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September 27, 2014
Alys
Francis, Nikkei Asian Review
New
Delhi, 27 September 2014
A few months ago, a group of wealthy industrialists and other
businessmen gathered in a plush Mumbai hotel suite to pore over
a selection of John Lobb handmade welted shoes that cost up to
$12,000 a pair.
It may just be a temporary “pop-up” store, but Thomas Collette, John Lobb’s commercial director for India, was excited. He said that a local agent for the bespoke shoemaker would start taking orders by appointment only. “This is a big step for us and a big step as well for the country,” he said.
Although international luxury brands have opened flagship stores all over developing Asia, they have hardly touched the Indian market. This may be about to change.
After all, many people in the population of 1.3 billion are steadily getting wealthier. According to the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India, luxury spending will reach $14 billion a year by 2016 compared with $8.5 billion in 2013.
But foreign luxury brands have had a tough time in the country, partly due to restrictions on investment.
Many major brands, such as Prada and Versace, only entered after 2006 when the government began to allow foreign investors in single-brand retail operations. Prior to that, foreign companies were only allowed to operate wholesale “cash-and-carry” outlets.
While companies welcomed the chance to open in India — albeit
with the requirement that a local partner owned at least 49% of
the business — they struggled with the lack of suitable retail
space and trained staff, bad supply chains, and a raft of customs
taxes and duties, as well as a long wait to turn a profit because
there was only a nascent market for their goods.
Since 2006, Prada and Gucci have been among the 50-odd brands that have either left India, restructured or quit soured partnerships, according to a 2012 report by retail consultant Third Eyesight.
In 2012, India started allowing full foreign ownership of single-brand retailers but included restrictions such as the need to source at least 30% of products from local small and midsize enterprises. That is virtually impossible for most luxury labels since their brand integrity often rests on the craftsmanship of products made in their home country. Unsurprisingly, the new rules did not trigger an influx of foreign brands.
Jones Lang LaSalle, the real estate company, in August ranked New Delhi and Mumbai near the bottom of its list of 30 major Asia-Pacific cities in terms of the presence of top luxury brands.
Indians optimistic
Some foreign brands, like John Lobb, have decided that franchise and distribution deals are a better way to establish their presence in a difficult market.
John Lobb’s local partner is Regalia Luxury, which spent a year wooing the Hermes-owned brand before securing a deal to sell John Lobb’s “By Request” line of shoes that are custom-made for each client.
Regalia Luxury is one of a number of Indian companies eyeing the rising number of style-conscious local shoppers who are hungry for Western luxury brands but are wary of entering the market on their own.
“From a longer-term perspective, there’s immense opportunity if you do it the right way,” said Regalia Luxury founder Pratik Dalmia, who clinched a franchise for bespoke Italian suitmaker Kiton in 2013 and expects to sign up two more brands by year-end.
But he admits that the market boom has yet to start and that operators will have to “run a tight ship” for the next couple of years.
Indian companies that represent foreign luxury brands need to have a long-term view and keep a close eye on what the younger generation likes — these are the customers with the most potential, since they are more exposed to overseas fashion trends.
“India is all about the customer of tomorrow,” said Darshan Mehta, CEO of Reliance Brands, a subsidiary of Reliance Industries that was set up in 2007 to bring foreign luxury fashion to India.
Mehta often sits in a cafe at DLF Emporio, New Delhi’s first luxury mall which opened in 2008, and watches shoppers. He said many people shop at Zara but they walk into Gucci and Zegna just to have a look. “That is what makes markets like India so promising: the aspirational consumer,” he said.
Unlike China, where a lot of luxury retailers are now at a consolidation stage after years of rapid expansion, brands are still struggling to find space in India for their first shops.
Even in Mumbai, the Emporio is the “only true luxury mall,” according to Mehta.
It may take some time before India’s luxury market takes off, but the market has been boosted by a stream of well-off Indian professionals and students returning after working and studying abroad, including many bankers who left Wall Street and London after the global financial crisis.
