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July 10, 2025
Alka Jain, Outlook Business
10 July 2025
Just when Blinkit, Instamart and Zepto were slowing down in their quick commerce game, Amazon’s entry may spur them towards a more aggressive race. The ecommerce giant has begun offering deliveries in as little as ten minutes in Delhi after Bengaluru, under the name ‘Amazon Now’.
“We are excited with the initial customer response and positive feedback, especially from Prime members. Based on this, we are now expanding the service over the next few months addressing immediate customer needs while maintaining Amazon’s standards for safety, quality and reliability,” the company said in an official statement.
Till now, the company was moving at its own pace with the idea that Indian consumers would wait a day or two for their deliveries. But the game has changed now—convenience is king here. Online shoppers want everything from milk to mobile chargers within a few minutes at their doorsteps.
And the big three of the quick commerce market—Blinkit, Instamart, Zepto—have cracked the consumer code perfectly. This trend has nudged Amazon and Flipkart to enter the 10-minute delivery segment. It started as an experiment in the larger ecommerce sector but has now become a necessity for online retailers.
Kathryn McLay, chief executive of Walmart International—an American multinational retail corporation—revealed that quick commerce now accounts for 20% of India’s ecommerce market and is growing at a rate of 50% annually. According to a Morgan Stanley report, the market is expected to reach $57bn by 2030.
Hence, Amazon could not afford to stay on the sidelines. The company has already pumped $11bn into Indian market since 2013 and recently announced another $233mn to upgrade its infrastructure and speed up deliveries. In addition, it has also opened five fulfilment centres across the country.
Despite continued investment, there are doubts if Amazon can disrupt the quick commerce game. Industry experts state that the ecommerce major’s late entry could upend the fragile unit economics of the space. It can even reignite discount wars and increase burn rate (a company spending its cash reserve while going through loss) for the incumbents, once the ecommerce giants begin to exert pressure and begin to capture market share.
Open Market, Thin Margins
Given the growth momentum and market size, quick commerce start-up Kiko.live cofounder Alok Chawla believes that there is definitely headroom to accommodate another player in the quick commerce market. However, margins may remain negative for a couple of years due to high business and delivery costs.
As per data, the average order value of ₹350–₹400 yields a gross margin of approximately 20% but high fulfilment and delivery costs (₹50–₹60 per order) significantly reduce overall profitability, often cancelling out most of the gains.
“Indian customers will not be willing to pay high shipping charges for convenience. But the market will continue to grow due to cart subsidies and shipping discounts. On top of this, profitability also remains quite some time away,” he says.
Even a survey by Grant Thornton Bharat, a professional services firm, shows that 81% of Indian quick commerce users cite discounts and offers as one of the main reasons they shop on platforms like Blinkit and Instamart.
But the fact is Amazon has extremely deep pockets, which means, the trio will once again have to get into aggressive discounting to protect their turf, said Chawla, indicating the possibility of higher cash burn quarters ahead.
In February, reports revealed that Indian quick commerce companies, including new entrants, were burning cash to the tune of ₹1,300–₹1,500 crore on a monthly basis. But a few months later, Aadit Palicha, chief executive of Zepto, a fast-growing 10-minute delivery platform, claimed that the company had slashed its operating cash burn by 50% in the previous quarter.
Still, the path to profitability remains shaky. Though Amazon can get an advantage of its existing huge customer base that is habitual of making online purchases including those in similar categories.
The real challenge lies beneath the surface because ecommerce and quick commerce operate on fundamentally different engines.
E-Comm vs Q-Comm: A Different Game
It may seem like a simple extension of what Amazon already does: deliver products. But in practice, the logistics, timelines and cost structures behind traditional ecommerce and quick commerce are different, said Somdutta Singh, founder and chief executive of Assiduus Global, a cross-border ecommerce accelerator that helps brands scale on global marketplaces through end-to-end solutions.
She explains the difference using a hypothetical situation: let’s say you order a phone case in Mumbai, which is picked from a nearby fulfilment centre. It will be added to a pre-routed delivery run with 30-50 other stops. This batching on the basis of route optimisation, keeps last-mile costs low, somewhere around ₹40–₹80.
But if you order the same item in a smaller town like Alleppey, it may first travel mid-mile from a hub in Cochin, then be handed off to a local partner like India Post. This increases the delivery time but keeps costs manageable through scale and planned routing.
This setup suits well in ecommerce business, which is built for reach and variety, not for speed. However, quick commerce runs on a completely different playbook because speed becomes priority here.
For instance, you order a pack of chips and a cold drink via Zepto in Andheri. These items are already stocked in a dark store within one to two kilometers of your home. The moment you place the order; someone picks it off the shelf. A rider is dispatched almost immediately and heads directly to your address.
There is no mid-mile movement, no routing logic and no batching. Each trip is a solo run. Delivery often happens within 10 to 15 minutes. This kind of speed relies on a dense network of local stores and a steady flow of short-range riders. But it also means higher costs.
“With no bundling of orders and lower average cart sizes, usually ₹250 to ₹300, the delivery cost per order can shoot up to ₹60 to ₹120. That is a heavy operational burden. Unlike traditional ecommerce, where cost efficiency scales with distance and order volume, quick commerce is constrained by geography and time pressure,” she explains.
So, it becomes more than just a category expansion for e-commerce platforms like Amazon and Flipkart. It marks a pivot in their “logistics thinking” and signals a broader shift in entry strategies. What once worked must now be retooled for hyperlocal and real-time operations.
