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August 6, 2025
Naini Thaker, Forbes India
Aug 06, 2025
It’s a known fact that of the thousands of startups founded each year, only a small fraction survive—and even fewer scale to become unicorns. Rarer still are those unicorns which, after reaching dizzying heights, come crashing down. The Good Glamm Group is one such cautionary tale.
Once celebrated as a unicorn that cracked the code on content-to-commerce, the company’s meteoric rise was matched only by the speed of its unravelling. At the heart of its downfall lies a critical misstep: The relentless pursuit of growth through acquisitions and brand launches, even as cracks in its house-of-brands model began to show. Instead of pausing to consolidate and build sustainably, Good Glamm doubled down—prioritising valuation over viability.
That strategy came to a head on July 23 when founder and CEO Darpan Sanghvi announced the dissolution of the group’s house-of-brands structure. In a LinkedIn post, Sanghvi confirmed that lenders would now oversee the sale of individual brands, effectively ending the company’s vision of building a digital-first FMCG conglomerate.
Despite raising $30 million in 2024 and undergoing multiple rounds of restructuring, the group failed to integrate its acquisitions or generate sustainable profitability. With key investors such as Accel and Bessemer Venture Partners exiting the board and leadership turnover accelerating, the company’s ambitious empire—built on rapid expansion and aggressive brand aggregation—has now been reduced to a lender-led breakup.
In the aftermath of the announcement, Sanghvi offered a candid reflection on what went wrong. “In hindsight, it wasn’t one decision, one market force, or one acquisition. It was three levers we pulled, which together, turned Momentum into a Trap,” he wrote in a LinkedIn post. According to Sanghvi, the group’s downfall stemmed from doing “too much, too fast and too big”.
He elaborated: “At first, Momentum feels like your greatest ally. Every headline, every funding round, every big launch is a shot of adrenaline. And you start believing you can do more and more and more. But momentum has a dark side. If you stop steering and go in a hundred different directions, it doesn’t just carry you forward, it drags you faster and faster until you can’t breathe.”
Where The Model Broke?
In October 2017, Sanghvi launched direct-to-consumer (DTC) beauty brand MyGlamm. Most brands at the time were big on selling on marketplaces such as Amazon or Nykaa. However, Sanghvi believed, “We wanted to be truly DTC and not just digitally enabled. We believed that to own the customer, the transaction needs to happen on our own platform.”
But the biggest challenge with being a DTC brand is its customer acquisition cost (CAC). Towards the end of 2019, the company was spending about $15 (over ₹1,000) to acquire a customer to transact on their website. “Around the same time, our revenue run rate was ₹100 crore. We were spending about $0.5 million to acquire 30,000 customers a month. That’s when we realised it was time to solve the CAC problem,” Sanghvi told Forbes India in 2022. In an attempt to find a solution, Sanghvi turned to the content-to-commerce model.
And then, started the acquisition spree. According to Sanghvi, with a single brand in a single category one can’t build scale. He told Forbes India, “The most you can scale it is ₹1,000 crore, if you want a company that’s doing ₹8,000 or ₹10,000 crore in revenue, it has to be multiple brands across multiple categories.” In hindsight, this perspective might be debatable.
As Devangshu Dutta, founder of consultancy Third Eyesight, points out, the “house of brands” model is essentially a modern-day consumer-facing business conglomerate—and its success hinges on multiple factors working in harmony. While there are examples globally and in India of such models thriving, both privately and publicly, the reality is far more nuanced. “Brands take time to grow, and organisations take time to mature,” Dutta notes, emphasising that rapid aggregation of founder-led businesses under a single ownership umbrella is no guarantee of success.
In recent years, Dutta feels the influx of capital into early-stage startups and copycat models—often seen as lower risk due to their success in other geographies—has shortened business lifecycles and inflated expectations. The hope is that synergies across the portfolio will unlock outsized value, but that rarely plays out as planned. “It is well-documented that more than 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions fail,” he adds, citing reasons such as weak brand fundamentals, lack of synergy, inadequate capital, limited management bandwidth, and internal misalignment.