Luxury players are also expecting a boost from the introduction of a Goods and Services Tax, which was promised by India’s new government and would get rid of complex multi-level taxes that are hampering the sector.
Reliance Brands, which also represents Reiss and BCBG Max Azria, expects to add three more brands to the company’s stable of 16 foreign brands by year-end.
A few pioneers are even setting up boutiques in smaller cities. Bangalore firm Fervour, which has licenses to sell Nina Ricci and Christian Lacroix, is planning to expand to Chennai and Hyderabad.
But most don’t see these cities as viable markets just yet.
“There is no sustained luxury market outside of Bombay and Delhi,” Mehta said. He expects luxury demand outside the two main cities to take another three years to reach critical mass.
Sanjay Kapoor, the founder of distributor Genesis Luxury, said India’s luxury market is not yet at the point where China was 10 years ago, even if the potential for growth is immense.
Kapoor founded Genesis Luxury in 2008 to sell foreign luxury brands in India and has deals with Jimmy Choo and Armani, among others.
“As awareness and retail space spread, demand will accelerate in smaller cities in the interior of India,” Kapoor predicted.
Tight ships
Amid the shortage of high-quality retail space, one option is to use the “shop in shop” model.
R&B International rents small spaces in other retailers’ stores to sell Australian luxury label Easton Pearson. The manufacturing firm supplied embroidery to the brand for years before nabbing a distribution agreement in India in June.
Dalmia also said he is in no hurry to open flagship stores for John Lobb and Kiton before 2016.
Instead he is targeting ultra-rich customers who want the pampering that comes with exclusive, by-appointment-only services. Clients are shown samples of Kiton’s made-to-measure suits and John Lobb shoes, and then measured by a trained team at a place and time that suits them, often at home in the late evening.
Collette said he’s been pleasantly surprised by how well the brand has been received in India. While the brand has wholly-owned stores in Japan and the U.S., Collette said it would have been impossible for it to enter India alone.
(Published in Nikkei Asian Review.)
admin
July 9, 2014
B2B event companies don’t often think about consumer spending as something directly relevant to their business. However, consumer trends can allow industry event and exhibition organizers to get an advance view of where the opportunities can lie in the future. In this Keynote address at UFI’s Asia Open Seminar in Bangalore, Devangshu Dutta shares his views about the key consumer trends in India, and the implications for the events and exhibitions industry.
(This presentation was delivered on 6 March 2014 in Bangalore, India.)
Devangshu Dutta
January 24, 2014
[This article appeared in the February 2014 print issue of Retailer, under the headline “Implications of the Tata-Tesco JV“]
India is a civilisation that has borne fruit from thousands of year of international cultural exchange, commerce and investment flowing both inwards and out. It is also one that has suffered from military and as well as economic colonisation over the millennia.
For those reasons, foreign investment into the country is bound to have both vociferous opponents as well as staunch supporters, and this debate is possibly most polarised in the retail sector that touches every Indian’s life daily. Over the last few decades, foreign investment into the retail sector has seen flip-flops from successive governments and political parties across the spectrum, being allowed until the late 1990s, then blocked (by Congress-led UPA), then selectively allowed (by BJP-led NDA, and later by Congress-led UPA). And more recently, with pressures, protests and influences from all sides 2011, 2012 and 2013 have certainly been on/off years during the UPA’s second successive term.
In this time Zara’s joint-venture, set up in 2010, has turned out be one of the most successful and profitable in India. More recently, Ikea announced a €1.5 billion plan for the country, followed by H&M’s US$ 115 million proposal, while Marks & Spencer identified India as its second largest potential market outside the UK. However in October 2013, the world’s largest retailer Wal-Mart decided to call off its joint venture amid investigations of its executives having supported or indulged in corruption and accusations that it had violated foreign investment norms. It decided to acquire Bharti’s stake in the cash-and-carry JV and announced that it would not invest in Bharti’s retail business.
