How Swiggy & Zomato Are Hitting The Brakes In The Race To Be Everything Everywhere All At Once

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May 25, 2025

Gargi Sarkar, Inc42

25 May 2025

SUMMARY: Swiggy and Zomato are scaling back non-core bets such as 10-minute food delivery, private labels, and event logistics to sharpen focus on core businesses and improve profitability. Both companies are betting on platform fees and selective verticals like quick commerce and ticketing, but analysts warn that financial discipline, not endless expansion, is key to long-term sustainability. The foodtech duo is stuck in a balancing act of rationalising what works and doesn’t. However, going ahead, this rationalisation game is only going to get more pronounced as they will strive to shield their core bread and butter businesses

For foodtech giants Swiggy and Zomato (now Eternal), the last few years have been about engaging in a battle for expansion, so much so that it has become difficult to tell them apart.

From quick commerce and cloud kitchens to intercity food delivery and even selling tickets for events and concerts, the two companies appear to be aping each other’s every move to be everything everywhere all at once.

However, what began as a bold bet to dominate every possible vertical falling under the ambit of food, lifestyle and entertainment is now undergoing a major course correction.

For starters, both are reconsidering their blitzkrieg, and while at it, they are gracefully stepping away from non-core bets, diluting underperforming or experimental units to focus on core operations to drive profitability.

For context: Zomato, which once saw the future of food logistics in ultra-fast deliveries, gave up on its 15-minute food delivery service, Quick, four months after its launch in January. It has also pulled the plug on its home-made meal service, Zomato Everyday. Tailored for office-goers and budget-conscious consumers, the service was floated in January 2025.

Swiggy, too, has made similar retreats. It suspended Swiggy Genie, its courier and pick-up-and-drop service that had gained popularity during the pandemic. The company also gave up on its private label food business by entering a strategic agreement with Kouzina, a chain of virtual restaurants, granting it exclusive rights to operate Swiggy’s digital-first food brands.

So, what has triggered this metaphorical fission in strategy?

One possible reason could be the growing realisation that profitability hinges on diversifying smartly rather than untamed expansion.

A market analyst, who did not wish to be named, pointed out that the duo’s attempt to rule their customers’ wallets for everything from food to groceries and entertainment to lifestyle has been quite ambitious. “The course correction was overdue,” the analyst said.

He believes that foodtechs are now forced to burn the visceral fat in the form of non-core businesses because those have been slowing them down, also eating into the revenues of core businesses and impacting operational efficiencies.

“Moreover, the more the segments, the higher the chances of operational hiccups. Managing logistics, customer experience, and quality control across a wide array of verticals inevitably leads to fragmentation and strain on core operations,” he added.

State Of Eternal Affairs: Zomato’s Diversification Saga

Eternal’s push to transform Zomato into a broader lifestyle platform in 2024 was not only about ambition but also a strategic response to a slowing core business — food delivery, according to industry observers.

Also, a glance at the table below reveals how the company has seen a marginal QoQ increase in its monthly transacting users.

In terms of monthly transacting customers, Zomato’s food delivery growth began strong with a 6.84% QoQ jump in Q1, but momentum quickly slowed, and Q2 saw only a 1.97% sequential rise, followed by a slight decline of 0.97% in Q3. This dip signalled stagnation, and although Q4 showed a mild recovery (1.95%), overall FY25 growth of the company’s monthly transacting users (food delivery) was modest at just 2.96%

Interestingly, Eternal founder and CEO Deepinder Goyal, too, acknowledged a slowdown in the company’s food delivery business while announcing the company’s Q4 FY25 results. He said the slowdown was due to rising competition from quick commerce platforms and weak discretionary spending. Goyal added that services like Zepto Cafe, Swiggy Snacc, and Blinkit Bistro, too, were eating into demand for restaurant deliveries.

In terms of Zomato’s food delivery numbers, average monthly transacting numbers grew to 20.9 Mn in Q4 FY25 from 20.5 Mn in Q4 FY24. Net order value (NOV) growth also remained subdued at 14% YoY versus the 20% YoY growth guidance.

Hence, the company was under pressure to unlock new revenue streams. Blinkit’s success became the reference point, and the company started envisioning similar success stories with other verticals too, a former Zomato employee said.

This was when the company got engulfed in the wave of diversification, paving the path for Zomato’s yet another bold move (besides Blinkit) — the INR 2,078 Cr acquisition of Paytm’s movies and events ticketing business, Insider, in August last year.