In the case of Good Glamm, these fault lines became increasingly visible as the group expanded faster than it could integrate or stabilise.
Scaling Without Steering
In FY21, the company had losses of ₹43.63 crore, which rose to ₹362.5 crore in FY22 and went up to ₹917 crore in FY23. Despite the mounting losses, Good Glamm marked its entry into the US market, in a joint venture with tennis player Serena Williams to launch a new brand—Wyn Beauty by Serena Williams. The launch was in partnership with US-based beauty retailer Ulta Beauty.
For its international expansion, it invested close to ₹250 crore over three years. “We anticipate that the international business will account for 25 to 35 percent of our total group revenues by the end of next year. This strategic focus on international expansion is pivotal as we prepare for our IPO in October 2025,” he told Forbes India in April 2024.
Clearly, things didn’t pan out as expected. As Sanghvi rightly points out, it was indeed a momentum trap. “You tell yourself you’ll fix the leaks after the next milestone. But the milestones keep coming, and so do the leaks. Soon, you’re running from fire to fire, never realising that the whole building is getting hotter. And somewhere along the way, you lose the stillness to think,” he writes on his LinkedIn post.
Dutta feels that a strong balance sheet is the most fundamental requirement, “to provide growth-funding for the acquisitions or for allowing the time needed for the acquisitions to mature into self-sustaining businesses over years. In the case of VC-funded businesses, the pressure to scale in a short time can go against what may be best for the business or for its individual brands”.
The Good Glamm Group’s fall is a reminder that scale alone doesn’t build resilience. Its story reflects the risks of expanding faster than a business can integrate, and of prioritising valuation over value. The house-of-brands model can work—but only when backed by strategic clarity, operational discipline, and patience. This is less a warning and more a reminder for founders: Scale is not success, and speed is not strategy.
(Published in Forbes India)
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July 28, 2025
By Meenakshi Verma Ambwani, Hindu Businessline
New Delhi, July 28, 2025
Nykaa said that Kay Beauty, co-founded with actor Katrina Kaif, has crossed the ₹240 crore mark in terms of Gross Merchandise Value.
Stars from the tinsel town are donning the entrepreneurial hat to venture into the beauty and fashion business space. Some have even succeeded in growing their brands sustainably, earning big bucks.
Take for instance Skincare brand Hyphen, co-founded by actor Kriti Sanon with Pep Brands, which recently touched the ₹400 crore-mark in Annual Recurring Revenues.
Tarun Sharma, CEO and co-founder, Hyphen told businessline: “The brand is witnessing healthy growth rate quarter-on-quarter. In the first year itself, it touched ₹100 crore ARR. We had aimed for ₹500 crore ARR in 3-4 years and, within two years, we are at ₹400crore ARR.” Pep Brands led by Sharma owns mCaffeine and Hyphen.
The model that works
Sharma believes an operator-led, celebrity anchored model works better. ”The operator can bring in the necessary financial and execution muscle. If a celeb partners with an operator that has deep expertise in the space, then there is huge potential for growth,” he added.
“Product launches, marketing and distribution are very data-driven at Pep Brands. It guides us on what to launch, when to launch, and how to launch products. That has helped Hyphen in achieving this kind of growth rate. It is by design that the majority of the business of Hyphen is D2C,” Sharma explained.
In May, Nykaa said that Kay Beauty, co-founded with actor Katrina Kaif, has crossed the ₹240 crore mark in terms of Gross Merchandise Value. On an earnings call for Q4FY25, Adwaita Nayar, Executive Director, Chief Executive Officer, Nykaa Fashion, said: “Kay Beauty is one of the fastest-growing brands on the platform. It’s hit about ₹240 crore of GMV. The innovations have been fantastic this year. So, it is quite a premium brand, and I think the consumers are accepting it even at that price point. It’s got great gross margins.”
