admin
June 5, 2025
Aakriti Bansal, MediaNama
June 5, 2025
A restaurant owner recently took to X (formerly Twitter) to publicly slam Zomato for “mystery charges” and unauthorised ad placements, reigniting concerns over how the platform treats its small business partners. The tweet, accompanied by screenshots of the restaurant’s earnings dashboard, claimed that despite months of listings, his restaurant received zero payouts, and Zomato allegedly ran ads without his consent.
“Dear @zomato @deepigoyal I’m finally pulling my restaurant off your platform. Congrats! Your mystery service charges, surprise ad placements (without consent), and a POC who ghosts like it’s a talent show—truly inspiring. Small outlets deserve better,” restaurant owner Manish posted on X, under the username @maniyakiduniya.Zomato responded: “We hear you! As mentioned earlier, please share your restaurant ID with us via DM, so that our team can get in touch with you.”
The post has struck a chord among restaurant owners who say Zomato’s ad model bleeds their business dry. In conversations with MediaNama over the week, two restaurant owners and a former manager with Zomato independently confirmed that the platform’s advertising system leaves little room for transparency, choice, or sustainable profit.
The names of the restaurant owners and the former Zomato manager have been withheld to protect their anonymity.
Forced Ad Spending and Diminishing Returns
Restaurant owners say visibility on Zomato is tightly tied to how much they spend on advertising.
“If you don’t run ads, your restaurant won’t even show up unless someone searches for you by name,” one owner told MediaNama. He further added, “From what I’ve seen, the top 10 restaurants you see when you open Zomato are all paying for that spot.”Even ratings and reviews don’t help. For instance, if a user searches for ‘noodles’, only those who have paid for the ad category will show up in the list.
Restaurant owners explained how the ad budget starts small, around Rs. 300–400 per week, but grows rapidly. In one case, as seen by MediaNama in a restaurant’s ad dashboard, spending jumped from Rs. 9,000 to Rs. 15,000 per week in just two to three weeks.
“Some are spending Rs. 18,000 to Rs. 20,000 weekly now on ads just to stay afloat,” an owner explained, noting that these costs are hard to bear for restaurants with weekly sales as low as Rs. 2,500.
“When everyone is pushed to advertise just to stay visible, it raises serious questions about how fair the competition is on the platform,” they said. “It’s not about food quality or ratings anymore, it’s about who pays more,” they added.
A screenshot shared by a restaurant owner showing a decline in sales from ads, offers, and orders with applied discounts, highlighting concerns over the effectiveness of Zomato’s advertising model.
Click Charges with No Sales
Zomato charges restaurants based on clicks, not conversions. This means a restaurant is charged whenever a user taps on its listing after seeing a sponsored ad, regardless of whether the user places an order.
One owner explained, “A single click can cost around Rs. 6. Even if a customer just views the restaurant by clicking on it and doesn’t buy, that money is deducted.” He showed a dashboard with 4,877 clicks – most of which occurred before noon – but no conversions. “They exhaust our daily limit by 12 PM and then tell us to increase ad budgets,” he added.
Another restaurant owner echoed similar concerns in a Reddit conversation reviewed by MediaNama. The owner stated that Zomato counts a ‘visit’ even when a user scrolls past an ad and places an order a day later. “That is on purpose,” he wrote, calling the model “scammy for sure”. He also confirmed that restaurants receive no detailed data on who placed orders via ads versus organically.
Furthermore, the owner noted that Zomato lacks a clear grievance redressal mechanism for ad-related issues, as complaints are often ignored by a restaurant owner’s point of contact.
“There’s no formal audit or independent review if an ad campaign fails,” he said.The Legal Escape Hatch: You Signed the Contract
Restaurant owners say Zomato deducts ad spends automatically, citing terms buried in the onboarding agreement – terms many admit they didn’t fully understand before signing. Once enrolled, there’s no clear way to pause or cancel.
“There’s no way to opt out once it starts, and no refunds either,” one merchant said. “Zomato just says, ‘You came to us,’ whenever we raise concerns,” he added.
But is this consent truly informed? “It’s a honeytrap,” the merchant said. “There’s no other option but to keep spending on ads if you want to stay relevant on the platform,” he explained.
Price Parity, Platform Pressure, and Squeezed Margins
Another major source of concern is Zomato’s price parity push. According to one owner, the company convinced restaurants to upload their table-rate menu on the platform by offering to lower commission fees. However, this strategy has backfired for many.
