Viveat Susan Pinto, Financial Express
August 28, 2023
Coffee Day Global, which operates the Cafe Coffee Day (CCD) chain, has been given a temporary relief against bankruptcy proceedings initiated by lender IndusInd Bank last month. The Chennai bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLAT) last week halted admission of IndusInd Bank’s plea against Coffee Day Global, a subsidiary of the listed Coffee Day Enterprises (CDEL), by the NCLT Bengaluru, till September 20.
What this means for CCD is that it get some more time at a time when it has swung into the black after struggling for the last few years, since the tragic demise of its founder VG Siddhartha in 2019. Coffee Day Global posted a net profit of Rs 24.57 crore for the June quarter of 2023-24 (FY24) versus a net loss of Rs 11.73 crore reported in the same period last year.
Revenue from operations stood at Rs 223.20 crore in the quarter under review, a growth of nearly 18% versus the year-ago period, CDEL results for Coffee Day Global showed.
More importantly, CCD outlets are down to 467 in the June quarter of FY24 from a peak of 1,752 stores in FY19, indicating that the company is shutting down unprofitable operations as it looks to manage its debt and other expenses. Group debt is down to Rs 1,711 crore, according to its latest annual report for FY23, versus Rs 7,214 crore reported in FY19.
“While the coffee retail market in India is growing, in CCD‘s case the need to downsize has to do with internal issues. Sometimes a smaller footprint just helps to manage operations better especially when you are dealing with larger problems such as a debt overhang,” says Devangshu Dutta, chief executive officer of retail consultancy Third Eyesight.
CCD’s financial health is critical for CDEL, which derives close to 94% of its group turnover from the coffee retail business, according to its FY23 annual report. In FY22, the contribution of the coffee retail business to group turnover was 85%. Losses of Coffee Day Global in FY23 narrowed to Rs 69.62 crore from Rs 112.48 crore in FY22. In FY19, the company had a net profit of Rs 10 crore.
Apart from cafes, CCD also has kiosks and vending machines installed in corporate offices, institutions and business hubs. While the number of kiosks has fallen over the last few years and is at around 265 now from a peak of 537 in FY19, the number of vending machines have been growing after briefly slowing down over the last few years. From a peak of 58,697 crore in FY20, it is now at 50,870 in number, the company’s latest results show.
CCD is also expected to fight the insolvency proceedings against it aggressively, according to industry sources. IndusInd Bank has claimed that Coffee Day Global defaulted on a loan of Rs 94 crore, which occurred on February 28, 2020. The company has disputed this in court.
(Published in Financial Express)
Bali, Financial Express
TinyOwl last year was in the news for a poorly-handled downsizing
operation in Pune, with a dramatic hostage situation involving
its co-founder Gaurav Choudhary. PepperTap also recently shut
down operations in six cities.
Ironically, giants like Amazon have not only aggressively entered
the hyperlocal space, they are building on it. Amazon is currently
offering the service in Bengaluru, Amazon Now, after running a
pilot project, Kirana Now, in 2015.
The investor sentiment in India is also on a decline, as was
reported earlier this year. Investments by venture capitalists
have dropped from $2.12 billion (October-December 2014) to $1.15
billion (October-December 2015), according to a report by CB Insights
and KPMG International. This leaves an even shorter window of
opportunity for players to retain investor interest.
Albinder Dhindsa, co-founder, Grofers, states that differing
levels of technology literacy among the majority of merchants
and consumer adaptation to the online platform are concern areas
for the company. In 2016, the company is looking to bring over
one lakh merchants aboard and ensure that turnaround time stays
under an hour. Grofers delivers more than 35,000 orders per day
on average. In Q4 2015, the firm acquired teams of SpoonJoy and
Townrush to bring dynamic learning to the table.
For Swiggy’s co-founder Nandan Reddy, the focus is currently
to grow the market, while catering to a wide demographic of consumers.
He admits that in the early stages, the brand had trouble educating
even its partners. Furthermore, operating a delivery fleet in
an on-demand service offering sub-40 minute deliveries is a challenging
task, given that there are at least 15 points of failure in an
average order. Swiggy currently owns a delivery fleet of 3,800
delivery executives. The brand’s repeat consumers contribute
to over 80% of orders.
Debadutta Upadhyaya, co-founder, Timesaverz, says some of the
major challenges in a hyperlocal market are optimum resource utilisation
and matching locations, price points, and other specific requirements
to customer needs. Timesaverz currently has a service range spread
across 40 categories, aided by a network of over 2,500 service
partners across five metros. Its revenue model is commission based,
where 80% of earnings from consumers are shared with service partners.
Vinod Murali, MD, Innoven Capital, points out that as the hyperlocal
industry is in its nascent stages, it needs a fair amount of time
to grow. “One aspect to keep in mind is that a large sized
equity cheque does not imply that a company has achieved operational
maturity or robust business metrics, especially in this segment,”
Given the recent consolidation in this category, the survivors
have the opportunity and time to focus on improving unit economics
and demonstrate that their businesses are viable and valuable.
