Devangshu Dutta
September 4, 2010
The last three years have been a roller coaster ride for food & grocery modern retail in India.
Progressive Grocer’s India edition was launched in September 2007, during what was an excellent series of years for the modern retail trade in the country.
It was a year after the launch of Reliance Fresh, and a few months after the acquisition of Trinethra’s chain of 170 stores by the traditionally conservative Aditya Birla Group. Spencer’s announced its plans to raise capital for expansion, while Food Bazaar together with its value-format non-food twin Big Bazaar already accounted for more than half the Future Group’s sales.
Other than the established corporate groups, new entrants such as Wadhawan were also well into growth through mergers and acquisitions, including their purchase of Sangam, Hindustan Unilever’s experiment at retailing directly to consumers, Sabka Bazaar and The Home Store.
The four largest foreign retailers were also making their presence felt through Walmart’s announcement of a joint-venture with Bharti in August, Tesco’s and Carrefour’s intensive investigations of the market and negotiations with potential partners, and Metro’s announcement of its planned growth to 100 outlets.
The modern retail engine seemed to be chugging along strongly. But there were also spots of trouble in paradise.
Protests against the opening of corporate chain stores were seen in a few states. In some cases state administrations even formally stepped in to ask for closure of corporate chains to avoid civic trouble, and it looked as if the lights were going out even before the party had really started!
Along with the battle between modern and traditional, both sides of the debate on foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Indian retail sector were also ramping up their arguments. There was vocal opposition from emerging large Indian retailers, as well as the small traders group, while investors and some of the prominent retailers championed the cause of foreign investment.
In both debates, international examples of the damage wrought by large or foreign retailers to local economies were quoted by those opposed to corporate retailers. And in both, the developmental aspects of modern retail were quoted by proponents of modern retail and FDI.
At Third Eyesight, in early 2007 we had carried out a study (“From Ripples to Waves”) on the increasing impact of modern retail on the supply chain. Amongst the study’s respondents, both retailers and suppliers had favourable things to say about the growth of modern retail and its impact on the supply chains for various products. There was not just talk of efficiency with fewer layers of transactions and lower costs, but also of effectiveness, with suppliers reporting 10-25% higher per square foot sales in modern retail stores as compared to their displays in traditional independent stores.
After years of resisting the impending changes to their ordering and servicing structures, major Indian FMCG and food brands became busy setting up or strengthening teams focussed on the modern trade or ‘organised’ corporate customers.
The market was rich with format experimentation for food and general merchandise retail, typically between 1,000 sq ft and 10,000 sq ft, but also with a gradual growing emphasis on 20,000-80,000 sq ft supermarkets and hypermarkets.
Literally hundreds of food brands from other countries actively sought to tap into the growing Indian market, and modern retailers offered them a familiar environment and a well-managed platform for launch.
At the same time, plenty of respondents also said that they had not made any significant changes to their business. Either inertia or fear of channel conflict was preventing them from pushing ahead with newer business models.
In short, there was no dearth of action and contradiction, no matter where you looked.
However, towards the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008, we had a sense of foreboding. With the rush to expand the store network to get first to some yet-invisible finish line, both property acquisition and human resource costs were driven up by a feeling of a shortage in both. I recall writing a column around that time, urging retailers to look at store productivity as their first priority (See: Priority #1: Store Productivity, Same Store Growth).
By the middle of 2008 the crisis was evident. There was a lot of square footage, much of it in the wrong places. There were issues with the supply chain for managing fresh and perishables, those very products that drive frequent footfall into a food store. More importantly, the global financial storm had started gathering strength, reducing liquidity in the market and making investors and lenders look more closely at existing business models.
The spectacular meltdown of Subhiksha in 2008, and the more gradual but equally deep impact on other businesses was visible. And worrying. Players as disparate as Reliance, with its ambitious plans to grow into a Rs. 300 billion retail juggernaut, and the Shopper’s Stop premium format Hypercity seem to take a break to rethink.
2008 and 2009 were years that I am sure many retailers would like to forget, but they were also very valuable. Some people have compared these years to the churning of the ocean (manthan) by the devas and the asuras in Indian mythology, with the deadly poison halahal coming to the surface before the divine nectar amrit could be reached.