The acquisition that was planned with the launch of the ‘District’ app meant but one thing — declaration of war against BookMyShow, the lone behemoth in the realm of the entertainment ticketing segment. Even the company knew the path wouldn’t be all rainbows and sunshine.

In its Q4 FY24 earnings call, the management acknowledged that while the gross order value (GOV) of the going-out vertical continues to grow at over 100% YoY, the business still operates at an adjusted EBITDA loss of -2 to -2.5% of net order value (NOV).

Besides, given that the transition of users from Paytm’s ticketing business and Zomato’s dining out platform to the District app requires sustained investment, the company doesn’t expect the business to turn profitable in the near term.

But Zomato expects losses to eventually see stability at current levels.

“However, even with plateauing losses, the company will have to keep spending on creating supply. This means: curating new event experiences, forging partnerships and acquiring new users for the District app… and all of this translates into one thing — prolonged burn,” the market analyst added.

Moving on, Zomato’s ambition to become a lifestyle super app didn’t just manifest into flashy verticals like events, entertainment, and ticketing — it also showed up in its renewed aggression in food delivery, the very space where it first made its name.

Therefore, Zomato began piloting a 15-minute food delivery service in select parts of Mumbai and Bengaluru early this year.

But the company now finds the initiative extremely difficult to operationalise as it has failed to generate incremental demand.

“Customers do not necessarily want food fast, they just want it reliably. A 10-minute turnaround without full control over the supply chain leads to poor customer experiences, operational stress, and negligible upside. Instead of delighting users, it makes the company vulnerable to inconsistent quality and frequent delays,” a Zomato insider added.

Satish Meena, the founder of Datum Intelligence, opined that without controlling the entire supply chain, delivering food items within 10 to 15 minutes cannot be a profitable proposition.

Swiggy’s U-Turns

In 2024, also the year of its public listing, Swiggy aggressively expanded its service offerings, launching several new verticals to diversify beyond its core food delivery business.

Among the most prominent launches was Bolt, a 10-minute food delivery platform. Initially launched in Bengaluru, Chennai and Mumbai, Bolt quickly expanded to over 400 cities, with over 40,000 restaurants, including KFC, McDonald’s and Starbucks.

To complement Bolt, Swiggy introduced Snacc, a separate app for instant delivery of snacks, beverages, and small meals within 15 minutes.

Continuing to diversify its portfolio, Swiggy launched Pyng, an AI-powered platform that bridges users with verified experts like yoga teachers or chartered accountants.

With this, Swiggy marked its entry into the on-demand services marketplace, making professional services easier to access.

Apart from these customer-facing services, Swiggy also entered events via Scenes and the B2B space with Assure, to keep pace with Zomato.

Interestingly, Swiggy, too, has begun consolidating its operations. The company has shut down Genie, its hyperlocal courier business, which competed with Porter, Borzo and Uber.

According to a competitor, sourcing delivery riders specifically for packages is a challenge, particularly in cities like Bengaluru. For Swiggy, which was already managing fleets for food delivery and quick commerce through Instamart, sustaining a separate rider network for Genie only added to the complexity.

In another such move, Swiggy exited its private label food business by transferring exclusive rights for its digital-first brands, including The Bowl Company and Homely, to cloud kitchen operator Kouzina.

Balance Sheet Blues

Imperative to highlight that the rollbacks by Zomato and Swiggy are rooted in the growing pressures on their respective balance sheets.

After diversifying at a breakneck speed, they are now faced with the hard realities of cost structures that don’t always align with revenue potential.

In Q4 FY25, Zomato and Swiggy both reported robust top-line growth. Zomato’s revenue surged to INR 5,833 Cr, largely buoyed by its three core pillars — the food delivery business (INR 1,739 crore), Blinkit’s quick commerce arm (INR 769 Cr), and Hyperpure, its B2B supply chain vertical, which posted a 99% YoY growth in revenue to INR 1,840 Cr.

However, despite the momentum, the company’s net profit declined sharply to INR 39 Cr in the quarter, largely thanks to ongoing investments in Blinkit and newer bets like the ‘District’ lifestyle app.

Meanwhile, Swiggy clocked INR 4,410 Cr in revenue in Q4, up 45% YoY, but saw its net loss nearly double to INR 1,081 Cr. The widening losses were fuelled by surging operational expenses.