Speed over Scale Not Easy
There are multiple challenges ahead for Amazon to make its presence felt and stay competitive in the quick commerce space. Firstly, it must build an operations and logistics layer that enables sub-15-minute deliveries, along with a technology stack to support it, according to Mit Desai, practice member at Praxis Global Alliance, a management consulting firm.
Second, it needs to build a dark store network to succeed in the space which is crucial to meet the 10-15 minutes delivery promise. Experts believe that a hybrid model will be the most successful in India—a mix of micro warehouses, partner stores and dark stores.
Desai states that Amazon’s existing capabilities can give it a base to build on, but it would also have to account for complexities and differences that come with the quick commerce business.
“For Amazon, the challenge will be operations. Can they build 700+ dark stores? Can they go hyperlocal? Can they navigate the chaos of Gurugram rain, Bengaluru traffic or the lanes of Dadar?” wonders Madhav Kasturia, founder and chief executive of Zippee, a quick commerce fulfilment start-up focused on hyperlocal deliveries and dark store management.
Another challenge can be repeat, loyal customers. As of now, customers check prices across platforms, and order where prices are the lowest. So, Amazon will have to spend heavily on discounts to gain market share. Chawla says retention will remain a problem because Zepto’s growth has also slowed down after a reduction in discounting burn.
However, Singh highlights that Amazon may not roll out everything in one shot. “We will likely see small-scale pilots, co-branded dark stores, local partnerships, new rider networks, tested in top cities before any nationwide push. They will also reveal whether it is viable to retrofit scale-driven e-commerce infrastructure into something that runs well in a hyperlocal loop,” she added.
Profitability Remains a Concern
While the quick commerce space is becoming increasingly dynamic with new entrants, the core question remains: is it a sustainable business model? The path to profitability is still fraught with operational complexity, margin constraints and uncertainty in consumer behaviour.
“Margins in quick commerce were never pretty to begin with,” says Kasturia. Yet he remains optimistic about the market because India’s grocery market is still largely untapped online.
As per data, India’s grocery and essentials market is over $600bn, of which online commerce is just three to four percent. Even quick commerce is sitting at ₹7,000–₹9,000 crore gross merchandise value today. So, the market isn’t crowded. It’s just early.
“We are barely scratching the surface,” he says, arguing that whoever wins customer behaviour, will lead the game. For example, in tier 1 cities, users no longer compare prices—they compare time.
For Amazon, this is both an opportunity and a constraint. Experts believe that the ecommerce giant can stand out by focusing on trust, hygiene and reliability—areas where existing players sometimes falter.
Kasturia says that the platform should not even chase everything, rather focus on profitable categories like fruits, dairy and personal care. “Build strong private labels. Nail density before geography and don’t discount blindly,” he adds.
The key is to build for reorders, not virality. That’s when customer acquisition cost (CAC) drops, margins compound and a player stops bleeding money per order. And to reduce the cost of dark stores, Chawla suggests an alternative route.
“Riding to neighbourhood stores for long-tail stock keeping unit can cut real estate and wastage costs,” he says, adding that it can decentralise inventory without owning all of it.
To follow this playbook, Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a management consulting and services firm, says that every player needs to invest hundreds of crores before the model begins to show surplus cash. It will demand multiple, interlocked shifts—in pricing strategy, tech backbone, category mix, and even brand positioning.
Amazon’s entry doesn’t merely add another contender in the 10-minute delivery race—it rewrites the playbook for every player. The real question now is: can the frontrunners hold their turf, or will Amazon’s scale and deep pockets tip the balance of power?
admin
July 1, 2025
Sankalp Phartiyal, Bloomberg
1 July 2025
Just last week, Amazon.com Inc.’s India unit announced the launch of five new fulfillment centers to speed up e-commerce deliveries across the South Asian country’s smaller towns and cities. The online shopping giant’s statement included the words fast, faster and fastest nine times. That’s because delivery speed has never mattered more in India than it does now.
Homegrown firms such as Eternal Ltd.’s Blinkit, Swiggy Ltd.’s Instamart and Zepto are now delivering everything from pricey herbal skincare to Bluetooth speakers in just 10 minutes, making Amazon’s overnight shipping look comparatively lethargic. With one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies and a swelling middle class that’s looking for instant gratification, India is growing ever more important — and demanding.
It’s no surprise that the as-yet-unprofitable Amazon India is investing another $233 million to boost its delivery network and infrastructure in the country this year. It’s already committed more than $11 billion in India, the bulk of which has gone toward building online retail from the ground up. Its upstart rivals, also in the red, are driving a behavioral shift and are quickly building up their order volumes to the point where they’ll be able to strike distribution deals with consumer brands at an Amazon-like scale. That’s the mood music I’m hearing from local investors and it’s why Amazon is actively trying to counteract these nascent fast-commerce players.
Take me as an example of changing habits. Last week, I found myself bereft of shaving supplies on the morning of a day that featured an important meeting. I ordered a razor, brush and shaving cream via Swiggy and they were with me within 10 minutes. That sort of convenience is (probably) why I neglected
to restock my bathroom cabinet in advance — I simply don’t need to spend time planning small purchases anymore.