Devangshu Dutta, CEO, Third Eyesight, is of the opinion that
hyperlocals make the mistake of borrowing business models and
terminologies from Silicon Valley, without adequately understanding
the real context of the Indian market. “Is there an existing
or even potential demand for the service claimed to be provided?
Or are you just going to introduce an intermediary and an additional
link in the chain, with additional costs and unnecessary administration
involved?” he asks.
(Published in Financial Express)
Aggregator models and hyperlocal delivery, in theory, have some significant advantages over existing business models.
Unlike an inventory-based model, aggregation is asset-light, allowing rapid building of critical mass. A start-up can tap into existing infrastructure, as a bridge between existing retailers and the consumer. By tapping into fleeting consumption opportunities, the aggregator can actually drive new demand to the retailer in the short term.
A hyperlocal delivery business can concentrate on understanding the nuances of a customer group in a small geographic area and spend its management and financial resources to develop a viable presence more intensively.
However, both business models are typically constrained for margins, especially in categories such as food and grocery. As volume builds up, it’s feasible for the aggregator to transition at least part if not the entire business to an inventory-based model for improved fulfilment and better margins. By doing so the aggregator would, therefore, transition itself to being the retailer.
Customer acquisition has become very expensive over the last couple of years, with marketplaces and online retailers having driven up advertising costs – on top of that, customer stickiness is very low, which means that the platform has to spend similar amounts of money to re-acquire a large chunk of customers for each transaction.
The aggregator model also needs intensive recruitment of supply-side relationships. A key metric for an aggregator’s success is the number of local merchants it can mobilise quickly. After the initial intensive recruitment the merchants need to be equipped to use the platform optimally and also need to be able to handle the demand generated.
Most importantly, the acquisitions on both sides – merchants and customers – need to move in step as they are mutually-reinforcing. If done well, this can provide a higher stickiness with the consumer, which is a significant success outcome.
For all the attention paid to the entry and expansion of multinational retailers and nationwide ecommerce growth, retail remains predominantly a local activity. The differences among customers based on where they live or are located currently and the immediacy of their needs continue to drive diversity of shopping habits and the unpredictability of demand. Services and information based products may be delivered remotely, but with physical products local retailers do still have a better chance of servicing the consumer.
What has been missing on the part of local vendors is the ability to use web technologies to provide access to their customers at a time and in a way that is convenient for the customers. Also, importantly, their visibility and the ability to attract customer footfall has been negatively affected by ecommerce in the last 2 years. With penetration of mobile internet across a variety of income segments, conditions are today far more conducive for highly localised and aggregation-oriented services. So a hyperlocal platform that focusses on creating better visibility for small businesses, and connecting them with customers who have a need for their products and services, is an opportunity that is begging to be addressed.
It is likely that each locality will end up having two strong players: a market leader and a follower. For a hyperlocal to fit into either role, it is critical to rapidly create viability in each location it targets, and – in order to build overall scale and continued attractiveness for investors – quickly move on to replicate the model in another location, and then another. They can become potential acquisition targets for larger ecommerce companies, which could acquire to not only take out potential competition but also to imbibe the learnings and capabilities needed to deal with demand microcosms.
High stake bets are being placed on this table – and some being lost with business closures – but the game is far from being played out yet.
As per a PwC analyst, investors have pumped more than $150 million
into companies like Grofers, TinyOwl, Swiggy, LocalOye, Spoonjoy,
Zimmber and HolaChef, among others. Judging by the patronage showered
upon them by customers and investors alike, it would appear that
hyperlocal start-ups are all set to create the next big boom in
the Indian retail sector. But is it really all that rosy? Probably
not, as can be amply witnessed by acquisitions taking place in
the nascent yet already overcrowded market.
Between November 2014 and February 2015, the Rocket Internet-backed
Foodpanda acquired rivals TastyKhana and JustEat.in, and is rumoured
to be in acquisition mode with TinyOwl. Restaurant search app
Zomato, which recently got into the food ordering space, is also
reportedly looking to acquire minority stakes in food-ordering
While investors are attracted to hyperlocal start-ups, controlling
logistics well is key to sustained growth for these businesses
— all of these will definitely go through a constraint in
the supply of delivery boys, for example. In India, organising
fragmented labour is a challenge and, hence, a services-based
hyperlocal needs to figure out the mechanics of human capital
even more than a traditional, product-based e-commerce firm.
For services, another challenge is customer stickiness. If a
user uses an app to obtain the services of a plumber, for example,
he may not go through the app to contact the plumber next time
if his services are found satisfactory. Discounting can induce
trials, but just like in any other business, prove fatal in the
long run. Like what led to the end of HomeJoy in the US —
excessive discounts to dissuade direct contact between servicemen
Even for product-based start-ups, maintaining data quality is
a big hurdle as stock and prices may not be updated by retailers
in real time, making it difficult to track offline sales.