“All of this explains the strategic pullbacks witnessed lately, Swiggy exiting Genie and private labels, Zomato pulling the plug on services like Quick and Legends. The rationalisation marks a reset, indicating that while growth via diversification was necessary, financial discipline and profitability are in the spotlight,” the market analyst said.

Platform Fee To The Rescue… But For How Long?

While it won’t be easy for Zomato and Swiggy to suddenly change course, the future of these two foodtech giants is all about heading towards a more focussed set of revenue streams driven by value rather than FOMO.

In the process, both foodtech giants appear to have struck gold with the platform fee, which has grown from just INR 2 in 2023 to INR 10 today.

But the real question is: Can rising platform fee help the duo neutralise the impact of aggressive expansion? Or is rationalisation the only way forward?

Devangshu Dutta, the founder of Third Eyesight, thinks otherwise. He believes that the companies will not stop looking for new revenue streams, even as they will continue to amputate the ones that offer little value.

“All of these companies have to look for growth, which is a given. If their existing businesses are not delivering the kind of growth they need to justify their stock price or valuation, then they have to look at new avenues.”

According to him, we are bound to see a flurry of experiments, trials of different services and new verticals as these companies attempt to expand their addressable markets.

At the end of the day, the foodtech duo is stuck in a balancing act of rationalising what works and doesn’t. However, going ahead, this rationalisation game is only going to get more pronounced as they will strive to shield their core bread and butter businesses.

[Edited by Shishir Parasher]

(Published in Inc42)

Inside the lucrative world of soft-drink bottling

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September 16, 2024

Priyamvada C., Mint

16 September 2024

When the late George Fernandes, the industries minister in the short-lived Janata Party government of 1977, issued a diktat to multinational corporations Coca-Cola, IBM and AstraZeneca to dilute their stake in their wholly owned subsidiaries to 40% in favour of Indian shareholders, Coca-Cola and IBM chose to exit India. Later, during P V Narasimha Rao’s proliberalisation government in 1993, Coca-Cola returned. It bought out Ramesh Chauhan’s Delhi Bottling Company and Coolaid, the bottling companies of five carbonated drinks, in 1998.

With Coca-Cola India now said to be evaluating options to list its wholly owned bottling subsidiary – Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages (HCCB), Mint explains the rationale behind companies considering such moves.

What caused the change in strategy?

Experts said there is a trend of consumer giants spinning off their units to optimise their balance sheets, go asset-light and focus on their core brands and business models. Coca-Cola India’s ambitions to list HCCB come almost a decade after rival PepsiCo’s bottler, Varun Beverages, listed on the local stock exchanges, yielding significant value for the Jaipuria family.

Unlike PepsiCo, Coca-Cola owns its bottling franchise, just as other MNCs including consumer goods major Whirlpool, ball-bearing specialist Timken, and tobacco giant BAT, who are keen to take advantage of the valuations that Indian investors give to well-run MNCs. Varun Beverages commands a market valuation of ₹2.09 trillion. Hindustan Unilever and Colgate-Palmolive (India) are examples of multinational companies that have listed in India.

Coca-Cola’s move is seen as a strategic attempt to yield significant benefits, including financial gains, risk mitigation and other exit opportunities. The Economic Times was the first to report on HCCB’s listing plans in May.

How does the parent company benefit?

Through such moves, the parent company can reduce exposure to risks associated with bottling companies, which include fluctuations pertaining to raw material, regulatory changes and local market conditions, said Alpana Srivastava, a partner at Desai & Diwanji. While spinning off bottling subsidiaries is more prevalent in the beverage industry, she said other fast-moving consumer goods and retail companies may explore similar strategies to optimise their balance sheets in the current environment.

Earlier this year, HCCB announced the transfer of its bottling operations in three territories in north India to streamline supply chains in the region. However, the bottler declined to comment on its IPO plans.

As part of the transition, the Rajasthan market will be owned and operated by Kandhari Global Beverages, which operates in parts of Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Chandigarh, Jammu & Kashmir, and Ladakh.

The Bihar market will be owned and operated by SLMG Beverages Pvt Ltd, which runs bottling operations in Uttarakhand, parts of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar. The Northeast market and select areas of West Bengal will be owned and operated by Moon Beverages Pvt Ltd, which operates in parts of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh.

What other factors motivate such spin-offs?