In these two years, we have seen stores closed, formats changed, and organisations made slimmer. Store staff have discovered how to live with small changes like higher ambient air-conditioning temperatures, and are learning the more important science of higher transaction values, even with leaner inventories. Management teams are becoming more accustomed to looking at retail metrics other than only sales growth that could be achieved from new square footage. Vendors are finding newer ways to make their brands more relevant to consumers and to the retailers.
More importantly, these years have also underlined the importance of India as a growth market to non-Indian companies.
2010 so far seems a far happier year. Income and GDP growth figures look much healthier. Real estate inventories in malls that were not released in 2007-2009 are coming on the market, many at terms that are more favourable than earlier. Retailers’ financial results look healthier.
There could always be the temptation to rush headlong into growth again. But I don’t think food retailers or their vendors should drop their guard yet.
The coming months and years need significant sharpening up of customer insight, merchandise and inventory planning capabilities and supply chains. Operational assessments, analytics, organisational capability building, are all tools which will need to be looked at closely.
We are at the cusp of the next growth curve, as the population grows and matures, and the market become more sophisticated.
Though the large-small, local-foreign debate isn’t closed yet, the much-awaited approval from the government to allow foreign investment into multi-brand retail businesses may be around the corner.
Even if FDI doesn’t happen immediately, the majors are already in or preparing to enter and ride the consumption growth that will logically happen. In addition to its support to Bharti’s Easyday chain, Walmart has launched its cash and carry operation, Bestprice. Carrefour reportedly is looking to open its first Indian (wholesale) outlet by November in New Delhi on its own, even as rumours of a partnership with the Future Group fly thick and fast. And Tesco is steadily steaming ahead with the Tata group.
And practically every month we are seeing new products and even new brands being launched by Indian and non-Indian companies.
An old saying goes: the journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.
From the tumultuous events of the last three years, it seems that the Indian food retail sector must have travelled at least a few hundred miles already. In one sense it has. Many of the developments that we’ve seen in three years would have taken at least a couple of decades in the more mature markets.
However, in another sense, the food and grocery modern retail sector in India has only taken the first few steps, with much to be accomplished still. The sector remains fragmented, and wide swathes of the market are yet to be penetrated – not just by modern trade, but even by brands that already supply traditional retail. The blend of players and business models, not to forget the spicy regional mix of different market segments, promises valuable lessons not only for those in India but potentially for other markets in the world.
There are very big questions seeking answers. How to improve agricultural productivity so that food security is ensured. How to save the abundant harvests rather than letting them rot in unprotected storage dumps. How to ensure adequate calories and nutrition get delivered not just to the wealthy and the middle class, but also to the poorest in the country.
On the retail side, the Indian versions of Walmart, Carrefour and Tesco are possibly still in the making, and may yet surprise us with their origins and growth stories. And e-commerce is a work-in-progress that may be the dark horse, or forever the black sheep.
I think the big stories are yet to unfold, and the unfolding will be exciting, whether we are just watching or actively participating in the modernisation of the Indian food retail business.
Devangshu Dutta
June 12, 2010

My first brush with Zara and Inditex (Zara’s parent company) was in the 1990s, when we were comparing product development and supply chain best practices for another European retailer.
In 2002, after writing a case study on the Zara business model, I was (and continue to be) surprised at the number of downloads from the website (referenced at the bottom of this article).
In 2004, the interest at the Images Fashion Forum was so intense that the Q&A after the presentation exceeded the allotted time, to the extent that I was almost declared persona non grata by the organising team!
I’m glad to say that we’re all still friends and, together, witness to the logical next phenomenon: the much anticipated Zara store launch in India in May 2010. And what a phenomenon! On a high-footfall day, at full price, the Delhi store looks as if the merchandise is being given away for free.
In 2006, India was the 8th highest source of traffic to the Inditex website (more than half a million, almost 2 per cent of the total); incredible, considering that the other Top-10 countries already had Inditex stores. Although Zara finally signed a joint-venture with the Tata Group, I’m pretty sure that those thousands of other rejected prospective Indian licensees and franchisees must be getting their Zara-fix now as customers.
What does the Zara launch mean for the Indian fashion and retail sector? Is this the beginning of a new era? Should we expect Zarafication of the market, where the customer is driven by fashion, and the supply chain will turn and churn products faster than ever before? Should other international brands and Indian fashion brands be worried?
