admin
May 25, 2025
Gargi Sarkar, Inc42
25 May 2025
SUMMARY: Swiggy and Zomato are scaling back non-core bets such as 10-minute food delivery, private labels, and event logistics to sharpen focus on core businesses and improve profitability. Both companies are betting on platform fees and selective verticals like quick commerce and ticketing, but analysts warn that financial discipline, not endless expansion, is key to long-term sustainability. The foodtech duo is stuck in a balancing act of rationalising what works and doesn’t. However, going ahead, this rationalisation game is only going to get more pronounced as they will strive to shield their core bread and butter businesses
For foodtech giants Swiggy and Zomato (now Eternal), the last few years have been about engaging in a battle for expansion, so much so that it has become difficult to tell them apart.
From quick commerce and cloud kitchens to intercity food delivery and even selling tickets for events and concerts, the two companies appear to be aping each other’s every move to be everything everywhere all at once.
However, what began as a bold bet to dominate every possible vertical falling under the ambit of food, lifestyle and entertainment is now undergoing a major course correction.
For starters, both are reconsidering their blitzkrieg, and while at it, they are gracefully stepping away from non-core bets, diluting underperforming or experimental units to focus on core operations to drive profitability.
For context: Zomato, which once saw the future of food logistics in ultra-fast deliveries, gave up on its 15-minute food delivery service, Quick, four months after its launch in January. It has also pulled the plug on its home-made meal service, Zomato Everyday. Tailored for office-goers and budget-conscious consumers, the service was floated in January 2025.
Swiggy, too, has made similar retreats. It suspended Swiggy Genie, its courier and pick-up-and-drop service that had gained popularity during the pandemic. The company also gave up on its private label food business by entering a strategic agreement with Kouzina, a chain of virtual restaurants, granting it exclusive rights to operate Swiggy’s digital-first food brands.
So, what has triggered this metaphorical fission in strategy?
One possible reason could be the growing realisation that profitability hinges on diversifying smartly rather than untamed expansion.
A market analyst, who did not wish to be named, pointed out that the duo’s attempt to rule their customers’ wallets for everything from food to groceries and entertainment to lifestyle has been quite ambitious. “The course correction was overdue,” the analyst said.
He believes that foodtechs are now forced to burn the visceral fat in the form of non-core businesses because those have been slowing them down, also eating into the revenues of core businesses and impacting operational efficiencies.
“Moreover, the more the segments, the higher the chances of operational hiccups. Managing logistics, customer experience, and quality control across a wide array of verticals inevitably leads to fragmentation and strain on core operations,” he added.
State Of Eternal Affairs: Zomato’s Diversification Saga
Eternal’s push to transform Zomato into a broader lifestyle platform in 2024 was not only about ambition but also a strategic response to a slowing core business — food delivery, according to industry observers.
Also, a glance at the table below reveals how the company has seen a marginal QoQ increase in its monthly transacting users.
In terms of monthly transacting customers, Zomato’s food delivery growth began strong with a 6.84% QoQ jump in Q1, but momentum quickly slowed, and Q2 saw only a 1.97% sequential rise, followed by a slight decline of 0.97% in Q3. This dip signalled stagnation, and although Q4 showed a mild recovery (1.95%), overall FY25 growth of the company’s monthly transacting users (food delivery) was modest at just 2.96%
Interestingly, Eternal founder and CEO Deepinder Goyal, too, acknowledged a slowdown in the company’s food delivery business while announcing the company’s Q4 FY25 results. He said the slowdown was due to rising competition from quick commerce platforms and weak discretionary spending. Goyal added that services like Zepto Cafe, Swiggy Snacc, and Blinkit Bistro, too, were eating into demand for restaurant deliveries.
In terms of Zomato’s food delivery numbers, average monthly transacting numbers grew to 20.9 Mn in Q4 FY25 from 20.5 Mn in Q4 FY24. Net order value (NOV) growth also remained subdued at 14% YoY versus the 20% YoY growth guidance.
Hence, the company was under pressure to unlock new revenue streams. Blinkit’s success became the reference point, and the company started envisioning similar success stories with other verticals too, a former Zomato employee said.
