Writankar Mukherjee, Economic Times
Kolkata, 28 July 2024

Top retail chains such as Reliance Retail, Shoppers Stop and Spencer’s Retail are facing a prolonged slowdown in consumption, pushing them to exit unprofitable markets, raise debt and control costs.

India’s largest retailer Reliance Retail shuttered 249 stores in the three months ended June. The company is also going slow on expansion, opening 331 new stores in the quarter compared to 470-800 stores opened every quarter in FY22, FY23 and FY24. The closures mean the retail business of Reliance Industries made 82 net new store additions last quarter–the lowest in 15 quarters.

Spencer’s Retail has decided to completely exit North and South India markets by closing 49 stores in the National Capital Region (NCR), Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. The step will erase Rs 490 crore of annual revenue, but the company is hopeful it will improve profitability.

Shoppers Stop chief executive officer Kavindra Mishra told investors last week that it may have to defer a few store openings this fiscal due to regulatory and other issues. The company will also borrow Rs 100 crore for expansion with demand remaining soft.

Meanwhile, V-Mart Retail has closed 22 stores in the first six months of 2024, as per its latest investor presentation.

“Pruning underperforming locations is a natural reaction during times of demand stress,” said Devangshu Dutta, CEO of retail sector consulting firm Third Eyesight.

Pure Economics

“Demand forecasting can never be perfect due to a lag between demand assessment and supply. Retailers now try to do away with underperforming stores at the bottom of the pile quickly. Earlier there were prestige issues in shutting down stores, but now it’s acceptable industry practice and pure economics,” said Third Eyesight’s Dutta.

Analysts say most retailers expanded rapidly after the pandemic, banking on pent-up demand and revenge shopping at the time. With demand turning sluggish, the industry is now being forced to take various steps to sustain operations. At Reliance Retail, net profit rose by a modest 4.6% from a year earlier in the June quarter to Rs 2,549 crore while revenue grew 6.6% to Rs 66,260 crore. It was the slowest pace of revenue growth and came after a 9.8% increase in Q4FY24. Net profit and revenue from operations fell sequentially in the June quarter.

Spencer’s Retail CEO Anuj Singh told analysts on Thursday the 49 stores it is closing make up nearly 22% of revenue, but also Rs 56 crore of losses at the regional Ebitda level in North and South India. “They were a drag on the balance sheet. We will now focus on Uttar Pradesh and the East where there is a sizable consumption opportunity with a 250 million population,” he added.

Singh said the store rationalisation exercise and about 35% headcount reduction at corporate offices will reduce overheads from 8% operating cost to 6.3% of total sales. “We now expect to achieve Ebitda breakeven by March 2025 which will give us the option to raise capital,” he said.

Mishra at Shoppers Stop said demand remained subdued last quarter due to fewer wedding dates, long election season with polling dates on weekend, heatwaves, and high level of cumulative inflation. All these factors combined hit growth and volume recovery, except in value fashion and beauty.

More stores shut than opened

In fact, the sustained demand slowdown saw chains like Pantaloons, Spencer’s Retail and Nature’s Basket close more stores than they opened last fiscal. Retailers like V-Mart Retail, W, Aurelia and Titan Eye+ had a higher rate of store closures than openings in the March quarter.

(Published in Economic Times)

In early-June Big Bazaar (part of Future Group) was reported to have broken off its relationship with Cadbury’s. About 2-3 weeks later the two were reportedly back together. The alleged differences and the apparent solutions have been reported widely, as also the feeling that some issues remain unresolved.

If that reads like something you would find in a celebrity tabloid, you’re probably right. The relationship between brands and large retailers is truly one of the “love-hate” kind. And this case is no different from many other such relationships in various markets around the world. In fact, the Future Group itself is reported to have had similar run-ins with PepsiCo’s FritoLay and GlaxoSmithKline in the past.

I won’t dwell on the various allegations and clarifications about commercial structures and differential pricing in this particular case, since the view from outside isn’t really clear. But it is certainly worth noting that this case is not unique, and thinking about what the future (no pun intended) might hold for brands in markets such as India.

There is no doubt that brands love the scale that large retailers provide them, with the quick access to a large footprint in the market, and the high visibility. On the other hand, as a vendor, they hate the negotiating edge that this scale gives the large retailer. Brand generally rule fragmented retail environments such as India. Large retailers, on the other hand, squeeze out more margins in the form of bulk discounts, placement fees and the like. There’s more: special promotions, differential merchandising and delivery needs…the list of demands seems endless.

On the other side, retailers love brands for the footfall they bring. The brand typically creates a “need to buy” on the consumer’s part, and invests in creating a distinctive proposition which is valuable in a cluttered market. In many cases the brand would have also advertised where it is available. This is all good stuff for the retailer, who then essentially has to make sure that the brand is available and visible in-store to the customer to convert the walk-ins into sales. However, what retailers don’t like is the fact that brands will generally charge a premium of 10-50% over a comparable generic product. In some cases the premium may be so high that the brand product’s price itself is multiples of a generic product’s price.

The retailer-brand partnership is a very powerful one, even from early days. Many consumer brands and branded companies have scaled up significantly with the growth of their retail customers. The US market due to its sheer size and its evolution offers numerous examples including companies such as Levi Strauss, Hanes, Fruit of the Loom and Proctor & Gamble that grew on the back of discounters such as Wal-Mart and K-Mart as well as retailers such as JC Penney, Macy’s and Sears. Similar examples appear from other countries where the modernisation and consolidation of retail have happened over decades along with economic development.