It was soon after, as if to compensate for Wal-Mart’s blow, that India’s Tata Group and British retailer Tesco announced that they would be creating a formal joint venture in India, with Tesco investing US$ 110 million. The Congress-led government went on to quickly approve the proposal, as if to visibly shake off accusations of “policy paralysis”.
Tesco’s investment doesn’t look like much for a country the size of India, especially in the context of Ikea’s ambitious proposal or H&M’s fashion retail business that is possibly less complex than Tesco’s multi-product multi-brand format. However, let’s keep in mind that Tesco is facing tough trading conditions in Europe, took a global write-down of US$3.5 billion last year including its exit from the US market, and merged its Chinese business with retail giant China Resources Enterprise to become a minority partner. In view of all that and the unpredictability of Indian politics, US$ 110 million looks like a reasonable if not disruptive commitment. It also does somewhat limit the downside risk for Tesco if the environment turns FDI-unfriendly after the general elections.
Whenever Tesco expanded into new markets, it has tried to adopt a localised or partner-led approach. In India, since 2007, Tesco has had an arrangement to provide support to Tata’s food and general merchandise retail business. The intent underlying the partnership was clearly to look at a joint retail business when allowed by regulations and not just at back-end operations. The existing structure has provided Tesco with an opportunity to learn about the Indian market and operating environment first-hand while working closely with Tata’s retail team. Tata, in turn, has drawn upon Tesco considerable expertise of operating retail businesses in both developed and emerging markets. At the very least, the FDI inflow from Tesco will deepen this arrangement further, benefiting both partners further.
But there are the inevitable twists in the tale. While the Tesco proposal was in the works, the new Aam Aadmi Party formed a government in surprise victory in Delhi state and announced that it would not allow foreign owned retail businesses in the state of Delhi. This strikes off one of the most lucrative metropolitan markets from the geographic target list at least in the short term. (The central government has pushed back saying that while retail is a state-subject, the decision to allow FDI by the previous Congress government cannot be reversed at will by the current AAP government, but the debate goes on.) BJP-led and BJP ally-led state governments have also indicated their unwillingness to allow foreign retailers into their markets.
So should we even attempt to forecast what Tesco and Tata could do in this environment? I would rather not pre-empt and second-guess the future plans of business executives who are trying to read the intent of politicians who are focussed on elections 4 months in the future! However, whatever the plans, the retailers must comply with the regulations such as they are now and utilise the opportunities that exist. So it is likely that the following scenario will play out.
Tata and Tesco have said that the proposed joint-venture looks at “building on the existing portfolio of Star Bazaar stores in Maharashtra and Karnataka”. These are both states where Trent has multiple locations, so a certain critical mass is available. Since current government policy requires the investment to be directed at creating fresh capacity, new stores would also be opened in these states, though the expansion plans look modest, with 3-5 new stores every financial year.
But with the 50 percent investment in back-end also being a regulatory requirement, new procurement, processing and logistics infrastructure which could service stores within these states as well as in other states are is likely to be built. Tesco’s wholesale subsidiary currently supplies merchandise to Star Bazaar stores across states – this relationship is likely to continue as some of Tata’s stores are in states that are not within the FDI ambit. The product mix proposed includes vegetables, fruits, meat, fish, dairy products, tea, coffee, liquor, textiles, footwear, furniture, electronics, jewellery and books.
The norms earlier required FDI proposals to ensure that 30 per cent of product sourcing would be domestic, from small-midsized enterprises. However, in August 2013, the government relaxed this requirement to be applied only at the beginning of the joint-venture operations, and that this requirement would not include fruits and vegetables, an area where Tesco has focussed significant energy. So the immediate focus would be on meeting the domestic sourcing requirements in other categories, and creating a viable business model and scale through an appropriate product mix.
The partners are likely to continue working on improving the performance of the existing Star Bazaar stores which are 40,000-80,000 sq ft in size. However, Tata has also launched a new convenience store format, Star Daily sized at about 2,000 sq ft focussed on fresh foods, groceries and essential items. Retailers with foreign investment are now also permitted to open stores in cities with populations under one million from which they had been prohibited previously, so the new small format can provide significant expansion opportunities and more volume for the back-end operations to reach critical mass quicker.