This was when the company got engulfed in the wave of diversification, paving the path for Zomato’s yet another bold move (besides Blinkit) — the INR 2,078 Cr acquisition of Paytm’s movies and events ticketing business, Insider, in August last year.
The acquisition that was planned with the launch of the ‘District’ app meant but one thing — declaration of war against BookMyShow, the lone behemoth in the realm of the entertainment ticketing segment. Even the company knew the path wouldn’t be all rainbows and sunshine.
In its Q4 FY24 earnings call, the management acknowledged that while the gross order value (GOV) of the going-out vertical continues to grow at over 100% YoY, the business still operates at an adjusted EBITDA loss of -2 to -2.5% of net order value (NOV).
Besides, given that the transition of users from Paytm’s ticketing business and Zomato’s dining out platform to the District app requires sustained investment, the company doesn’t expect the business to turn profitable in the near term.
But Zomato expects losses to eventually see stability at current levels.
“However, even with plateauing losses, the company will have to keep spending on creating supply. This means: curating new event experiences, forging partnerships and acquiring new users for the District app… and all of this translates into one thing — prolonged burn,” the market analyst added.
Moving on, Zomato’s ambition to become a lifestyle super app didn’t just manifest into flashy verticals like events, entertainment, and ticketing — it also showed up in its renewed aggression in food delivery, the very space where it first made its name.
Therefore, Zomato began piloting a 15-minute food delivery service in select parts of Mumbai and Bengaluru early this year.
But the company now finds the initiative extremely difficult to operationalise as it has failed to generate incremental demand.
“Customers do not necessarily want food fast, they just want it reliably. A 10-minute turnaround without full control over the supply chain leads to poor customer experiences, operational stress, and negligible upside. Instead of delighting users, it makes the company vulnerable to inconsistent quality and frequent delays,” a Zomato insider added.
Satish Meena, the founder of Datum Intelligence, opined that without controlling the entire supply chain, delivering food items within 10 to 15 minutes cannot be a profitable proposition.
Swiggy’s U-Turns
In 2024, also the year of its public listing, Swiggy aggressively expanded its service offerings, launching several new verticals to diversify beyond its core food delivery business.
Among the most prominent launches was Bolt, a 10-minute food delivery platform. Initially launched in Bengaluru, Chennai and Mumbai, Bolt quickly expanded to over 400 cities, with over 40,000 restaurants, including KFC, McDonald’s and Starbucks.
To complement Bolt, Swiggy introduced Snacc, a separate app for instant delivery of snacks, beverages, and small meals within 15 minutes.
Continuing to diversify its portfolio, Swiggy launched Pyng, an AI-powered platform that bridges users with verified experts like yoga teachers or chartered accountants.
With this, Swiggy marked its entry into the on-demand services marketplace, making professional services easier to access.
Apart from these customer-facing services, Swiggy also entered events via Scenes and the B2B space with Assure, to keep pace with Zomato.
Interestingly, Swiggy, too, has begun consolidating its operations. The company has shut down Genie, its hyperlocal courier business, which competed with Porter, Borzo and Uber.
According to a competitor, sourcing delivery riders specifically for packages is a challenge, particularly in cities like Bengaluru. For Swiggy, which was already managing fleets for food delivery and quick commerce through Instamart, sustaining a separate rider network for Genie only added to the complexity.
In another such move, Swiggy exited its private label food business by transferring exclusive rights for its digital-first brands, including The Bowl Company and Homely, to cloud kitchen operator Kouzina.
Balance Sheet Blues
Imperative to highlight that the rollbacks by Zomato and Swiggy are rooted in the growing pressures on their respective balance sheets.
After diversifying at a breakneck speed, they are now faced with the hard realities of cost structures that don’t always align with revenue potential.
In Q4 FY25, Zomato and Swiggy both reported robust top-line growth. Zomato’s revenue surged to INR 5,833 Cr, largely buoyed by its three core pillars — the food delivery business (INR 1,739 crore), Blinkit’s quick commerce arm (INR 769 Cr), and Hyperpure, its B2B supply chain vertical, which posted a 99% YoY growth in revenue to INR 1,840 Cr.
