Devangshu Dutta
August 31, 2006
Mall Mania, Mall Madness – alliterate as you will – it’s a phenomenon that is certainly taking over the newsprint, airtime and, quite possibly, your neighbourhood.
A study published in 2005 estimated that by 2007 over 360 shopping centres would be operational around the country, with approximately 90 million square feet. A meagre increase of 0.08 sq. ft. in per capita shopping space doesn’t seem like much in a country of a billion-plus people.
But most of it is concentrated around the big cities – Delhi and Mumbai account for more than half of the total space projected, with the other metros and mini-metros such as Bangalore, Pune, Hyderabad etc. taking the total up to 90% of the space.
One may argue that money (real estate development) is only following the money (consumers) – after all, there are more consumers and higher incomes in these major urban centres.
But why would mall developers expect Delhi’s consumers to suddenly switch en-masse to shopping in Gurgaon, where 6 malls are already active in a short distance of about a kilometre, 3-4 more under hectic construction in the same area and several more scattered around that suburb? Or why do Mumbai’s developers expect people to drive several kilometres from the suburbs on a regular basis to the centre of town to grace only their shopping centre? It is only such expectations that can explain the gold rush mentality that is overpopulating certain areas with shopping centres and malls.
While per-capita availability of A-grade shopping real estate looks really low, in certain areas we foresaw oversupply, with developers thinking in terms of “property” rather than as retail space managers.
Most shopping centre developers have carried out only cursory studies on the customer catchments that their tenants will be expected to live-off. As a result, conversion of footfall into sales is low for the tenants, except for food-courts, which are benefiting from the window-shoppers rounding off a day or an evening of roaming the malls with a meal. There is a lack of differentiation in product and service offer between the shopping centres and, with nothing distinctive on offer, repeat visits and – more importantly – repeat purchases are a challenge.
Developers in smaller towns seem to be following the same model, scaling up space or scaling it down based on the capital cost vs. expected capital gain and tenancy income. They are pitching for much the same brands as tenants as the developers in the bigger cities.
There is competition for customer traffic between the shopping centres and large stores (such as Mumbai’s newly opened Hypercity, across the street from InOrbit Mall, both developed by the Rahejas), between the shopping centres and the traditional high street, and between large format stores and speciality malls.
For the most part shopping centre development in India in the recent years has been seen as an aspiration to be fulfilled – hence, the most important factors have been the size of the shopping centre, quality of fixtures, marquee tenants who can provide the glamour or the legitimacy). The focus has been more on the “positioning”.
The business will begin maturing and will begin taking developmental leaps forward when centres are seen as commercial infrastructure to be planned with the end-consumer in mind, and to be serviced over a certain lifetime.
Until then, we can look forward to announcements of many hundreds of shopping centres, the launch of a few hundred, and the conversion of many of those into uses other than as shopping centres within a few months or years of their launch. And for investors also it might be a game of Roulette rather than Patience.
Devangshu Dutta
May 18, 2006
When I am at the receiving end of expectations, business plans and such like, of companies that are looking to ride the current retail boom in India, one thing stands out, and scares me the most: the opening slides, paragraphs or pages that are devoted to the “opportunity presented by India’s booming middle class and its rising income”.
In the previous part to this column (“The Case of the Missing Millions“, 27 April 2006), we concluded that for most international companies looking at India, the potential target market was in the region of 18-19 million people, or over 3 million households. When international companies look at the “middle class” they may be looking at annual household incomes adjusted for PPP in the region of US$ 40,000 (Rs. 5 Lakhs, in absolute terms, not adjusted for PPP), and this population number is what appears on the radar.
Clearly, this less than a tenth of the figures around which many new businesses are being launched in the hottest retail market globally (as global comparative studies are stating). 200 million, 300 million – take your pick – they’re all in the mythical range!
So is it time to put out a missing persons alert for the hundreds of millions of so-called “middle class consumers”, on whose back the current retail boom is to be built?