What does this mean for Amazon? Well, beyond everyday conveniences, Amazon and Walmart Inc.’s Flipkart may also lose out on higher-ticket purchases such as smartphones and other consumer electronics. Why wait in line or for days for the latest iPhone if an army of scooter riders is ready to drop it off at your doorstep almost instantly? And, specific to Amazon, how compelling will Prime delivery be if there are superior alternatives?
The Seattle-based online retailer was once driven out of China by regulations promoting domestic names, “which had deep and patient capital, and strong capabilities,” said Devangshu Dutta, head of retail consultancy firm Third Eyesight. “Because of this, it becomes that much more important for Amazon to succeed in India, as it’s now the world’s largest market by users. The consumption numbers will also grow with time.”
It’s no overstatement to say that quick commerce could redefine online shopping for Indians, setting a precedent unique to the country. We’ve already seen that happen with UPI, the state-backed peer-to-peer digital payments system that’s outshined credit cards. The company that best adapts to and serves the demands of India’s growing online consumer base will command a share of a rapidly growing e-commerce arena that’s today worth $60 billion in gross merchandise value, according to Bain & Co.
Amazon’s already shifting gears in a highly visible way. Last month, it launched “Now,” a 10-minute delivery service, in some parts of the southern tech hub of Bangalore. That marks its experimental foray into quick commerce. The company is also taking baby steps to plug the money bleed, now charging all
online shoppers 5 rupees ($0.06) in marketplace fees. That’s negligible per transaction, but need I remind you that India is the world’s most populous country and hundreds of millions shop on Amazon?
Even while operating from a position of considerable strength, Amazon sees the rise of its more quick-witted rivals and the shift in consumer behavior, and it’s taking action. To avert those young companies building a comparable retail empire to its own, Amazon will have to show it still has the agility to outrace all comers.
–With assistance from Brunella Tipismana Urbano.
To view this story in Bloomberg click here:
https://blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories/SYPVYEDWLU68
admin
June 13, 2025
Hiral Goyal, The Morning Context
13 June 2025
Several smart, well-to-do Indians believe they have an opportunity to build a successful business by selling apparel to affluent people. Armed with this hypothesis and with venture capital in tow, these entrepreneurs are having a go at the market.
Some are building a business just around undergarments, for instance. Others are focusing on premium T-shirts. Or denim wear. There’s also ethnic wear. And work clothes. Even workout clothes. It would appear that every niche in the apparel market is being exploited by someone who believes they have a product that can disrupt the category and create a large, sustainable business.
Amid this sea of ventures, BlissClub stands out.
In only five years of operations, the Bengaluru-based startup has made a name for itself. By simply focusing on premium activewear for women. Now that’s a niche within a niche.
Founded by Minu Margeret in 2020, BlissClub’s story goes something like this. Drawing on her personal experience as a frisbee player, Margeret started BlissClub to address the needs of Indian women who struggled to find comfortable and functional activewear. With inclusive sizing and tiny details such as pockets and wide waistbands in leggings, the startup catered to Indian women with products that were specifically designed for them and their body types.
The idea clicked. Women were willing to experiment with BlissClub’s clothing and, on the back of its early success, the company has grown from zero to revenue of over Rs 85 crore as of 31 March 2024. The startup has also been able to raise capital from VC investors like Elevation Capital, Eight Roads Ventures and Alteria Capital, who’ve come on board hoping that Margeret is onto something. Just last month, the company raised Rs 45 crore (around $5.3 million) in a Series B funding round, a mix of debt and equity. This took its total fundraise to nearly $26 million (Rs 222 crore), according to Entrackr.
Except that’s all the good news there is. Five years in, it looks like BlissClub is at a crossroads. Its revenue growth has slowed-from 360% year-on-year in 2022-23 to just 27% in 2023-24-and its valuation remains flat at $67 million.
Already, women’s activewear as a category is far too niche. It doesn’t help that BlissClub now faces intense competition from legacy players like Page Industries (Jockey’s India licensee), Aditya Birla Group and French sporting goods retailer Decathlon as well as startups like HRX and Clovia. All of them are trying to grow their sales to keep up with the rapidly growing trend of casual attire, where product differentiation is now largely down to marketing. It is another matter altogether that these customers are price-conscious, and disposable income to spend on premium clothing is limited to a few million people in India.
That’s the reality of the market where BlissClub operates. “The greatest challenge for the new athleisure brands, apart from capital and internal execution discipline, is to maintain brand integrity rather than get sucked into price battles and discounting, which is a race to the bottom that only the businesses with large balance sheets can win,” says Devangshu Dutta, founder and chief executive of Third Eyesight, a management consulting firm focused on the retail and consumer goods industry.
Questions sent to Margeret did not elicit a response. But it’s important to ask, what should BlissClub do? It may have had a great start, but is that enough to scale? This is what we’ve set out to explore in this story.
Fighting the big guns
Almost every customer in India who’s out to buy activewear or athleisure-has enough well-known brands to choose from. There’s Jockey, Decathlon, Nike, Puma, Adidas, Asics and Skechers, to name a few. And there’s something for everyone at every possible price point.
So, what particular need is BlissClub trying to fulfill?
Margeret says she started the company because she could never find appropriate activewear in the Indian market. From BlissClub’s website about its origin story: “While some clothes were comfortable, they simply did not stretch enough. Those that did stretch, were too compressive.” With BlissClub, Margeret focused on inclusive sizes and comfortable fabric that was ideally suited to India’s hot climate.
But are inclusivity and quality enough when it comes to having a differentiating factor? Not really.