An established brand provides the new retailer credibility, even as the retailer provides the brand new shelf-space. Or the other way around: even a new brand provides value to an established retailer by identifying the market need, developing the product, managing sourcing & production, and establishing the consumer’s interest in the product, while it is the established retailer who provides the much-needed credibility and presence to the new brand.

For most, this remained a happy relationship for a long time even as the retail environment grew and evolved. Retailers focussed on creating shelf-space and managing it, while the brands focussed on creating products and desirability.

However, economic shocks various times and the rise of low-cost imports raised questions in retailers’ minds about the value added by the brand compared to the margin they supposedly made on the higher prices. At the same time, better communication and travel infrastructure as well as falling costs made it easier for retailers to consider approaching factories directly.

Enter private label, the “other” in the love-hate triangle.

Over the last couple of decades, department stores, hypermarkets, grocery stores and even discounters have worked seriously on private label.  The opening premise was that you could entice the customer with a lower price (sharing some of the margin earned by direct sourcing), and as long as you gave a comparable product the consumer was happy. Many Indian retailers followed a similar route when they began exploring private label.

The strategy has had a varied degree of success, much of it to do with how the private label has been handled (indifferently in most cases). Recognising this flaw, many retailers around the world have attempted to improve their handling of their private label product development and also presenting it also in a manner (including advertising) similar to a national or an international brand. Some of these retailers’ own labels are now serious brands in their own right even though they are restricted to only one retail chain.

The difference between a “label” and a “brand” is the inherent promise that a brand has built into the name, the repeated experience that the customer has had with the brand that reinforces this promise, and the relationship that develops between the consumer and the brand. All of this requires structuring, nurturing and careful management, and it costs time, effort and money. When the economy and individual incomes are growing, consumers are willing to shell out a little extra for a brand and all that it stands for.

However, brands get into trouble if income and spending perceptions turn downwards, and comparable products are available. The 10+ per cent premium between branded and generic begins to look like an important saving to the customer.  Or conversely, due to the growing market more suppliers for the same product appear that the retailer can use as a foil to the branded market leader. With falling import barriers, more diverse contract manufacturing becomes available for sourcing private label merchandise. The scenario becomes particularly grim if the relationship between the brand and the consumer is not old enough to have become lasting – in this case, replacement of the brand with an alternative or a retailer’s own label is truly feasible.

The Indian market, at this time, shows all of the above ingredients. Inflation is making consumers reconsider how and where they spend their money.  The growth of the market over the last few years has attracted several companies with alternative products and brands e.g. ITC as a challenger to biscuit-cookie major Britannia as well as to Pepsi’s potato chip brand Lays. Retailers such as the Future Group, Shopper’s Stop and Reliance have actively incorporated imports into their sourcing strategy. In many cases, the brands that most want to be on the modern retailer’s shelves are new to the market, and don’t yet have a strong imprint on the consumer’s mind.

However, at the same time, retailers themselves are still developing the systems and disciplines to manage their relatively new businesses. They are more than fully occupied with rising real estate costs, and managing the front end. If a brand can handle the product and supply side for a reasonable margin, they are more than happy to ride with the brand.

There is place for the branded suppliers in the market, and for them even to lead the market. Even as retailers grow, branded suppliers won’t lie down or die quietly. Many of them (such as Hindustan Unilever) are also actively engaging with smaller retailers, to help them improve their business processes and competitiveness. On the other hand, they are also reconciled to the inevitable growth of modern retailers, and are developing “key account management” functions, parallel distribution processes etc. to cater to the large retailers differently from the rest of the market.

So will brands survive, or will it be the retailer with the muscle of the storefront relegate them to a small portion of the market?

As long as the competitive pressures and economic cycles remain, the relationship between retailers and their branded suppliers will inherently be a tug-of-war for margin.

In either case, whether individual brands or retailers win or lose in the short term, the consumer will hopefully be a beneficiary in terms of better product, more variety and some sanity in terms of prices.

Creating an entrepreneurial ecosystem is absolutely critical to a healthy and vigorous society and economy.

Creating a “democratic” entrepreneurial ecosystem is even more critical to sustaining that health. A democratic entrepreneurial system is like all other democracies – inclusive and widespread – and vital to improving the baseline quality of life.

As we’ve pointed out elsewhere, retailing is not just a fundamentally entrepreneurial business, it also offers up a platform for the birth and growth of other entrepreneurial businesses.

Obviously, big retailers offer a change for companies to scale up faster, once they meet the performance criteria set by the retailers.

The interesting thing is that small retailers offer an even more interesting growth opportunity since, as their own business grows, they grow their supply partners as well.

Countless companies and brands have been launched on the back of the likes of Wal-Mart, Carrefour, Tesco, Marks & Spencer, and in India retailers such as Pantaloon’s and Spencer’s (and even some of the early modern retailers in India that don’t exist anymore).

In view of this, it is wonderful to see 2-9 February 2008 being celebrated as Entrepreneurship Week (on the National Entrepreneurship Network’s website) and also its powerfully worded pledge.