Besides providing liquidity for the bottler, listing may offer tax benefits such as reduced capital gains tax or more favourable transfer pricing rules and optimise the overall tax burden for both the parent company and the subsidiary, Srivastava explained. It may allow both entities to be valued more accurately based on their individual capacities in growth, risk profiles and capital intensity.

This comes in the backdrop of companies looking to make the most of a bullish stock market to unlock more value for shareholders by listing their manufacturing subsidiaries. It enables the companies to raise more capital, which can be used to strengthen their market presence and reduce debt, said Devangshu Dutta, founder of Third Eyesight, a management consulting firm. He said the core value generator for companies such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi are brands and marketing rather than manufacturing.

In April, private equity firm Lighthouse Funds invested ₹700 crore in Parsons Nutritionals, a contract manufacturer specialising in packaged foods, beverages, and personal care products, underlining investor appetite in this sector. Other co-investors include the International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group, Evolvence India, HDFC AMC’s Fund of Funds, and various family offices.

However, there may be legal considerations, too. While exclusive contracts exist, the bottler may have partnerships with other companies in its distribution portfolio, which may have to be reviewed and renegotiated. There may be regulatory compliance and other anticompetitive considerations when it involves such big entities.

Other instances of such moves

While there are fewer examples of bottling companies listed in India, this practice is more common globally. Coca-Cola has listed most of its bottling subsidiaries in other global markets such as North America and Europe.

While there is no shareholding between PepsiCo and Varun Beverages, there is an exclusive arrangement for Varun Beverages to bottle, use trademarks, distribute, market, and sell PepsiCo products across India. The beverage giant benefits from royalty and licence fees. Over the past year, Varun Beverages’ revenue rose 22% to ₹16,400 crore while its profit increased to ₹2,056 crore from ₹1,497 crore in FY22. As of Friday’s close, the bottler’s shares had gained almost 30% to ₹645.20 since the beginning of this year.

Any potential listing opportunity for HCCB may allow a staggered exit for Coca-Cola India from managing local operations, monetising its stake and participating in future licence fees and/or royalty arrangements, said Dhruv Chatterjee, a partner at Saraf and Partners. He added that there are indications in the retail and fast-moving consumer goods category of similar divestments. Coca-Cola India did not respond to Mint’s request for comment.

Ravikumar Distilleries is an example of a listed manufacturing company that has tie-ups with liquor companies Radico Khaitan, Shashi Distilleries and John Distilleries, in addition to manufacturing and marketing its own liquor products. Bengal Beverages is an unlisted bottler that manufactures and distributes non-alcoholic beverage brands under licence from Coca-Cola across categories such as sparkling soft drinks, juice and water.

What kind of contracts exist between the bottler and the parent company?

Many bottling plants are usually set up by companies as a joint venture with a local partner. The bottler procures the concentrate from the companies. About 14-15% of the concentrate cost goes to the bottler, which translates into revenue for the brand, according to a person familiar with such discussions who spoke on condition of anonymity. The company spends a part of this revenue on marketing activities that target mass audiences through television, radio and newspapers.

Depending on the terms of the contract, the bottler may be expected to spend a portion of its revenue on marketing through outdoor settings such as billboards, flyers, social media and events. The arrangement between a bottler and a company may be either a pure bottling arrangement (or contract manufacturing) or a bottling and distribution arrangement, where the bottler is also responsible for marketing, branding, and last-mile distribution.

How has the carbonated beverage market fared?

Market research provider Statista estimated that the carbonated drink market in India clocks about $2.4 billion in revenue and is expected to grow by 6.98% annually over the next four years. The volume consumed at home and other outdoor locations is likely about 4.2 billion litres this year.

In 2022, Parle Agro’s brand Appy Fizz and Coca Cola dominated with a 31% market share each, followed by Fanta, Pepsi, 7UP and Sprite, among others. Other brands such as Reliance-backed Campa Cola are expected to challenge the dominance of these companies.

Before Reliance acquired Campa for ₹22 crore in 2022, the soft drink had been launched by Pure Drinks Group in the 1970s. The group was behind the launch and distribution of Coca-Cola in 1949, before the US company was shunted out of the country in 1977.

Pure Drinks and Campa Beverages subsequently launched Campa Cola to fill the gap left by foreign soft drink companies in the country. However, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo re-entered the Indian market in the 1990s, throttling local competition.

