endless expansion, is key to long-term sustainability. The foodtech duo is stuck in a balancing act of rationalising what works and doesn’t. However, going ahead, this rationalisation game is only going to get more pronounced as they will strive to shield their core bread and butter businesses
For foodtech giants Swiggy and Zomato (now Eternal), the last few years have been about engaging in a battle for expansion, so much so that it has become difficult to tell them apart.
From quick commerce and cloud kitchens to intercity food delivery and even selling tickets for events and concerts, the two companies appear to be aping each other’s every move to be everything everywhere all at once.
However, what began as a bold bet to dominate every possible vertical falling under the ambit of food, lifestyle and entertainment is now undergoing a major course correction.
For starters, both are reconsidering their blitzkrieg, and while at it, they are gracefully stepping away from non-core bets, diluting underperforming or experimental units to focus on core operations to drive profitability.
For context: Zomato, which once saw the future of food logistics in ultra-fast deliveries, gave up on its 15-minute food delivery service, Quick, four months after its launch in January. It has also pulled the plug on its home-made meal service, Zomato Everyday. Tailored for office-goers and budget-conscious consumers, the service was floated in January 2025.
Swiggy, too, has made similar retreats. It suspended Swiggy Genie, its courier and pick-up-and-drop service that had gained popularity during the pandemic. The company also gave up on its private label food business by entering a strategic agreement with Kouzina, a chain of virtual restaurants, granting it exclusive rights to operate Swiggy’s digital-first food brands.
So, what has triggered this metaphorical fission in strategy?
One possible reason could be the growing realisation that profitability hinges on diversifying smartly rather than untamed expansion.
A market analyst, who did not wish to be named, pointed out that the duo’s attempt to rule their customers’ wallets for everything from food to groceries and entertainment to lifestyle has been quite ambitious. “The course correction was overdue,” the analyst said.
He believes that foodtechs are now forced to burn the visceral fat in the form of non-core businesses because those have been slowing them down, also eating into the revenues of core businesses and impacting operational efficiencies.
“Moreover, the more the segments, the higher the chances of operational hiccups. Managing logistics, customer experience, and quality control across a wide array of verticals inevitably leads to fragmentation and strain on core operations,” he added.
State Of Eternal Affairs: Zomato’s Diversification Saga
Eternal’s push to transform Zomato into a broader lifestyle platform in 2024 was not only about ambition but also a strategic response to a slowing core business — food delivery, according to industry observers.
Also, a glance at the table below reveals how the company has seen a marginal QoQ increase in its monthly transacting users.
In terms of monthly transacting customers, Zomato’s food delivery growth began strong with a 6.84% QoQ jump in Q1, but momentum quickly slowed, and Q2 saw only a 1.97% sequential rise, followed by a slight decline of 0.97% in Q3. This dip signalled stagnation, and although Q4 showed a mild recovery (1.95%), overall FY25 growth of the company’s monthly transacting users (food delivery) was modest at just 2.96%
Interestingly, Eternal founder and CEO Deepinder Goyal, too, acknowledged a slowdown in the company’s food delivery business while announcing the company’s Q4 FY25 results. He said the slowdown was due to rising competition from quick commerce platforms and weak discretionary spending. Goyal added that services like Zepto Cafe, Swiggy Snacc, and Blinkit Bistro, too, were eating into demand for restaurant deliveries.
In terms of Zomato’s food delivery numbers, average monthly transacting numbers grew to 20.9 Mn in Q4 FY25 from 20.5 Mn in Q4 FY24. Net order value (NOV) growth also remained subdued at 14% YoY versus the 20% YoY growth guidance.
Hence, the company was under pressure to unlock new revenue streams. Blinkit’s success became the reference point, and the company started envisioning similar success stories with other verticals too, a former Zomato employee said.
This was when the company got engulfed in the wave of diversification, paving the path for Zomato’s yet another bold move (besides Blinkit) — the INR 2,078 Cr acquisition of Paytm’s movies and events ticketing business, Insider, in August last year.
The acquisition that was planned with the launch of the ‘District’ app meant but one thing — declaration of war against BookMyShow, the lone behemoth in the realm of the entertainment ticketing segment. Even the company knew the path wouldn’t be all rainbows and sunshine.
