Written By Aditi Shrivastava & Samidha Sharma, ET Bureau

BENGALURU | NEW DELHI: In what would be one of the most significant consolidation moves in the sector, Uber Eats, the food delivery arm of the global ride-hailing platform, is in final stages of negotiations to sell its India business to rival Swiggy, three people privy to the development told ET. The deal, which is expected to close by next month, will be Swiggy’s largest acquisition till date, and Uber’s first divestment of its food business globally.

The transaction is likely to be a share swap, sources said, giving Uber about 10% stake in the Bengaluru-based company last valued at $3.3 billion.

The development is in line with Uber’s global strategy to cut down on losses as it prepares for a public offering at a possible valuation of $120-150 billion. For the ride-hailing giant, Uber Eats alone is estimated to be valued at over $20 billion. The business generated $1.5 billion in revenue globally in the first quarter of 2018, according to US-based tech news portal, The Information.

High Cash Burn

“It is prudent to be invested in Swiggy than burn capital competing for the same set of restaurants and consumers,” said a source in the know of the deal. “This should bring some rationality to the cashguzzling food-delivery market,” this person added, hinting that discounts are likely to significantly reduce post integration.

In the past year or so, both Swiggy and Gurgaon-based Zomato have been raising capital as they have gone on a tear to acquire new customers. Along with these two, the market has seen heightened discounting by Uber Eats and Ola’s Foodpanda which has led to high cash burn by these companies.

Sources said that Uber Eats had also held discussions with Zomato, but those talks fell through. In an emailed statement to ET, spokespersons for Uber and Swiggy said, “We do not comment on rumour or speculation.”

Uber Eats India racked up a cash burn of around $25 million on an average 9 million orders a month, a top executive at the firm told ET. Swiggy burns about $40-45 million a month on its food business, according to industry estimates.

The deal talks come at a time when Uber’s India rival Ola has put its food business under Foodpanda in the slow lane, and cut marketing and customer acquisition costs by two-thirds. The company is now focusing on its own private labels and cloud kitchens which include The Great Khichdi Experiment, Lovemade and FLRT brands.

“Last-mile logistics is an operations-heavy, low-margin business. In the long run, I don’t see how the market can sustain so many parallel micro-logistics networks,” said Kartik Hosanagar, professor of technology & digital business at The Wharton School.

Over the last couple of months, Uber Eats has grown in markets such as Hyderabad, Chennai and Pune. Experts say consolidation has been on the cards in the food-delivery business. “Consolidation will happen due to the thin operating margins and market acquisition costs, which will place enormous pressure on the companies to raise capital,” said Devangshu Dutta, chief executive of Third Eyesight, a specialist retail consulting firm.

In India, Uber Eats was launched in May 2017 and is currently present in 37 cities across the country. Swiggy’s largest investor, South African media and internet conglomerate Naspers, has been particularly bullish on the market potential in the Indian food delivery space.

“Food delivery is a perfect example of our strategy in action with online platform capabilities that address a large offline societal need in a high-growth market. It’s still early days, but if you look at the growth in revenue and the underlying operating metrics, it gives us real confidence in the potential here,” said Naspers CEO Bob van Dijk in a recent investor call.

Source: economictimes

When American fast food standard bearers McDonald’s and Domino’s Pizza stepped into India in the mid-1990s, the market was just ripe enough for take-off.

McDonald’s and later Domino’s Pizza can be credited with not just growing the consumer appetite for fast food but also for fostering an entire food service ecosystem, including fresh produce, baked goods, sauces and condiments, and cold chain technology.

India has been typically difficult for business models driven by scale, replicability and predictability. The customer is price sensitive, operating costs are high and non-compliance of business standards is a frequent occurrence. In this environment, these brands have reinvented the meaning of meals, snacks and treats.

Their growth has set the stage for other international players and also set business aspirational standards for Indian food entrepreneurs and conglomerates alike.

Product experimentation has also been an important part of their success; it keeps excitement in the brand alive and help improve footfall. However, how far a product sustains and whether it becomes a menu staple can’t be predicted accurately. New products also need significant investment in both supply chain and front-of-house changes in standardisation-oriented QSRs, so the new product launch cannot be undertaken lightly. This is one reason these successful QSR formats don’t overhaul their menus drastically but make changes incrementally.

For these market leaders, future scale and deeper penetration is only feasible with higher visit frequency. For growth in middle-income India, they need to become a significantly cost-competitive option to be seen as more than a ‘treat’ or celebration destination.

So, while both McDonald’s and Domino’s Pizza have invested significantly in Indian flavours and menu offerings, perhaps it’s also best for them to reconcile with the fact that there will be a significant part of the consumer’s heart, stomach and wallet that will remain dedicated to indigenous offerings.

In a global environment that’s turning hostile to fast food, India isn’t a quick-fix growth market, but it’s certainly one to stay invested in, for the longer term.

And I have no doubt that as much as these companies aim to change India, over time India will also change them.

(Also published in Brand Wagon, The Financial Express)

(Published in the Financial Express, 10 May 2016)

In about 20 years, Café Coffee Day (CCD) has grown from one ‘cyber café’ in Bengaluru to the leading chain of cafés in the country by far.

In its early years, it was a conservative, almost sleepy, business. The launch of Barista in the late 1990s and its rapid growth was the wake-up call for CCD — and wake up it did!