Since the game is hyperlocal, you need to be physically present
in the city to bring retailers aboard. For that, you need a city
team. Other challenges include retailer verification and assessment,
given that hyperlocals deal with small city retailers.
Stickiness is needed on both sides, and each locality will certainly evolve into having a market leader and a follower, with other players falling far behind. “So the critical success factor for a hyperlocal is being able to rapidly create a viable model in each location it targets, and then—to build overall scale and continued attractiveness for investors—quickly move on to replicate the model in another location, and then another,” says retail consultant Devangshu Dutta of Third Eyesight. As they do that, they will become potential acquisition targets for larger ecommerce companies, which could use acquisition to not only take out potential competition but also to imbibe the learning and capabilities needed to deal with microcosms of consumer demand.
(Published in Financial Express.)
(Published in ETRetail.com on 6 December 2013)
Franchising isn’t rocket science, but advanced space programmes offer at least one parallel which we can learn from – the staging of objectives and planning accordingly.
A franchise development programme can be staged like a space launch, each successive stage being designed and defined for a specific function or role, and sequentially building the needed velocity and direction to successfully create a franchise operation. The stages may be equated to Launch, Booster, Orbiter and Landing stages, and cover the following aspects:
Stage 1: Launch
The first and perhaps the most important stage in launching a franchise programme is to check whether the organisation is really ready to create a franchise network. Sure, inept franchisees can cause damage to the brand, but it is important to first look at the responsibilities that a brand has to making the franchise network a success. Too many brands see franchising as a quick-fix for expansion, as a low-cost source for capital and manpower at the expense of franchisee-investors. It is vital for the franchiser to demonstrate that it has a successful and profitable business model, as well as the ability to provide support to a network of multiple operating locations in diverse geographies. For this, it has to have put in place management resources (people with the appropriate skills, business processes, financial and information systems) as well as budgets to provide the support the franchisee needs to succeed. The failure of many franchise concepts, in fact, lies in weakness within the franchiser’s organisation rather than outside.
Stage 2: Booster
Once the organisation and the brand are assessed to be “franchise-ready”, there is still work to be put into two sets of documents: one related to the brand and the second related to the operations processes and systems. A comprehensive marketing reference manual needs to be in place to be able to convey the “pulling” power that the brand will provide to the franchisee, clearly articulate the tangible and intangible aspects that comprise the brand, and also specify the guidelines for usage of brand materials in various marketing environments. The operations manual aims to document standard operating procedures that provide consistency across the franchise network and are aimed at reducing variability in customer experience and performance. It must be noted that both sets of documents must be seen as evolving with growth of the business and with changes in the external environment – the Marketing Manual is likely to be more stable, while the Operations Manual necessary needs to be as dynamic as the internal and external environment.
Stage 3: Orbiter
Now the brand is ready to reach out to potential franchisees. How wide a brand reaches, across how many potential franchisees, with what sort of terms, all depend on the vision of the brand, its business plan and the practices prevalent in the market. However, in all cases, it is essential to adopt a “parent” framework that defines the essential and desirable characteristics that a franchisee should possess, the relationship structure that needs to be consistent across markets (if that is the case), and any commercial terms about which the franchiser wishes to be rigid. This would allow clearer direction and focussed efforts on the part of the franchiser, and filter out proposals that do not fit the franchiser’s requirements. Franchisees can be connected through a variety of means: some will find you through other franchisees, or through your website or other marketing materials; others you might reach out to yourselves through marketing outreach programmes, trade shows, or through business partners. During all of this it is useful, perhaps essential, to create a single point of responsibility at a senior level in the organisation to be able to maintain both consistency and flexibility during the franchise recruitment and negotiation process, through to the stage where a franchisee is signed-on.
Stage 4: Landing
Congratulations – the destination is in sight. The search might have been hard, the negotiations harder still, but you now – officially – have a partner who has agreed to put in their money and their efforts behind launching YOUR brand in THEIR market, and to even pay you for the period that they would be running the business under your name. That’s a big commitment on the franchisee’s part. The commitment with which the franchiser handles this stage is important, because this is where the foundation will be laid for the success – or failure – of the franchisee’s business. Other than a general orientation that you need to start you franchisee off with, the Marketing Manual and the Operational Manual are essential tools during the training process for the franchisee’s team. Depending on the complexity of the business and the infrastructure available with the franchiser, the franchisee’s team may be first trained at the franchiser’s location, followed by pre-launch training at the franchisee’s own location, and that may be augmented by active operational support for a certain period provided by the franchiser’s staff at the franchisee’s site. The duration and the amount of support are best determined by the nature of the business and the relative maturity of both parties in the relationship. For instance, someone picking up a food service franchise without any prior experience in the industry is certainly likely to need more training and support than a franchisee who is already successfully running other food service locations.
Will going through these steps guarantee that the franchise location or the franchise network succeeds? Perhaps not. But at the very least the framework will provide much more direction and clarity to your business, and will improve the chances of its success. And it’s a whole lot better than flapping around unpredictably during the heat of negotiations with high-energy franchisees in high-potential markets.