Earlier this year, Reliance Retail Ventures announced that it has decided to acquire 51 per cent stake in Ed-a-Mamma , a kid and maternity wear brand founded by actor Alia Bhatt. According to some reports, Hrithik Roshan’s sportswear brand HRX is a ₹1,000 crore brand.
Among the recent entrants are Ranbir Kapoor, who has decided to foray in the apparel and accessories space with ARKS. Launched in February, the brand has also launched its first store in Mumbai, followed by a second store in New Delhi and another with Broadway in Hyderabad.
‘Shift in preferences’
Abhinav Verma, co-founder and CEO, ARKS, told businessline: “We are seeing a shift in consumer preferences towards made-in-India brands. We decided to leverage on the strong manufacturing capability that India has to build a brand that is both aspirational and offers value. We are looking to build a ₹100 crore brand in the next 3-4 years with a strong omni-channel strategy.”
“The success of some of these brands demonstrates that building on consumer relevance and with powerful time-bound execution, celebrity ventures can become significant players in a crowded market. With consumer demand for relatability and digital-first branding on the rise, this segment will definitely grow. However, only brands that offer genuine value to consumers, and not just star appeal, are likely to endure,” said Devangshu Dutta, CEO, Third Eyesight.
(Published in The Hindu-Businessline)
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July 28, 2025
Ananditha Anand, Deccan Chronicle (Hyderabad Chronicle)
Hyderabad, 28 July 2025
Beauty is borrowing from the bakery. Be it glazed donut skin, popularised by Hailey Bieber, jam lips, or strawberry freckles – food related makeup looks, as well as cosmetic marketing trends have been at an all-time high. In June 2025, around 2 lakh users looked up latte makeup on the image-based social media platform, Pinterest.
The Novelty Value
According to social-media-influencer Yashvi Bhaia, these trends bring a sense of novelty to cosmetic products. “Take a look at one of the body washes called Whipped Lush. It feels exactly like whipped cream – fluffy, foamy and sweet. This visual being attached to the product brings a pleasant connection,” she says.
Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a management consulting firm, says, “Terms like choco mousse blush or berry lip tint evokes indulgence, comfort, and a sense of reward, transforming cosmetics into emotional experiences rather than just functional items.” Dutta likened these products to comforting treats, exuding warmth and a nostalgia for food they have consumed before, bottled in these makeup products.
Dhanashree Kavitkar is an avid follower of makeup trends on platforms like Instagram, as well as Chinese sites like Douyin and Red Note. She observes that the melding of the sensory elements of food and makeup “satisfied” the consumer.
“It works almost the same way ASMR does. When I think of jelly lips, I think edible, with a plump and glossy texture. And it just hits the right spot in my brain,” she says.
She also believes that many of these beauty trends, under the guise of novelty, are repackaging pre-existing makeup trends to make it appealing again. “Take strawberry freckle makeup for example, it is literally just drawing freckles on your face, but they gave it a new name to intrigue people,” she says.
Bina Punjani, owner of Bina Punjani Hair Studio says, “These are all marketing buzz-words created by online makeup companies, who wish to advertise to a younger audience.” She explains that food related nomenclature has existed forever in the realm of hair care products, with wines, chocolates, and caramels dominating the hair colour market.
“Sensory feelings have been a huge part of marketing and communication, be it on television, or anywhere else,” said Bhaia. “Now that marketing is so video-forward online, brands will create visuals associated with food,” she says.
Dutta adds that rather than a new concept, the increased intensity and consistency of these beauty brands employing food-related marketing on social media platforms differentiate it from their marketing in the 1980s – when it was first popularised.
Cultural Adaptation
Talking about the virality aspect of these makeup trends, Kavitkar points out how the looks trending in India (and around the world right now), were popular in East Asian countries like China and South Korea a year ago.