Nothing, for instance, would stop other brands from copying BlissClub’s designs or offering comparable quality to gain customers. Additionally, BlissClub risks losing customers to other brands if it fails to keep up with its promise of top-most quality products. Some customers have already taken to social media recently to share their grievances (here, here, here and here). Their most common complaint? The quality of BlissClub’s fabric has gone down and there’s a lot of pilling.
On top of this, there is unrelenting competition from legacy players, most of whom have been building their athleisure portfolio for sometime now. Take Page Industries, for example. The company launched its athleisure portfolio in 1995, but it only doubled down on making it a key growth pillar in 2014-15. Just a couple of years later, Aditya Birla Group entered the men’s athleisure business with Van Heusen in 2016 and later expanded into women’s wear as well. Both these brands were quick to identify the shifting fashion trend to casual wear and benefited handsomely when the category finally exploded during the COVID-19 pandemic-as people started working from home and focusing on their physical health. Here’s what Page Industries’ CEO Karthik Yathindra told Mint in 2022 about the company’s decision to focus on athleisure: “So, the timing worked out for us very well. Demand has also been healthy across innerwear for men and women, but athleisure really surged a lot more than what we had anticipated or planned for. I would say, we jumped a year or two in terms of demand with athleisure compared to pre-pandemic days. We literally doubled our business. Whereas, overall, as an organization, we clocked 37-38% jump in revenue in the last financial year.”
It is no surprise then that these companies are well positioned in terms of the distribution network and the range of choices they offer to take on the Indian athleisure market as compared to BlissClub and other small players. Page Industries, for example, has more than 111,000 multi-brand stores and 1,453 exclusive brand stores, besides its digital presence through its own website and third-party marketplaces. BlissClub, on the other hand, has largely been an online player, selling products through its own website or through marketplaces like Myntra and Amazon. At present, it runs 14 retail stores across nine cities.
That’s no small gap, and competition is only going to heat up. So, what options does BlissClub have?
Stretched thin
From where BlissClub stands today, there are only a few ways it can grow its top line. Mostly because the size of India’s athleisure market remains small; it’s even smaller for women. “Athleisure is a $15 billion market with a CAGR of 20%. Of this, women are -30-40%,” says Gaurav Verma, co-founder and head of consumer investments at venture capital fund Ortella Global Capital. This $5-billion market for women’s activewear becomes smaller if we take into account only the premium space. (We couldn’t independently verify this estimate as there are no reliable reports available.)
In a niche market like this, there’s limited room to scale. Unless you cut down prices, introduce more categories, start catering to all genders or open retail stores. Let’s look at each of these options.
First up, the prices. Any premium brand that cuts prices risks diluting itself. Now, BlissClub has been handing out discounts and buy-one-get-one offers more liberally than ever before. For example, its Ultimate Leggings the company’s bestselling product -is priced at Rs 2,299 and sold at Rs 1,399 after discount. But when you compare it with Decathlon or homegrown brands like Hrithik Roshan-backed HRX or Clovia, you’d find that BlissClub remains in the premium segment even after discounts. And while lowering prices further might help BlissClub gain more customers, its margins-already EBITDA-negative-will most likely suffer.
The second strategy is introducing more categories. This is something BlissClub seems to be interested in. The startup entered the innerwear category with sports bras. The latest additions have been swimwear and travel wear. But in these segments, BlissClub is yet to replicate the kind of success it saw with its flagship products-Ultimate Leggings and Ultimate Flare Pants.
There is a bigger problem here. When it comes to athleisure startups, says Verma, “there are growth concerns beyond the top 3-5 SKUs [stock keeping units) like leggings, tops.” He goes on to say, “Unless we see growth in [direct-to-consumer) on higher-priced SKUs like jackets, shoes and accessories, we will continue to see pressure on both top line and bottom line growth.”
To make matters worse for BlissClub, the new categories the company is venturing into are witnessing increased competition. Take innerwear, for example. Influencer Kusha Kapila recently announced her shapewear brand Underneat, backed by Fireside Ventures and Mamaearth co-founder Ghazal Alagh. Besides this, players like Jockey, Clovia and Van Heusen have also been fighting for market share.
The third option, then, is to enter the menswear category. Though a natural extension for any athleisure brand, it does not promise scale. Let’s look at Technosport for some perspective. The A91 Partners-backed company, which sells affordable activewear for men and women across categories, reported a revenue of Rs 382 crore (around $44.5 million) in 2023-24. But that is after 18 years of operations and catering to the mass market with a fairly well-established distribution in the offline channel.
An even bigger challenge for BlissClub here would be to shake off its identity as a brand for women. Take the case of Lululemon. When the Canadian activewear company entered the men’s business in 2014, the biggest concern was that the brand was popularized by women and it would be tough to convince male customers to buy its products. The breakthrough here was the company’s ABC pants-short for anti-ball crushing pants-which helped Lululemon acquire male customers. Still, Lululemon continues to struggle with its identity as a women’s brand. Its latest effort to fight this was by making seven-time Formula 1 champion Lewis Hamilton its brand ambassador.
Finally, there’s the option of opening physical stores to acquire more customers. A digital-first strategy, says Dutta, allows the newer niche brands to directly connect with their target customers and achieve a critical mass. However, to get greater scale, “they need to add offline presence as well,” he notes. “Offline stores are not just a mainstreaming opportunity but also a way to create a brand immersion experience for the consumers, which can strengthen the connect with their core consumer segment.”