(Published in Mint)

The Classic pivot: Charting ITC’s FMCG growth story

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October 13, 2023

Anand JC, Economic Times
13 October 2023

Once the butt of jokes in Dalal Street circles, 113-year-old ITC has turned a new leaf in recent years, as its strategy to derive higher revenue from its consumer business is bearing fruit, bit by bit.

Registered in Calcutta as the Imperial Tobacco Company, the FMCG major has always relied on its cigarettes and leaf tobacco business for a major chunk of its revenues. ITC’s true diversification move might have begun with the launch of its hotel in Chennai in 1975, including a failed attempt at the financial services business, but it wasn’t until August 2001 that the tale of the FMCG behemoth came to be.

Having relied on its cigarette business since 1910, ITC has increasingly sought to earn more from its ‘cleaner’ consumer goods products. In a 2018 interview, CEO Sanjiv Puri admitted that while the journey to diversify the company started a long time ago, it only got traction around 2008. Under Puri’s first term as the ITC chairman, the company embarked on the ‘ITC Next’ strategy. The first decade was focused on preparing the company for the transition, he said. ITC now can innovate products, create brands and allow “pro-neurs” or professional entrepreneurs to build businesses in FMCG.

The plan has worked

ITC, a darling of dividend-led investing lovers, has always been a long-term growth story in the making. Nearly two decades after entering the food business, the company holds a leadership position across categories.

As per the company’s latest annual report, it holds the leadership spot in the branded Atta market through Aashirvaad, cream biscuits segment via Sunfeast, bridges segment of snack foods via Bingo!, notebooks via Classmate and dhoop segment via Mangaldeep. Its Yippee noodles trails Nestle’s Maggi, as the latter continues to lead in a highly consolidated market. However, Yippee has managed to gobble up Maggi’s share at an enviable pace. Capturing these positions, this quickly is no easy feat either.

One of the things that worked for ITC is their understanding of the distribution of products, stemming from their strength in the tobacco business. ITC started exploring aggressively diversifying away from the tobacco business around the 90s, says Devangshu Dutta, head of retail consultancy Third Eyesight.

ITC’s foray into the food business was supported by its presence in the hotel business. “Some of the marquee products that used to be served in their hotel restaurants, packaged dal and so on, they packaged and sold but it was not a humungous success. It was marginal at best.”

“But they started understanding the distribution aspect because those were sold through traditional distribution channels,” Dutta says.

ITC also put in a lot of financial muscle behind the brand building, given no dearth of resources, Dutta says. This helped them grow rapidly in product categories in which they didn’t have a presence earlier on.

“Starting from scratch, particularly on the foods side, ITC has been one of the most successful companies in the last 15-20 years. Their overall revenue this year has been roughly Rs 19,000 crore, out of which Rs 15,000-16,000 is purely from foods segment,” Amnish Aggarwal, Head of Research, Prabhudas Lilladher told ET Online.

“For a company which started this business, maybe, say, two decades back, this is a very big achievement,” he says.

Unlike its commanding position in its cigarette business, ITC’s ‘other-FMCG’ ambitions faced stiff competition from local and national companies in categories including soaps, shampoos, atta, snacks, biscuits, noodles and confectioneries.

Supporting ITC’s ‘other-FMCG’ ambitions is its core competency, the cigarette business. ITC’s consumer business’ growth has weathered storms, in part, thanks to the cash flows generated by its cigarette business which has helped it create stronger brands, an essential part of any consumer-centric business. Through its cigarette business, ITC also gets unparalleled access to a network of brick-and-mortar stores that have a diverse presence across India.

Also complimenting its growth is ITC’s agri-business, a segment which has also grown in strength over the years. From 10 per cent in FY14, the agri-business in FY23 contributed around 24 per cent to the company’s revenue from operations, as per ET Online’s calculations. ITC over the years has invested in building a competitive agri-commodity sourcing expertise. Some of these structural advantages have facilitated the company’s sourcing of agri raw materials for ITC’s branded packaged foods businesses, be it towards its atta, dairy or spices.

Like its peers, ITC too has given a fair deal of importance to its digital push, with more and more companies launching their D2C platforms. These platforms help customers buy products directly from the company website without the hassle of dealing with channel partners, and at the same time, the companies get their hands on first-party data. Such access can help the company market its offerings better. ITC, like some of its other peers, has also been investing in start-ups to diversify its product portfolio. It recently invested in Yoga Bar and Mother Sparsh.