Hang on – the trick is in changing the frame of reference. Let’s first define what the characteristics of the middle class should be.
In my opinion a good starting point is a simple one – look for a segment that is on the middle of the income scale.
Most marketers and their reference guides live in a high-income urban India paradigm (read, Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore). Passing out of even a second-tier business school today, starting salaries can easily be over Rs. 20,000 a month. When you get into the middle-management segment, metropolitan salaries in the private sector can easily be Rs. 35,000 – 50,000 a month. This may not sound like much money when you live life from the Delhi-Mumbai-Bangalore paradigm, but trust me, it is still a very large sum of money as you go further down the list of cities and towns in India. In those towns and in semi-urban and rural India, the rupee goes a much longer way.
However, the income scale can be defined subjectively by different people.
So, to this evaluation I would add one other important attribute – this middle segment should be a substantial proportion of the total population. Clearly, a population that is only 2 to 3 per cent of the total is still very much at the narrow tip of the pyramid. We definitely need to move further down the income scale to find the real middle class.
The next annual household income range defined by NCAER is Rs. 2 Lakhs to Rs. 5 Lakhs. Now it starts to get interesting. In this income segment we are talking about approximately 9 million households or a little under 50 million people. An income of Rs. 2 Lakhs (US$ 4,500 in absolute terms) is equivalent to a little over US$ 16,000 by PPP, which is well below middle-class standards in developed economies. However, in India an income of Rs. 16,700 per month brings a number of aspirational and discretionary purchases within reach. This size of population is about the same, or larger, than many countries in Europe and will grow to 70-80 million by the end of the decade.
However, as far as my criterion of significant proportion is concerned, this still doesn’t cut it – we’re still only in the range of 6 per cent of the total population. We need to move further down the income scale, to the Rs. 90,000-200,000 annual household income range.
Bingo!
NCAER identifies this segment as having over 41 million households – that is over 225 million people – about 22 per cent of the total population. Large towns (population of over 500,000) have about 30 per cent of this population, while rural India has about half of this income group.
Earning between Rs. 7,500 a month to over Rs. 16,000 a month, this is the population that, in my opinion, is the real growth engine for the great Indian retail dream. This population has discretionary income, and yet it spends with discretion, if you will pardon the pun. It is a population that is only just beginning to be touched by cashless spending, a population that is beginning to appreciate the comforts and conveniences of modern retail, and its power as a driver of markets. It is possibly more firmly rooted in Indian traditions than aspiring to move to western standards. It is a population that is probably discovering the benefits of investing as much as it is the joys of spending thus reducing the free cash available.
Many brands are ending up planning for the 150-200 million real middle class population, while offering products and prices that are more appropriate for the ersatz “middle-class” of 15-20 million.
Consumer markets are structured around obsolescence, replacement and repeat purchases. If your product fits well within the price-value equation for repeat purchases, you have a winner. If you don’t, then what you get is a bunch of occasional purchases from most of your consumers, with long replacement cycles (or even, no repurchase).
The end result is the sales plateau that is the characteristic of so many brands in India.
If you want to volumes, prepare a product and price offer that makes sense to the real Indian middle class. The small shampoo packs make sense, the “chhota recharge” on the mobile phones makes sense. Does your product?
The missing millions aren’t really missing – they’re just invisible through our Delhi-Mumbai-Bangalore upper income blinkers. It’s time to take off the blinkers.
Devangshu Dutta
March 9, 2006
We love sales! Big Bazaar just proved it on Republic Day this year, when it couldn’t handle the crowds on its “Sabse Sasta Din” (Cheapest Day). And the designers ousted from the recently demolished shopping malls are privately thanking their stars for the sale-struck consumers who have flocked to the hotel in south Delhi, for the “(insert a designer’s name) at never-before-prices and never again”.
The psychology behind the discount sale is that we think we’ve got a great deal, having paid less than what the product is worth. There is a hint of the illicit, a feeling of having “got away” with something faintly irregular.