However, despite the momentum, the company’s net profit declined sharply to INR 39 Cr in the quarter, largely thanks to ongoing investments in Blinkit and newer bets like the ‘District’ lifestyle app.
Meanwhile, Swiggy clocked INR 4,410 Cr in revenue in Q4, up 45% YoY, but saw its net loss nearly double to INR 1,081 Cr. The widening losses were fuelled by surging operational expenses.
“All of this explains the strategic pullbacks witnessed lately, Swiggy exiting Genie and private labels, Zomato pulling the plug on services like Quick and Legends. The rationalisation marks a reset, indicating that while growth via diversification was necessary, financial discipline and profitability are in the spotlight,” the market analyst said.
Platform Fee To The Rescue… But For How Long?
While it won’t be easy for Zomato and Swiggy to suddenly change course, the future of these two foodtech giants is all about heading towards a more focussed set of revenue streams driven by value rather than FOMO.
In the process, both foodtech giants appear to have struck gold with the platform fee, which has grown from just INR 2 in 2023 to INR 10 today.
But the real question is: Can rising platform fee help the duo neutralise the impact of aggressive expansion? Or is rationalisation the only way forward?
Devangshu Dutta, the founder of Third Eyesight, thinks otherwise. He believes that the companies will not stop looking for new revenue streams, even as they will continue to amputate the ones that offer little value.
“All of these companies have to look for growth, which is a given. If their existing businesses are not delivering the kind of growth they need to justify their stock price or valuation, then they have to look at new avenues.”
According to him, we are bound to see a flurry of experiments, trials of different services and new verticals as these companies attempt to expand their addressable markets.
At the end of the day, the foodtech duo is stuck in a balancing act of rationalising what works and doesn’t. However, going ahead, this rationalisation game is only going to get more pronounced as they will strive to shield their core bread and butter businesses.
[Edited by Shishir Parasher]
(Published in Inc42)
admin
May 23, 2025
By Kunal Purohit and Ananya Bhattacharya, Rest of World
Mumbai, India, 23 May 2025
Online retail continues to elude India’s richest man.
The Shein India app, launched by Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Retail in partnership with the Chinese fast-fashion giant, has struggled to gain traction in a market where Amazon and Walmart have been fighting neck-to-neck for nearly a decade. Downloads for Shein India nosedived from 50,000 a day shortly after its launch in early February to 3,311 in early April, according to AppMagic, a U.S.-based app performance tracker.
In April, when U.S. tariffs hit China, the app saw renewed interest as it was in the news, but experts are unclear on whether this growth is sustainable.
“Unlike earlier times, now … [the] market is saturated with multiple options and offers, and user interest can quickly dwindle,” Yugal Joshi, partner at global research firm Everest Group, told Rest of World.
Kushal Bhatnagar of Indian consulting firm Redseer, however, sees the late-April spike as a healthy sign, given that Reliance has yet to run paid marketing campaigns for Shein.
Reliance Retail declined to respond to Rest of World’s queries about its partnership with Shein.
Reliance launched Shein for India five years after the original Shein app was banned in the country over border tensions with China. But the Shein that has returned is entirely separate from Shein’s global platform: Rather than selling made-in-China clothes and accessories directly to consumers, Shein now operates as a technology partner, while Reliance Retail handles the heavy lifting — from sourcing and manufacturing to distribution. All consumer data is managed by the Indian company.
The partnership is part of Ambani’s broader effort to overhaul his retail business, whose valuation fell to $50 billion in 2025 from $125 billion in 2022. Although the company has made a push into digital platforms like JioMart, Ajio, and most recently Shein India, the bulk of its retail revenue still comes from its 18,000 physical stores.
Lagging behind Amazon and Walmart-backed Flipkart, which together control nearly 60% of India’s e-commerce market, Reliance has spent years trying to break into the sector. Between 2020 and 2025, Ambani’s group acquired majority stakes in companies spanning digital services, online pharmaceuticals, and quick commerce. But the investments have yet to position Reliance as a serious challenger to Amazon and Flipkart.