However, considering that BlissClub is a premium brand, it only makes sense for the brand to open outlets in high-street markets. But this would entail some serious expenditure. After all, opening retail stores requires capital.
Raising capital, though, does not look like a tall order for BlissClub. Its most recent fundraise, which will be used towards growth and expansion, is a testament to that. Before that, the company had raised $15 million in its Series A round. The credit for this partly goes to Margeret and Vidit Aatrey’s connections in the VC ecosystem. Aatrey, Margeret’s husband, is Meesho’s co-founder and CEO (the e-commerce company itself has raised $1.61 billion in total funding.)
Thanks to the funds it has been able to raise, BlissClub has had a good run so far.
However, with competition brewing in this space, the company risks losing its edge and becoming one of many. To give credit where it’s due, BlissClub has done a great job at building brand equity in the Indian activewear market. To grow beyond where it is today, though, it will need to rethink its strategy.
Perhaps it already is. In the last year, BlissClub has entered into categories beyond activewear; this includes innerwear, swimwear and most recently, travel wear. At the same time, it is also opening retail stores across the country.
How BlissClub scales will leave cues not just for Margeret but everyone else who believes they can build a niche apparel company in India successfully.
(Published in The Morning Context)
admin
June 7, 2025
Pooja Yadav, Inc42
7 Jun 2025
SUMMARY: Nearly two decades after its founding, Myntra has made its first international foray with the launch of‘Myntra Global’ in Singapore. Armed with 100+ Indian brands and over 35,000 styles, it is betting big on the 6.5 Lakh-strong Indian diaspora. Shipping directly from India without local warehousing helps avoid upfront costs but could lead to expensive shipping, long delivery times, and tough return logistics.
Nearly two decades after its incorporation in 2007, Myntra announced last month that it marked its first international foray under the new ‘Myntra Global’ banner. The fashion ecommerce marketplace has launched its operations in Singapore.
The Flipkart-owned platform aims to leverage brand loyalty to drive cross-border commerce by tapping into the Indian diaspora of around 6.5 Lakh people in the island nation.
However, while the brand’s intent is clear, the timing and choice of market raise some concerns. For starters, Singapore isn’t going to be an easy market, especially for a newbie like Myntra. This is because the region is filled to the brim with players like Shopee, Shein, Lazada, and Zalora that enjoy a strong brand recognition and stickiness.
Then, experts believe, Singapore-based shoppers are highly selective, constantly seeking great deals and ahead of the rapidly evolving fashion trends. This, among other factors, could make Myntra’s Singapore entry arduous.
So, what makes industry observers say so? Why isn’t Singapore a promising market for Myntra to begin with? What are the stakes at play here — the hits and the misses? Let’s get right into these questions to make sense of Myntra’s Singapore foray.
A Strategic Experiment?
Myntra’s entry into Singapore isn’t just about going global, it’s a strategic experiment to understand how Indian fashion resonates beyond borders.
According to CEO Nandita Sinha, the core of this launch is Myntra’s attempt to test the waters and understand the product-market fit for Indian fashion in an overseas setting.
But why Singapore? Well, the choice was driven by data. Myntra has found that about 10–15% of its web traffic comes from international markets, and Singapore stands out as a concentrated and engaged segment.
According to Statista (2024), approximately 6.5 Lakh Indians reside in Singapore, with around 3 Lakh Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs). Sinha pointed out, “While analysing our data and exploring potential market opportunities, we discovered that nearly 30,000 of these users are visiting our platform every month.”
This organic interest gave the company confidence to make Singapore its first stop under the Myntra Global banner. The platform has gone live in Singapore with 35,000+ styles, which it now plans to scale up to 1 Lakh in the near future.
However, what’s interesting is that Myntra is betting big on desi styles and brands to cater to the Indian diaspora in Singapore. The platform has launched a curated lineup of over 100 Indian brands, including popular names like Aurelia, Global Desi, AND, Libas, Rustorange, Mochi, W, The Label Life, House of Pataudi, Chumbak, Anouk, Bombay Dyeing, and Rare Rabbit.
Whether it’s ethnic wear, fusion fashion, or home décor, the idea is to spotlight Indian design and craftsmanship. Not to mention, Myntra sees significant potential for cultural occasions such as festivals, weddings and special celebrations.
As per Devangshu Dutta, the founder and chief executive of Third Eyesight, Singapore is an ideal market for Myntra’s international test run due to several reasons. For one, it is a digitally advanced, high-income market with a significant Indian diaspora that is familiar with the brands Myntra offers.
“This makes it a natural nucleus for testing an out-of-India offering,” Dutta said, adding that Singapore’s relatively small size makes it easier to manage the complexities of merchandising across different segments, potentially making it a more efficient testing ground.
Moreover, if the business succeeds, Singapore could serve as a strategic launchpad for Myntra to expand into other Southeast Asian markets. However, for now, Myntra’s Singapore launch is less about scale and more about learning.
Ankur Bisen, senior partner and head at Technopak Advisors, said that Myntra’s recent expansion makes strong strategic sense. This is because it is no longer an Indian company, and expanding to Singapore and Southeast Asia offers significant scale and growth opportunities.
“Unlike a purely Indian company, Myntra can explore multiple markets simultaneously and is not restricted to focussing solely on India,” Bisen said.
