Faizan Haidar, Economic Times
10 Aug 2024, New Delhi

Japanese apparel major Uniqlo’s sales growth in India slipped by more than half to a still-strong 32% last fiscal year while its net profit expanded by 25%.

The Indian unit of Asia’s biggest clothing brand posted a net profit of ₹85.1 crore for the year ended March 2024 with net revenues of ₹824 crore, according to its latest filing with the Registrar of Companies (RoC). Uniqlo India had posted a profit of ₹68.1 crore with sales of ₹625 crore in the previous year. Its on-year revenue growth was 69% in FY23 and 64% in FY22.

Uniqlo opened its first door in the country in September 2019, but lockdowns and other constraints during the Covid-19 pandemic delayed its store expansion plans. At present, it has about 13 outlets in the country. Overall retail sales growth rate across segments such as apparel, footwear and quick service restaurants (QSR) fell year-on-year every month in FY24, reflecting comparatively weaker consumer sentiment.

Last fiscal’s comparatively slower 4-7% growth rate sustained this year as well, with May and June seeing a 3% and 5% rise each, Retailers Association of India (RAI) recently said after a survey of top 100 retailers.

“The market was sluggish for the industry as a whole last year, and that will reflect in practice every brand P&L, whether Indian or international,” said Devangshu Dutta, chief executive of retail sector consultancy Third Eyesight. “However, any brand that is committed to the Indian market as a strategic market for its future growth will take the ups and downs in its stride,” he said.

“Uniqlo’s expansion plans now include store sizes that would be smaller both in the cities it is already present in and in newer cities, which should help it tap into the demand at operating costs that are appropriate to each location,” Dutta said. Inditex Trent, Spanish fast-fashion major Zara’s joint venture with Tata that runs 23 stores in the country, saw its revenue rise 8% to ₹2,775 crore last fiscal, significantly down from 40% growth a year earlier, according to Trent’s annual report. Its net profit fell 8% on year to ₹244 crore.

Over the past decade, global brands Zara and H&M have become market leaders in the fast fashion segment in India.

Uniqlo has said India is one of the most priority markets where consumers are increasingly shifting from ‘fast fashion’ to long-lasting essentials and functional wear. As the world’s second most-populated country, India is an attractive market for apparel brands, especially with youngsters increasingly embracing western-style clothing.

Uniqlo is globally popular for functional basics like T-shirts, jeans and woollen wear, unlike fast-fashion rivals which are associated with designs that move quickly from the catwalk to the showroom.

(Published in Economic Times)

Viveat Susan Pinto, Financial Express

August 28, 2023

Coffee Day Global, which operates the Cafe Coffee Day (CCD) chain, has been given a temporary relief against bankruptcy proceedings initiated by lender IndusInd Bank last month. The Chennai bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLAT) last week halted admission of IndusInd Bank’s plea against Coffee Day Global, a subsidiary of the listed Coffee Day Enterprises (CDEL), by the NCLT Bengaluru, till September 20.

What this means for CCD is that it get some more time at a time when it has swung into the black after struggling for the last few years, since the tragic demise of its founder VG Siddhartha in 2019. Coffee Day Global posted a net profit of Rs 24.57 crore for the June quarter of 2023-24 (FY24) versus a net loss of Rs 11.73 crore reported in the same period last year.

Revenue from operations stood at Rs 223.20 crore in the quarter under review, a growth of nearly 18% versus the year-ago period, CDEL results for Coffee Day Global showed.

More importantly, CCD outlets are down to 467 in the June quarter of FY24 from a peak of 1,752 stores in FY19, indicating that the company is shutting down unprofitable operations as it looks to manage its debt and other expenses. Group debt is down to Rs 1,711 crore, according to its latest annual report for FY23, versus Rs 7,214 crore reported in FY19.

“While the coffee retail market in India is growing, in CCD‘s case the need to downsize has to do with internal issues. Sometimes a smaller footprint just helps to manage operations better especially when you are dealing with larger problems such as a debt overhang,” says Devangshu Dutta, chief executive officer of retail consultancy Third Eyesight.

CCD’s financial health is critical for CDEL, which derives close to 94% of its group turnover from the coffee retail business, according to its FY23 annual report. In FY22, the contribution of the coffee retail business to group turnover was 85%. Losses of Coffee Day Global in FY23 narrowed to Rs 69.62 crore from Rs 112.48 crore in FY22. In FY19, the company had a net profit of Rs 10 crore.

