Category: Beauty & Personal Care

The reality behind Reliance’s retail rush

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September 28, 2020

Written By Mihir Dalal

Mumbai-based Jain, a computer science graduate from the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, usually orders groceries from BigBasket and sometimes from Dunzo. He said that he doesn’t plan to use JioMart again.

“A couple of my friends and relatives (in Mumbai and Kota) have also had similarly bad experiences. It doesn’t look like JioMart is ready for online groceries. Their operations and customer care teams weren’t in sync,” Jain said.

Since JioMart expanded to more than 200 cities this summer, scores of customers like Jain have complained about missing products, delayed deliveries and generally poor service. Still, industry executives say that while its service levels have been inconsistent, JioMart is registering similar order volumes to BigBasket, the largest e-grocer, on the back of aggressive marketing and discounts.

These volumes still comprise a small fraction of the overall business of Amazon India and Walmart-owned Flipkart, the two dominant online retailers. But that’s because JioMart is only selling groceries now; it plans to sell other products like fashion and electronics soon. It’s clear that after many years of talk and hype, Reliance, which owns India’s largest offline retail chain, is finally becoming a serious challenger to Amazon and Flipkart, as well as BigBasket and Grofers.

Still, industry executives, logistics firms, consultants and analysts that Mint spoke with said that Reliance will find it tough to break the dominance of Amazon-Flipkart in e-commerce, similar to how Walmart is struggling to challenge Amazon in digital sales in the US even as its stores continue to prosper. Amazon and Flipkart both have deep pockets, proven expertise in e-commerce, popular brands and good knowledge of the Indian market.

“Reliance has the financial muscle, but Walmart (Flipkart) and Amazon are no pushovers,” said Harminder Sahni, managing director, Wazir Advisors, a consultancy. “Today, most people who want to shop online are happy with Flipkart and Amazon. These companies have achieved significant scale and have very few weaknesses. As a latecomer, it will be very difficult for Reliance to make a big dent in the market.”

Reliance did not respond to an emailed questionnaire seeking comment.

Local internet powerhouse

During the pandemic, Reliance has not only moved fast to make inroads into the e-commerce market, it has also consolidated its leadership in organized offline retail. Last month, Reliance bought most of the businesses of Future Group for about $3.4 billion in a deal that will take its retail footprint to nearly 14,000 stores—by far, the largest in India.

In the past six months, Reliance has raised more than $21 billion for its digital unit Jio Platforms. This month, Reliance kickstarted a separate fund-raising spree for its retail unit, Reliance Retail, bagging about $1.8 billion from private equity firms Silver Lake and KKR, two of the investors in Jio. Several more investment firms, including other shareholders in Jio, are expected to join them.

These moves are part of Reliance’s efforts to transform itself into a 21stcentury digital behemoth. It is positioning itself as India’s answer to Amazon, Facebook, Google, Alibaba and other world-class digital giants, and unlike local startups like Flipkart, Ola and Paytm that have or had similar ambitions, Reliance enjoys some unparalleled advantages.

It is now accepted wisdom among politicians and regulators that India needs a ‘local’ internet powerhouse to counter the dominance of America’s Big Tech and the growing influence of Chinese firms, partly because of sovereignty concerns. Reliance’s mastery in lobbying and its political clout makes the firm best-placed to exploit this urgent establishment need to find a domestic internet powerhouse.

Amazon, Flipkart, Facebook and others face many policy-related restrictions that not only serve as obstacles to them but pave the way for domestic firms led by Reliance to enter the fray. For instance, foreign investment rules prevent Amazon and Flipkart from owning inventory or selling private labels (though critics say that these firms do it anyway using clever legal workarounds), while Reliance has no such constraints. Apart from a supportive policy environment and huge capital resources, on the business front, too, Reliance has an enviable digital distribution network and reservoir of customer data on account of Jio.

But despite these formidable advantages, Reliance has yet to prove that it has the chops to realise its ambitious vision.