However, not everything is rainbows and sunshine, as Myntra’s success will only hinge on pricing, local adaptation, and understanding the distinct preferences of the Indian diaspora in Singapore that may be different from Indian buyers. In simple terms, one size may not fit all.
Then, shipping delays and high logistics costs could dilute the value proposition, especially in a market like Singapore where consumers are used to fast and affordable service.
Imperative to mention that Myntra currently has no plans to set up a warehouse in Singapore. Myntra CEO Sinha mentioned that products would be shipped directly from India, where the inventory will be maintained by the brands themselves.
“Myntra Global was not intended to be a localised service tailored to the Singapore market or any other international location. Instead, the focus would remain on serving global consumers from India, with no immediate plans for physical expansion or local warehousing.”
What Could Go Wrong?
Expanding into a new market is always a risky affair. Some potential pitfalls for Myntra could be logistics complexities, return management, and supply chain localisation.
Yash Dholakia, partner, Sauce.vc, too, pointed out that execution risks extend beyond pricing and scale to include logistics, returns, and supply chain.
Dholakia added that Singapore is a different ballgame altogether, as its distinct retail landscape is not an easy feat. “The fashion industry’s fast-changing nature calls for a sharp understanding of Singapore’s diverse, millennial consumers, who have unique cultural preferences and social media-driven buying habits.”
Moreover, many second- or third-generation PIOs see themselves mainly as Singaporean and have different cultural and fashion preferences.
Therefore, assumptions that what works in India will work for this class of consumers may lead to failure.
To hedge this, Myntra will have to take a fully local approach, which will include setting up independent teams on the ground to understand and address these local differences, rather than just copying and pasting its India playbook.
Moreover, from a branding and market reach perspective, targeting just the 10–15% Indian diaspora in Singapore restricts Myntra’s audience significantly. The fashion market in the city-state is already competitive, with several efficient players offering fast and affordable options.
“Myntra’s edge would primarily be Indian ethnic wear, which restricts its ability to emerge as a broad-market contender,” Dholakia said.
Per Dutta, relying heavily on the Indian diaspora may provide a strong initial boost, but this may not sustain for too long.
A Launchpad For D2C Brands
This is not the first time Myntra has tried to enter an international market. In 2020, Myntra partnered with UAE-based platforms, noon and Namshi, to enter the Middle East with a few Indian brands.
However, its current expansion into Singapore looks more ambitious with a cavalry of over 100+ Indian brands.
To strengthen its footprint in Singapore, Myntra is offering free shipping across a wide range of categories, including women’s fashion, kidswear, and home essentials.
Myntra is offering products across a wide range of price buckets. In the women’s tops category, prices start as low as INR 350 with brands like Tokyo Talkies, and go up to INR 4,800 with brands like Berrylush, DressBerry, and Vishudh. Western dresses also extend up to INR 7,100. In ethnic wear, kurtas range from INR 833 to over INR 3,800, while sarees are priced between INR 1,200 and INR 18,000.
“In terms of pricing, it’s ultimately the brands themselves that determine their price positioning on the platform. As they begin listing and transacting with consumers, they will decide how they want to price their products,” said Sinha.
In addition, what could work in its favour is the opportunity to give the global audience a taste of fast-growing Indian D2C brands.
Many Indian internet-first brands haven’t had the chance to engage with global consumers before, but this expansion lets them showcase their products directly to the Indian diaspora in Singapore.
Besides, the expansion will allow Indian brands to understand new consumer preferences, optimise their product mix for cross-border demand, and grow their presence beyond India.
This pilot could indeed spark broader cross-border opportunities for Indian D2C brands. But it demands localised marketing, deep consumer understanding, and a willingness to adapt to regional preferences.
For brands used to making for Indian buyers, this could be a steep but rewarding learning curve. If executed well, it offers them not just an entry into Singapore but a scalable template for global expansion.
The Cross-Border Gamble
Myntra’s global play comes at a time when the ecommerce platform posted a net profit of INR 30.9 Cr in FY24 versus a loss of INR 782.4 Cr in FY23. This turnaround came on the back of a 15% increase in its operational revenue and tighter cost control.
The platform generates revenue through a mix of transaction fees from sellers, logistics services, advertising, and its private labels. To move towards profitability, Myntra brought down its total expenses to INR 5,123 Cr in FY24 from INR 5,290.1 Cr in FY23.
However, its recent entry into Singapore may bring new financial challenges, even as Myntra has opted not to set up a warehouse in Singapore. It would rather ship products from India through third-party logistics providers.
So, is the fashion major being penny-wise and pound-foolish?
Probably. While this asset-light model avoids upfront capital expenditure, it introduces risks such as longer delivery times, higher logistics costs, customs delays and complicated return processes that could sour customer sentiment. For a platform that just turned profitable, these are crucial levers that could strain margins.
Further, even though Myntra is not offering exchange and returns currently, once it does, it could complicate things further.
This is because shipping a 2 Kg fashion parcel from India to Singapore costs an estimated INR 2,800 to INR 3,500, inclusive of air freight, GST, and last-mile delivery. Reverse logistics could add another INR 1,200 to INR 2,000 per item, pushing the total cost per cross-border order significantly higher.
According to Dibyanshu Tripathi, cofounder and CEO of Hexalog, a logistics company, cross-border logistics could significantly impact Myntra’s profitability as it expands into Southeast Asia.