Apart from cafes, CCD also has kiosks and vending machines installed in corporate offices, institutions and business hubs. While the number of kiosks has fallen over the last few years and is at around 265 now from a peak of 537 in FY19, the number of vending machines have been growing after briefly slowing down over the last few years. From a peak of 58,697 crore in FY20, it is now at 50,870 in number, the company’s latest results show.

CCD is also expected to fight the insolvency proceedings against it aggressively, according to industry sources. IndusInd Bank has claimed that Coffee Day Global defaulted on a loan of Rs 94 crore, which occurred on February 28, 2020. The company has disputed this in court.

(Published in Financial Express)

Shinmin Bali, Financial Express

Mumbai, 21 February 2016

Having created quite a stir at the time of their launch, hyperlocal companies are now witnessing a dampened mood. While several have folded up operations in some cities, others have downsized staff, tweaked the services they offer and even made alterations to their business models. A recent example is Grofers shutting down operations in Bhopal, Bhubaneswar, Coimbatore, Kochi, Ludhiana, Mysuru, Nashik, Rajkot and Visakhapatnam.

TinyOwl last year was in the news for a poorly-handled downsizing operation in Pune, with a dramatic hostage situation involving its co-founder Gaurav Choudhary. PepperTap also recently shut down operations in six cities.

Ironically, giants like Amazon have not only aggressively entered the hyperlocal space, they are building on it. Amazon is currently offering the service in Bengaluru, Amazon Now, after running a pilot project, Kirana Now, in 2015.

The investor sentiment in India is also on a decline, as was reported earlier this year. Investments by venture capitalists have dropped from $2.12 billion (October-December 2014) to $1.15 billion (October-December 2015), according to a report by CB Insights and KPMG International. This leaves an even shorter window of opportunity for players to retain investor interest.

Albinder Dhindsa, co-founder, Grofers, states that differing levels of technology literacy among the majority of merchants and consumer adaptation to the online platform are concern areas for the company. In 2016, the company is looking to bring over one lakh merchants aboard and ensure that turnaround time stays under an hour. Grofers delivers more than 35,000 orders per day on average. In Q4 2015, the firm acquired teams of SpoonJoy and Townrush to bring dynamic learning to the table.

For Swiggy’s co-founder Nandan Reddy, the focus is currently to grow the market, while catering to a wide demographic of consumers. He admits that in the early stages, the brand had trouble educating even its partners. Furthermore, operating a delivery fleet in an on-demand service offering sub-40 minute deliveries is a challenging task, given that there are at least 15 points of failure in an average order. Swiggy currently owns a delivery fleet of 3,800 delivery executives. The brand’s repeat consumers contribute to over 80% of orders.

Debadutta Upadhyaya, co-founder, Timesaverz, says some of the major challenges in a hyperlocal market are optimum resource utilisation and matching locations, price points, and other specific requirements to customer needs. Timesaverz currently has a service range spread across 40 categories, aided by a network of over 2,500 service partners across five metros. Its revenue model is commission based, where 80% of earnings from consumers are shared with service partners.

Vinod Murali, MD, Innoven Capital, points out that as the hyperlocal industry is in its nascent stages, it needs a fair amount of time to grow. “One aspect to keep in mind is that a large sized equity cheque does not imply that a company has achieved operational maturity or robust business metrics, especially in this segment,” he notes.

Given the recent consolidation in this category, the survivors have the opportunity and time to focus on improving unit economics and demonstrate that their businesses are viable and valuable.

Devangshu Dutta, CEO, Third Eyesight, is of the opinion that hyperlocals make the mistake of borrowing business models and terminologies from Silicon Valley, without adequately understanding the real context of the Indian market. “Is there an existing or even potential demand for the service claimed to be provided? Or are you just going to introduce an intermediary and an additional link in the chain, with additional costs and unnecessary administration involved?” he asks.

(Published in Financial Express)

Aggregator models and hyperlocal delivery, in theory, have some significant advantages over existing business models.

Unlike an inventory-based model, aggregation is asset-light, allowing rapid building of critical mass. A start-up can tap into existing infrastructure, as a bridge between existing retailers and the consumer. By tapping into fleeting consumption opportunities, the aggregator can actually drive new demand to the retailer in the short term.

A hyperlocal delivery business can concentrate on understanding the nuances of a customer group in a small geographic area and spend its management and financial resources to develop a viable presence more intensively.

However, both business models are typically constrained for margins, especially in categories such as food and grocery. As volume builds up, it’s feasible for the aggregator to transition at least part if not the entire business to an inventory-based model for improved fulfilment and better margins. By doing so the aggregator would, therefore, transition itself to being the retailer.