The war among Reliance and Flipkart and Amazon and other internet firms is also not restricted to retail, but will extend to other sectors like financial services, content and business-to-business commerce. The technology-centric nature of the battle is more suited to the internet companies than to Reliance. There’s little doubt that Reliance will be a major player in the digital business, but the jury’s out on how much value the firm can corner. Its foray in e-commerce and B2B will provide early answers to this question.

Retail battle

After JioMart began testing its service late last year, media reports said that the company would deliver products to customers from local kirana stores. After Facebook invested in Jio in April in a deal that included a business partnership between JioMart and WhatsApp, Ambani said that JioMart would soon connect some 3 crore kirana stores with their neighbourhood customers.

Many analysts, too, expect the partnership with WhatsApp, the most popular app in India, to be a game-changer. In July, Goldman Sachs estimated that Reliance’s entry will help expand the online grocery market by 20 times to about $29 billion by 2024. Reliance’s partnership with Facebook could help the firm become the leader in e-grocery and garner a market share of more than 50% by 2024, Goldman said.

But Mint learns that Reliance is sourcing a majority of orders on JioMart in many cities through Reliance Retail’s supply chain; only a small number of orders are served through kirana stores. JioMart is signing up a few thousand kirana stores every month, but its expansion is happening at a slower rate than many analysts expect. Two industry executives said that JioMart’s average order value is lower than that of other e-grocers, which means that Reliance is losing larger amounts of money on every order.

According to one e-commerce executive, for BigBasket and Grofers, the delivery cost is about 3-4% of the average order value, which exceeds ₹1000. For Reliance, the delivery cost is presently much higher because its order value is below ₹800. The lower order value is partly because most of JioMart’s 200 city-markets are non-metros. BigBasket and others generate an overwhelming majority of their business from the metros. Reliance is betting on expanding the e-grocery market rather, than taking market share from incumbents, which generate an overwhelming majority of their sales from 10-15 cities. But while Reliance may be able to attract customers in smaller cities initially with discounts, profitability will be tough.

“The economics of serving metros are very different from the rest of India. In the mass market, bill values are much, much lower. Right now, Reliance’s main focus is to scale JioMart, so they aren’t worried about the delivery cost,” the executive cited above said. “But eventually, reality will catch up, and they will have to increase basket sizes because this model isn’t sustainable. Grocery has very thin margins to start with. “

Private label push

One obvious way for Reliance to boost margins is by selling more private label products. In the grocery category, Reliance Retail already generates 14% of its revenues from private labels. People familiar with Reliance’s plans said that the company wants to push its private label products to kirana stores. While there are hundreds of well-known brands in FMCG, the grocery category (products like rice, pulses and flour) is largely unstructured. Reliance plans to sell its private label products both in grocery and FMCG.

Apart from retail, Reliance is also rapidly expanding its B2B business. Its private label products form a key component of its retail and wholesale business plans, the people cited above said.

The private label push, however, is making large FMCG companies like Hindustan Unilever, Marico and Dabur, which sell competing products, wary of working with Reliance’s B2B arm.

Like Flipkart and Amazon, which are also expanding their B2B businesses, Reliance’s grand vision over time is to have an integrated ecosystem of wholesale and retail in which it connects consumer goods makers with kirana stores and retailers, supplies a large number of private label products across many categories to retailers and end-customers, and becomes the biggest omnichannel retail firm in the country. But realising this vision will require Reliance to work seamlessly with millions of kirana stores, thousands of brands, modern retailers (all of which will see the firm as a rival to an extent)—and provide exceptional service in a profitable manner to retail customers.

Analysts and industry executives said that Reliance has a higher probability of finding success in categories like fashion (in which it already runs a portal called Ajio) and grocery that are mostly unorganised and have a shortage of established brands. In these categories, Reliance faces fewer barriers from existing players and has a better chance of pushing its private labels in both the wholesale and retail markets. But in categories like electronics and FMCG, which are dominated by entrenched brands, kirana stores and e-commerce firms, Reliance may struggle to scale as fast.