Would there be a change of name on the store fascia? Unlikely, since Tesco has been operating stores under other brands as well in markets outside the UK and a “Tesco” name appearing on the fascia may not significantly change the consumer’s perception of the store. Other than in lifestyle categories or overtly brand-driven products (such as fashion), most Indian consumers focus on utility, quality, local relevance and price as significantly more important purchase drivers than an international name. In fact, a trusted Indian name like Tata carries as much weight or more weight in many categories than an international brand would. So the stores may carry a joint by-line, but the focus is likely to remain on the existing brand names.
And what of several other retailers who are interested in the Indian market? Will they draw inspiration from Tesco and take their plunge into the market, urged on by the outgoing government eager to demonstrate results during its final months?
Wal-Mart, for one, seems to have returned to the table, having set up a new subsidiary, perhaps preparing the ground for a retail launch with another partner. A European retailer, remaining nameless for now, is being mentioned as being the next proposal in the FDI pipeline.
However, it is likely that most will remain in the wait-and-watch mode until the outcome of the national elections is clear. The real issue is not the regulations themselves as much as the unpredictability of the regulatory environment. Policies are being made, turned around, and twisted over in the name of politics, without a clear thought given to the real impact on the country, the economy and the industry of either the original policy formulation or its reversal.
Until that dust settles down, we should expect no dramatic changes in the near term, no sudden rushes into the market. But then, we could be wrong – policy and politics have taken unexpected twists earlier, and could do so again!
Devangshu Dutta
December 5, 2013
(Published in ETRetail.com on 6 December 2013)
Franchising isn’t rocket science, but advanced space programmes offer at least one parallel which we can learn from – the staging of objectives and planning accordingly.
A franchise development programme can be staged like a space launch, each successive stage being designed and defined for a specific function or role, and sequentially building the needed velocity and direction to successfully create a franchise operation. The stages may be equated to Launch, Booster, Orbiter and Landing stages, and cover the following aspects:
Stage 1: Launch
The first and perhaps the most important stage in launching a franchise programme is to check whether the organisation is really ready to create a franchise network. Sure, inept franchisees can cause damage to the brand, but it is important to first look at the responsibilities that a brand has to making the franchise network a success. Too many brands see franchising as a quick-fix for expansion, as a low-cost source for capital and manpower at the expense of franchisee-investors. It is vital for the franchiser to demonstrate that it has a successful and profitable business model, as well as the ability to provide support to a network of multiple operating locations in diverse geographies. For this, it has to have put in place management resources (people with the appropriate skills, business processes, financial and information systems) as well as budgets to provide the support the franchisee needs to succeed. The failure of many franchise concepts, in fact, lies in weakness within the franchiser’s organisation rather than outside.
Stage 2: Booster
Once the organisation and the brand are assessed to be “franchise-ready”, there is still work to be put into two sets of documents: one related to the brand and the second related to the operations processes and systems. A comprehensive marketing reference manual needs to be in place to be able to convey the “pulling” power that the brand will provide to the franchisee, clearly articulate the tangible and intangible aspects that comprise the brand, and also specify the guidelines for usage of brand materials in various marketing environments. The operations manual aims to document standard operating procedures that provide consistency across the franchise network and are aimed at reducing variability in customer experience and performance. It must be noted that both sets of documents must be seen as evolving with growth of the business and with changes in the external environment – the Marketing Manual is likely to be more stable, while the Operations Manual necessary needs to be as dynamic as the internal and external environment.