Customer acquisition has become very expensive over the last couple of years, with marketplaces and online retailers having driven up advertising costs – on top of that, customer stickiness is very low, which means that the platform has to spend similar amounts of money to re-acquire a large chunk of customers for each transaction.

The aggregator model also needs intensive recruitment of supply-side relationships. A key metric for an aggregator’s success is the number of local merchants it can mobilise quickly. After the initial intensive recruitment the merchants need to be equipped to use the platform optimally and also need to be able to handle the demand generated.

Most importantly, the acquisitions on both sides – merchants and customers – need to move in step as they are mutually-reinforcing. If done well, this can provide a higher stickiness with the consumer, which is a significant success outcome.

For all the attention paid to the entry and expansion of multinational retailers and nationwide ecommerce growth, retail remains predominantly a local activity. The differences among customers based on where they live or are located currently and the immediacy of their needs continue to drive diversity of shopping habits and the unpredictability of demand. Services and information based products may be delivered remotely, but with physical products local retailers do still have a better chance of servicing the consumer.

What has been missing on the part of local vendors is the ability to use web technologies to provide access to their customers at a time and in a way that is convenient for the customers. Also, importantly, their visibility and the ability to attract customer footfall has been negatively affected by ecommerce in the last 2 years. With penetration of mobile internet across a variety of income segments, conditions are today far more conducive for highly localised and aggregation-oriented services. So a hyperlocal platform that focusses on creating better visibility for small businesses, and connecting them with customers who have a need for their products and services, is an opportunity that is begging to be addressed.

It is likely that each locality will end up having two strong players: a market leader and a follower. For a hyperlocal to fit into either role, it is critical to rapidly create viability in each location it targets, and – in order to build overall scale and continued attractiveness for investors – quickly move on to replicate the model in another location, and then another. They can become potential acquisition targets for larger ecommerce companies, which could acquire to not only take out potential competition but also to imbibe the learnings and capabilities needed to deal with demand microcosms.

High stake bets are being placed on this table – and some being lost with business closures – but the game is far from being played out yet.

Devina Joshi, Financial Express

Mumbai, 8 September 2015

Recently, there was news of restaurant reservation site EazyDiner expanding operations to Mumbai from the National Capital Region, having secured Series A funding worth $3 million led by existing investor DSG Consumer Partners, and Saamna Capital.

As per a PwC analyst, investors have pumped more than $150 million into companies like Grofers, TinyOwl, Swiggy, LocalOye, Spoonjoy, Zimmber and HolaChef, among others. Judging by the patronage showered upon them by customers and investors alike, it would appear that hyperlocal start-ups are all set to create the next big boom in the Indian retail sector. But is it really all that rosy? Probably not, as can be amply witnessed by acquisitions taking place in the nascent yet already overcrowded market.

Between November 2014 and February 2015, the Rocket Internet-backed Foodpanda acquired rivals TastyKhana and JustEat.in, and is rumoured to be in acquisition mode with TinyOwl. Restaurant search app Zomato, which recently got into the food ordering space, is also reportedly looking to acquire minority stakes in food-ordering firms.

While investors are attracted to hyperlocal start-ups, controlling logistics well is key to sustained growth for these businesses — all of these will definitely go through a constraint in the supply of delivery boys, for example. In India, organising fragmented labour is a challenge and, hence, a services-based hyperlocal needs to figure out the mechanics of human capital even more than a traditional, product-based e-commerce firm.

For services, another challenge is customer stickiness. If a user uses an app to obtain the services of a plumber, for example, he may not go through the app to contact the plumber next time if his services are found satisfactory. Discounting can induce trials, but just like in any other business, prove fatal in the long run. Like what led to the end of HomeJoy in the US — excessive discounts to dissuade direct contact between servicemen and customers.

Even for product-based start-ups, maintaining data quality is a big hurdle as stock and prices may not be updated by retailers in real time, making it difficult to track offline sales.

Since the game is hyperlocal, you need to be physically present in the city to bring retailers aboard. For that, you need a city team. Other challenges include retailer verification and assessment, given that hyperlocals deal with small city retailers.

Stickiness is needed on both sides, and each locality will certainly evolve into having a market leader and a follower, with other players falling far behind. “So the critical success factor for a hyperlocal is being able to rapidly create a viable model in each location it targets, and then—to build overall scale and continued attractiveness for investors—quickly move on to replicate the model in another location, and then another,” says retail consultant Devangshu Dutta of Third Eyesight. As they do that, they will become potential acquisition targets for larger ecommerce companies, which could use acquisition to not only take out potential competition but also to imbibe the learning and capabilities needed to deal with microcosms of consumer demand.

(Published in Financial Express.)