“Thanks to the matcha wave now, strawberry matcha makeup is popular. More East Asian food items like mochi and tanghulu have also picked up steam in the makeup space, and have gotten popular globally. But they can feel a bit alien to Indian consumers who don’t know these trends beforehand,” she says. Bhaia talks about how Indian cosmetic products adapted these trends to cater to the Indian “taste.” A leading brand has come up with lip products named masala chai, and jalebi glaze.
“These are such Indian terms, and they’ve been marketed so well. When you think of jalebi, you think of this shiny, orange-ish kind of thing, and you have a very clear visual of it.”
Just Another Trend
What keeps the novelty of these trends alive? Punjani thinks that it is the familiarity that we as humans draw towards nature and ourselves. “Suppose you look at your skin tone, and you see that exact shade in a pear – you end up drawing a psychological connection between the two,” she says.
Kavitkar thinks that they bring in a new wave of experimentation. She says, “Look at tangerine dream makeup. It is a mix of yellow and orange blush on your face, which looks so weird. If you saw someone wearing yellow blush outside, you’d be like, what the hell is she wearing? But that’s the beauty of this look, it’s so out of the box.”
Dutta notes that the frequency of usage of any imagery in the industry ebbs and flows with fashions. “Food, however, consistently provides an intuitive, emotional, and relatable entry point for consumers to engage with beauty, and will remain a versatile tool for building stories around pleasure, nostalgia, authenticity, and self-care,” he says.
While the world goes ‘bananas’ over ‘latte makeup’ and ‘gingerbread nails’ you can try the silent power of ‘smokey eyes’ and nude lips!
(Published in Deccan Chronicle)
Devangshu Dutta
June 30, 2025
In every strategy meeting today, one metric is invariably mentioned: Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC). Whether you’re a well-funded corporate retailer, or raising your first angel round, or a well-established digital duopolist brand scaling Series C, CAC is one of the key performance metrics. “Real” spend that is neatly broken down by channel, optimised by funnel tweaks, scrutinised to the last rupee or dollar.
But there’s a metric we almost never hear about that could be costing brands far more in the long run.
Let’s call it Customer Forfeiture Cost (CFC), the residual lifetime value that is lost when a customer walks away from your business not because of price, competition, or even shifting needs, but because of a “burn”: a delivery missed or messed up, a refund that took weeks, an arrogant customer service call, or a product that failed spectacularly against the promise. In other words, when your brand hurts someone enough to make them walk away. Probably for ever.
It’s a paradox: brands are pumping thousands of crores into acquiring users, but they’re bleeding value at the other end. Yet, while CAC is a line item in every financial statement, CFC is invisible in management dashboards. CEOs don’t announce, “We’ve cut our forfeiture cost by 20% this quarter.”
Yet. every CXO knows it exists. The NPS scores, the social media complaints, the “never again” comments in reviews, the sinking feeling when repeat purchase rates fall.
Why CFC Matters More Than Ever
In every business, during the early stages each sale is a victory. Whether it was the retail chains that grew in the 1990s and early-2000s or the digital upstarts that came up through 2010s and 2020s, scale has been the mantra, and investors have poured money into scaling through the growing consumption of India 1 and India 2 customers.
Today customer acquisition isn’t cheap. The same person who clicked impulsively in 2020 now thinks twice before confirming payment. In this landscape, retention isn’t optional, it’s existential.
Every lost customer isn’t just a refund processed, or a cart abandoned. It’s the long tail of future repeat purchases that will never happen, negative word of mouth and brand distrust in the customer’s circle of influence, and increased future CAC due to declining organic reach.
Way back in 1967, management consultant Peter Drucker wrote in his book “The Effective Executive”: “What gets measured, gets managed”.
Today your CAC may be Rs. 500-1,000. If the average customer life time value (LTV) is Rs. 10,000, and a single burn causes churn after just one order worth Rs. 2,000, your CFC is Rs. 8,000, and that doesn’t even include reputational spillover.