A peek at history is useful here. It is said that when Spanish conquistadors landed on the shores of the Americas they managed to conquer the land and the people through a combination of guns, germs and steel. [Credits to Jared Diamond for that evocative phrase.] That is, the Spanish carried guns and fine steel swords but, most importantly, they also carried diseases that were alien to the local population. In many places, the weakened and leaderless indigenous people were simply too battered psychologically and physically by disease, to fight the colonisers.
Keeping that in mind I would say, Zara’s entry is a warning bell only if your business is suffering from recent financial and operational illnesses. It is only dangerous if your team are psychologically weak, and would be overwhelmed just by the thought of the supply chain wizardry that Zara has deployed in its business internationally. It may be fatal for sleepy marketing teams whose only strategy has been to spend lots of money on advertising in season and on mark-downs after the season.
But it’s not doom and gloom for brands and businesses that have a competitive spark of life. If you’re prepared to learn, Zara’s business can provide lessons on how to create a product mix that doesn’t stay on the shelf for months, and on how to create the buzz and excitement around the brand.
Zara’s business success in India is not a foregone conclusion. Let’s look at the facts.
Zara’s business model in its home market was built on getting up-to-date fashion into the market before anyone else, and at lower costs. Its prices encouraged fashion-conscious consumers to buy more frequently, and though its limited production quantities were a way of reducing risk, it added to the allure of the brand. In most overseas markets, however, Zara is a somewhat more premium brand. The “value-for-money” for the brand rests on fashionability rather than product quality.
The Indian consumer base, on the other hand, is less fashion-sensitive than the European consumer. This is not equivalent to being less sensitive aesthetically – Indian consumers can tell good design from bad; allowing, of course, for varying taste! However, value consciousness drives many consumers to buy during discount sales with delay of 2-3 months, rather than buying current fashions at full price. This can be a problem for a brand that thrives on change.
Zara will initially have a limited physical footprint. It is targeted at the premium to luxury end of the market, fitting a certain physical profile of customer. Its products that are imported are disadvantaged by a hefty import duty and shipping costs, as well as the shipment lead time. So, there is time available to Indian businesses that want to adapt their business model, and learn from this new competitor.
With the product development strengths and the agility that Indian apparel companies have displayed in the past, there is no reason why Indian brands cannot compete effectively with Zara on their home turf. When it comes down to it, I think Indian businesses (the small ones, with less “organisation” and “process” orientation) are fast on their feet in identifying design trends and are able to responding to the trends with products being available in the market very quickly. I would call them the Indian “baby Zaras”.
So the real question is this: can these Indian “baby Zaras” learn to be disciplined and structured, and learn to scale up their businesses?
Could we, perhaps, even see some people creating copies of Zara’s styles and bringing them to the market quickly at much lower prices (in effect doing a Zara on Zara)? Let’s not forget, what is today an 11-billion Euro business was once a contract manufacturer to other retailers, and Zara started with one shop carrying low-priced versions of products inspired by those of high-fashion designer brands.
The coming years promise to be interesting and I think we should watch out for an Indian version of an Inditex emerging in the next few years. It remains to be seen whether it will be from among the existing players in the domestic market, an exporter who is a contract manufacturer for western retailers (as Inditex once was), or someone totally new.
The people who should be really worried are those international brands whose product mix in India is weak, whose prices make you want to marry a rich banker, and whose brand ethos is totally unclear. To them I would say: Zara has you in its gun-sights.
Tarang Gautam Saxena
March 19, 2010
India has been consistently rated amongst the top destinations for consumer businesses year after year. While international fashion brands had earlier entered India at a steady pace, there was a greater surge of the global brands in the Indian market since 2002.
Interestingly many international brands opted to choose the franchise route for their entry into India. There were changes in the market environment and government policies that made the business environment favourable for growth through franchising.
Firstly, as a signatory of the WTO, India reduced import duties consistently. Consequently products could be sourced from other countries at more competitive prices and international brands could create an internationally-consistent product offering, with greater control on the supply chain.
Secondly, with more international brands vying for a share of consumer’s wallet, there was a need for brands to create a distinctive brand identity. Exclusive branded outlets increasingly became a marketing tool through which the brands could not only showcase a complete product range but also create the full brand experience.