Analysts say the Indian behemoth hopes to leverage Shein’s artificial intelligence-powered trendspotting and automated inventory systems to pursue an ambitious goal: capturing a major share of India’s e-commerce market, projected to hit $345 billion by 2030.
According to Kaustav Sengupta, director of insights at VisionNxt, an Indian government-funded initiative that uses AI to forecast fashion trends, such a model is likely to make good use of Reliance’s humongous customer data sets: more than 476 million subscribers for its Jio telecom brand, 300 million users for e-commerce platform JioMart, and 452 million subscribers for its news and entertainment portfolio, consisting of 63 channels, a streaming service, and digital news outlets.
“With these data points, Reliance wants to now sell fashion products, so all it needs is a system where it can feed all these data points,” Sengupta told Rest of World. He said the model would be able to predict best-selling products and suggest the right prices for them.
The original Shein app uses AI-driven models for intelligent warehousing and to spot customer trends before manufacturing a new product. It scales the manufacturing up or tweaks the designs based on the feedback. At any given time, the Shein website has a catalogue of more than 600,000 items. Its Indian iteration does not match up, according to reviews on the Google Play store. Several customer reviews for Reliance’s Shein app are critical of higher prices and reduced options. The app’s rating hovered at 2 out of 5 until February; in May, it climbed to 4.4, but reviews were still a mixed bag.
Reviews of the Indian app highlight the disparity with Shein’s global version, criticizing higher prices and a reduced selection of categories and styles.
As of April 25, Reliance Retail said only 12,000 products were live on Shein India, a stark contrast to the 600,000 items available on Shein’s global platforms. While Shein is reportedly set to debut on the London Stock Exchange this year, Ambani’s years-old promise to take Reliance Retail public remains unfulfilled.
Reliance Retail, which accounts for around 30% of the conglomerate’s overall business, is facing a slowdown in annual growth. Its sales rose just 7.9% in the fiscal year ending March 2025, down from 17.8% the previous year. Meanwhile, shares of rival Tata Group’s retail and fashion arm, Trent, have soared by 133%.
“Reliance would have looked at reviving that momentum and riding on it, while for Shein, adding India back on its portfolio of markets could be a plus point before its proposed public listing,” Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a brand management consultancy that has worked with various global e-commerce brands including Ikea, told Rest of World.
A Reliance Retail official privy to information about its fast fashion expansion plans told Rest of World the partnership with Shein also hinges on global manufacturing ambitions as the Chinese company is trying to “source its products from other countries like India” to meet the “additional demand that is coming from newer markets.” Reliance Retail has tapped a network of small and midsize Indian manufacturers to locally source products, and its subsidiary Nextgen Fast Fashion Limited is leading the charge. “We need to first scale up our domestic manufacturing, before our partnership starts manufacturing for global markets. Let us see how that goes, first,” the official said, requesting anonymity as he is not authorized to share this information publicly.
India’s Gen Z population is at 377 million and counting, and their spending power is set to surpass $2 trillion by 2035, according to a 2024 report by Boston Consulting Group. Every fast-fashion retailer wants to capture this market, but it “is very new even for Reliance,” Rimjim Deka, founder of Indian fast-fashion platform Littlebox, told Rest of World.
Deka said smaller brands like hers “just see [a trend] and implement it,” which could take a large conglomerate months to do, by which time the trend may have lost relevance.
Reliance’s previous attempts to attract young shoppers with clothing brands like Foundry and Yousta failed to find much success. Anandita Bhuyan, who works in trend forecasting and product creation for fast-fashion clients like H&M and Myntra, told Rest of World the company has struggled to effectively leverage consumer data and target India’s youth.
According to the Reliance Retail official, the company is confident that if “there are 10 existing brands, the 11th brand will also get picked up as long as there is value and there is fashion.”
“Shein already has a recall among the youth. It gives us yet another brand in our portfolio through which we can cater to the youth,” the official said.
Shein was built in China on the back of more than 5,400 micro manufacturers — a scattered and loosely organized network of small and midsize factories.