The numbers behind ITC’s consumer business behemoth

Built to engage in the tobacco business, ITC got into cigarette packaging nearly 100 years ago. Another intent in recent decades has been to focus more on the non-cigarette business.

Puri saw it coming.

Upon being asked about the FMCG business overtaking cigarettes, Puri had said “We do not give guidance. But it will certainly happen because the other businesses are growing faster.”

After contributing nearly 62 per cent to the overall revenue in FY14, the cigarettes business in FY23 contributed only around 37 per cent.

ET Online calculations show that the other-FMCG business contributed 17 per cent to the overall revenue in FY14, which grew to 25 per cent in FY23.

Data confirms the claims made in the above segment. ITC’s non-cigarettes businesses have grown over 31-fold and currently form over two-thirds of its net segmental revenues. The company’s other-FMCG business didn’t start turning consistent profits up until FY14. Since then, it has gone from strength to strength.

ITC’s Other FMCG segment (the second largest contributor to sales) is also witnessing strong earnings and growth momentum, unlike most consumer staples peers.

The segment clocked a revenue of 19 per cent YoY while Nestle and Britannia saw 21 and 11 per cent growth each. FMCG EBITDA performance was even better, with the margin expanding by 430 bps YoY to 13.3 per cent & EBITDA growing 2.1x YoY.

Laughing stock no more

For years, the cigarette business has funded the growth of ITC’s other businesses like non-cigarette FMCG products, sometimes to the ire of shareholders who weren’t happy with the slow growth in financials and scrip value.

A slower growth in scrip value meant that for years ITC was also the laughing stock among social media circles. The stock often remained elusive during market rallies in the previous decade, offering poor returns in comparison to FMCG peers. Between 2014 and July 2022, ITC rose with dividends rose 53 per cent while Nifty50 rose 200 per cent, as per moneydhan.com, a SEBI RIA. ITC’s shares trailed the Sensex for five out of eight years through 2020.

“In the last ten years, HUL has done far, far better than ITC. And if you look at other companies in the same universe, say Dabur, it has also given superior performance. ITC has actually underperformed many of the large consumer names,” Aggarwal said.

But fast forward to 2023, not only is it among the best performers within the benchmark index, ITC has even trumped it. While Nifty50 has gained around 17 per cent in the last year, ITC has grown nearly 40 per cent. The ITC scrip in July crossed a market capitalization of Rs 6 lakh crore, beating HUL to become the largest FMCG company.

Sin stock

Prompting a move away to other segments is the nature of the cigarettes business. Tobacco is toxic, and investors are increasingly recognising it as such. Sin stocks are shares of companies engaged in a business or industry that is considered unethical or immoral.

While Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) investing may be at a nascent stage in India, it is a serious parameter for global investors. Asia’s largest cigarette maker ITC cannot ignore it.

“The company sustained its ‘AA’ rating by MSCI-ESG –the highest amongst global tobacco companies– and was also included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Emerging Markets Index,” Puri noted in the company’s 2022 sustainability report.

Cigarettes, a bitter but essential overhang

For all the accolades for its gains in its other-FMCG business, ITC is nowhere close to ending its love for cigarettes, not that we are claiming it wants to. The Gold Flake-maker currently controls nearly 80% of the cigarette market.

The numbers in recent years suggest that the segment is flourishing more than ever before.

On an annualized basis, the return on depreciated cigarette assets is approaching a staggering 240%, three times the level two decades ago, as per a Bloomberg report. The entire legal cigarette industry was bleeding in the recent past due to punitive and discriminatory taxation on cigarettes. Taxes on cigarettes in India are multiple times higher than in developed countries viz. 17x of USA, 10x of Japan, 7x of Germany and so on, data shows.

But, companies are now recovering due to stable taxation. ITC’s three four-year cigarette sales CAGR are at their best levels since FY15 despite the company not taking material price increases over the last 13-14 months, as per a Motilal Oswal report.

ITC, which accounts for three out of every four cigarettes sold in the white market in the country, is currently seeing its best growth levels in over a decade, and is far superior to the flattish volumes of the past ten and twenty years.

(Published in Economic Times)

Building the Safety Net

admin

September 22, 2008

Devangshu Dutta

In a departure from popular retail philosophy, Devangshu Dutta calls for a new model of food supply based on multiplicity and diversity. Modern retail must, he says, take into account the changing environment and be sensitive to evolving consumer preferences and to the failures and obsolescence of traditional mass retail models adopted by western developed markets.