“They promised lower commission if we maintained the same prices online and offline. But now we pay Good and Services Tax (GST), high commissions, and ad spends on top of that. Our margins are cut down to 5–10%,” he said. Commissions alone can go up to 35–40% every month, forcing smaller restaurants to comply just to remain competitive.
In effect, merchants are footing the bill for everything: discounts, ads, visibility, and commissions, while Zomato gains from each layer.
Coupons and Data Obscurity
The dashboard Zomato offers shows data like clicks and visits, but it hides key financial insights that would help merchants make informed decisions. “They will show you how much you sold, but not how much you are paying to the platform,” one owner said.
Restaurant owners also said they have little to no control over how Zomato spends their ad budget. “We don’t know when our ads are shown, or to whom. There’s no data on which campaign worked better, or what to change,” one merchant said. Without visibility into targeting and performance strategy, many feel they are blindly spending in hopes of visibility.
Coupon codes, too, are deducted from the restaurant’s share, even if the platform offers them without informing the merchant. “Whatever discount a customer sees, it’s cut from our side. Zomato’s share is tiny, about 15%. We bear the rest,” the merchant added.
If a platform issues discounts unilaterally but bills restaurants for them, is that a fair bargain?
Opaque Categories and Manipulated Targeting
Merchants also highlighted how Zomato divides ad rates by cuisine categories — North Indian, Chinese, etc. — and even by customer frequency. “There are eight to 10 customer categories, each with a different ad rate,” an owner said. “Frequent buyers are more expensive to target”, he added.
The platform nudges merchants to buy targeted ads by showing graphics and dashboards that suggest potential boosts. But when profits drop, and merchants reach out, they are told that competition has increased significantly since they last got in touch with Zomato and they should spend more.
“It’s a vicious cycle. They’ll say: ‘Try a brand title ad or pay Rs. 300 extra to reach daily customers.’ The game never ends,” revealed the restaurant owner.Inside Zomato: How Ads Shape Visibility
A former Zomato manager told MediaNama that restaurants not running ads don’t get deliberately penalised, but they do end up losing visibility. “Those who run ads automatically rise in rankings. So the others fall behind,” he said. Even a high-rated restaurant may slip if competitors outspend it.
For context, how much a restaurant pays for ads often depends on their rapport with the specific Zomato account manager and their business goals. “If a restaurant wants aggressive growth, we push it to the top line: high spend, high return. Others stay in the down line: lower investment, slower scale,” he said.
Ad pricing, he said, is not standardised. “It varies depending on what the manager thinks the client can afford and how much they are willing to push.”
He added that Zomato’s discovery algorithm changes every five to six months, which makes it difficult for restaurants to adapt or plan long-term. “The idea is to keep the system rotating so one client doesn’t dominate.”
Performance tracking for restaurants, he said, is mostly transparent except for one missing piece: acquisition data. “Zomato doesn’t show how many customers came through advertising. That’s where it becomes murky.”
He admitted Zomato doesn’t intervene if a restaurant complains about bad ad results. “It depends on the manager’s willingness but hardly anyone did it because of too many internal disputes on this issue.”
Why Ad Revenue Matters So Much
Ad revenue, the former Zomato manager said, is especially crucial in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities.
“In big cities, order values are high, so aggregators can survive on commissions. But in smaller cities, ad income is the main driver as the order values are comparatively low”, the former manager added.Zomato’s Q4FY25 Shareholders’ Letter reflects this reliance: the company’s advertising and sales promotion expenses rose to Rs. 1,972 crore on a consolidated basis in FY25, up from Rs. 1,432 crore in FY24. While these are expenses borne by the platform, they highlight how advertising has become a structural lever in both customer acquisition and revenue generation.
Elsewhere, an HDFC Securities report states that quick commerce companies have theoretical levers to improve margins, such as increasing take rates, including higher ad income. It also observes that Blinkit would need to improve its take rates from 18.5% to 22% to reach a 5% adjusted EBITDAM (Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, Amortisation, and Management Fees), with ad revenue identified as a key lever to meet that target.
However, the report notes that heightened competition may keep some of these levers non-operational.
Zomato‘s Response
In response to MediaNama’s queries, a Zomato spokesperson shared the following statement:
“All marketing collaborations such as ads, promotions, and discounts etc., as well as commercials, are mutually discussed with our restaurant partners before being switched on, switched off or modified. Our multi-factor authentication system ensures that partners retain full control and give explicit consent which is registered before any changes go live. We also maintain robust escalation mechanisms, allowing partners to raise concerns and receive prompt, satisfactory resolutions through the Restaurant Partner App as well as centralised helpline numbers.