For instance, Flipkart and Amazon dominate online sales of electronics and fashion, which together comprise more than 75% of all e-commerce. To win significant share in electronics, Reliance will have to spend enormous amounts on discounts, marketing and offering favourable terms to brands . But, in fashion, Reliance can tap its low-priced private labels to lure customers without resorting to value destruction.

“The market is too varied for one player to be big in all categories,” an investment banker said. “Reliance will have to carefully choose its battles. There’s a risk that it may spread itself too thin, so it’s wise for them to have started with grocery.”

Meanwhile, while Google and Facebook have together invested more than $10 billion in Reliance, both companies are continuing to expand their own businesses in India. Google and Facebook have ambitions to enter e-commerce and expand in other sectors like payments and content. What this means is that while Google and Facebook will end up collaborating with Reliance in some areas, they will also compete with the firm in others, joining Flipkart and Amazon in the war of the digital conglomerates.

Flipkart and Amazon have already stepped up their lobbying efforts with the emergence of Reliance as a threat. Because of the pandemic that has made e-commerce indispensable, there has been a thaw in the government’s attitude towards the US e-commerce firms. A more antagonistic attitude may return when the pandemic passes.

Eventually, though, the war will be decided by customers. Here, experts are divided on whether Reliance will emerge as the winner. “Reliance still has to do a lot more on getting the customer experience in place, but given the strides they’ve made, it is well-placed to compete in the digital space,” said Devangshu Dutta, head of retail consultancy firm Third Eyesight.

Source: livemint

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Post-Lockdown, Indian retailers welcome customers back (VIDEO)

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June 7, 2020

Indian retailers welcoming customers back as stores are opening up – a look at what changes are in store.

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Jeff Bezos to visit India in January, may meet PM Narendra Modi

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November 19, 2019

Written By Rasul Bailay

Bezos comes calling amid protests by a group of small traders against foreign-funded ecommerce companies. The Amazon founder is expected to highlight that it is generating jobs in India and empowering SMEs and other small businesses, according to two people familiar with the matter. He will also raise aspects such as stable business environment and policy continuity for foreign companies, they said.

“We do not have any plans to share at present for this,” an Amazon spokesperson said in an emailed response to a questionnaire regarding Bezos’ upcoming visit.

The outcry against ecommerce companies escalated after the Diwali festive season, when small traders accused Flipkart and Amazon of “unfair business practices” and violation of foreign direct investment rules. They blamed the predatory pricing strategies of the two foreign-owned marketplaces for a slump in traditional retail business during Diwali.

Flipkart and Amazon generated combined sales of Rs. 31,000 crore ($4.3 billion) during the 15-day festival period in October, according to a report by Red Seer Consulting.

The government has been stepping up its scrutiny of Amazon and its India rival Flipkart over their compliance with India’s foreign direct investment laws for ecommerce marketplaces.

The commerce ministry had asked Amazon and Flipkart to furnish details including their shareholding, subsidiaries, business structure and information on their top sellers and their tax details.

Amazon and Flipkart have responded to the questions raised by the government and maintain that they are in full compliance with FDI legislation.

“It is a huge distraction for us,” a senior ecommerce executive said, asking not to be identified. Amazon has reasons to be nervous. The US giant considers India its fastest-growing market with a potential to reach $10 billion in gross merchandise value and outpace the UK, Germany and Japan as its largest overseas subsidiary. In October, Amazon pumped in Rs. 2,800 crore into the flagship Amazon, in marketplace after injecting Rs. 9,450 crore in the unit last year.

So far, Amazon has invested more than $5 billion in India. “The various twists and turns in policies and caveats over the years have created ambiguity and room for interpretation as to what is allowed under the ambit of foreign investment,” said Devangshu Dutta, CEO of retail consultancy Third Eyesight.