Devangshu Dutta is chief executive of Third Eyesight, a management consulting firm focused on consumer products and retail, whose clients include brand leaders and some of the largest companies in their respective markets.

Food price inflation it is still hogging the headlines. It is, after all, an emotive topic. We are terribly concerned not just as food and grocery professionals, but also as consumers and the general public. After all, food and grocery typically account for half of our monthly spend, give or take a few percentage points.

Most students of management, economics, and human behaviour are aware of Abraham Maslow’s classification of human needs into a hierarchy construct. Other economists and psychologists prefer to use other models. Whichever model you consider, the need to eat and the need for security are invariably at the bottom or base level which must be fulfilled the earliest.

The interesting fact is that well after you would imagine these basic concerns have been taken care of, they are actually never far from the surface. This is true not just of the poorest of the poor, but of the wealthy and the well-off as well—whether individuals, communities, or nations.

Increasingly, the agricultural supply chain is dependent on non-renewable petroleum and its products, rather than by the natural energy of the sun being converted into food by the plants.

Is it any wonder that “food security”—the combination of these two—is such a charged subject, especially in these times?

However, a significant set of questions is not really touched in the question of costs and in the question about the continuing security of food supplies: how the food supply chain is structured, how it is driving consumption, what impact that might have on food prices and several broader cost implications.

INDUSTRIALISING AGRICULTURE—FARMING PETROLEUM

Thousands of years ago, when hunter-gatherer human beings stumbled upon agriculture, it was a breakthrough similar to the discovery of controlled fire. Hunter-gatherers were dependent on the natural availability of food, while agriculture created the opportunity to have some control over food supplies and reduce the natural feast-famine cycle. Thereafter, farming, processing and storage techniques kept evolving incrementally to ensure that more food could be produced for each unit of land and effort, and stored for longer – all moving towards ensuring “food security”. This led to the age of empire-building, where monarchs grew their wealth (essentially food territory) with the help of military- imperial complexes, and the greater wealth in turn supported the military-imperial complex.

This remained the trend for a few thousand years, until the age of industrialisation and the age of petroleum. Through the industrialisation and the world wars, the military- imperial complex gave way to a military-industrial complex, which essentially became the military-industrial-petroleum- agricultural complex. Suddenly, there were not just machines to plant, reap, thresh, sort, clean and process, but also petroleum-based and synthetic substances to dramatically increase output and to keep the produce fresher for longer.

As farms industrialised, the parameters that began to be applied were the same as in any factory—how to produce more while spending less—and every year the target was to grow more for less. Underlying this was the principle of “efficiency from larger scale”. The same philosophy played out further down in the supply chain – from processing aimed at extending the shelf-life of the product as it was (chilling, cleaning, sorting) to processing and packing in order to change the nature of the product itself and gain additional value (such as turning tomatoes into puree and potatoes into chips).

Standardisation became a vital link in industrialisation — if you can standardise produce, you can cut down human handling — while you may lose product variety (including flavour and colour) you gain through lower production costs. By reducing unpredictability, you can also concentrate on building the scale of business, because it becomes more repetitive.

The interesting side-effect of this is that, gradually, we are converting ourselves (and people in many industrialised economies already have) into petroleum-burning machines rather than those running on solar energy, because increasingly, the agricultural supply chain is dependent on non-renewable petroleum and its products, rather than by the natural energy of the sun being converted into food by the plants.

The important thing to keep in mind is that, in this switch- over, energy efficiency is actually going down rather than up

Energy efficiency is actually going down rather than up – we are using more calories of fuel source to produce each calorie of food energy.

—we are using more calories of fuel source to produce each calorie of food energy.

So it is worth asking the question: can lower costs actually be costing us more?

THE DEMAND-SIDE STORY

The growth of industrial agriculture has not happened alone, but has been accompanied by the growth of modern or “organised” retail.

On the one hand, large retailers such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour, Tesco, Metro and others, have been widely credited for achieving cost-efficiencies from scale, and then passing on these efficiencies to the consumer in the form of lower prices (and, apparently, higher standards of living). That is a good thing and definitely of benefit to the population at large, especially in inflationary times such as these. Surely, it is good to push for lower costs rather than keeping prices high as a result of inefficient sourcing, wasteful and expensive handling, and non-value-adding costs in the supply chain.