Why We Don’t Measure It
Yes, CFC is hard to quantify. It’s not as easily attributable as ad spends. There’s usually no neat model telling you why someone never returned, because tech stacks aren’t typically designed to track emotional exits. And let’s face it, introspection about broken relationships is uncomfortable, even for management teams.
But that doesn’t mean it’s not real. If a customer leaves because your delivery executive messed up, or because your app crashed during checkout twice in a row, that’s on you, not the market. And in a business climate where sustainable growth is the mantra, LTV is king.
Ignoring CFC is like watching your roof leak and blaming the rain.
Toward a New Discipline
Brands and retailers must start measuring CFC, the value lost when customers disengage due to friction, mistrust, or neglect, and then start working on reducing it. This can be done by:
The Competitive Edge We’re Not Using
In a crowded space where everyone’s vying for eyeballs, trust is the true moat. Customers don’t expect perfection – they do expect accountability, authenticity, and recovery when things go wrong.
Brands that understand and act on Customer Forfeiture Costs will quietly start building a powerful edge: deeper brand loyalty, lower CAC over time thanks to referrals and repeats and greater lifetime value per user.
In other words, real, compounding value.
As the Indian brand ecosystem matures, Customer Forfeiture Cost needs to be as visible and valued as CAC. Acquisition is the invitation; experience is the relationship. Relationships, once broken, are expensive to rebuild; if they can be rebuilt at all.
In the end, growth isn’t just about who comes in. It’s about who stays, and why.
(Written by Devangshu Dutta, Founder of Third Eyesight, this was published in Financial Express on 2 July 2025)
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June 13, 2025
Hiral Goyal, The Morning Context
13 June 2025
Several smart, well-to-do Indians believe they have an opportunity to build a successful business by selling apparel to affluent people. Armed with this hypothesis and with venture capital in tow, these entrepreneurs are having a go at the market.
Some are building a business just around undergarments, for instance. Others are focusing on premium T-shirts. Or denim wear. There’s also ethnic wear. And work clothes. Even workout clothes. It would appear that every niche in the apparel market is being exploited by someone who believes they have a product that can disrupt the category and create a large, sustainable business.
Amid this sea of ventures, BlissClub stands out.
In only five years of operations, the Bengaluru-based startup has made a name for itself. By simply focusing on premium activewear for women. Now that’s a niche within a niche.
Founded by Minu Margeret in 2020, BlissClub’s story goes something like this. Drawing on her personal experience as a frisbee player, Margeret started BlissClub to address the needs of Indian women who struggled to find comfortable and functional activewear. With inclusive sizing and tiny details such as pockets and wide waistbands in leggings, the startup catered to Indian women with products that were specifically designed for them and their body types.
The idea clicked. Women were willing to experiment with BlissClub’s clothing and, on the back of its early success, the company has grown from zero to revenue of over Rs 85 crore as of 31 March 2024. The startup has also been able to raise capital from VC investors like Elevation Capital, Eight Roads Ventures and Alteria Capital, who’ve come on board hoping that Margeret is onto something. Just last month, the company raised Rs 45 crore (around $5.3 million) in a Series B funding round, a mix of debt and equity. This took its total fundraise to nearly $26 million (Rs 222 crore), according to Entrackr.
Except that’s all the good news there is. Five years in, it looks like BlissClub is at a crossroads. Its revenue growth has slowed-from 360% year-on-year in 2022-23 to just 27% in 2023-24-and its valuation remains flat at $67 million.
Already, women’s activewear as a category is far too niche. It doesn’t help that BlissClub now faces intense competition from legacy players like Page Industries (Jockey’s India licensee), Aditya Birla Group and French sporting goods retailer Decathlon as well as startups like HRX and Clovia. All of them are trying to grow their sales to keep up with the rapidly growing trend of casual attire, where product differentiation is now largely down to marketing. It is another matter altogether that these customers are price-conscious, and disposable income to spend on premium clothing is limited to a few million people in India.