Let’s not even begin to dissect how many discounts are actually just padded-up prices being “slashed”, or how much “promotional merchandise” is bought cheap by the store especially for the sale. Such faux-discounts are not peculiar to India, nor are they a problem for retailers or brands providing, as they do, an event around which to build excitement and customer traffic.
The bigger issue is the nightmare the Indian market is proving to be for brands in terms of genuine discounts. Many brands end up achieving as much as 40-70% of the total annual sales turnover in one or two discount sales—clearly not a recipe for long-term business success. The problem is not restricted to a few brands. We seem to be caught in a vicious cycle of low sales in season and mad traffic during end-of-season discount events.
To me there are two main aspects to this problem—unrealistic expectations of volume and the “full-ticket price” that the products carry.
Unrealistic marketing projections may actually be the lesser of the two evils. Each brand manager believes that “customers will definitely choose my brand over other brands in the market”. Some just end up believing their own hype too much, over-rating the demand or under-rating the competition.
Some managers end up being driven by that international image more than the saleability of the brand. The end result is a marketing plan that is based on the premise that if you make enough product, create enough retail points in the market and spend enough money on advertising, the brand will deliver up to the hype.
Yes, a rising tide lifts all boats and a growing market lifts all brands. The problem arises when your boat, or brand, is leaky and results in lot of left-over product being thrown overboard at the end of the season, at discounts of 25-70%.
The bigger question is what’s the right price? Arrogant brand managers may think that there is a customer (read: sucker) at every price point and the trick is to find enough suckers…oops!…customers. Unfortunately for them, customers are fairly sharp—and reject overpriced merchandise if they can get comparable value elsewhere at lower prices.
Let me take one comparison with a market that is economically at a stage similar to India. In Bangkok, you can buy a pair of reasonably well-made polyester-viscose trousers for the equivalent of Rs 225-275 from a Thai hypermarket. Retail prices at a normal high street store in Delhi or Mumbai for a comparable product may range from Rs 400-600 or even higher. Differences of similar magnitude are visible in personal electronics and electrical items, as well as a range of other products.
If the Indian retail price points were in line with, say, the Thai retail price points, surely a lot more merchandise would move off the shelf.
Clearly, cost of goods has a large part to play in this difference. Manufacturing costs can be much higher in India due to lack of process-driven efficiencies. Also, most Indian manufacturing capacity targeted at the domestic market is sub-scale and even qualitatively sub-par.
Retail costs — including high real estate costs and store overheads — add to the problem. Most retail locations in India are priced at levels where the only store that could make money consistently would be a luxury store where low price is the last thing on the customer’s mind! Higher unit costs lead to higher prices and lower volumes, while low market off-take prevents larger scale and better manufacturing — a vicious cycle.
One way out is to take a holistic approach to the product and the supply chain. The strategy needed is “Aim low, engineer low”. Once the threshold target price at which large volumes will be sold is known, one can engineer the entire organisation, supply chain and retail location to make sure that the price point can be delivered.
As Prof C K Prahlad proposes, there is a fortune to be made at the bottom of the pyramid. At the right price, the Indian consumer is always ready to confirm, “Deal!”
(Column from The Financial Express – 9 March 2006)
Devangshu Dutta
March 3, 2006
In February, just before the mega-blitz of “India Everywhere” at the World Economic Forum, the Indian government took a step forward. Amidst shrill outcries from its coalition partners and domestic anti-FDI lobbies, it finally decided to bell the cat, and let foreigners invest in retail again!
About a month has passed since the cabinet announcement, the dust has settled, and it is a good time to consider what has happened.
Since the initial euphoria of the early-to-mid 1990s when international retailers entered the market including companies such as Benetton (50% JV) and Littlewoods (100% subsidiary), this revised policy provides the first opportunity for large global companies to participate in the Indian market’s growth.
The key questions being raised are:
What Is Allowed, and Who Might Enter?