“If any foreign-owned or foreigninvested entity is operating in the fuzzy zones of policy and law, there is bound to be concern. ‘Interpretation’ is a double-edged sword — on the plus-side it can give businesses strategy flexibility, but the downside is that government officials can also interpret it strictly.”

In October, Walmart CEO Doug McMillon had written to Modi, seeking certainty and a predictable business environment in India.

Last year, Walmart had purchased Flipkart, India’s largest ecommerce entity, for $16 billion, bringing the US adversaries to a direct fight over market share in the nation’s burgeoning online retailing market.

Following Walmart’s acquisition of Flipkart, India amended the FDI rules for online marketplaces in December, plugging many holes that Amazon and Flipkart are alleged to have misused. Opponents of foreign-funded ecommerce accuse both the global titans of virtually running inventory-led ecommerce, which India bars.

The legislation called Press Note 2 restricted bulk purchases by any vendor from any entity or group company of marketplace to 25%. The rules banned any financial affiliate of the marketplace operator from selling on such platforms. These changes came as blows to Amazon and Flipkart as they either sold through partner entities or through independent vendors that sourced directly from wholesale units related to the FDI-funded

Source: economictimes

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Half a century and 55,000 artists later: Fabindia’s journey from rural crafts to high-end stores 

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September 12, 2016

Suneera Tandon, Quartz
New Delhi, 12 September 2016 

The Platonic ideal

“Efficiency is doing better what is already being done.” – Peter Drucker, Innovation & Entrepreneurship: Practices and Principles

The practice

Research firm Gartner defines supply chain as, “…the processes of creating and fulfilling demands for goods and services. It encompasses a trading partner community engaged in the common goal of satisfying end customers.”

Sounds simple? But it hardly is. In fact, the supply chain can be one of the most complex structures in a business, piecing together design, development, sourcing, manufacturing, and distribution. It gets even more complex when it relies on rural India, which is scattered over 640,867 villages and are often hard to access. Fabindia, a chain of retail stores, has spent close to five decades scoping India’s hinterland to connect rural Indian artisans to urban shoppers. Here’s how they did it.

Fabindia began its India sojourn back in 1960 when John Bissell, who was first introduced to the country in 1958 while on a two-year grant from the Ford Foundation, decided to set up an export shop to sell home furnishings to overseas customers. Bissell, whose work at the foundation involved advising government-based craft organizations on handloom fabrics, spent a lot of time traversing the length and breadth of the country.

In 1976, the export house diversified into retail through a small store that sold leftovers from export orders in Delhi’s tony market of Greater Kailash. It took another two decades for retail to became the mainstay of the company’s business.

Fifty years later, Fabindia, managed by John’s son William Bissell, is a widely recognized global brand, known for handwoven and hand-made goods that connect some 55,000 artisans from the country to consumers worldwide. In the process, it has achieved two broad goals: to market the handloom tradition of India to the rest of the world and to provide sustained employment to artisans in rural areas.

The chain sells everything from handwoven saris, rugs, apparel, home d�cor, and organic food in its 220 stores across 83 cities in India, including eight stores in overseas markets such as Dubai, Singapore, Malaysia etc. It also retails its products online to 33 countries. For the fiscal year 2014-15, Fabindia had a turnover of Rs1,148 crore (approximately $170 million).
 
But behind the red and black Ikat-printed scarves, Kalamkari prints from south India, and block-printed Bagru fabric from north India is an extensive and complex supply chain that runs from villages across the country, covering a third of India’s over 650 districts.

The retailer has successfully taken its founder’s vision to enable social change at the grassroots level while engaging in a profit-making business for urban shoppers. It does this while building systems that encourage not just fair remuneration to India’s rural artisans, but also provides infrastructure, access to technology and systems, quality guidelines, and timely payments to these craftsmen. Fabindia also offers access to capital and raw materials to artisans working with the retailer.