We continue to see restaurants having confidence in our partnership and are taking a proactive step to improve and enhance our interactions and processes. For our smaller restaurant partners, we work extra hard to make it easier for them to grow with us. There are always opportunities to improve and we are committed to working on them, on-time.”
While Zomato says it maintains robust escalation mechanisms and explicit partner consent, restaurant owners who spoke to MediaNama described a different reality: one of automatic deductions, limited control, and opaque ad operations.
What Zomato’s Policy Says and Doesn’t
According to Zomato’s Sponsored Listing Service terms, merchants are expected to make full payments in advance. Refunds are not guaranteed, and Zomato has full discretion on ad placements, sizes, and category changes.
The company “assumes no liability or responsibility for any… click frauds, technological issues or other potentially invalid activity that affects the cost of Service.” It also “does not warrant the results from use of Service, and the Merchant assumes all risk and responsibility.”
The Sponsored Listing Service terms grant Zomato broad rights to use merchant content, brand names, and logos, while limiting the company’s liability to the amount of fee paid during a term. These terms become legally binding once the Service Request Form (SRF) is signed.
While Zomato offers a merchant dashboard to track visits, it does not disclose the full breakdown of how ad money is being spent or how much value is being returned. One merchant noted that visibility data only started appearing in the last five to six months. Before that, they had no metrics at all.
Swiggy’s Self Serve Ads: A More Transparent Model?
Swiggy says its ad platform puts control in the hands of restaurant partners. Through the Self Serve Ads tool, restaurants can create their own campaigns, adjust daily spends, and track how those campaigns perform. The company promotes the tool as flexible and cost-effective, with no upfront payments.
The onboarding process is laid out step-by-step: restaurants upload documents like GST and Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) certificates, complete Know Your Customer (KYC), and sign a Partnership Agreement after a verification visit from a Swiggy representative, As per Swiggy, commissions are based on location and whether a restaurant opts for extra promotions.
Compared to Zomato’s Sponsored Listings model, which some restaurant owners say they didn’t fully understand when signing up, Swiggy’s approach looks more structured and consent-driven, at least on the surface.
But that clarity doesn’t always hold up. One of the restaurant owners told MediaNama that Swiggy’s model isn’t entirely different from Zomato’s. “You have to pay them if you want your restaurant to show up in search. It’s the same thing, just framed differently,” the owner said, suggesting that visibility on the platform often comes at a cost, regardless of how the ad system is marketed.
Advertising as a Structural Lever in Quick Commerce
Restaurant owners have flagged the rising costs and opacity of advertising on platforms like Zomato. But industry research shows that this isn’t just a revenue stream but it’s central to how delivery platforms, especially in quick commerce, are designed to operate.
A September 2024 report by CLSA, titled App-racadabra- Magic Behind Instant Delivery Liberating Customers, found that ad revenue makes up around 3.5% to 4.5% of gross merchandise value (GMV) on Zepto. That figure is only expected to grow as more brands start recognising the significance of quick commerce.
Interestingly, Zepto doesn’t just run ads for brands that sell on its platform. It also allows companies to advertise even if they aren’t listed, using spaces like the order tracking page, according to the report.
Quick commerce platforms can also use past purchase data to deliver more targeted ads and push higher-value products – what the report calls driving “premiumisation” of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).
Zomato’s quick commerce arm, Blinkit, is expected to lean heavily on ads to hit profitability targets. CLSA notes that Blinkit’s margins could eventually exceed those of food delivery, given the larger potential for ad revenue and the shift toward higher-margin categories.
The report adds that quick commerce is especially useful for smaller or direct-to-consumer (D2C) brands. These businesses can tap into a pan-India audience without having to build their own distribution networks.
The CLSA findings reinforce how advertising isn’t just about visibility, but it is baked into the business model. As margins tighten, discovery on these apps is no longer organic but paid.
Expert View: Power, Visibility, and Platform Dependence
These patterns mirror broader trends across retail and platform ecosystems, not just food delivery.
Devangshu Dutta, the Founder and Chief Executive of specialist consulting firm Third Eyesight, told MediaNama that these dynamics are not unique to Zomato or even food delivery.
“Advertising and promotion focussing on specific brands or products is standard across various platforms and formats. It is an outcome of the balance of power between the platform and the supplier brand, and is equally true of physical retail chains, online marketplaces and aggregation platforms such as Zomato,” he said.