Let’s first deal with what the government has actually allowed. In a nutshell, a foreign retailer can set up a company in India in which it holds 51% equity, the balance being held by an Indian partner. This subsidiary can operate retail stores in India under one brand name. All products in the store must also carry the same brand name, and this branding must have been applied during the process of manufacturing.
This means that, as yet, a foreign department store selling multiple national and international brands cannot set up its own 51% owned operation in India. Nor can a supermarket or hypermarket chain like Wal-Mart, Carrefour or Tesco, sell their wide range of products under any name but their own, if they decided to take a majority stake in a retail operation.
In theory, you could have a Wal-Mart store selling Wal-Mart cola (not Pepsi), Wal-Mart butter (not Amul or Mother Dairy), Wal-Mart chocolates (not Cadbury’s), Wal-Mart cookies (not Britannia or Sunfeast), Wal-Mart T-shirts (not USI or Duke). You could have Tesco jeans (not Levi’s or Numero Uno) or Carrefour luggage (not Samsonite or VIP). This obviously dilutes the consumer proposition of the store, which may then have to primarily focus on a single-point agenda – such as low prices – to draw consumer footfall.
On the one hand, the cabinet decision clearly allows companies such as Starbucks and The Body Shop to step in with a majority stake, provided the branding is clearly by the primary name (store name) – thus, you may not be sold the famous “Tazo Tea” in Starbucks, but get “Starbucks Tea” instead.
However, to a brand such as Starbucks, this policy change is significant as its international expansion is largely through owned operations, especially in potentially large and strategic markets such as India. Starbucks would now have the option of not only controlling the retail operation through a 51% ownership, but also the raw material sourcing, storage and wholesale operation.
On the one hand, this may mean nothing to a retailer such as The Body Shop, whose international strategy in Asia has been largely driven through franchise relationships. This is true now of India as well, as The Body Shop announced its master franchise arrangement with Planet Sports in India.
A retailer such as Gap would need to set up separate retail operations for Gap, Old Navy, Banana Republic and Forth & Towne. There obviously are ways to consolidate operations even with the diverse retail corporate structure, but it does mean that the foreign retailer will be operating several corporate entities in India.
An existing company such as Benetton does not benefit from this change in regulation. In 2005 Benetton actually increased its stake in its joint-venture to 100%, but in the bargain had to forego the stores it was running. Its current network comprises entirely of franchise stores, and will have to remain so, unless Benetton reduces its stake to 51% in order to be able to run stores in India, which is highly unlikely.
Other existing international brands such as Levi Strauss, Adidas and Nike are not retailers in themselves, and are not dramatically affected by the change in policy at all. All of them operate subsidiaries in which they have complete or majority ownership. Brands such as Tommy Hilfiger, Wrangler and Lee are also present through licence or franchise relationships, and unlikely to change their strategy.
Will Global Retailers Come?
All of this obviously raises the question whether government regulations preventing foreign investment in retail were or are actually keeping foreign companies out of the Indian retail market.
The answer to that is both “No” and “Yes”. The reason is that companies that are looking at international expansion apply criteria that are specific to their own business needs which can lead to very different evaluations by each company.
Laws allowing or preventing FDI in retail are only one of the several factors that any global retailer would look at, when considering a market.
Other factors, such as various market options possible at the time, the state of development in the market, existing sourcing and other relationships, scale and scope of investment required vs. the rate of return expected, the risk factors involved, and the retailer’s own business strategy, all play a part in their decision-making process.
Thus, in one company’s case India may be the hottest market in which it would like to open a store at the earliest possible date this year, while for another company India may be of interest only after 5-7 years.
Opening single-brand retail to foreign direct investment, therefore, is at best an encouraging signal that the government has provided. It is unlikely to prompt international retailers to look at India any sooner than they might otherwise have.
The second key issue is whether FDI itself is of any consequence to whether the retailers enter India. This again is related to the individual retailer’s own strategy and business context, as well as how they perceive the risk-return ratio.