As William Bissell puts it in a Harvard Business School case study: “It seems contradictory that we pursue both a social goal and a profit, but I believe that is the only way to do it.”

Through most of the ’90s and early 2000s, Fabindia grew as a retail chain expanding modestly in the country’s top metros.

Since the opening of the Indian economy through the economic reforms of 1991, Fabindia’s interaction with artisans scattered across the country has grown significantly (pdf). The complexity of the company’s supply chain is far different from that of a regular manufacturer that works through designated factories.
 
The company’s interaction with these artisans is very localized since it works with them through multiple associations. The retailer deals directly with individual artisans who work out of their homes and also with clusters of crafters and rural NGOs and organizations that have a crafts supply base.

In addition, the company uses its 11 production hubs across the country, which are basically aggregation points, to centralize orders and pair up vendors with artisans. Each hub has a number of field offices attached to it.

“The production hubs and field offices act as nodal points for interaction with the artisans that constitute the supply chain, which is one of the most unique in the world,” said Prableen Sabhaney, head of communications and public affairs at Fabindia Overseas.

While most artists have the skill and the craft, they don’t have the acumen to decipher fashion trends for the season. So Fabindia acts like a conduit between their crafts and the market.

At Fabindia, a large proportion of products carry some element of the handmade, which requires an ability to communicate with artisans and institute quality control as most artisans work largely in India’s hinterland. For instance, an 18-step process is required to create a simple pattern in Bagru print, a traditional form of block-printing using natural dyes perfected in the northern state of Rajasthan.

And the company has spent years putting processes to ensure newer collections reach the stores on time. Recently, the product range has become more diversified as well.

As for remuneration, Fabindia follows a bottom-up structure. It asks artists what it costs them in terms of—time, energy, skills, and raw material to hand-make a certain fabric or accessory and pays accordingly.

Analysts who track the sector believe that Fabindia’s unique model sets it apart from other domestic or export-focused handicraft companies purely because of the sheer volume of artisans it works with.

“In handicraft, there are several companies that have created substantial export-led supply bases, which tap into craft both from the rural artisans as well as those based in smaller urban centers,” Devangshu Dutta, chief executive at consulting firm, Third Eyesight said. 

“Among these, Fabindia has certainly had the most visible success in terms of size and brand profile domestically. Fabindia has achieved scale by working through artists, intermediaries and supplier companies who have acted as anchors in the rural communities,” said Dutta.

Sabhaney offers that challenges span from co-creating contemporary products while using traditional techniques to quality issues, since the products are created in environments that are very different from where they are finally used. The company also works hard to provide access to raw material and capital across many hard-to-access areas—and doing all of this at scale.

“The ability to do this and not lose anything in translation has been and will continue to be Fabindia’s strength,” added Sabhaney.

The takeaways

As the market evolves with e-commerce and the entry of foreign brands, which has altered consumer preferences and style-cycles, Fabindia knows it needs to quicken its response to these changes.

Not all of the innovations the company has tested remain. In a unique ownership structure created by Bissell, Fabindia set up supplier regional communities (SRCs), which were community owned companies, self-managed by a group of artisans, weavers and craft workers in a particular geography back in 2007. According to a case study by INSEAD (pdf), these SRC’s “offered artisans joint ownership of resources and access to common facilities. It also trained artisans and developed new handicrafts. The SRC allowed Fabindia to consolidate supply capacity instead of dealing with single-loom weaver units, and to implement a standard system for production and delivery control.”

The 2010 book, The Fabric of Our Lives reveals how production worked under the SRC model. A number of dedicated designers and sourcing officers worked closely with rural artists giving them design inputs in tandem with the latest trends in the market and order quantities through dedicated distribution centers in key villages. These designers worked with the weaver to develop samples. They were then shown by the designers that refer it to a product selection committee. The fabric was then approved and the cost price finalized. The quantity of fabric to be produced the first time was pre-determined by software based on a minimum stock requirement ratio and an order is given to the weaver to make the product. The weaver produced the requisite amount of fabric in a month and brought it into the distribution centers.