In its Q4 FY24 earnings call, the management acknowledged that while the gross order value (GOV) of the going-out vertical continues to grow at over 100% YoY, the business still operates at an adjusted EBITDA loss of -2 to -2.5% of net order value (NOV).
Besides, given that the transition of users from Paytm’s ticketing business and Zomato’s dining out platform to the District app requires sustained investment, the company doesn’t expect the business to turn profitable in the near term.
But Zomato expects losses to eventually see stability at current levels.
“However, even with plateauing losses, the company will have to keep spending on creating supply. This means: curating new event experiences, forging partnerships and acquiring new users for the District app… and all of this translates into one thing — prolonged burn,” the market analyst added.
Moving on, Zomato’s ambition to become a lifestyle super app didn’t just manifest into flashy verticals like events, entertainment, and ticketing — it also showed up in its renewed aggression in food delivery, the very space where it first made its name.
Therefore, Zomato began piloting a 15-minute food delivery service in select parts of Mumbai and Bengaluru early this year.
But the company now finds the initiative extremely difficult to operationalise as it has failed to generate incremental demand.
“Customers do not necessarily want food fast, they just want it reliably. A 10-minute turnaround without full control over the supply chain leads to poor customer experiences, operational stress, and negligible upside. Instead of delighting users, it makes the company vulnerable to inconsistent quality and frequent delays,” a Zomato insider added.
Satish Meena, the founder of Datum Intelligence, opined that without controlling the entire supply chain, delivering food items within 10 to 15 minutes cannot be a profitable proposition.
Swiggy’s U-Turns
In 2024, also the year of its public listing, Swiggy aggressively expanded its service offerings, launching several new verticals to diversify beyond its core food delivery business.
Among the most prominent launches was Bolt, a 10-minute food delivery platform. Initially launched in Bengaluru, Chennai and Mumbai, Bolt quickly expanded to over 400 cities, with over 40,000 restaurants, including KFC, McDonald’s and Starbucks.
To complement Bolt, Swiggy introduced Snacc, a separate app for instant delivery of snacks, beverages, and small meals within 15 minutes.
Continuing to diversify its portfolio, Swiggy launched Pyng, an AI-powered platform that bridges users with verified experts like yoga teachers or chartered accountants.
With this, Swiggy marked its entry into the on-demand services marketplace, making professional services easier to access.
Apart from these customer-facing services, Swiggy also entered events via Scenes and the B2B space with Assure, to keep pace with Zomato.
Interestingly, Swiggy, too, has begun consolidating its operations. The company has shut down Genie, its hyperlocal courier business, which competed with Porter, Borzo and Uber.
According to a competitor, sourcing delivery riders specifically for packages is a challenge, particularly in cities like Bengaluru. For Swiggy, which was already managing fleets for food delivery and quick commerce through Instamart, sustaining a separate rider network for Genie only added to the complexity.
In another such move, Swiggy exited its private label food business by transferring exclusive rights for its digital-first brands, including The Bowl Company and Homely, to cloud kitchen operator Kouzina.
Balance Sheet Blues
Imperative to highlight that the rollbacks by Zomato and Swiggy are rooted in the growing pressures on their respective balance sheets.
After diversifying at a breakneck speed, they are now faced with the hard realities of cost structures that don’t always align with revenue potential.
In Q4 FY25, Zomato and Swiggy both reported robust top-line growth. Zomato’s revenue surged to INR 5,833 Cr, largely buoyed by its three core pillars — the food delivery business (INR 1,739 crore), Blinkit’s quick commerce arm (INR 769 Cr), and Hyperpure, its B2B supply chain vertical, which posted a 99% YoY growth in revenue to INR 1,840 Cr.
However, despite the momentum, the company’s net profit declined sharply to INR 39 Cr in the quarter, largely thanks to ongoing investments in Blinkit and newer bets like the ‘District’ lifestyle app.
Meanwhile, Swiggy clocked INR 4,410 Cr in revenue in Q4, up 45% YoY, but saw its net loss nearly double to INR 1,081 Cr. The widening losses were fuelled by surging operational expenses.
“All of this explains the strategic pullbacks witnessed lately, Swiggy exiting Genie and private labels, Zomato pulling the plug on services like Quick and Legends. The rationalisation marks a reset, indicating that while growth via diversification was necessary, financial discipline and profitability are in the spotlight,” the market analyst said.