That’s the reality of the market where BlissClub operates. “The greatest challenge for the new athleisure brands, apart from capital and internal execution discipline, is to maintain brand integrity rather than get sucked into price battles and discounting, which is a race to the bottom that only the businesses with large balance sheets can win,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder and chief executive of Third Eyesight, a management consulting firm focused on the retail and consumer goods industry.
Questions sent to Margeret did not elicit a response. But it’s important to ask, what should BlissClub do? It may have had a great start, but is that enough to scale? This is what we’ve set out to explore in this story.
Fighting the big guns
Almost every customer in India who’s out to buy activewear or athleisure-has enough well-known brands to choose from. There’s Jockey, Decathlon, Nike, Puma, Adidas, Asics and Skechers, to name a few. And there’s something for everyone at every possible price point.
So, what particular need is BlissClub trying to fulfill?
Margeret says she started the company because she could never find appropriate activewear in the Indian market. From BlissClub’s website about its origin story: “While some clothes were comfortable, they simply did not stretch enough. Those that did stretch, were too compressive.” With BlissClub, Margeret focused on inclusive sizes and comfortable fabric that was ideally suited to India’s hot climate.
But are inclusivity and quality enough when it comes to having a differentiating factor? Not really.
Nothing, for instance, would stop other brands from copying BlissClub’s designs or offering comparable quality to gain customers. Additionally, BlissClub risks losing customers to other brands if it fails to keep up with its promise of top-most quality products. Some customers have already taken to social media recently to share their grievances (here, here, here and here). Their most common complaint? The quality of BlissClub’s fabric has gone down and there’s a lot of pilling.
On top of this, there is unrelenting competition from legacy players, most of whom have been building their athleisure portfolio for sometime now. Take Page Industries, for example. The company launched its athleisure portfolio in 1995, but it only doubled down on making it a key growth pillar in 2014-15. Just a couple of years later, Aditya Birla Group entered the men’s athleisure business with Van Heusen in 2016 and later expanded into women’s wear as well. Both these brands were quick to identify the shifting fashion trend to casual wear and benefited handsomely when the category finally exploded during the COVID-19 pandemic-as people started working from home and focusing on their physical health. Here’s what Page Industries’ CEO Karthik Yathindra told Mint in 2022 about the company’s decision to focus on athleisure: “So, the timing worked out for us very well. Demand has also been healthy across innerwear for men and women, but athleisure really surged a lot more than what we had anticipated or planned for. I would say, we jumped a year or two in terms of demand with athleisure compared to pre-pandemic days. We literally doubled our business. Whereas, overall, as an organization, we clocked 37-38% jump in revenue in the last financial year.”
It is no surprise then that these companies are well positioned in terms of the distribution network and the range of choices they offer to take on the Indian athleisure market as compared to BlissClub and other small players. Page Industries, for example, has more than 111,000 multi-brand stores and 1,453 exclusive brand stores, besides its digital presence through its own website and third-party marketplaces. BlissClub, on the other hand, has largely been an online player, selling products through its own website or through marketplaces like Myntra and Amazon. At present, it runs 14 retail stores across nine cities.
That’s no small gap, and competition is only going to heat up. So, what options does BlissClub have?
Stretched thin
From where BlissClub stands today, there are only a few ways it can grow its top line. Mostly because the size of India’s athleisure market remains small; it’s even smaller for women. “Athleisure is a $15 billion market with a CAGR of 20%. Of this, women are -30-40%,” says Gaurav Verma, co-founder and head of consumer investments at venture capital fund Ortella Global Capital. This $5-billion market for women’s activewear becomes smaller if we take into account only the premium space. (We couldn’t independently verify this estimate as there are no reliable reports available.)
In a niche market like this, there’s limited room to scale. Unless you cut down prices, introduce more categories, start catering to all genders or open retail stores. Let’s look at each of these options.