Brands or restaurant chains with deeper pockets tend to secure greater visibility—whether through premium shelf space in physical stores or prominent placements like sponsored listings and banners on delivery platforms.
“Demand-side concentration inevitably favours larger suppliers and brands who can fund visibility, whether it is through endcap displays in a retail aisle or sponsored banners or top-of-search-list positions on an app,” Dutta stated.However, he noted that some established brands may choose to bypass platform dependence altogether.
“If brands are well-established or have other means to ensure that their message and product reaches the target consumer, they may choose to opt out of the channel, as many restaurants have done with Zomato and Swiggy,” Dutta explained.
How Can Restaurants Push Back?
In the context of restaurants displaying resistance to food delivery apps, one of the restaurant owners said that small restaurants need to come together.
“There should be local unions who can stand up to Zomato. And there should be a blanket rule on how much ad spend is allowed, so merchants don’t fall into this trap,” the owner said.He added that Zomato seems to earn more from merchants than from customers. “Whatever we pay to be visible, it all goes into the platform’s pocket”, he explained.
Further, he argued that without collective action, individual pushback rarely works. “The minute we stop ad spend, our listings drop to the bottom. So we need to walk together. If even 30% of merchants stop ads at once, it will force a reaction.”
Why This Matters
As India’s online food delivery market continues to grow, so does the reliance of small businesses on platforms like Zomato. However, these platforms are acting as gatekeepers by deciding who gets seen, how often, and at what price.
By tying discovery to opaque algorithms and costly ad spends, they tilt the playing field in favour of businesses that can afford to pay more. In such a system, can small restaurants survive?
And the issue goes beyond advertising. Zomato recently paused its 50:50 refund-sharing policy after public backlash and partner complaints. Restaurant owners said the company auto-enabled the policy and deducted money without consent or clear explanation. As with ads, there was no transparent opt-out process or formal appeal.
Together, these practices raise broader concerns: Should platform-led monetisation come with stricter disclosure norms? Can regulators step in to ensure pricing fairness and transparency in merchant contracts? And what role can merchant collectives play in counterbalancing this power?
For now, many restaurant owners feel caught in a system that offers visibility and participation at a cost they cannot afford and exit without impact.
(Published in MediaNama)
admin
August 28, 2023
Viveat Susan Pinto, Financial Express
August 28, 2023
Coffee Day Global, which operates the Cafe Coffee Day (CCD) chain, has been given a temporary relief against bankruptcy proceedings initiated by lender IndusInd Bank last month. The Chennai bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLAT) last week halted admission of IndusInd Bank’s plea against Coffee Day Global, a subsidiary of the listed Coffee Day Enterprises (CDEL), by the NCLT Bengaluru, till September 20.
What this means for CCD is that it get some more time at a time when it has swung into the black after struggling for the last few years, since the tragic demise of its founder VG Siddhartha in 2019. Coffee Day Global posted a net profit of Rs 24.57 crore for the June quarter of 2023-24 (FY24) versus a net loss of Rs 11.73 crore reported in the same period last year.
Revenue from operations stood at Rs 223.20 crore in the quarter under review, a growth of nearly 18% versus the year-ago period, CDEL results for Coffee Day Global showed.
More importantly, CCD outlets are down to 467 in the June quarter of FY24 from a peak of 1,752 stores in FY19, indicating that the company is shutting down unprofitable operations as it looks to manage its debt and other expenses. Group debt is down to Rs 1,711 crore, according to its latest annual report for FY23, versus Rs 7,214 crore reported in FY19.
“While the coffee retail market in India is growing, in CCD‘s case the need to downsize has to do with internal issues. Sometimes a smaller footprint just helps to manage operations better especially when you are dealing with larger problems such as a debt overhang,” says Devangshu Dutta, chief executive officer of retail consultancy Third Eyesight.
CCD’s financial health is critical for CDEL, which derives close to 94% of its group turnover from the coffee retail business, according to its FY23 annual report. In FY22, the contribution of the coffee retail business to group turnover was 85%. Losses of Coffee Day Global in FY23 narrowed to Rs 69.62 crore from Rs 112.48 crore in FY22. In FY19, the company had a net profit of Rs 10 crore.
Apart from cafes, CCD also has kiosks and vending machines installed in corporate offices, institutions and business hubs. While the number of kiosks has fallen over the last few years and is at around 265 now from a peak of 537 in FY19, the number of vending machines have been growing after briefly slowing down over the last few years. From a peak of 58,697 crore in FY20, it is now at 50,870 in number, the company’s latest results show.