Platform Fee To The Rescue… But For How Long?
While it won’t be easy for Zomato and Swiggy to suddenly change course, the future of these two foodtech giants is all about heading towards a more focussed set of revenue streams driven by value rather than FOMO.
In the process, both foodtech giants appear to have struck gold with the platform fee, which has grown from just INR 2 in 2023 to INR 10 today.
But the real question is: Can rising platform fee help the duo neutralise the impact of aggressive expansion? Or is rationalisation the only way forward?
Devangshu Dutta, the founder of Third Eyesight, thinks otherwise. He believes that the companies will not stop looking for new revenue streams, even as they will continue to amputate the ones that offer little value.
“All of these companies have to look for growth, which is a given. If their existing businesses are not delivering the kind of growth they need to justify their stock price or valuation, then they have to look at new avenues.”
According to him, we are bound to see a flurry of experiments, trials of different services and new verticals as these companies attempt to expand their addressable markets.
At the end of the day, the foodtech duo is stuck in a balancing act of rationalising what works and doesn’t. However, going ahead, this rationalisation game is only going to get more pronounced as they will strive to shield their core bread and butter businesses.
[Edited by Shishir Parasher]
(Published in Inc42)
admin
August 19, 2024
Ratna Bhushan, Economic Times
New Delhi, 19 August 2024
Close to a dozen small to mid-sized global cafes and restaurant brands have either entered India in the past two quarters or are in talks with local players at a time when large global chains are seeing sharp decline in same store sales and growth.
Mid-sized global chains are making investments even in a modest range of Rs. 20-30 crore to tap select cities and intend to keep store counts under about 30 to stay profitable on each store. This is in contrast to earlier times when cafes and chains entered India with mega deals and investment plans, executives said.
Belgian bakery Le Pain Quotidien, French patisserie chain Laduree, UK’s JD Wetherspoon and Frank HotDogs are among those to have inked collaborations with Indian partners, while newer homegrown ones such as Harley’s, Paper & Pie, abCoffee and First Coffee are expanding with first-time investors and mid-rung store rollouts.
“A combination of factors is driving this change of newer, smaller launches,” said Devangshu Dutta, chief executive of retail consultancy Third Eyesight. “There are niches the newer chains are addressing as consumers’ choices evolve and get more specific. Also, there’s a broadening of a wealth base in India leading to mid-sized business houses having capability to invest and willingness to try out newer segments,” he said.
With the big-bang launches in food services drying up, there’s been a mushrooming of small deals that is expected to surge.
Bake & Brew, which has inked a master franchise agreement with Belgian bakery chain Le Pain Quotidien to re-enter India, is investing Rs 35 crore in the first year. “We’ll start in metros and may expand to smaller towns later. We also see potential in travel retail, airports and larger train stations,” Annick Van Overstraeten, chief executive of Le Pain Quotidien, told ET. Bake & Brew is backed by the Nalanda group with core business interests in automotive metal parts.
Earlier this month, the French patisserie chain Laduree said it was launching its cafe at Ritz-Carlton, Pune, in collaboration with CK Israni Group which has business interests in home decor and construction. Its Managing Director Chandni Nath Israni said in a statement that the CK Israni group planned to expand Laduree’s presence across other Indian cities.
Experimenting in newer cuisines is also driving the change. “Our decision to expand in India stems from a deep appreciation for variety and a passion for bold flavours. We see great potential in the Indian market,” said Benjamin Attal, founder of US chain Franks Hot Dog.
Smaller and newer homegrown chains, in contrast, are expanding, backed by mid-ticket investors and business houses, many of whom are foraying into food services for the first time.
Last week Brigade Group, a realtor, announced a partnership with specialty coffee chain abCoffee to set up six outlets within Brigade properties.
“We partnered with abCoffee to enhance the F&B offerings at our office parks. abCoffee is able to retrofit into operational buildings without requiring additional water or gas points,” Arvind Rao, vice president – commercial business, Brigade Group, said.
Specialty coffee startup First Coffee plans to open 35 stores by 2024-end “focused on delivery and minimalist store aesthetic,” according to a company statement, to sell flavoured coffees, cold brews and bubble teas.
(Published in Economic Times)