In January this year, on a visit to China, Deka met with manufacturers working for Shein and Temu. On the outskirts of Guangzhou, Deka saw factories set up in areas that appeared residential, with “women sitting inside houses” making clothes.
“The tech is built in a way that somebody sitting there is able to see that, okay, next 15 days or next one month, how much I should be making … that is the kind of integration they have done,” Deka said.
Deka told Rest of World this model is easier to replicate at a smaller scale. “Me, coming from [the] supply chain industry, I understand that it is much easier for a brand like us because we are at a very smaller scale. We can still go to those people, we can still build it in a very unorganized way and then pull it off,” she said. Her company’s annual net revenue is 750 million Indian rupees ($8.6 million).
“[But] somebody like Reliance, they just cannot go haphazard here. … It has to be always organized,” Deka said.
Shein moved its headquarters to Singapore sometime between late 2021 and early 2022, a strategic departure to distance itself from its Chinese origins and facilitate hassle-free international expansion amid the U.S.-China trade war.
India is part of Shein’s wider strategy to diversify its supply chain — one that also includes a newly leased warehouse near Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam, and efforts to establish alternative manufacturing hubs in Brazil and Turkey.
But in India, Reliance needs Shein as much as Shein needs Reliance for its global pivot. According to Bloomberg, Reliance Retail is focusing on creating leaner operations to weather a wider consumption slump in the Indian economy.
“It remains to be seen whether the Reliance-Shein combine can deliver on the brand’s promise with a wide range of products, fast and on-trend,” Dutta said. “In the years that Shein has been absent, the Indian market has evolved further, competition has intensified, and past goodwill is not enough to provide sales momentum.”
Kunal Purohit is a freelance journalist based in Mumbai, India.
Ananya Bhattacharya is a reporter for Rest of World covering South Asia’s tech scene. She is based in Mumbai, India.
(Published in Rest of World)
Devangshu Dutta
December 24, 2024
Opinion piece by Devangshu Dutta, published in TexFash.com
12 December 2024
TLDR:
The core premise of quick commerce is time-sensitive buying by the consumer, typically emergency purchases and top-ups of food and grocery, cleaning or personal care items. Although 10-minute delivery has been widely hyped, deliveries are usually—and more realistically—made in a time span of 20–60 minutes, which is often better than the cost and time involved in driving to nearby stores that are beyond walkable distance, in India’s crowded urban environment.
While quick commerce platforms had already begun disrupting FMCG and grocery buying, impacting traditional kirana shops, recently they have also started adding fashion products to improve their margin mix and profitability.
The fashion business, by its very nature, is built on width of choice, frequency of change and unpredictability, whereas the quick commerce business model depends on a narrow, shallow merchandise mix which comprises products that are sold predictably, frequently and in large numbers within a small delivery radius. Stocking a variety of fashion styles, sizes, and colours is inherently more complex than handling products like soaps or spices.
Also, unlike FMCG or essential products, fashion items certainly depend on sensory experience of touch and feel. Shopping for clothing often requires browsing through a variety of styles, fabrics, and fits; consumers spend considerable time researching, comparing, and reading reviews to ensure the right fit, colour, and fabric.
However, there is potential for basics (e.g. T-shirts in common colours, innerwear, socks, and hosiery), last-minute outfit changes, urgent replacement for damaged clothing, event-driven products, or specially promoted products that look like great deals, as all of these would fulfil immediate needs without the same level of evaluation and comparison.
In contrast, fashion shopping for high-value items such as dresses, shirts, or outerwear will remain a slower, more deliberate process. The higher the emotional or experiential value attached to a product, the less quick commerce will fit.
Myntra has announced its quick commerce launch offering 10,000 styles, across fashion, beauty, accessories and home, and expects to expand the offering to over 100,000 products in 3–4 months.
I see Myntra’s entry into this space partly as a defensive move to fend off the quick commerce upstarts from cannibalising its business in a market that is already beset with damp offtake and highly discounted sales. Surely Myntra would not want to lose its customers who may looking to make repeat, impulse or emergency purchases of fashion products and may be less price sensitive while doing so.
It’ll be interesting to see how they address the product complexity with super-quick deliveries, and how geographically spread this business model can be for Myntra.