Thus, while China may not have any restrictions on foreign investment in retail, western retailers may still prefer to go with a local partner due to the differences in cultural and market nuances. Even in other unrestricted markets international retailers may prefer to enter through licensees or franchisees because the effort and investment in setting up their own company may not be compensated by the size of the opportunity, or their own investment strategy may not be in line with setting up international subsidiaries.
Some companies such as Wal-Mart, Tesco, Gap and Starbucks prefer to invest in international operations themselves, as ownership gives them a higher degree of control over the business. Of course, both Tesco and Wal-Mart have set up joint ventures in markets that are starkly different in cultural and business norms from their home markets but, by and large, where feasible these companies prefer majority or 100% stake in the business.
Other companies, such as Mothercare, Debenhams and The Body Shop, have expanded their international presence through franchises. Their premise is proprietary product and an enormously powerful brand that translates well across cultures. These companies have taken the less intensive route of franchise. In India, too, they have signed master franchises. Mothercare has assigned master franchise rights to the Rahejas’ Shoppers Stop. Debenhams and The Body Shop have both signed up with Planet Sports (soon to be renamed Plant Retail), which is also the franchisee for Marks & Spencer.
Thus, while allowing FDI may help some companies, it is unlikely to have investors beating down the door in a rush to enter.
What Does FDI in Retail Mean for India?
Permission for foreigners to invest in retail businesses in India obviously mean different things to different stakeholders in India.
For real estate owners, especially shopping centre developers, new entrants are always welcome, since it provides a wider basket of brands to present to the consumer, and the opportunity to differentiate one shopping centre from another.
To existing retailers, it does mean potentially more clutter in the market, possible higher marketing expenditure for them to maintain their position. However, it also means that more players can encourage the growth of the market, which otherwise can end up looking stale and in-bred. Brands that are entering the market for the first time can also bring fresh ideas in terms of merchandise, store planning and display, advertising etc.
To the question of whether Indian retailers are prepared to handle the competition, I would say that, while global best practices help, retail is a uniquely local business. Indian retailers who bother to listen to the consumer and constantly upgrade their own business are possibly in a stronger competitive position than a foreign brand that wants to impose its own alien sensibility on the market.
For suppliers, new brands bring in new avenues for business growth. Many of the international brands will look to increasing their sourcing from India, to take advantage of local labour costs and skills, or to down-play the disadvantage of duties on imported merchandise. Thus, especially for suppliers of fashion goods this is definitely a growth opportunity. Retailers might even prefer to work with the supply base from which they already source for their operations in other markets. Thus, the growth opportunity exists for exporters – the question is how many of them are willing and able to make the transition to begin supplying locally.
Not only do new retailers bring the prospect of increased business, but also the possibility of better systems and skills, improved product development, and in all, an opportunity for the supply base to upgrade itself. This will certainly have a positive fall-out for exporters, since their business is likely to become overall more competitive globally, too.
Let’s consider another stakeholder, who we tend to miss – the government itself. Organised retailers, including global companies, tend to be more constrained by law than a retailer from the unorganised segment. Based on that assumption, a large international retailer (and his Indian counterpart) will set up a local company that will carry out business by the book, recording all sales and purchase transactions. All local sales and purchases will be subject to VAT and sales taxes, while all imports would be documented and therefore subjected to import duties. All of this means more revenue for the government.
On the other hand, do foreign retailers pose a threat at all?
Well, there is certainly a threat to those retailers who insist that the market needs to remain structured the same way that it has been for years, and who refuse to upgrade their own business. There may even be a threat to the large Indian corporate retailers who are competing on the basis of their scale relative to the rest of the market. With the presence of global retailers with deeper pockets, these large Indian retailers will no longer be the big boys on the block. But the positive outcome for the many seems to outweigh the negative outcome for the few.
What I would certainly like to see is how quickly the government translates the promise of opening into a concrete plan that can benefit the Indian consumer, the Indian supplier, the Indian real estate market and the government itself.
admin
January 1, 2006
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