Simultaneously the real estate market grew significantly, bringing in many “investors” who did not have the capability or the desire to develop their own brand. The availability of potential master franchises ready to invest capital and real estate created an environment conducive for growth of franchising.
As per Third Eyesight’s report (“Global Fashion Brands: Tryst with India”), by the end of 2008, just under half of the brands were present through a franchise or distribution relationship.
Unlike more developed markets where brands have sizable networks of large-format store as a launch and growth platform, in India there are still limited choices to simply “plug-and-play” using department stores or any other large-format retail network. Also, having a local partner as a franchisee provides a closer understanding of the market and the ability to adapt to changing consumer needs.
For a successful relationship it is vital that a franchisee should have an entrepreneurial mind-set. The essence of the brand needs be well understood, and the franchisee must have operational involvement rather than a “passive investment” approach.
The question is whether franchising would continue to remain the preferred entry mode as a new decade starts. Liberalisation of foreign investment norms has already led to many brands transitioning into a joint venture or subsidiaries. (See the more recent version of the report on International brands in India.)
However, while for many international brands it would be ideal to have ownership and control over the operations in a strategic market like India, direct investment does also increase their risk and the investment is not financial alone.
Therefore, for many brands, franchising would still remain the more practical choice whether by using a national master franchisee or using site-specific franchise relationships in combination with a direct wholesale presence in India.
admin
January 7, 2010
By Tarang Gautam Saxena, Chandni Jain and Neha Singhal
In Retrospect
While India was a promising market to many international brands, it was not completely immune from the global economic flu. More than its primary impact on the economy, the global downturn sobered the mood in the consumer market. Even the core target group for international brands, that had just begun to splurge apparently without guilt, tightened their purse strings and either down-traded or postponed their purchases.
In 2008 in the midst of economic downturn, skepticism and uncertainty, the international fashion brands had continued to enter India at nearly the same momentum as the previous year. Many international brands such as Cartier, Giorgio Armani, Kenzo and Prada entered India in 2008 targeting the luxury or premium segment. However, given the high import duties and high real estate costs, the products ended up being priced significantly higher than in other markets. Many players ended up discounting the goods heavily to promote sales while a few also gave up and closed shop.
As the Third Eyesight team had foreseen last year, 2009 saw a further slowdown and fewer international brands being launched during the year. The brands that were launched in 2009 included Beverly Hills Polo Club, Fruit of the Loom, Izod, Polo U.S., Mustang, Tie Rack and Timberland. Some of these had already been in the pipeline for quite some time and invested a considerable time and effort in understanding the dynamics of the Indian retail market, scouting for appropriate partners, building distribution relationships and tying up for retail space, setting up the supply chain and, most importantly, getting their operational team in place.
International Fashion Brands in India
After many deliberations, the well-known global brand Donna Karan New York set foot in the Indian market in 2009 through an agreement with DLF Brands to set up exclusive DKNY and DKNY Jeans stores India. The brand is also reported to have signed a worldwide licensing agreement with S Kumars Nationwide Ltd to design, manufacture and retail DKNY menswear in certain specific countries.
Second Chances
Amongst the international brands that have recently entered the Indian market, a few are on their second or even third attempt at the market.
For instance, Diesel BV initially signed a joint venture agreement in 2007 with Arvind Mills, and the partnership intended opening 15 stores by 2010. However, by the middle of 2008, the relationship ended with mutual consent, as Arvind reduced its emphasis on retailing international brands within the country. Within a few months of the ending of this relationship, Diesel signed a joint venture with Reliance Brands for a launch scheduled for 2010. Both partners seem to be strategically aligned with a common goal as the international iconic denim brand wants to take on the Indian market full throttle and the Indian counterpart has indicated that it wants to rapidly build its portfolio of Indian and foreign brands in the premium to luxury segments across apparel, footwear and lifestyle segments.
Similarly, Miss Sixty entered India in 2007 through a franchisee agreement with Indus Clothing. It switched to a joint venture with Reliance Brands in the same year but the partnership was called off in 2008, despite plans to open more than 50 stores in the first three years of operations. Miss Sixty has finally entered India through a franchise agreement with a manufacturer of women’s footwear and accessories. The company has currently introduced only shoes and accessories category and is looking at potential partners for its label Energie and girls’ range Killah.