Myntra’s parent company Flipkart has already announced that it expects to IPO by 2025–26, and it needs to be seen as evolving and staying relevant in an increasingly competitive environment, rather than losing customers and business to younger q-commerce businesses.
We shouldn’t confuse quick commerce with “fast fashion”. What is fast in quick commerce is the speed of decision making and shopping that is enabled by a limited choice, and fast deliveries.
The fast fashion model is built on the foundation of changing trends, which needs companies to quickly identify winning trends, get product ready to sell, and move out of trend so as not to be stuck with out-of-demand inventory. The fashion-conscious customer profile wants frequent and, most importantly, trendy changes to their wardrobe. Fast fashion is waste-inducing because it encourages discarding products that are out of trend, but otherwise perfectly fine.
Quick commerce, on the other hand, needs to have a profitable business on a much narrower product profile. The more predictable and basic the product, the more it suits a Q-commerce business model.
Sustaining the ability to make fashion-trend related changes to the product mix would be nightmarishly complex for quick commerce.
I would expect quick commerce of fashion to be more driven by “need” than by “want”, and in that aspect to be, hopefully, less waste-inducing and perhaps less environmentally harmful than the established fast fashion business models and brands.
Quick commerce could also create an additional outlet for inventory that is stuck and feed into value-conscious customers’ requirements.
For small manufacturers, Myntra’s entry into the q-commerce space could be a double-edged sword.
On one hand, quick commerce can create a new demand channel for them beyond modern retail, traditional stores and online marketplaces, offering growth in a tough market environment.
However, it can also intensify the pressure on their already tight margins because of the consolidation of trade demand and a push by large customers such as Myntra to improve their own profitability. Suppliers may also be asked to hold inventory at their end ready for replenishment of the quick commerce dark stores, to ensure that service levels are maintained.
This can increase pressure on production timelines and on working capital for small manufacturers, who would need to adapt quickly or risk being squeezed out by larger, more agile competitors.
On the competitive side, while larger retailers—whether traditional, family-owned department stores or large chains—are likely to be less affected, quick commerce of fashion products will certainly hit smaller fashion stores whose merchandise mix is limited in width and depth. These stores will necessarily need to define what is their continuing value proposition to the changing consumer.
admin
October 7, 2024
Writankar Mukherjee, Economic Times
7 October 2024
Reliance Retail has initiated efforts to enter the thriving quick commerce market in a move that is set to escalate competition for Zomato-owned Blinkit, Swiggy Instamart and BigBasket, among others. The country’s largest retailer has started offering quick commerce services in select areas in Navi Mumbai and Bengaluru through its ecommerce platform JioMart since last weekend.
It will initially sell grocery items from its retail stores totalling about 3,000 nationwide, eventually adding value fashion and small electronic products such as smartphones, laptops and speakers, a senior executive said. All orders will be fulfilled from its own network of stores including Reliance Digital and Trends.
The retail arm of Reliance Industries plans to rapidly scale up its quick commerce venture pan-India by this month-end with the aim to deliver most orders in 10-15 minutes and the rest within 30 minutes, the executive said. The company will use its acquired logistics service Grab for the fulfilment.
Reliance, however, doesn’t have any plan to set up dark stores or neighbourhood warehouses, unlike other quick commerce operators, the executive said. Analysts said this may become a challenge in delivering orders within 30 minutes in large cities where traffic is high during peak hours.
To entice customers, Reliance won’t charge any delivery fee, platform fee or surge fee irrespective of the order value, and keep a major focus on untapped smaller cities and towns where quick commerce operators like Blinkit are yet to enter, the executive said. Other platforms have a delivery fee and platform fee.
Reliance plans to offer a wider choice of products of 10,000-12,000 stock keeping units by linking its entire store inventory to the quick commerce business, which too is much more than rivals.
Eventually, the company aims to cover 1,150 cities spanning 5,000 pin codes where it runs grocery stores. The executive said the company would target a bigger share of business from towns and smaller cities hitherto untapped by quick commerce firms.