Stage 3: Orbiter
Now the brand is ready to reach out to potential franchisees. How wide a brand reaches, across how many potential franchisees, with what sort of terms, all depend on the vision of the brand, its business plan and the practices prevalent in the market. However, in all cases, it is essential to adopt a “parent” framework that defines the essential and desirable characteristics that a franchisee should possess, the relationship structure that needs to be consistent across markets (if that is the case), and any commercial terms about which the franchiser wishes to be rigid. This would allow clearer direction and focussed efforts on the part of the franchiser, and filter out proposals that do not fit the franchiser’s requirements. Franchisees can be connected through a variety of means: some will find you through other franchisees, or through your website or other marketing materials; others you might reach out to yourselves through marketing outreach programmes, trade shows, or through business partners. During all of this it is useful, perhaps essential, to create a single point of responsibility at a senior level in the organisation to be able to maintain both consistency and flexibility during the franchise recruitment and negotiation process, through to the stage where a franchisee is signed-on.
Stage 4: Landing
Congratulations – the destination is in sight. The search might have been hard, the negotiations harder still, but you now – officially – have a partner who has agreed to put in their money and their efforts behind launching YOUR brand in THEIR market, and to even pay you for the period that they would be running the business under your name. That’s a big commitment on the franchisee’s part. The commitment with which the franchiser handles this stage is important, because this is where the foundation will be laid for the success – or failure – of the franchisee’s business. Other than a general orientation that you need to start you franchisee off with, the Marketing Manual and the Operational Manual are essential tools during the training process for the franchisee’s team. Depending on the complexity of the business and the infrastructure available with the franchiser, the franchisee’s team may be first trained at the franchiser’s location, followed by pre-launch training at the franchisee’s own location, and that may be augmented by active operational support for a certain period provided by the franchiser’s staff at the franchisee’s site. The duration and the amount of support are best determined by the nature of the business and the relative maturity of both parties in the relationship. For instance, someone picking up a food service franchise without any prior experience in the industry is certainly likely to need more training and support than a franchisee who is already successfully running other food service locations.
Will going through these steps guarantee that the franchise location or the franchise network succeeds? Perhaps not. But at the very least the framework will provide much more direction and clarity to your business, and will improve the chances of its success. And it’s a whole lot better than flapping around unpredictably during the heat of negotiations with high-energy franchisees in high-potential markets.
Devangshu Dutta
October 12, 2013
Much has been written about the various relationship break-downs that have happened in the Indian retail sector in recent years. The biggest, most recent high profile ones are between Bharti and Wal-Mart and the three-way conflict playing out at McDonald’s. Other visible ones include Aigner, Armani, Jimmy Choo, and Etam, while Woolworth’s faded away more quietly because, rather than being present as a retail brand, it was mainly involved in back-end operations with the Tata Group.
I think it’s important to frame the larger context for these relationship upsets. Most international companies, non-Indian observers as well as many Indian professionals are quick to blame the investment regulations as being too restrictive, and being the main reason for non-viability of participation of international brands in the Indian consumer sector.
However, India with its retail FDI regulations is not the only environment where companies form partnerships, nor is it the only one where partnerships break up. Regulations are only one part of the story, although they may play a very large role in specific instances. In most cases, FDI regulations are like the mother-in-law in a fraying marriage: a quick, convenient scapegoat on which to pin blame.
Many of the reasons for breaking up of partnerships can be found in the reasons for which they were set up the first place. The main thing to keep in mind is that the break-down is inevitably due to the changes that have happened between the conception of the partnership to the time of the split. The changes can fall into the following categories, and in most cases the reasons behind the break are a combination of these:
According to Third Eyesight’s estimates, more than 300 international brands are currently operating in the Indian retail sector across product categories, if we just count those that have branded stores, shop-in-shop or a distinct brand presence in some form, not the ones that merely have availability through agents or distributors.
Of these, about 20 per cent operate alone, while other others work with Indian partners, either in a joint-venture or through a licensing or franchise arrangement. The relationships that have broken up in the last decade are only about 5 per cent of the total brands that have come in, and in many cases the international brand has stayed in the market by finding a new partner.
So there’s life after death, after all. And my advice to those who’re feeling particularly defensive or pessimistic because of a few corporate break-ups: take time for a song break. Fleetwood Mac (“Don’t Stop”, “Go your own way”) or Bob Dylan (“Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right”) are good choices!