Other brands that have re-entered the Indian market include Germany-based Lerros whose first presence in India was back in mid-1990s. The brand re-entered the market in 2008 through own brand stores and is growing its presence through this route as well as through multi-brand stores.
Oshkosh B’gosh is another brand that had entered India in mid 1990s, through a licensing agreement with Delhi based buying house, Elanco. The licensee found the childrenswear market hard to crack, and closed down. In 2008, Oshkosh re-entered the Indian market through a licensing partnership with Planet Retail and is now available through shop-in-shop counters at Debenhams stores. Reports suggest that it may consider setting up exclusive brand outlets.
During the turbulence of 2008 and 2009, a few brands also exited the market. Some of them were possibly due to misplaced expectations initially about the size of the market or about the pace of change in consumer buying habits. Others were due to a failure either on the part of the brand or its Indian partners (or both) to fully understand what needed to be done to be successful in the Indian market. Whatever the reason, the principals or their partners in the country decided that the business was under-performing against expectations and for the amount of effort and money being invested, and that it was better to pull the plug.
Some brands that have been pulled out of the Indian market during 2008 and 2009 include Dockers, Gas, Springfield and VNC (Vincci). Gas (Grotto SpA) is reported to remain interested in the market but has not found another partner after its deal with Raymond fell through in 2007 and all dozen of its standalone stores were shut down.
The Scottish brand Pringle and its Indian licensee did not renew their agreement upon its expiry. The Indian partner has reportedly signed an agreement to launch another international brand in India, while Pringle is said to be looking for new licensee.
The good news is that successful relationships outnumber every exit or break in relationship possibly by a factor of ten. Some of the brands that have sustained are among the early entrants having a presence in India since the late-1980s and 1990s or even earlier. These include Bata, Benetton, adidas, Reebok (now also owned by adidas), Levi Strauss and Pepe. Having grown very aggressively during 2006 and 2007 Reebok quickly became the largest apparel and footwear brand in India, while Benetton and Levi’s are expected to cross the $100-million mark for sales this year.
Entry Strategy & Recent Shifts
As envisaged in Third Eyesight’s report from a year ago, with changing market conditions and a growing confidence in the Indian market, there has been a shift among international brands in the choice of the launch vehicle. While franchising has been the preferred mode of market entry in the recent past for risk-averse brands, more brands today demonstrate a long-term commitment to the Indian market, and are choosing to exercise ownership through wholly or partially owned subsidiaries and through joint ventures.
In 2009, we have seen a noticeable shift in favour of joint-ventures as the choice for entry into the market. Even the brands already present are looking to modify the nature of their existing presence in India in order to exert more control over the retail operations, products, supply chain and marketing.
Current Operating Structure
(End 2009)
Brands that changed their operating structures and, in some cases partners, in recent years include VF (Wrangler, Lee etc.), Lee Cooper, Lee, and Louis Vuitton amongst others.
Mothercare, the baby product retailer, which is present through a franchise agreement with Shopper’s Stop has, in addition, recently formed a joint venture with DLF Brands Ltd to enable the expansion through stand-alone stores. Gucci, which had initially entered in 2006 with the Murjani Group as a franchisee, has recently changed over to Luxury Goods Retail, and is now in the process of restructuring the relationship into a joint venture.
VF has also been reported to be looking to license Nautica, Jansport and Kipling to a new partner. Until now, these brands were handled through the joint venture with Arvind Brands. Arvind has increasingly focused on its core business, closed stores and scaled down expansion plans for the international brands.
Burberry that had entered India in 2006 through a franchisee arrangement with Media Star opened two stores under this arrangement. It has now set up a new joint venture with Genesis Colors and plans to open 20 stores across the country.
More recently Esprit has also been reported to have approached Aditya Birla Nuvo to deepen its engagement by moving from its distribution arrangement into joint venture as the international brand sees excellent potential in the Indian market.
Buckling up for 2010
Throughout 2009, the one fact that became clear was that the Indian market was resilient. Now, as the global economic condition stabilizes, confidence levels of brands and retailers in India have also improved.
Several launches are already expected in 2010, and possibly many more are being worked upon. In the following 12 months, consumers can expect to find within India acclaimed brands such as Diesel, Topman, Topshop and the much-anticipated Zara. Many more Italian, British and French brands are examining the market.