CCD then expanded aggressively. It focussed on the young and more affluent customers. Affordability was a keystone in its strategy and it largely remains the most competitively priced among the national chains.

Its outlets ranged widely in size — and while this caused inconsistency in the brand’s image — it left competitors far behind in terms of market coverage. However, the market hasn’t stayed the same over the years and CCD now has tough competition.

CCD competes today with not only domestic cafés such as Barista or imports such as Costa and Starbucks, but also quick-service restaurants (QSRs) such as McDonald’s and Dunkin’ Donuts. In the last couple of years, in large cities, even the positioning of being a ‘hang-out place’ is threatened by a competitor as unlikely as the alcoholic beverage-focussed chain Beer Café.

CCD is certainly way ahead of other cafés in outlet numbers and visibility in over 200 cities. It has an advantage over QSRs with the focus on beverage and meetings, rather than meals. Food in CCD is mostly pre-prepared rather than in-store (unlike McD’s and Dunkin’) resulting in lower capex and training costs, as well as greater control since it’s not depending on store staff to prepare everything. However, rapid expansion stretches product and service delivery and high attrition of front-end staff is a major operational stress point. Upmarket initiatives Lounge and Square, which could improve its average billing, are still a small part of its business.

Delivery (begun in December 2015) and app-orders seem logical to capture busy consumers, and to sweat the assets invested in outlets. However, for now, I’m questioning the incremental value both for the consumer and the company’s ROI once all costs (including management time and effort) are accounted for. The delivery partner is another variable (and risk) in the customer’s experience of the brand. Increasing the density through kiosks and improving the quality of beverage dispensed could possibly do more for the brand across the board.

The biggest advantage for CCD is that India is a nascent market for cafés. The café culture has not even scratched the surface in the smaller markets and in travel-related locations. The challenge for CCD is to act as an aggressive leader in newer locations, while becoming more sophisticated in its positioning in large cities. It certainly needs to allocate capex on both fronts but larger cities need more frequent refreshment of the menu and retraining of staff.

An anonymous Turkish poet wrote: “Not the coffee, nor the coffeehouse is the longing of the soul. A friend is what the soul longs for, coffee is just the excuse.” There are still many millions of friends in India for whom the coffee-house remains unexplored territory, whom CCD could bring together.

As the debate over FDI (even for single brand retail) continues, over 250 international brands in the food service and fashion and lifestyle sectors alone continue to service the Indian consumers. Interestingly more than half of them are present in the Indian market through the franchising route.

Franchising has been a preferred entry strategy especially in case of the food service sector. Many of the international food brands have opted to give the master franchise to an Indian partner who can use the international brand’s name but is responsible for sourcing the ingredients and maintaining the international quality standards for food and service. One such example is Dominos, which incidentally is also the country’s largest international food service brand. Of course, as FDI liberalisation seems nearer the finish line, brands such as Starbucks are choosing to join hands with an Indian partner while others such as Denny’s Corp are planning to tie up with regional licensees.

In case of the fashion sector, in the early years of liberalisation few international companies chose franchising. Instead some chose licensing to gain a quick access to the Indian market at a minimal investment. Others set up wholly owned subsidiaries or entered into majority-owned joint ventures to have a greater control over their Indian business operations, product sourcing and supply chain and brand marketing.

However, at the turn of the last decade, many international fashion brands chose franchising owing to favourable business environment. An environment conducive for growth of franchising was created by reduction in import duties under WTO agreements, the absence of a wide network of multi-brand retail platforms, the need for using exclusive branded outlets as a marketing tool to create a full brand experience and the simultaneous growth of real estate investors who were potential master franchises ready to invest capital and real estate.

The question is how the liberalisation of FDI norms will impact the choice of market entry strategy for the international brands. Would franchising continue to remain the preferred entry mode as we set into the liberalised FDI regime? The change in foreign investment norms has already led to some brands (in particular those in the fashion and lifestyle sector) transitioning their existing licensing or franchise partnership into a joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary while the new entrants are actively considering ownership routes rather than franchising.

Certainly, the ideal scenario for an international brand would be to have complete ownership and control over the operations in a strategic market like India, but direct investment does also increase their risk and the investment is not financial alone. Amongst other choices licensing offers the least control, and while joint venture may be preferable for some brands, for many franchising still proves to be the practical choice for some time to come.

Franchising may potentially be quicker way to launch with higher chances of the retail business being successful. As it is an “entrepreneurship” model of business, the franchisee’s motivation to make the venture a success is high. The international brand has an assured income by way of royalty on the license agreement and could expand more rapidly in the market. Having a local partner with a closer understanding of the market and the ability to adapt to the changing needs of the consumers also helps to ensure that the international brand’s offering is tuned in to consumers’ demand.

Further, unlike more developed markets where brands have sizable networks of large-format store as a launch and growth platform, in India there are still limited choices to simply “plug-and-play” using department stores or any other large-format retail network. Partnering with a franchisee who has access to retail real estate can be a quick way to reach the target consumers. On his part the franchisor needs to ensure that the business model is well thought through in terms of the team and infrastructure required and is scalable.

For a successful relationship it is vital that the franchisee has an entrepreneurial mind-set. The essence of the brand needs be well understood, and the franchisee must have operational involvement rather than a “passive investment” approach.

If both partners understand their respective responsibilities, franchising can truly be a win-win business model.

Global quick-service restaurant brands are expanding their footprint in the quickly evolving Indian market. But some are also falling by the wayside.

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