“Sustaining margins will be challenging with high per-order shipping costs, return expenses, and longer delivery timelines that may affect customer satisfaction. Without localised infrastructure or cost efficiencies, profitability in new markets may be hard to maintain despite revenue growth,” Tripathi said.
In contrast, players such as Lenskart and Nike have structured their global expansions with supply chain control at the core.
All in all, Myntra’s Singapore foray is a bold experiment aimed at testing global appetite for Indian fashion, especially among the diaspora.
While the move offers promising opportunities for Indian D2C brands and cross-border growth, it’s also fraught with challenges. For one, with a lack of local infrastructure, high shipping costs and a diaspora divided between two cultures, sustaining this expansion may prove tough. Can Myntra turn its Singapore pitch into a lasting global success story?
(Published on Inc42)
admin
May 25, 2025
Gargi Sarkar, Inc42
25 May 2025
SUMMARY: Swiggy and Zomato are scaling back non-core bets such as 10-minute food delivery, private labels, and event logistics to sharpen focus on core businesses and improve profitability. Both companies are betting on platform fees and selective verticals like quick commerce and ticketing, but analysts warn that financial discipline, not endless expansion, is key to long-term sustainability. The foodtech duo is stuck in a balancing act of rationalising what works and doesn’t. However, going ahead, this rationalisation game is only going to get more pronounced as they will strive to shield their core bread and butter businesses
For foodtech giants Swiggy and Zomato (now Eternal), the last few years have been about engaging in a battle for expansion, so much so that it has become difficult to tell them apart.
From quick commerce and cloud kitchens to intercity food delivery and even selling tickets for events and concerts, the two companies appear to be aping each other’s every move to be everything everywhere all at once.
However, what began as a bold bet to dominate every possible vertical falling under the ambit of food, lifestyle and entertainment is now undergoing a major course correction.
For starters, both are reconsidering their blitzkrieg, and while at it, they are gracefully stepping away from non-core bets, diluting underperforming or experimental units to focus on core operations to drive profitability.
For context: Zomato, which once saw the future of food logistics in ultra-fast deliveries, gave up on its 15-minute food delivery service, Quick, four months after its launch in January. It has also pulled the plug on its home-made meal service, Zomato Everyday. Tailored for office-goers and budget-conscious consumers, the service was floated in January 2025.
Swiggy, too, has made similar retreats. It suspended Swiggy Genie, its courier and pick-up-and-drop service that had gained popularity during the pandemic. The company also gave up on its private label food business by entering a strategic agreement with Kouzina, a chain of virtual restaurants, granting it exclusive rights to operate Swiggy’s digital-first food brands.
So, what has triggered this metaphorical fission in strategy?
One possible reason could be the growing realisation that profitability hinges on diversifying smartly rather than untamed expansion.
A market analyst, who did not wish to be named, pointed out that the duo’s attempt to rule their customers’ wallets for everything from food to groceries and entertainment to lifestyle has been quite ambitious. “The course correction was overdue,” the analyst said.
He believes that foodtechs are now forced to burn the visceral fat in the form of non-core businesses because those have been slowing them down, also eating into the revenues of core businesses and impacting operational efficiencies.
“Moreover, the more the segments, the higher the chances of operational hiccups. Managing logistics, customer experience, and quality control across a wide array of verticals inevitably leads to fragmentation and strain on core operations,” he added.
State Of Eternal Affairs: Zomato’s Diversification Saga
Eternal’s push to transform Zomato into a broader lifestyle platform in 2024 was not only about ambition but also a strategic response to a slowing core business — food delivery, according to industry observers.
Also, a glance at the table below reveals how the company has seen a marginal QoQ increase in its monthly transacting users.
In terms of monthly transacting customers, Zomato’s food delivery growth began strong with a 6.84% QoQ jump in Q1, but momentum quickly slowed, and Q2 saw only a 1.97% sequential rise, followed by a slight decline of 0.97% in Q3. This dip signalled stagnation, and although Q4 showed a mild recovery (1.95%), overall FY25 growth of the company’s monthly transacting users (food delivery) was modest at just 2.96%
Interestingly, Eternal founder and CEO Deepinder Goyal, too, acknowledged a slowdown in the company’s food delivery business while announcing the company’s Q4 FY25 results. He said the slowdown was due to rising competition from quick commerce platforms and weak discretionary spending. Goyal added that services like Zepto Cafe, Swiggy Snacc, and Blinkit Bistro, too, were eating into demand for restaurant deliveries.
In terms of Zomato’s food delivery numbers, average monthly transacting numbers grew to 20.9 Mn in Q4 FY25 from 20.5 Mn in Q4 FY24. Net order value (NOV) growth also remained subdued at 14% YoY versus the 20% YoY growth guidance.
Hence, the company was under pressure to unlock new revenue streams. Blinkit’s success became the reference point, and the company started envisioning similar success stories with other verticals too, a former Zomato employee said.
This was when the company got engulfed in the wave of diversification, paving the path for Zomato’s yet another bold move (besides Blinkit) — the INR 2,078 Cr acquisition of Paytm’s movies and events ticketing business, Insider, in August last year.
The acquisition that was planned with the launch of the ‘District’ app meant but one thing — declaration of war against BookMyShow, the lone behemoth in the realm of the entertainment ticketing segment. Even the company knew the path wouldn’t be all rainbows and sunshine.
In its Q4 FY24 earnings call, the management acknowledged that while the gross order value (GOV) of the going-out vertical continues to grow at over 100% YoY, the business still operates at an adjusted EBITDA loss of -2 to -2.5% of net order value (NOV).