Most of the international fashion brands already present in the market are also projecting a cautiously upbeat outlook in their plans, while a few are looking positively bullish.
For example, Pepe, an old player in premium and casual wear segment, has reported plans to grow its retail network further and open 50 more franchise stores by September 2010. Similarly the German fashion brand S. Oliver that entered the Indian market in 2007 is looking to grow significantly. It has already moved from a franchise arrangement with Orientcraft to a joint-venture with the same partner, and has stepped up its above-the-line marketing presence. The brand has recently reported its plans to scale up its retail presence to 77 stores by the end of 2012 while also strengthening its presence through shop-in-shop in multi-branded outlets in high potential markets.
Those international brands that have tasted success have not achieved it by blindly importing business models and formulas from other markets. Most have had to devise a different positioning from their home markets. Some have significantly corrected pricing and fine-tuned the product offering since they first launched. These include The Body Shop which decreased its prices by up to 30% this year, and Marks & Spencer which reduced prices by 20-40%. Others are unearthing new segments to grow into; for instance, Puma and Lacoste are now seriously targeting womenswear as a growth market.
On the operational side, the good news for retailers and brands is that the average real estate costs have reduced significantly, although marquee locations remain high. In several locations lease models have also moved from only fixed rent to some form of revenue sharing arrangement with the landlord. And, while the sector has seen some employee turmoil as many non-retail executives who came into the business in the last 5-7 years have returned to other sectors, employee salary expectations are also more realistic.
As customer footfall and conversions pick up, international brands are also shoring up their foundations for future expansion in terms of better processes and systems, closer understanding of the market, and nurturing talent within their team. Third Eyesight’s recent work with international brands’ business units in India highlights the international players’ concern with ensuring a consistent brand message, improved organizational capabilities right down to front-line staff, and focus on unit productivity (per store and per employee).
We may yet see a few more exits, and possibly some more relationships being reshuffled and partners being changed. However, all things considered, we can look forward to a net increase in the number of international brands in the country.
The Indian consumer is certainly demonstrating more optimism and as far as there are no major unforeseen global or domestic shocks, this optimism should translate into a healthier business outlook for international brands as well. According to early signs, 2010 could be an excellent curtain-raiser for a new decade of growth for international fashion brands in India.
[The 2009 report is available here: “International Fashion Brands – India Entry Strategies”]
(c) 2010, Third Eyesight
[Note: This report is based on information collected from a combination of public as well as proprietary sources, and in some cases may differ from press reports. However, no confidential information has been shared in this report.]
Devangshu Dutta
October 23, 2009
Trade, of course, has been global for millennia, so it seemed hardly unusual for retailers in the US, and in Europe to begin sourcing from distant countries in Asia where certain items were more readily available or significantly cheaper. Imports have also been encouraged as a political and developmental vehicle to aid friendly countries.
So, on the sourcing-end, large retailers have been comfortably operating beyond international borders for several decades even while the stores-end of their business was entirely domestic.
For most large modern retailers however, after the post-Second World War economic boom their core markets have grown relatively slowly (and rather predictably). While the sheer size of the US market kept American retailers busy domestically, planning and legal restrictions in terms of store size, locations, market share etc. limited manoeuvrability for retailers in Europe.
Among the current major retailers, the early retail explorer, Carrefour set out into neighbouring Spain in 1973 and then into distant Brazil in 1975. Soon after, Dutch retailer Ahold landed in the USA in 1977.
However, it took the opening up of East European economies in the 1990s to really prime the pump for growth of international retail. Suddenly, many more millions of consumers became available to European retailers close to their existing markets – both geographically and culturally – and western European retailers jumped at the opportunity.
At the same time, China seemed to have become steadily more open over the previous decade and in the early-1990s India looked accessible again. Some of the Latin American markets were also steaming up.
And, obviously, the prospect of 3-4 billion new consumers in emerging or developing markets was clearly not going to be ignored. In 2001, post dot-com, another inspiring idea hit the business world that was desperately looking for hope – the golden BRICs – the four countries focussed upon by Goldman Sachs as the biggest economies of the future: Brazil, Russia, India and China.
As incomes grew in these “developing” or “emerging markets”, the hypothesis was that consumer would want products and services similar to those in the more developed markets, creating the opportunity for retailers to cross borders. In the last 15 years or so, retail internationalization (and gradually “globalization”) has become an increasingly acceptable theme – in conceptual thinking, in retail boardrooms, in white papers, and finally in trade and mainstream media. The world has witnessed a network of retail subsidiaries, joint-ventures, franchise and other relationships spreading across continents.