“Reliance has reworked the way orders are delivered for JioMart. Earlier, orders had a scheduled delivery taking 1-2 days by small trucks who would take multiple orders and deliver them one by one. Now, all grocery orders will be quick commerce where one delivery bike or cycle will deliver one order. Each grocery store will cover a 3 KM radius,” the executive said.
Earlier this year, the company tried to reduce JioMart delivery timings to a few hours or at least the same day under its hyperlocal initiative. It has fine-tuned the process further to 10-30 minute delivery. “This has become a top-of-the-kind requirement in the market right now,” the executive said.
A spokesperson for Reliance Retail didn’t respond to ET’s queries.
Devangshu Dutta, chief executive at consulting firm Third Eyesight, said Reliance can ultimately use a blended approach of quick commerce deliveries in areas near its stores and scheduled deliveries a bit far away.
“Since they are in a market share acquisition mode in quick commerce, charging no transaction fees and offering higher discounts on products is a given. There is significant scope for deep-pocketed players like Reliance to strengthen presence in quick commerce. They have aggressively backed other experiments in the retail business once they worked, and may do it again,” said Dutta.
For fast-moving consumer goods companies, quick commerce is the fastest growing channel, accounting for 30-35% of total online sales.
(Published in Economic Times)
admin
September 16, 2024
Sesa Sen, NDTV Profit
16 September 2024
As India’s economy grows and digital technologies reshape consumer behavior, the future of kirana stores—the quintessential neighbourhood grocery shops—hangs precariously in the balance.
These soap-to-staple sellers, once impervious to change, now confront an existential threat from quick commerce players like Blinkit, Instamart, Zepto, and from modern retailers such as DMart and Star Bazaar, raising a pivotal question: Can kiranas survive the pressure of change, or will they die a slow death?
The All India Consumer Products Distributors Federation, that represents four lakh packaged goods distributors and stockists, has recently raised alarms, urging Union Minister for Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal to investigate the unchecked proliferation of quick commerce platforms and its potential ramifications for small traders.
Their concerns are not unfounded. Data suggests that the share of modern retail, including online commerce, which is currently below 10%, is set to cross 30% over the next 3-5 years. Much of this growth will come at the cost of traditional retail.
“Unless the government takes on an activist role to support the smallest of business owners, the shift toward large corporate formats is inevitable,” according to Devangshu Dutta, head of retail consultancy Third Eyesight.
Casualties Of The Boom
Madan Sachdev, a second-generation grocer operating Vandana Stores in eastern Delhi, has thrived in the recent years, adapting to the digital age by taking orders via WhatsApp and employing extra hands for home delivery.
Despite having weathered the storm of competition from giants like Amazon and BigBazaar, he now finds himself disheartened, as his monthly sales have halved to about Rs 30,000, all thanks to quick commerce.
Sachdev is worried about meeting expenses such as rent, his children’s education, and other household bills. He finds himself at a crossroads, uncertain about how to modernise his store or adopt new-age strategies in order to attract customers in an increasingly competitive market.
India’s $600 billion grocery market, a cornerstone for quick commerce, is largely dominated by more than 13 million local mom-and-pop stores.
Retailers like Sachdev are also seeing a steep decline in their profit margins from FMCG companies, which now hover around 10-12%, down from the 18-20% margins seen before the Covid-19 pandemic. The consumer goods companies are instead offering higher margins to quick commerce platforms so that they can afford the price tags.
Quick deliveries account for $5 billion, or 45%, of the country’s $11 billion online grocery market, according to Goldman Sachs. It is projected to capture 70% of the online grocery market, forecasted to grow to $60 billion by 2030, as consumers increasingly prioritise convenience and speed.
Many of the mom-and-pop shops are family-run and have been in business for generations. Yet they lack the resources to modernise and compete effectively with larger chains. Modern retail businesses, including quick commerce, begin with significantly more capital, thanks to funding from corporate investors, venture capital, private equity, and public markets.
“They can scale quickly and capture market share due to a superior product-service mix, larger infrastructure, and more robust business processes,” said Dutta.
Moreover, their ability to engage in price competition poses a challenge for small retailers and distributors, making it difficult for them to compete.