Besides, given that the transition of users from Paytm’s ticketing business and Zomato’s dining out platform to the District app requires sustained investment, the company doesn’t expect the business to turn profitable in the near term.
But Zomato expects losses to eventually see stability at current levels.
“However, even with plateauing losses, the company will have to keep spending on creating supply. This means: curating new event experiences, forging partnerships and acquiring new users for the District app… and all of this translates into one thing — prolonged burn,” the market analyst added.
Moving on, Zomato’s ambition to become a lifestyle super app didn’t just manifest into flashy verticals like events, entertainment, and ticketing — it also showed up in its renewed aggression in food delivery, the very space where it first made its name.
Therefore, Zomato began piloting a 15-minute food delivery service in select parts of Mumbai and Bengaluru early this year.
But the company now finds the initiative extremely difficult to operationalise as it has failed to generate incremental demand.
“Customers do not necessarily want food fast, they just want it reliably. A 10-minute turnaround without full control over the supply chain leads to poor customer experiences, operational stress, and negligible upside. Instead of delighting users, it makes the company vulnerable to inconsistent quality and frequent delays,” a Zomato insider added.
Satish Meena, the founder of Datum Intelligence, opined that without controlling the entire supply chain, delivering food items within 10 to 15 minutes cannot be a profitable proposition.
Swiggy’s U-Turns
In 2024, also the year of its public listing, Swiggy aggressively expanded its service offerings, launching several new verticals to diversify beyond its core food delivery business.
Among the most prominent launches was Bolt, a 10-minute food delivery platform. Initially launched in Bengaluru, Chennai and Mumbai, Bolt quickly expanded to over 400 cities, with over 40,000 restaurants, including KFC, McDonald’s and Starbucks.
To complement Bolt, Swiggy introduced Snacc, a separate app for instant delivery of snacks, beverages, and small meals within 15 minutes.
Continuing to diversify its portfolio, Swiggy launched Pyng, an AI-powered platform that bridges users with verified experts like yoga teachers or chartered accountants.
With this, Swiggy marked its entry into the on-demand services marketplace, making professional services easier to access.
Apart from these customer-facing services, Swiggy also entered events via Scenes and the B2B space with Assure, to keep pace with Zomato.
Interestingly, Swiggy, too, has begun consolidating its operations. The company has shut down Genie, its hyperlocal courier business, which competed with Porter, Borzo and Uber.
According to a competitor, sourcing delivery riders specifically for packages is a challenge, particularly in cities like Bengaluru. For Swiggy, which was already managing fleets for food delivery and quick commerce through Instamart, sustaining a separate rider network for Genie only added to the complexity.
In another such move, Swiggy exited its private label food business by transferring exclusive rights for its digital-first brands, including The Bowl Company and Homely, to cloud kitchen operator Kouzina.
Balance Sheet Blues
Imperative to highlight that the rollbacks by Zomato and Swiggy are rooted in the growing pressures on their respective balance sheets.
After diversifying at a breakneck speed, they are now faced with the hard realities of cost structures that don’t always align with revenue potential.
In Q4 FY25, Zomato and Swiggy both reported robust top-line growth. Zomato’s revenue surged to INR 5,833 Cr, largely buoyed by its three core pillars — the food delivery business (INR 1,739 crore), Blinkit’s quick commerce arm (INR 769 Cr), and Hyperpure, its B2B supply chain vertical, which posted a 99% YoY growth in revenue to INR 1,840 Cr.
However, despite the momentum, the company’s net profit declined sharply to INR 39 Cr in the quarter, largely thanks to ongoing investments in Blinkit and newer bets like the ‘District’ lifestyle app.
Meanwhile, Swiggy clocked INR 4,410 Cr in revenue in Q4, up 45% YoY, but saw its net loss nearly double to INR 1,081 Cr. The widening losses were fuelled by surging operational expenses.
“All of this explains the strategic pullbacks witnessed lately, Swiggy exiting Genie and private labels, Zomato pulling the plug on services like Quick and Legends. The rationalisation marks a reset, indicating that while growth via diversification was necessary, financial discipline and profitability are in the spotlight,” the market analyst said.
Platform Fee To The Rescue… But For How Long?
While it won’t be easy for Zomato and Swiggy to suddenly change course, the future of these two foodtech giants is all about heading towards a more focussed set of revenue streams driven by value rather than FOMO.
In the process, both foodtech giants appear to have struck gold with the platform fee, which has grown from just INR 2 in 2023 to INR 10 today.
But the real question is: Can rising platform fee help the duo neutralise the impact of aggressive expansion? Or is rationalisation the only way forward?
Devangshu Dutta, the founder of Third Eyesight, thinks otherwise. He believes that the companies will not stop looking for new revenue streams, even as they will continue to amputate the ones that offer little value.
“All of these companies have to look for growth, which is a given. If their existing businesses are not delivering the kind of growth they need to justify their stock price or valuation, then they have to look at new avenues.”
According to him, we are bound to see a flurry of experiments, trials of different services and new verticals as these companies attempt to expand their addressable markets.
At the end of the day, the foodtech duo is stuck in a balancing act of rationalising what works and doesn’t. However, going ahead, this rationalisation game is only going to get more pronounced as they will strive to shield their core bread and butter businesses.
[Edited by Shishir Parasher]
(Published in Inc42)