CCD is also expected to fight the insolvency proceedings against it aggressively, according to industry sources. IndusInd Bank has claimed that Coffee Day Global defaulted on a loan of Rs 94 crore, which occurred on February 28, 2020. The company has disputed this in court.
(Published in Financial Express)
admin
August 11, 2023
Christina Moniz, Financial Express
August 11, 2023
Pizza chain Domino’s recently unveiled a Rs. 49 pizza, its cheapest anywhere in the world. At $0.60, the pizza chain’s seven-inch cheese pizza is priced far lower than Domino’s in China (where $3.80 is the cheapest option). As per media reports, the rising inflation has caused Jubilant FoodWorks, which runs Domino’s outlets in India, to see a 70% slide in profits in the first quarter of CY23.
Competitor Pizza Hut has launched its Flavour Fun range, offering 12 new pizzas in five different sauce flavours, starting at a price of Rs. 79, which is easy on the pocket, especially targeted at young consumers. “We further stabilise costs by rolling out value deals from time to time such as 1 Plus 1 (two personal pizzas at Rs. 299 each), a Hut Treat Box for four starting at Rs. 799 and My Box deals starting at Rs. 229 for solo consumption. While food inflation is projected to persist, QSR brands must demonstrate agility and innovation in their offerings to effectively engage with customers,” says Merrill Pereyra, managing director, Pizza Hut India Subcontinent. Despite the competitive nature of the QSR market, he remarks that the rising purchasing power of consumers opens up promising opportunities for brands to expand.
Get the drift?
Crisil says the cost of a vegetarian thali rose 28% in July on the back of high tomato, onion and other raw material prices. With consumers also cutting back on eating out and discretionary spends, brands are bending over backwards to serve offerings at attractive prices to drive up footfalls .
Other fast food chains in the country too are rolling out value meals and snacks to appeal to price-conscious consumers. Burger King India announced its latest value range of ‘Tasty Meals’ starting at Rs. 99 to encourage dine-in consumers, while KFC too has unveiled its snacker range, featuring its most popular offerings like the classic chicken roll and chicken popcorn, at Rs. 99. McDonald’s India (West and South) also recently unveiled a campaign showcasing its easy-on-the-pocket McSaver meals at Rs. 179. McDonald’s India (North and East) made headlines with its decision to temporarily drop tomatoes from their products due to quality concerns and supply shortage.
This is just the second quarter of the current fiscal, but Devangshu Dutta, CEO, Third Eyesight, observes that the trend among QSR brands is to absorb costs or reduce expenses rather than raise prices and risk a drop in footfalls. Most brands are hoping to keep consumer demand up and make up for the loss in margins in the second half of the financial year.
That would be a 1% hit on margins on account of inflation, say experts.
Pramod Damodaran, CEO, Wagh Bakri Tea Lounge, has a slightly different take. Noting that food input cost is just one cost item for a QSR brand, he says that most companies make gross margins of over 60% on each order. These margins are without taking into account costs of labour, rent, etc. “The new price points are designed to drive more walk-ins and new customers. The menu is vast enough to get consumers to eventually spend more after they walk in. Customers often buy a small burger but that is not a substantial meal and so they need to buy fries or other sides, which have higher margins. Most QSR chains find a way to pass on the inflation-added cost to the customer,” says Damodaran. For example, he says, if the inflation rate is at 5% this year, restaurants may increase the price of certain items on the menu by 3% for the first six months and by another 3-4% in the next six months, thus covering the additional input cost.
Focus on efficiency
The fact that brands have launched affordable, lower-priced offerings may have landed them in a slightly tricky situation, says Rajat Tuli, partner, Kearney. “The value offerings at lower prices have encouraged trials and new customer walk-ins, but existing customers are also opting for these. That has resulted in a lower average ticket size, while the cost to serve stays the same. Order volumes have grown but average order values have stayed the same or reduced, which could be a challenge if the trend continues,” he points out, though he adds that gross margins in the current quarter have shown improvement over the last quarter. Fast food chains need to bring in more efficiencies in cost, streamline processes and introduce more digitalisation.
It is also something that McDonald’s India (West & South) is working towards, says MD Saurabh Kalra. Noting that inflation is not new to the company in India, Kalra explains, “Recognising that food inflation is a domestic truth, over the years, we have developed tools and strategies to manage it effectively. This is attributed to our strategic management of our supply chain and product mix, as well as our cost initiatives. We have been successful in managing our costs and in maintaining healthy margins.” Further, with the reality of global warming, there will be pressures on agricultural output.