On the other hand, these organisations are driven to standardise their own product offerings, reduce the number of supplier touch-points and increase the volume per supply source.

There is not just a reduction in diversity of suppliers, but also a reduction in the number of product variants. (I’m not referring to the number of “types” of potato chips or packaged meals, but to the actual core food product—the natural species or sub-species that are the basic source.) Of course, agriculture itself is a process of consciously selecting and encouraging species that are more useful to us humans, but industrial

  • Lower costs can be delivered by reducing the variation of products

  • Higher sales can come from either having consumers buy more of the same product (which in food does tend to taper off after a while), or by turning the basic product into a “value-added” product (e.g. potatoes into wafers, mash, fries; corn into syrup and food additives, and so on).

THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT MODEL

We don’t have to look too far into the future to realise that this is not a sustainable model. (Or, as someone pithily said: “Only fools and economists believe in infinitely compounding growth.”) So far, this model has impacted less than a fifth of the world’s human population, but now the growth markets of choice for industrial agriculture companies are China and India. If these two countries move through the exactly same path as have the western economies in terms of agriculture and food processing, given the population base itself the impact may be 5-7 times (or more) on the demand for petroleum as well as the fall-out on the ecosystem.

You may ask: why should retailers and their suppliers worry about this?

Firstly, pure cost considerations – clearly, the costs of petroleum are ranging at the highest levels ever, and explosive demand through industrialised agriculture will only serve to push them up. How far can you push the food bill every month, before people start buying less? What impact would that have on large retail supply chains and farmers whose processes are increasingly built around products of industrial agriculture?

Secondly, what consumers are already beginning to express in western markets will possibly happen in India in the next few years as well: concern about where and how the product has been produced, what has been the fall-out on the environment and on the overall health of people involved with that supply chain as well as the health of consumers. Carbon footprint, food miles and locavores (people who only consume food that is produced within 100 miles of where they live) are terms that companies are increasingly becoming familiar with.

agriculture takes it to a completely different level. Carbon footprint, food miles

The industrial-agricultural-retail economic model can be paraphrased as follows:

  • Businesses (especially those that are publicly held) need to show growth in profits each year

  • Growth in profits can come from higher sales at the same cost base or lower costs

Carbon footprint, food miles and locavores (people who only consume food that is produced within 100 miles of where they live) are terms that companies are increasingly becoming familiar with

And an alternative set of questions is also being raised. Is it ok to burn non-sustainable fossil fuel if you get “carbon credits” by planting trees somewhere else—have all the carbon costs been accounted for from the start to the finish of the production process? Is it better to reduce the food miles and have food produced locally in a high-cost economy’s industrial agricultural model, or to have naturally grown foods from a more primitive farm in Africa or Asia where the environmental impact is only the “carbon debit” of the air-freight. And, even if the produce is carbon-friendly, what about the nitrogen footprint (from the fixation of nitrogen into fertilisers) and the methane footprint (from large scale animal farming)?

THE POWER OF THE SMALL AND THE MANY

And finally the question of maintaining diversity must be top- of-mind. For all its so-called inefficiency, diversity is actually a great shock-absorber. Imagine a bean bag or a piece of foam — what gives them their cushioning ability is the space and air between the little balls, or the material. Now imagine a cropland that is attacked by a pest—if there is diversity in the plant population, there is a good chance that certain varieties will survive even if others don’t; unlike a cropland with limited variety which may be totally wiped out (and possibly the farmer with it). Further imagine a supply chain that has multiple suppliers with the same or similar product versus one where the supply base is highly concentrated. Which ecosystem do you think will survive better during times of trouble, even if some of the suppliers—a part of the ecosystem—do not? (One doesn’t have to think too far: the example of the former Soviet Union with its mega manufacturing plants supplying the whole country are a case in point.)

To really find long-term solutions for food security issues, retailers, suppliers, economists and governments need to acknowledge that sustainable safety lies in numbers and diversity. A dispersed economic system with a lot of variety has resilience built in. And the solutions may actually be very close at hand, in the updating of traditional techniques.

It is high time to start figuring out how India (and China) can take the lead in creating an alternative and more sustainable model for food security for large populations, rather than blindly push development models borrowed from the 19th and 20th century western economic history.

Source: FLY ON THE WALL

Building the Safty Net

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