Certainly, through the 1990s and 2000s, growing tele-connectivity, fashion, portable TV programming concepts, movies and print media seemed to give the impression that consumers around the world are becoming more similar, and can be reached by common formats and brands. Led by the FMCG companies on the one hand and fashion brands on the other, insights, concepts, products, formats, advertising campaigns are routinely extended across countries. (Unilever’s TV commercial for Close-Up in West Asia is a great example of this – an Anglo-Dutch company’s international brand of toothpaste, Indian models in Thailand, an Arabic voiceover and a Hindi song (“Paas Aao” – “Come Closer”) by Sona Mohapatra – surely you don’t get more global than that?)
But wait! Is the picture really as clear as that?
In 2006 Wal-Mart pulled the plug on its €2 billion German business that was a combination of German chains that it had acquired. In Russia it still has only a development presence since 2005, though it is reported to be looking at opening 10-15 stores in the following three years. According to Newsweek, Wal-Mart’s 13 year old Chinese business – even after an acquisition that is still to be approved – will have fewer stores than it would have opened in the US just in 2009. In the past it has struggled in Japan and Brazil.
In June 2009, Carrefour opened its first 86,000 sq. ft. hypermarket in Moscow, and a second one soon after that. In September, the company affirmed that the BRIC markets were its highest priority for international growth. However, in October it announced that it was pulling out of Russia. Within 4 months of the first store, Russia has gone from a market with “outstanding long term potential” to being a market to exit. In previous years the company has moved out of Japan, South Korea and Mexico. The Economist reports that significant Carrefour’s shareholders are forcing it to look at selling its Chinese business as well – obviously a move that would be politically very sensitive in China. The same shareholders are also reported to be urging a sale of its Latin American business. For now, the official statement from the company maintains an ongoing interest in all these markets.
Ikea has decided to freeze further investments in Russia, and has decided not to enter India until the Indian government allows 100 per cent foreign ownership of retail operations. It entered China in 1998, and has only 7 stores so far.
Even as Carrefour and Ikea announce plans to pull out of Russia, Russian retailers have pulled out from Ukraine, while Metro is cautious in its outlook about that country. French retailer Auchan has opened three stores in Ukraine since 2007, while the German retailer Rewe has opened all of nine since 2000.
Could the juggernaut of global retail be slowing, stopping or even – shock! – reversing? Are the BRICs and emerging markets falling out of favour?
Before we jump to conclusions, as they say in the television world: please don’t adjust your sets. As the French author Karr wrote: “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” (the more things change, the more they are the same).
It is a fact that, no matter how international or global a company becomes, when it gets to the business of retail, it needs to be intensely local. While elements of the business – concepts, products, people, money – can travel across borders, it is extremely difficult to take across an intact retail mix and expect to address a significant portion of the population in the new country. And given how important scale is to mass retailers, lack of localization would be a significant hurdle.
A company sourcing products from a developing country can fully expect his suppliers to adapt to his practices and customs. On the other hand, the same company entering that country as a retailer needs to do exactly that – adapt to the customers – rather than expecting them to fall in line because the “best practice” manual dictates certain processes or because central merchandising found some deals that were great for the home market which are totally irrelevant in the new market.
However, there are encouraging signs that retailers looking to grow internationally understand this more and more. Tesco, for one, has been following a localized approach in Thailand and South Korea, while Carrefour, Ikea, Wal-Mart have all steadily modified their approach in China and other markets. Wal-Mart’s cautious steps in India, including the stores opened by its joint-venture partner Bharti, are a complete contrast to the aggressive “plans” that were being reported in the press 2006-onwards. Recently Wal-Mart’s international chief C. Douglas McMillon was quoted by BusinessWeek as saying “we know you can’t run the world from one place”.
For the larger international retailers this means that, the benefits from international scale would be limited by the amount of localization that they carry out in their operations. For smaller and local competitors that are based in an emerging market this means a fighting chance to remain in business and even remain market leaders.
Lastly, as far as all the dark clouds gathered over international retailing and all the retreats being announced – stay tuned – this weather will change, too.