“This is something that has happened worldwide, in the largest markets, and I don’t think India will be an exception,” Dutta said, adding that it would be incomplete to single out a specific format of corporate business such as quick commerce as the sole villain in this situation.
“India is a tough, friction-laden environment at any given point in time, including government processes which don’t make it any easier,” he said.
Peer Pressure
Data from research firm Kantar shows that general trade, which comprises kirana and paan-beedi shops, have grown 4.2% on a 12-month basis in June, while quick commerce grew 29% during the same period.
Shoppers are becoming more omnichannel, rather than gravitating towards one particular channel, said Manoj Menon, director- commercial, Kantar Worldpanel, South Asia. “While the growth [for quick commerce and e-commerce] might appear to have declined compared to a year ago, a point to note is that the base for these channels has significantly grown. Therefore, achieving this level of growth is still commendable.”
Consumer goods companies such as Hindustan Unilever Ltd., Dabur India Ltd., Tata Consumer Products Ltd., etc., have acknowledged the salience of quick commerce to their packaged food, personal and homecare products. The platform currently comprises roughly 40% of their digital sales.
“We are working all the major players in the quick commerce space and devising product mix and portfolio. This is a very high growth channel for us,” according to Mohit Malhotra, chief executive officer, Dabur India.
Elara Capital analysts have pointed out that the share of quick commerce is expected to rise to60% in the near future with e-commerce and modern trade turning costlier for FMCG brands than quick commerce. “The larger brands tend to make better margins on quick-commerce platforms versus e-commerce due to lower discounts on the former,” it said in a report.
However, it is too premature to draw a parallel between kirana and quick commerce in terms of competition, given the significant size difference.
The average spend per consumer on FMCG in kirana stores stands at Rs. 21,285 annually while the same is Rs. 4,886 for quick commerce, according to Menon.
Rural Vs Urban Divide
Quick commerce is still an urban phenomenon. In contrast, in rural settings, where internet penetration is still catching up and access to large retail chains is limited, kirana stores continue to thrive.
According to Naveen Malpani, partner, Grant Thornton Bharat, while the growth of quick commerce is undeniable, this channel is not poised to replace traditional retail, which still has a wider reach in the country. “It will complement older models, filling a niche for immediate, smaller purchases. Also, a 10-20-minute delivery may not have a strong market pull in rural markets where distance and time are not much of a concern.”
Yet many others believe, even in these areas, the challenge is palpable.
The small businesses are beginning to feel the sting of same slow decline that once befell the ubiquitous telephone booths in the era of mobile phone, according to Sameer Gandotra, chief executive officer of Frendy, a start-up that is building ‘mini DMart’ in small towns where giants like Reliance and Tatas have yet to establish their presence.
As rural customers slowly start to embrace digital shopping and seek more variety, kirana stores must adapt or risk becoming obsolete, he said.
Besides, the popularity of quick commerce is set to challenge the dominance of incumbent e-commerce platforms, especially in categories such as beauty and personal care, packaged foods and apparel.
“Quick commerce is primarily operational in metros and tier 1 markets, which is impacting the sales of traditional companies in these areas. However, if quick-commerce players were to extend their operations to tier 2 and tier 3, it would even challenge companies such as DMart and Nykaa, and would pare sales and profitability,” noted analysts at Elara Securities.
Frendy’s Gandotra believes the journey for kirana stores is not a lost cause, but it requires strategic interventions. Many kirana store owners struggle to integrate point-of-sale systems, inventory management software, or even digital payment solutions. These stores need to embrace technology.
Another aspect is the need for policy support. Regulations to ensure fair competition can prevent monopolisation by large retailers. Additionally, subsidies, tax benefits, and grants for infrastructure improvements can help small businesses adapt to changing market dynamics. With renewed support, kirana stores can continue to be the backbone of Indian retail.
Nonetheless, there will be some who’ll be left behind during this shift. Analysts at Elara Capital warn that the swift rise of quick-commerce platforms, combined with aggressive discounting, could wipe off 25-30% of traditional grocery stores.
(Published on NDTV Profit)