First up, the prices. Any premium brand that cuts prices risks diluting itself. Now, BlissClub has been handing out discounts and buy-one-get-one offers more liberally than ever before. For example, its Ultimate Leggings the company’s bestselling product -is priced at Rs 2,299 and sold at Rs 1,399 after discount. But when you compare it with Decathlon or homegrown brands like Hrithik Roshan-backed HRX or Clovia, you’d find that BlissClub remains in the premium segment even after discounts. And while lowering prices further might help BlissClub gain more customers, its margins-already EBITDA-negative-will most likely suffer.
The second strategy is introducing more categories. This is something BlissClub seems to be interested in. The startup entered the innerwear category with sports bras. The latest additions have been swimwear and travel wear. But in these segments, BlissClub is yet to replicate the kind of success it saw with its flagship products-Ultimate Leggings and Ultimate Flare Pants.
There is a bigger problem here. When it comes to athleisure startups, says Verma, “there are growth concerns beyond the top 3-5 SKUs [stock keeping units) like leggings, tops.” He goes on to say, “Unless we see growth in [direct-to-consumer) on higher-priced SKUs like jackets, shoes and accessories, we will continue to see pressure on both top line and bottom line growth.”
To make matters worse for BlissClub, the new categories the company is venturing into are witnessing increased competition. Take innerwear, for example. Influencer Kusha Kapila recently announced her shapewear brand Underneat, backed by Fireside Ventures and Mamaearth co-founder Ghazal Alagh. Besides this, players like Jockey, Clovia and Van Heusen have also been fighting for market share.
The third option, then, is to enter the menswear category. Though a natural extension for any athleisure brand, it does not promise scale. Let’s look at Technosport for some perspective. The A91 Partners-backed company, which sells affordable activewear for men and women across categories, reported a revenue of Rs 382 crore (around $44.5 million) in 2023-24. But that is after 18 years of operations and catering to the mass market with a fairly well-established distribution in the offline channel.
An even bigger challenge for BlissClub here would be to shake off its identity as a brand for women. Take the case of Lululemon. When the Canadian activewear company entered the men’s business in 2014, the biggest concern was that the brand was popularized by women and it would be tough to convince male customers to buy its products. The breakthrough here was the company’s ABC pants-short for anti-ball crushing pants-which helped Lululemon acquire male customers. Still, Lululemon continues to struggle with its identity as a women’s brand. Its latest effort to fight this was by making seven-time Formula 1 champion Lewis Hamilton its brand ambassador.
Finally, there’s the option of opening physical stores to acquire more customers. A digital-first strategy, says Dutta, allows the newer niche brands to directly connect with their target customers and achieve a critical mass. However, to get greater scale, “they need to add offline presence as well,” he notes. “Offline stores are not just a mainstreaming opportunity but also a way to create a brand immersion experience for the consumers, which can strengthen the connect with their core consumer segment.”
However, considering that BlissClub is a premium brand, it only makes sense for the brand to open outlets in high-street markets. But this would entail some serious expenditure. After all, opening retail stores requires capital.
Raising capital, though, does not look like a tall order for BlissClub. Its most recent fundraise, which will be used towards growth and expansion, is a testament to that. Before that, the company had raised $15 million in its Series A round. The credit for this partly goes to Margeret and Vidit Aatrey’s connections in the VC ecosystem. Aatrey, Margeret’s husband, is Meesho’s co-founder and CEO (the e-commerce company itself has raised $1.61 billion in total funding.)
Thanks to the funds it has been able to raise, BlissClub has had a good run so far.
However, with competition brewing in this space, the company risks losing its edge and becoming one of many. To give credit where it’s due, BlissClub has done a great job at building brand equity in the Indian activewear market. To grow beyond where it is today, though, it will need to rethink its strategy.
Perhaps it already is. In the last year, BlissClub has entered into categories beyond activewear; this includes innerwear, swimwear and most recently, travel wear. At the same time, it is also opening retail stores across the country.
How BlissClub scales will leave cues not just for Margeret but everyone else who believes they can build a niche apparel company in India successfully.
(Published in The Morning Context)