But the SRC model has now been diluted as the company looks more innovative ways to engage rural artisans.

In the company’s next vision plan, it is focusing more on cluster development that will basically help bring artisans up to speed with the processes and market trends.

“There are plans for a greater focus on the handloom and hand-craft sector,” Sabhaney said.

“There is a much bigger focus on the social aspect, there are going to be significant investments in developing clusters and bringing them up to what is required around the country,” she added.

(Published in Quartz)

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Big bang later, hyperlocal companies losing steam

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February 21, 2016

Shinmin Bali, Financial Express

Mumbai, 21 February 2016

Having created quite a stir at the time of their launch, hyperlocal companies are now witnessing a dampened mood. While several have folded up operations in some cities, others have downsized staff, tweaked the services they offer and even made alterations to their business models. A recent example is Grofers shutting down operations in Bhopal, Bhubaneswar, Coimbatore, Kochi, Ludhiana, Mysuru, Nashik, Rajkot and Visakhapatnam.

TinyOwl last year was in the news for a poorly-handled downsizing operation in Pune, with a dramatic hostage situation involving its co-founder Gaurav Choudhary. PepperTap also recently shut down operations in six cities.

Ironically, giants like Amazon have not only aggressively entered the hyperlocal space, they are building on it. Amazon is currently offering the service in Bengaluru, Amazon Now, after running a pilot project, Kirana Now, in 2015.

The investor sentiment in India is also on a decline, as was reported earlier this year. Investments by venture capitalists have dropped from $2.12 billion (October-December 2014) to $1.15 billion (October-December 2015), according to a report by CB Insights and KPMG International. This leaves an even shorter window of opportunity for players to retain investor interest.

Albinder Dhindsa, co-founder, Grofers, states that differing levels of technology literacy among the majority of merchants and consumer adaptation to the online platform are concern areas for the company. In 2016, the company is looking to bring over one lakh merchants aboard and ensure that turnaround time stays under an hour. Grofers delivers more than 35,000 orders per day on average. In Q4 2015, the firm acquired teams of SpoonJoy and Townrush to bring dynamic learning to the table.

For Swiggy’s co-founder Nandan Reddy, the focus is currently to grow the market, while catering to a wide demographic of consumers. He admits that in the early stages, the brand had trouble educating even its partners. Furthermore, operating a delivery fleet in an on-demand service offering sub-40 minute deliveries is a challenging task, given that there are at least 15 points of failure in an average order. Swiggy currently owns a delivery fleet of 3,800 delivery executives. The brand’s repeat consumers contribute to over 80% of orders.

Debadutta Upadhyaya, co-founder, Timesaverz, says some of the major challenges in a hyperlocal market are optimum resource utilisation and matching locations, price points, and other specific requirements to customer needs. Timesaverz currently has a service range spread across 40 categories, aided by a network of over 2,500 service partners across five metros. Its revenue model is commission based, where 80% of earnings from consumers are shared with service partners.

Vinod Murali, MD, Innoven Capital, points out that as the hyperlocal industry is in its nascent stages, it needs a fair amount of time to grow. “One aspect to keep in mind is that a large sized equity cheque does not imply that a company has achieved operational maturity or robust business metrics, especially in this segment,” he notes.

Given the recent consolidation in this category, the survivors have the opportunity and time to focus on improving unit economics and demonstrate that their businesses are viable and valuable.

Devangshu Dutta, CEO, Third Eyesight, is of the opinion that hyperlocals make the mistake of borrowing business models and terminologies from Silicon Valley, without adequately understanding the real context of the Indian market. “Is there an existing or even potential demand for the service claimed to be provided? Or are you just going to introduce an intermediary and an additional link in the chain, with additional costs and unnecessary administration involved?” he asks.

(Published in Financial Express)