Kalra argues that enhancing efficiency and adoption of new technology are the only ways to create long-term solutions, something that McDonald’s has been doing globally too.
(Published in Financial Express)
admin
June 16, 2023
Sharleen D’Souza & Shivani Shinde, Business Standard
June 8, 2023
Why are companies finding it difficult to sustain the supply-chain business?
Experts point out that gross margins in supplying fast-moving consumer goods (FMCGs) are very low.
While it does look attractive because it is the largest part of the consumption market, the last-mile supply chain and retailer are not making money.
“FMCG brands have ensured high margins for their businesses by streamlining and smoothing their supply chains over decades and making them cost-efficient,” said Anshuman Singh, founder and managing director, Stellar Value Chain Solutions.
Singh said in rural markets, the costs of supply chains were proportionately high due to lower volumes.
He added: “The low margins in the last leg of the FMCG rural supply chain make it difficult for new-age rural distribution players to offset the high costs.”
Devangshu Dutta, chief executive officer, Third Eyesight, a consultancy firm, said modern B2B (business-to-business) players had tried to step in to replace the traditional links in supply chains with price incentives and a large selection of products.
“Traditional distributors and wholesalers don’t just add costs but also add value, including aggregating demand for brands, disaggregating supplies for small retailers, providing market intelligence to both ends of the chain, and giving credit to retailers and a sort of financial guarantee for manufacturers,” Dutta said.
He said for their business models to work — online or offline — B2B businesses needed a significant concentration of demand, which had been tough to get in many locations.
On July 6, 2022, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), in the dispute between biscuit manufacturer Parle and B2B player Udaan, upheld the plea of the former, saying it did not violate competition laws. Parle had refused to sell its products directly to Udaan.
Udaan was the first B2B start-up to have a run-in with a well established brand, which was not interested in moving away from the traditional distribution model.
What has that meant for Udaan? It has meant tweaks to its business.
It further diversified its product portfolio so that its access to the market was not impacted.
It forayed into the mobile accessories segment as local brands tapped into its network of over 3 million retailers.
Earlier, this year it expanded its reach in the miller segment, which supplies staples like pulses, grains, wheat, rice, and oil.
Udaan aims to take on board about 100 miller partners per quarter.
It works with over 500 miller partners, supplying over 10,000 SKUs (stock-keeping units) to retailers and kirana owners, according to the company in an interaction with Business Standard.
The other company that recently had to tweak its business or go back to its focus on rural India is Pune-based ElasticRun.
B2B start-up ElasticRun has decided to focus on the core business and wind up its new expansion plans.
Backed by SoftBank and Prosus Venture, ElasticRun, which typically runs distribution for FMCGs in rural areas, decided to expand and also cater to retailers within city limits, i.e. tier 1 and tier 2 markets that had a strong distribution owing to companies having direct distribution in those areas.
“We initiated a pilot for urban markets. But through the year, as the macro changed, we decided not to pursue the urban pilot and focus on our core of rural business … we have to part ways with almost 2 per cent of our employees,” said Sandeep Deshmukh, co-founder and chief executive officer, ElasticRun, in an earlier interaction with Business Standard.
ElasticRun extends the reach of the brands’ direct distribution networks to deep rural markets. It enables access to a set of net new stores and customers, who were not accessible through traditional distribution networks.
The need to spend in order to get market share has caused well-entrenched players like Amazon to pull out of some of its distribution business.
Amazon India has decided to shut down Amazon Distribution, according to sources. This follows its recent decision to close down its food delivery and edtech offers. The moves are part of the annual operating planning review process amid global macroeconomic uncertainties. The e-commerce giant is looking to focus on its core businesses, sources said.
Amazon Distribution operates a platform where sellers sell FMCGs and apparel products from companies and distribute them among kiranas and small neighbourhood stores.
However, this unit operated in only three cities of Karnataka — Bengaluru, Mysuru, and Hubbali.
(Published in Business Standard)
admin
March 27, 2019
“Fashion is a zombie business. It is dead and it doesn’t know it yet,” says Devangshu Dutta, Founder of Third Eyesight, a specialist management consulting firm.
This is a must-watch excerpt from a presentation and panel discussion anchored by Devangshu Dutta on 27 March 2019 at the India Fashion Forum, in Mumbai.
The challenge he presents is simple: create a new business model for the fashion sector.